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ABSTRACT 
 
JONATHAN RIEHL: The Federalist Society and Movement Conservatism: How a Fractious 
Coalition on the Right Is Changing Constitutional Law And the Way We Talk and Think 
About It 
(Under the direction of J. Robert Cox) 
 
This study is the first in-depth examination of the Federalist Society, the nation’s 
preeminent organization of conservative and libertarian lawyers. Founded by a few 
enterprising young college friends in the early days of the Reagan administration, its 
participants now number 40,000 lawyers, policymakers, judges, and law students. The 
Society functions as a forum for debate, intellectual exchange, and engagement between the 
factions on the right as well as their liberal opponents—hence my use of rhetorical theory. I 
explore how Federalists have promoted conservative legal theories of interpretation, such as 
originalism and textualism, and also how have also fueled the broader project of the 
American right to unmake the liberal consensus on a wide range of legal and social issues 
from Affirmative Action and race to foreign policy. 
 By serving as a forum for the generation and incubation of conservative legal thought, 
the Federalist Society has provided an invaluable intellectual proving ground; and with 
chapters now active at all accredited law schools in the country, the Society is widening its 
reach and providing a home for aspiring conservative lawyers, whether they seek to go into 
private practice, public service, or the judiciary. This is the Federalist “pipeline”: an ever-
expanding network that spreads conservative ideas. It is the engine that drives the boldest 
Federalist goal: changing legal culture.  
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I examine how Federalist conservatives are making headway with this project—
“getting a seat at the table,” as former Attorney General Edwin Meese put it. My research 
draws on over 100 interviews conducted with the Federalist rank-and-file as well as 
conservative leaders, including a number of federal judges associated with the Society. In 
addition to providing a critical history of the group, I consider a number of conservative legal 
theories, often the subject of Federalist Society events and publications. I focus in particular 
on several key individuals: Justice Antonin Scalia and his modes of textual interpretation; 
Attorney General Meese and “originalism”; Professor Richard Epstein and libertarianism; 
former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton and national sovereignty. 
I conclude that the Federalists deserve commendation for their efforts to engage 
intellectually with their opponents and with the many factions on the right. I also conclude 
that the left needs to counter the Federalist project with a similarly vigorous and open 
strategy—and organization—of their own. 
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PROLOGUE 
HARRIET MIERS AND THE MOVEMENT 
 
Sandra Day O’Connor announced her retirement from the Supreme Court of the 
United States on July 1, 2005, presenting President George W. Bush with his first 
opportunity to nominate a Justice to the highest court in the land. Although it had hardly been 
a central issue in either of his presidential campaigns, Bush had let it be known that he 
preferred conservative approaches to the law and declared his intention to appoint Justices in 
the mold of Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Among the 40,000 conservative and 
libertarian lawyers of the Federalist Society—founded as a student group with then-Professor 
Scalia as their first faculty sponsor—Bush’s backing carried a lot of weight. 
Two and a half weeks later, Bush nominated D.C. Circuit Judge John G. Roberts Jr. 
to succeed O’Connor. Roberts had worked in the Reagan justice department, and also in 
private practice—where he had argued an impressive number of cases before the Supreme 
Court. He had no academic writings to his name and had been on the D.C. circuit barely long 
enough to author a dozen opinions; his “paper trail” was exceedingly thin. He seemed an 
ideal pick, well-respected, bright, and clearly conservative.  
Then on September 3, 2005, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist died in office, 
presenting Bush with another vacancy to fill. In a move that surprised some Court watchers, 
he bumped Roberts up to fill Rehnquist’s seat—there is no requirement that Chief Justices 
already be sitting on the Court. Roberts had clerked for Rehnquist, and his familiar presence 
2as an advocate before his potential colleagues suggested he would be smoothly accepted as 
one of their brethren. There remained O’Connor’s empty chair to fill. 
Pressure quickly mounted in the press for Bush to nominate a woman. O’Connor, 
after all, had been the first female to be nominated to the high court and was generally 
viewed as a centrist with appeal to both liberals and conservatives; she consistently cast a 
swing vote in key cases on controversial issues like abortion rights. The leaks regarding 
Bush’s “short list” included several women, but none mentioned the eventual nominee, 
White House Counsel Harriet Miers. 
Washington, and the rest of the country, was baffled. Miers had never served as a 
judge and was hardly viewed as an intellectual luminary, as Roberts was. Her greatest 
qualifications for the post appeared to be that she was first, a Bush loyalist, having served in 
his administrations in Texas as well as Washington, and second, female.  
It took several days for the punditocracy to react. It was unclear how Miers’s name 
had been put forward in the first place; some said it was just another example of Bush’s 
placing loyalty above all else; others claimed Democratic Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid 
had suggested Miers to Bush as a compromise candidate—perhaps because Reid had some 
inside knowledge about her views on abortion rights. As the hours and days ticked by, it 
became clear Miers’s staunchest opposition would come not from Reid’s Democrats, most of 
whom withheld judgment, but from the President’s base. Most perturbed were those who had 
actually been toiling in the vineyards of the law since the last controversial nomination of a 
conservative judge—Robert Bork. 
And Bork himself was out in front going after Miers, who had even less of a paper 
trail than Roberts. On CNN, Bork reminded viewers of Bush’s pledge to nominate judges 
3like Scalia and Thomas. “That's what he said he would do.” Bork said. “There’s no evidence 
that this a judge like Scalia or Thomas.” He went further. Not only was Miers something of a 
blank slate, but there was no end of other qualified conservatives (people like Roberts) Bush 
might have selected. “It’s a slap in the face to the conservatives that have been building a 
legal movement,”1 he intoned. A big part of that movement—if not the only part—has for the 
past 25 years been the Federalist Society. Bork taught one of the group’s founders 
Constitutional law, hired two others as his law clerks, and has served as national co-chairman 
of its board of trustees for sixteen years.  
In the wake of Reagan’s election in 1980, part of the reason the group was started was 
to identify, mentor, and promote bright young conservatives who would work to change 
American legal culture—in academia, government, and on the bench. And as Judge A. 
Raymond Randolph of the Washington, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, a  longtime Federalist 
Society booster, told me, “The legal culture starts with the Supreme Court.”  
Among the people put in a real bind by the situation was Leonard Leo, the 
Federalists’ Vice President who was on a “leave of absence” to advise the White House on 
possible nominees. Stuck between the rock of strong conservative opposition to the 
nomination among the Society’s membership and the hard place of loyalty to the President, 
Leo walked the line. He supported the nomination, but told me he understood the opposition.  
“There’s no question that people made their assessment and felt this was not consistent with 
conservative legal principles that had been articulated over the years,” he said in an 
interview. “Individuals in the movement are not always going to embrace what the political 
power base does.” 
 
1 American Morning, CNN, New York, N.Y., 11 October 2005. 
4The Movement. Since World War II, conservatives in America have had an identity 
as a movement, launched in large part by William F. Buckley and his colleagues at National 
Review. There have since then been two kinds of conservatives: “movement” types, 
and…Republicans. The divide was there as far back as 1948, when conservatives who would 
eventually form The Movement backed Senator Robert Taft of Ohio against Eisenhower. The 
Movement balked at Nixon from the get-go, and shook its collective head when he self-
destructed. The Movement was bored with Ford and backed Reagan first in ’76 (some had 
already been backing him in ’68) and then propelled him to victory in ‘80.  
The distinction between movement conservatives and Republicans has been less a 
factor in contemporary politics, with Bill Clinton’s presidency producing a largely unified 
Republican right in opposition to a Democratic administration and George W. Bush—until 
recently—producing unity from the other, affirmative side. Miers pulled the proverbial gauze 
off the wounds. 
“You will either respond as a Republican—my party right or wrong—or as a 
conservative, from a perspective as ideas and principles,” said John Fund of The Wall Street 
Journal—one of Bork’s allies in defeating the Miers nomination. Fund, though not a lawyer, 
has long been associated with the Federalist Society and was the keynote speaker at the 
Student Division’s conference held less than a year after the Miers nomination was 
effectively torpedoed and the president sent back to the drawing board. “It was the finest 
hour of the Federalist Society, because Samuel Alito now sits on the Supreme Court,” he said 
to a record-setting crowd of over 1,200 young conservative law students. “When President 
Bush has his Harriet Miers moment,” he said,  the conservative movement “rose up as one. It 
played an enormous role when President Bush decided he was going to be results oriented.”  
5“You and I and the Federalist Society are about something more important,” he 
continued, “a palpable and reasonable standing on principle.” This drew a standing ovation. 
Leonard Leo was watching, and probably not applauding, though I didn’t ask. “There’s no 
question in my mind that Judge Bork and John Fund believed that this was a difference 
between principle and politics, and that the principled thing to do would have been to 
nominate someone else,” he said. 
The Movement, led by people like Bork, Fund, Bill Kristol of the Weekly Standard 
and ex-Bush speechwriter David Frum (author of the “Axis of Evil”) were relentless and 
were eventually able to muster enough force so that Bush had to back down—with this most 
stubborn of presidents, no small accomplishment. Before she had even been given a 
Congressional hearing, Harriet Miers was history.  
Her demise proved that the difference between Republicans of the “I-support-the-
president” variety and Movement Conservatives still exists. And when liberal critics often 
point out the apparent contradiction of the Federalists’ claim to “beleaguered minority” status 
when Republicans occupy the White House, have majorities in both houses of Congress, and 
a majority of GOP nominees on the Supreme Court, they miss the vital distinction between 
the Movement and the Party. There may be more or less congruence between the two on any 
given issue at any given time, but when it comes to legal conservatives—many if not most of 
whom are Federalists—this is a distinction with a very big difference. It is a difference that 
directly affected the makeup of the United States Supreme Court. 
And while the Federalist Society as such did not defeat the Miers nomination—White 
House advisor Leo would chafe at the suggestion—“the legal conservative movement” did. 
6And there isn’t much to the legal conservative movement other than the Federalist Society. 
At least that’s what Leonard Leo told me. 
 
* * *
By the time Miers was forced to withdraw her name from consideration, even most 
GOP loyalists had joined the conservative hard core in opposing a nominee who had started 
to look incompetent as well as ideologically unreliable. Coalition building like this has been 
integral to postwar movement conservatism since its inception, and part of my thesis in this 
work is to illustrate how much difference exists, still today, on the right. Even within the 
Federalist Society’s explicitly more intellectual and professional forum, a veritable 
cacophony of different positions exist. Movement conservatism is a coalition, as is its 
Federalist flank. 
 Critics on the left who do not recognize the teeth-gritting unity of the right—and the 
legal Right in particular—do so at their own peril. As all rhetoricians know, it is impossible 
to persuade if one does not understand one’s audience. Likewise, it is difficult to defeat a foe 
if without properly grasping its composition. If you see a conspiracy, your strategy will be 
aimed at undoing a conspiracy. If you perceive in your opponents a brainwashed herd of 
know-nothings, your rhetorical strategy to discredit them will reflect this perception. If the 
perception is wrong, the strategy will not succeed. It might even backfire. 
 The point is this: The right is a diverse, fractured coalition—social conservatives, 
libertarians, Wall Street Republicans, populists, foreign policy hawks, evangelicals, 
pragmatists. The Federalist Society is a microcosm of this diversity. Even among a self-
7selecting group of politically conservative, highly trained professionals, the lawyers, law 
students, and academics that make up the Society’s 40,000 participants2 span a broad range 
of intellectual and political positions. Some of the divisions are stark; some are more 
nuanced; some can be confusing. Many are contradictory, and the factions frequently clash. 
The Federalist Society is anything but an echo chamber. It is a forum for debate—but always 
debate in the service of a political and legal project.   
 In Chapter One I will lay out the way movement conservatism challenged the postwar 
liberal consensus both intellectually and rhetorically. By rhetorically I mean persuasively, 
and that in turn meant conservatives had to identify their key audiences, build networks, 
appeal to existing sentiments and perceptions, and develop a strategy for political success. 
From the very start, ur-conservatives at Bill Buckley’s National Review and among the 
Goldwaterites, understood they had to speak to multiple audiences at the same time. There 
was an intellectual and theoretical aspect to the movement, and there was a political one. 
Rhetorical strategies differed; Goldwater’s Conscience of a Conservative was not written in 
the erudite, elliptical prose of Buckley’s weekly columns. Conservative rhetoric has thus 
always reflected a continuum of style as well as substance. We see this starkly on the right 
today: One can hardly imagine New York Times columnist David Brooks or Weekly Standard 
editor William Kristol hamming it up with Ann Coulter. One can also hardly imagine them 
using her language. 
 With its striped-suit demeanor and wonkish agenda, the Federalist Society is clearly 
positioned on the intellectual end of the rhetorical continuum. (Though Federalist Society 
student chapters sometimes do indulge in the delight of hosting bombthrowers like Coulter 
 
2 This number reflects the mailing list, and is the number commonly cited by Federalist Society 
officials and by journalists. Dues paying membership is substantially lower.  
8on their campuses and watching their liberal friends pull their hair out.)  These are the elite, 
and they know it. And while it may strike some as problematic that the conservative 
braintrust is content to make common cause with the bombthrowers, a solid majority of 
conservatives I asked about this did not. Ultimately, theirs is a practical political 
compromise: If Bill Buckley had written Conscience of a Conservative one must assume it 
would not have sold all those millions of copies. If Professor Richard Epstein were to take 
over Rush Limbaugh’s radio contract, ratings would plummet. (No offense meant to 
Professor Epstein, a thoroughly witty and caustic raconteur.) An intellectual project speaks in 
a different language and to a different audience, but the project of modern conservatism has 
succeeded in large part because it always linked the intellectual to the popular. As Aristotle 
might say, using his definitions of two fundamental categories of rhetoric, the logos (logic, 
rationality) of elite political discussion compliments the pathos (passions, emotionalism) of 
the popular. 
My work here is explicitly concerned with the intellectual project of the legal right, 
but the popular enters into consideration at some important moments. After all, turning 
“activist judges” into a term of common currency required that the Limbaughs, Coulters, and 
Pat Robertsons integrate that term, and its desired meanings, into their vocabulary. Popular 
support means political support, which means electoral victory, which means judicial 
appointments and policy changes.  
In Part II, we move from a consideration of how the conservative movement has 
functioned rhetorically to a specific focus on the Federalist Society. In two chapters, I review 
the organization’s history, expansion, networks, and functions. A great deal of this material is 
drawn from first-person accounts and my own experiences with the Society and its members. 
9The history of the Federalist Society is a case study in how conservatives have translated 
theory into practice: As Leonard Leo told me, the two missions of the organization are 
education and what he calls “the pipeline.” Ideas matter, but so do results. And as we will 
see, what comes out of the pipeline is not a brainwashed phalanx of Rush Limbaugh 
“dittoheads.” It is a cadre of independent-thinking young lawyers who embrace debate and 
engagement in the service of a very broad political ideology. 
The ideology—legal conservatism—is, however, so broad that the term is almost 
inappropriate. There are varying levels of adherence to legal methodologies such as 
originalism, textualism, or strict constructionism. Some Federalists favor a consideration of 
social context; some believe traditions should impact textual meanings; some would have the 
conversation begin and end with Merriam-Webster (though even then there is the debate over 
whether to use a dictionary printed at the time the relevant law was passed or at the time it is 
being evaluated by the judge). We will take up some of these questions of legal interpretation 
in the first three chapters of Part III. 
In Chapter Four, we review the controversies stirred up by Attorney General Edwin 
Meese when, in a series of speeches, he launched the popular debate over “originalism” and 
the “intent of the Founders.” Here I will consider the evolution of “original intent” as a 
rhetorical tool in both legal and popular settings. As we will see, originalists come in many 
varieties. In Chapter Five originalism is put to the test with the advent of the Civil Rights era 
and the undoing of legal racial segregation; many of the vaunted Founders owned slaves—
what does this say about Meese’s theory, many ask? In our contemporary setting, we will 
consider how the debate over Affirmative Action has reignited many of the philosophical as 
well as legal controversies about the role of courts in righting past societal wrongs. 
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From here we turn to another essential tool in the Federalist toolbox: Textualism. 
Differentiated from originalism on conceptual grounds but still linked to it, textualists range 
in their persuasions from strict formalists to textualist-contextualists like Justice Antonin 
Scalia. The Federalist Society’s first faculty sponsor when it was founded 25 years ago, 
Scalia is the focus of this chapter mostly due to his emphasis on the importance cultural 
traditions bring to bear on the law. Embraced by many social conservatives for this reason, 
Scalia’s jurisprudence defends tradition against a rhetorically constructed assault by—you 
guessed it—those liberal activist judges. Scalia is additionally contrasted by a man who 
might, in another day, have been named as his colleague: Judge Robert Bork. A longtime 
Federalist booster, Bork’s social conservatism is branded by more libertarian conservatives 
as “majoritarianism.” The pejorative is meant to suggest the danger of putting everything to a 
vote. Majorities can be wrong, many formalists and libertarians argue. Even 
unconstitutionally wrong. 
In Chapters Seven and Eight we turn to additional substantive areas of law that have 
been important to the past and future of the Federalists and legal conservatism. First, I review 
the development and impact of Richard Epstein’s work on property rights, a vital component 
of both the broader “Law and Economics” school and the more controversial “Constitution in 
Exile” movement. The latter holds that Constitutional theory jumped completely off the rails 
during the New Deal era, calling into question both Supreme Court jurisprudence and the 
public policy legacy of the Roosevelt years. Epstein’s accomplishments as a lifelong 
academic are considered alongside his role within the Federalist Society, where he impacted 
other conservative schools of thought.  
11
Epstein is sometimes seen as libertarian, though he prefers the more specific label 
“classical liberal”; the gradations here do become complex and at times, heated. Enraging 
some conservatives, a cohort of libertarians actually embrace what social conservatives see 
as one more variety of dreaded “judicial activism”—if it means the undoing the New Deal. 
The libertarian-conservative split has been present ever since Buckley and company launched 
their “fusionist” project in the 1950s; the fusion being between anti-Communists and Wall 
Street Republicans. The project was put into effect by Buckley’s deputy Frank Meyer, whose 
son Eugene grew up to be…the Federalist Society’s only president.  
 We conclude with a look at the Federalist Society’s currently declared area of focus: 
international law and sovereignty. Led by high-profile figures such as former United Nations 
Representative John Bolton, these “New Sovereigntists” have argued for a rejection of U.N. 
multilateralism and a bold assertion of American national interests, particularly in light of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The so-called “neo-conservatives” are part of this 
milieu, but only a part. The Federalist coalition has united around the issue of international 
law not necessarily because of Bush’s aggressive Middle East policies (which are no more 
popular among the Federalists than the population at large) but for deeper theoretical reasons. 
The Federalist elite are, in fact, deeply concerned with the philosophical underpinnings of 
law, and they have engaged sovereignty on this level. Given the mess in Iraq, though, the fate 
of their theoretical project is hardly secure. 
 A final word before we turn to the Federalists’ history. After years immersed in the 
group’s culture and its legal productions, the recurring question I landed on time after time 
was: What holds this surprisingly chaotic, argumentative group together? And how is it that 
12
they, like the right in general—at least in its Reagan heyday—have managed to forge such a 
strong sense of unity and group identity?  
 Ultimately, as we will see, the answer is twofold. On a theoretical and even 
philosophical level, Federalists simply believe they have more in common with each other 
than with the liberal left. They know what they are against, or at least they think they do: The 
Living Constitution. And certainly, an enemy can be a strong unifier. Secondly, however, is a 
rhetorically more significant factor. The Federalists, for all their internal conflict and 
contradiction, are held together by an agreement on method.  
 Debate—with both liberals and conservatives of unlike mind—is the only real rule of 
engagement. Corresponding well with the rules of legal procedure Federalists know well, 
opposing advocates are heard and granted respect; debate is pointed but rarely personal. The 
medium, one might even say, is the message: Their common commitment is to a mode of 
discourse. One must conclude that it has served their broader political and legal project well: 
They have disrupted the postwar liberal consensus in the realm of the law and provided 
intellectual heft and manpower for the right’s broader social and political project. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
RHETORIC AND THE RISE OF THE RIGHT 
 
The Miers meltdown is our entrée, but before embarking on the exploration of how 
conservatives have fundamentally reframed the debate over Constitutional law and the role of 
the courts, we need to first take a step back and consider the broader context—the 
ascendancy of the New Right in postwar America. The goal here, however, is not to present a 
hyper-condensed version of this story; any number of good accounts are now available. 
Rather, I will be taking an explicitly rhetorical look at the rise of the right, considering the 
persuasive strategies put to use by conservatives as they went about upsetting the 
comfortable consensus of the Eisenhower era.  
The later chapters on Constitutional law—and law in general—will show how 
rhetoric links the conservatives’ political project with their legal one. By rhetoric I mean not 
only my means of critical evaluation—rhetoric as a way of reading—but also the second 
sense I introduced earlier: the processes of persuasion, as it occurs in the interpretation and 
reinterpretation of texts and events, the reframing of questions and the means of 
rearticulating social reality. We are communicative animals, and we persuade each other all 
the time—from the water cooler to the high stakes of presidential elections. We don’t always 
realize how persuasion is being worked upon us—by our friends, teachers, and family, or by 
the advertisers, consultants, and other professionals who construct our modern day lived 
experience. As a discipline, rhetoric demands a wide-angle lens, for it asks us to attune 
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ourselves to the arguments being made to us (subtle as well as overt) and to question our 
assumptions about what is unarguably true. Much of politics—and law—boils down to just 
that. How receptive will an audience be toward your argument? How persuadable are they? 
When will they start seeing your persuasion as manipulation? How can you speak in a way 
that will resonate with them, engage them, help them look at their world in a new way? 
These are the questions faced by all rhetorical actors, from the PTA president to the 
Commander-in-Chief and the Justices of the Supreme Court.  
 My interest in this wonderfully arcane-sounding discipline was first sparked some 
years ago, before I entered law school or began “thinking like a lawyer.” A freshly minted 
graduate of the University of Virginia, I managed to land a job as a speechwriter and pollster 
with self-styled “language consultant” Frank Luntz. Frank’s fame as a conservative 
wordsmith was first showcased by the success of the Contract with America, the checklist of 
policies and reforms that helped Newt Gingrich’s Republicans capture the House of 
Representatives in 1994. Frank’s approach was seen as revolutionary. As he well knows—
and as he explains in his recent book Words that Work—it is deeply rhetorical.3
Training in politics and debate at Cambridge helped Frank understand the fatal error 
committed by most pollsters and communication strategists. Rhetorically speaking, much 
public opinion research—and political discourse in general—puts the proverbial horse before 
the cart. Whether driven by ego, idealism, or (more rarely) genuine wisdom, leaders and their 
consultants present their audiences with choices, advancing one set of actions or policies over 
the others. We are taught from elementary school on that this process is what leadership is all 
about. This gets the process of persuasion exactly backwards. Before making an argument for 
 
3 Frank Luntz, Words that Work: It’s Not What You Say, It’s What People Hear (New York: Hyperion, 
2007), 150-160. 
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change (or against it), the smart rhetorician must first take account of audience. For 
politicians and other leaders, this means making a specific effort at listening. It means 
listening to how average people talk about the choices they perceive for themselves, their 
families, their communities, and their nation. As Frank writes in Words that Work, his 
method is essentially “listener-centered,” because the audience’s “perceptions trump 
whatever ‘objective’ reality a given word or phrase you use might be presumed to 
have…what matters isn’t what you say, it’s what people hear.”4 Though my personal politics 
have drifted a good distance away from Gingrich conservatism, I credit my old boss for 
introducing me to a new and wonderfully rich way of thinking about politics and law. 
Luntz’s technique is hardly complicated, and mainly involves asking politicians to do 
something they’re not used to doing: listening. Try to understand not only how people 
perceive reality, but how they articulate their perceptions in everyday language. David 
McIntosh, one of the Federalist Society’s founders and a member of the Gingrich Revolution 
class of ’94, told me that when it comes to political persuasion, “Frank shows that it makes 
all the difference in the world how it’s presented.” Presentation affects understanding, 
providing us with a literal vocabulary as well as a broader, more conceptual grasp of what we 
call “common sense.” As liberal Yale Law professor Jack Balkin has written, movement 
conservatives have been working for decades to reshape just what is accepted as common 
sense in the law. “Political agitation and social movement activism followed by successful 
elections and judicial appointments change constitutional common sense,” Balkin writes. 
“They make arguments that were previously considered ‘off the wall’, ‘on-the-wall’.”5
4 Luntz, It’s Not What You Say, xvi. 
5 Jack Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism,” Boston 
University Law Review 85 (2005): 702. Balkin has elsewhere described this as a process of “ideological drift.” 
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Engagement with people, and with their understandings, informs the persuasive 
project of any social movement seeking to affect popular opinion and common sense 
understanding of the day’s vital issues. Political language should “speak to the common 
sense of the common people,” Luntz writes—even as it seeks to reshape it.6 Whether the task 
at hand is winning a presidential election, leading a meeting of a corporate board of directors, 
a nonprofit group’s steering committee, or achieving confirmation for a nominee to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, the rhetorical process should be attended to in the same 
fashion: a goal-oriented communicative process grounded in the shared language and 
experience of the audience confronting the speaker.  
The countercharges to this audience-centered approach are familiar, of course, and 
they exist alongside the deeply embedded idea of the “visionary leader”—the one who need 
not listen because he already knows what to say. Politicians are all just telling people what 
they want to hear, so runs the critique. And Luntz’s focus groups and video feedback dials 
only prove that deception can be turned into a business.  
The audience-centered model runs counter to the common understandings of rhetoric, 
which dominate popular and even scholarly discourse. First, there is “mere rhetoric,” the 
view which sees language as inherently empty and divorced from “real” meaning. Second 
there is the understanding of rhetoric as hardly empty, but rather manipulative and 
exploitive—pandering to an audience’s desires while harming their interests. I do not 
propose these categories as absolutes, but rather points on a sliding conceptual scale. 
 
“Drift is always the result of human activity. It is the result of continuous attempts to understand and describe 
the world, and to persuade others about the right and the reasonable, the just and the efficacious, in a changing 
historical context.” Jack Balkin, “Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning.” Connecticut Law Review 
25 (1993): 866. 
6 Luntz, It’s Not What You Hear, xvii. 
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The dismissal of rhetoric as either empty or inherently manipulative has a long 
pedigree, spanning the history of Western civilization from Plato to George Orwell.7 In the 
city states of ancient Greece and later in Rome—the birthplaces of democracy and law as we 
understand it—wordsmiths like Luntz had their similarly suspect forbears. These were the 
Sophists (think “sophistry”), traveling tutors who would—for a fee—assist the accused in 
honing their arguments for maximum persuasive effect (think “sophisticated”). The Sophists 
were vilified by Plato and his followers, whose philosophy of idealism regarded rhetoric as 
both superficial and dangerous. Superficial because mere persuasion could never 
approximate the absolute truths and ideals of the Platonic universe, and dangerous because 
abandonment of those ideals meant opening the door to immorality, deception, and 
exploitation by unscrupulous leaders. In many ways, very little has changed over the 
intervening two thousand years. Politicians still talk in terms of absolutes and moral rules, 
and pollsters like Luntz are still attacked as corrupting manipulators—even as their politician 
clients declare disdain for “following the polls.”  
This anti-rhetoric argument couldn’t be further divorced from modern political 
reality; anti-rhetoric is just one more way of arguing and persuading—one more rhetorical 
strategy. Luntz’s success, and the success of conservatives since 1994, gives lie to the age-
old “mere rhetoric” critique. Whatever conservatives might say about polls and principles, 
they are listening to people, finding a way to articulate their policy goals in a way that 
resonates with their audience of voters. They are acting rhetorically, aiming to persuade. 
Rhetoric, properly understood and skillfully deployed, becomes the means of enacting their 
ideas and bridging the gap between theory and practice—converting ideas into lived realities 
 
7 As Stanley Fish writes, it is “a quarrel Plato was already calling ‘old’ in the fifth century before 
Christ.” Doing What Comes Naturally (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 478. 
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by persuading democratic majorities that it’s the right thing to do. This is the third point on 
the conceptual scale. 
At its worst, rhetorical strategies operate on the other end of that scale, devoid of any 
real attempt to engage and devolving into the rote regurgitation of clichés all too common on 
Sunday morning political talk shows. Truly artful rhetoric demands creativity and 
inventiveness, moving toward the goal of genuinely “bringing one’s audience around” and 
inviting them to perceive the world in a comprehensively new way. That is not to say that 
short-term political gains cannot be had in the process. In a representative democracy, they 
almost always are…for one side or the other. 
As a critic and author, it is important for me to note that when we consider politically 
interested actors in the process of making arguments and changing the way people perceive 
the world—which is ultimately what this book is about—I choose not to take sides in all 
situations I might. Much of that I leave to you. But my own critical perspective is 
unavoidable; rhetoric is not only a practice, like the Federalist Society’s debates: it is a way 
of reading—a mode of inquiry attentive to language, persuasion, and framing. As a rhetorical 
critic, I will be evaluating the right’s arguments about legal interpretation and law, arguing 
that some of them hold up better than others (and some do nor hold up at all). In these first 
chapters I will be using rhetorical analysis as a way of “reading” the rise of movement 
conservatism since World War II; in later chapters my rhetorical lens is applied in both a 
more theoretical, and a more practical way. 
As a way of separating these different rhetorical functions, I suggest a kind of three-
tiered model. In the first sense, rhetoric operates for a critic such as myself as a kind of 
lens—a way of reading texts and of evaluating arguments. In a second sense, rhetoric 
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operates as a practice, as it does for my primary subject here, The Federalist Society. Debate 
and argument are manifested in literal forms here, as different arguments are presented at 
conferences, meetings, and informal networks. This all fits well, I think: applying rhetorical 
criticism to a thoroughly rhetorical enterprise. But there is yet another level in which this 
project engages rhetoric. The Federalists are explicitly concerned with law—a rhetorical 
enterprise if ever there was one. Lawyers (and judges) are professional arguers, charged with 
the tasks of persuasion (of juries, for example) and interpretation (of the Constitution, for 
example). Persuasion is rhetoric in practice; interpretation is rhetoric as a way of reading.  
 
Skillfully deployed rhetoric has allowed conservatives to reshape the terms of the 
debate in our national political life, enacting policy that has literally changed our lived 
realities. The rhetorical approach represents an attitude toward communication, politics, and 
leadership that accepts the need to understand before setting about the process of attempting 
to persuade. For the leader, listening can inform persuasion not as a mere means to ingratiate 
and flatter but as a way to attain a meeting of the minds between the citizens and their 
representatives. This understanding, in turn, makes possible collaboration for the common 
good and the realization of shared hopes and goals. The political actors involved in this 
process are necessarily interested, and I do not mean to establish rhetoric here as an idealized 
concept divorced from the world of majoritarian politics. Democracy necessarily implicates 
interests—as the Federalists’ hero figure James Madison so concisely laid out in the essays 
from which the Society takes its name. In a democratic system that guarantees open debate, 
pitting interest against interest and power functions systemically as a safeguard for liberty.  
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Each of Madison’s “factions” have their own interests, necessarily opposed to their 
counterparts. There are winners in this framework, and there are losers. All are not persuaded 
by all—or to invert Lincoln, some of the people will be fooled some of the time, but not all 
of the time. Madisonian democracy can survive only through its rhetoricity: the competition 
of interested factions, each mustering their arguments in the public forum, each willing to 
abide by democratic results. Against power, rhetoric in this sense is neither empty or 
manipulative. It is the means to a democratic end, and it is enacted through discussion, 
debate, engagement with those of dissimilar casts of mind and background—above all, 
careful listening. In the most basic sense, democracy—and the law of democracy—is 
rhetorical. As the great defender of the Roman Republic Cicero argued two thousand years 
ago, “The Republic is constituted by discourse.”8 If we surrender the debate, we surrender 
democracy. 
In order for representative democracy to flourish, factions must embrace this 
attentiveness I describe not only in respect to their constituencies (often meaning their voters) 
but also in respect to their opponents. Our adversarial legal system functions on the same 
principle: counsel are charged with zealously representing their clients’ interests to the best 
of their abilities, while recognizing ethical limitations. When a lawyer fails in this, he or she 
is may be disbarred. The legal system—a rhetorical enterprise if ever there was one—breaks 
down when there is no pushback from the other side. The same goes for our broader political 
and social debates. When one faction goes unchallenged, the process itself is threatened. As I 
will argue, the American political and legal left has rested too long on its laurels as the 
insurgents of the right went about the business of unmaking consensus, actively working to 
 
8 Robert Hariman. Political Style: The Artistry of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995),  
111. 
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persuade their many audiences in courts, classrooms, and in society at large. Indeed, this is 
my central argument in these pages: Not only has the right been able to undo the liberal 
consensus by legitimating its ways of reading and doing law, but the left has contributed to 
this by failing to engage with the diverse and fractured conservative coalition. 
 
Rhetoric demands of its practitioners a sophistication not only in the ability to present 
arguments in ways that their audiences will understand, but to take the process a step further. 
After all, “empty rhetoric” isn’t hard to detect; people have an uncanny ability to tell when 
they are being pandered to. What the best leaders and speakers (and lawyers) are able to do is 
not only to grasp, but to rearrange the common sense understandings of their audiences. To 
reconstellate the universe of possibilities and limitations of their audiences perceived realities 
by taking account of the interests and values, causing them to move away from one 
understanding of reality and toward another. In the political and legal arena, “the meeting of 
the minds” should not be taken to suggest a naïve fifty-fifty I’ll-come-your-way, You’ll-
come-mine compromise arrangement. Artful persuasion remakes understandings and 
reframes questions such that compromise is unnecessary. As we will see, conservatives argue 
against “judicial activism,” and in doing so tap into values, perceptions, and resentments 
present or latent in their audiences (their constituencies), eventually recharacterizing the 
popular view of the courts cemented during the Civil Rights era—as partners in the righting 
of social wrongs.  
Conservatives have had an interest in this project; they believe they are right, of 
course, and they also have a larger social project in mind, a project at odds with the liberal 
project of the earlier era that produced the mainstream view of the courts that peaked in the 
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1960s. The right’s rhetoric is interested and strategic in a Madisonian sense, and as I argue 
here, it has carried the day. Its successes have occurred on multiple levels and through a 
rhetoric operating at various levels of directness and sophistication. I do not engage in a 
critique here of Rush Limbaugh’s rants, or Ann Coulter’s diatribes. Both speak often on legal 
matters, but their contributions generally do not move beyond the level of sloganeering and 
what William F. Buckley calls ipse-dixitism—“it is because it is.”  
In saying this I am not dispensing with popular discourse. But for our core purposes 
here I am more concerned with the rhetorical carryovers generated for the polemicists and 
bombthrowers by the elites in intellectual circles: How the elites of National Review created 
the conditions of possibility for Conscience of a Conservative; how the Federalist Society 
laid the intellectual foundation for talk-radio rants about a liberal-activist-judiciary. Popular 
opinion can be genuinely altered by speakers and leaders who persuade people of another 
way to see what is happening, in ways that often resonate authentically with the values and 
beliefs of non-elites. The political—often meaning elite political—project is not necessarily 
contradicted by the popular one; indeed, the two have much to profit from each other. Recall 
the idea of the rhetorical continuum: Buckley at one pole, Coulter and Limbaugh at the other. 
The right has always understood this, and has been consistently succeeding in its project. The 
left has not—arguably because they have not taken sufficient account of the work—the legal 
work and the rhetorical work—conservatives, like those in the Federalist Society, have been 
up to. 
The left’s rather embarrassing catch-up attempts include such examples as the short 
book by would-be presidential candidate Howard Dean’s linguist advisor, University of 
California Professor George Lakoff—of which the title, Don’t Think of an Elephant, is 
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probably the most engaging aspect. Republicans like Luntz have long since grasped the 
power and impact of rhetorical thinking that Lakoff presents here as a revelation. 
Yes…language matters.9 People are much more likely to support the elimination of a “Death 
Tax” than an “Estate Tax.”10 As professor Thomas Goodnight once reminded me, 
rhetoricians believe that naming is framing. The difference of a single word (“death” vs. 
“estate”) invokes different conceptual systems, different versions of what’s “really” going on 
in that particular section of the Internal Revenue Code. Are we taxing “death,” or taxing 
“estates”? Who among us has an estate? (A few, but not many; it’s only fair that they should 
probably pay their share.) Who among us dies?  (Everyone, and beyond the egalitarian 
aspect, it seems silly to be taxing death.) In the law, as we shall see, the meanings of single 
words take on enormous importance. The Estate (or Death) tax affects a small number of 
people. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affects hundreds of 
millions. 
Even as I offer the “death tax” as an example, I hasten to make clear that the battle for 
rhetorical dominance over American politics is not a battle over slogans. Speaking to legal 
liberal leaders Ralph Neas of People for the American Way and Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky of Duke Law School, as well as lawmakers including Sen. Dick Durbin, I 
encountered a similar refrain: “The right has better slogans.” As if sloganeering was the end-
point of all political communication. Liberal scholar Geoffrey Nunberg, who has written 
extensively on conservatism’s persuasive strategies, shoots this cop-out defense down on 
 
9 For a comprehensive critique of Lakoff’s approach from a sympathetic liberal, see Geoffrey Nunberg, 
Talking Right: How Conservatives Turned Liberalism into a Tax-Raising, Latte-Drinking, Sushi-Eating, Volvo-
Driving, New York Times-Reading, Body-Piercing, Hollywood-Loving, Left-Wing Freak Show (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2006) 98-104. 
10 This was one of Luntz’s first major successes.  See Luntz, Words that Work, 164-166. 
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page three of his wonderfully titled book Talking Right: How Conservatives Turned 
Liberalism into a Tax-Raising, Latte-Drinking, Sushi-Eating, Volvo-Driving, New York 
Times-Reading, Body-Piercing, Hollywood-Loving, Left-Wing Freak Show. “The right’s most 
notable linguistic achievement isn’t its skill in coining distracting catchphrases,” he writes, 
“but its success in capturing the language of everyday political discussion.”11 
The Bush administration understands rhetorical tactics quite well—and not just when 
it comes to tax policy. The rhetoric of “the war on terror” began promptly after the attacks of 
September 11th, 2001, and has subsequently functioned to frame everything from the 
invasion of Iraq to dubiously Constitutional secret eavesdropping on American citizens. “The 
War on Terror” thus functions as a “metanarrative”—a story that subsumes all others, a 
master frame fitted around the events of our chaotic world, deployed to contextualize and to 
persuade. In our “post-September 11th world,” we are told, everything has changed. To reject 
Bush’s version of the meaning of 9/11, Bush’s “narrative,” is to—we are told—still be living 
in September 10th.  
As an argument, this is a master stroke. Seizing the moment, Bush and his advisors 
crafted a new narrative, an inventive way of understanding reality that resonated with many 
Americans’ patriotism as well as their understanding of history, their sense of responsibility, 
justice, and sacrifice. The Bush narrative was not the only way that the post-9/11 narrative 
could have been told. But Democrats have still not figured out how to respond, and five years 
after the attacks on that September morning, the coherence—and continuing 
persuasiveness—of Bush’s explanation has only now begun to crack under the military 
realities of a failed adventure in Iraq. Narrative is central to persuasion; it provides context—
 
11 Nunberg, Talking Right, 3. 
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substantial steps beyond the focus-grouping of one slogan versus another. As Nunberg 
writes, “having a narrative involves something more than fashioning new campaign 
themes…it means making the story part of the fabric of American political discourse.”12 It 
means “telling the right stories.”13 As we will see in later chapters, narrativity is central to the 
arguments conservatives have been making about the role of the Courts and the process of 
Constitutional law. 
 
Opponents as diverse as Nunberg and Luntz readily acknowledge that there is 
something decidedly “Orwellian” going on here. And it is no coincidence that George Orwell 
decried the subversive, deceptive power of political language—most famously in the 
formulation that absolute power consists in the ability to declare that two plus two equals 
five. The language of Orwell’s 1984 dictatorship was “newspeak,” and the regime’s power to 
control truth, to announce “2+2=5,” was explicitly linked to its ability to control language. A 
generation ago, the “heartland” of America—the Midwest and sections of the South—were 
reliable Democratic voters. No more. By rearticulating policy positions and relating them to 
values and principles, conservatives persuaded vast numbers of people they were something 
they had thought they were not—and to vote accordingly. It happened only because 
conservatives figured out how to be better communicators, and were able to persuade. 
Working with Luntz did not convince me that Orwell was right. He was, like so many 
critics, right in one way and wrong in another. As my teacher Lawrence Grossberg often 
says, ideas are not responsible for the people who have them—and focus group data is not 
 
12 Nunberg, Talking Right, 15. 
13 Nunberg, Talking Right, 34. 
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responsible for the politicians who use it. Luntz’s lesson is that if we respect people we 
should listen to them, particularly if we put ourselves forward as leaders. The lesson is a 
nonpartisan one—I almost prefer to call it agnostic. It is a lesson as old as Western 
civilization, and perennially misunderstood. Just as the ancient Sophists understood that 
conceptions of “truth” varied among the many Mediterranean city-states where they offered 
their tutorials, modern conservatives have learned that effective argument requires an 
understanding of peoples’ common sense before attempting to reframe it.  
Furthermore, most people have an uncanny ability to know when they are being 
manipulated or being spoon-fed talking points. In the modern world of language consultants, 
focus groups, and polling-driven policy, there are fewer and fewer possibilities for what we 
might call “undiluted” rhetorical exchange in the realm of national politics. Within the law, I 
will argue that the tradition is kept alive by conservatives in the Federalist Society. The 
Federalist project, as we will see, is connected up with other political projects of the right and 
is therefore not entirely a cordoned-off domain, “rhetorically pure” in its promotion of 
reasoned debate. The levels of interaction between policy advocates, lobbyists, political 
pundits, law professors, and students is complex, and their interests are varied. Yet the 
Federalist Society provides a forum where their different perspectives, interests, and ideas 
can be shared and tested—in the service of a larger project that on its face seeks to unmake 
the liberal consensus that has dominated American law for generations. It is a project that is 
succeeding in part because the right has been resourceful, energetic, and persistent, in part 
because the left has been complacent and failed to engage its opponents, often dismissing 
them as either fanatics or fools. The Federalists are neither. 
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The conservatives’ approach worked famously in the Gingrich Revolution of 1994, 
and it has worked for the legal conservatives I will be considering here. When I asked Ronald 
Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese about the vast difference between the self-
conscious intellectualism of the Federalist Society and the anti-intellectual court-bashing of 
popular conservative authors like Mark Levin, Meese’s answer was simple: consider the 
audience. It is simply not effective to talk the same way to a popular audience as one would 
talk to an audience of lawyers and constitutional scholars. There is an undeniable element of 
elitism at work here, but in the strategic context of politics this does not mean elitism. 
Different audiences operate with different levels of education and understanding, let alone 
vocabularies. The Federalist professoriate would not be able to write a bestseller like Levin; 
not even his boss Ed Meese was able to do that (Bork was, but more of that later). 
Recognizing that all audiences are not alike is not only a pragmatic concession. In its most 
affirmative sense it reflects a respect for the variety of perspectives among the American 
public, and the desire to speak to them all. Conservatives understand this. They also remain 
open to charges of whether or not they go beyond a respect for differences among their 
audiences to strategic manipulation is a different, but valid, question. Should intellectuals in 
the Federalist Society, or policy wonks like Meese, for example, be ethically comfortable in 
writing off their polemical cousins in the movement simply by saying they speak to a 
different audience? 
Rhetoric has an obsession with audience—without which no persuasion is possible. In 
politics and in law, “losing your audience” means losing—period. Conservatives know this, 
and know it well. The conservative ascent has been a rhetorical one. As Luntz argues in 
Words that Work, conservatives have better come to understand the realities of modern 
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American common sense and have calibrated their message accordingly.14 “In another age,” 
writes Luntz’s liberal critic Nunberg, “William Jennings Bryan could earn the respectful 
attention of the common people with high-flown orotundity. Nowadays, Americans expect 
their leaders to talk the way they do.”15 The payoff has been electoral victory after victory. 
Until 2006, anyhow. It remains to be seen whether a Democratic presidential nominee will 
avoid the disastrous communication strategies of candidates Gore and Kerry. 
Particularly in the realm of the law, conservatives’ success at reshaping the terms of 
debate have been nearly complete: in a very real sense, we are all conservatives now. Even if 
we oppose their ideas or their methods, we join the battle on their terms. Whereas a 
generation or two ago the liberal lions of the Supreme Court—Earl Warren, William 
Brennan, Thurgood Marshall—spoke eloquently (and persuasively) of a Living Constitution, 
the discourse today is dominated by the right’s originalism, traditionalism, strict 
constructionism, and textualism. As rhetorical scholar Rod Hart and his coauthors wrote 
recently, the assimilation of these key phrases into the popular discourse acts as a kind of 
“cultural barometer,” signifiers of the conservative ascent.16 In his recent book Active 
Liberty, Justice Stephen Breyer exemplifies the battered left’s struggle to stake out a 
pragmatic middle ground, having abandoned the liberal activism of the Warren Court era—
 
14 See Luntz, Words that Work, 179-228, a comprehensive survey of his polling findings on 
mainstream  American opinion, and how these findings apply to political communication strategy. Luntz notes 
in an aside that not all conservatives are interested in the common sense of the common people.  “I once invited 
[columnist George F.] Will to attend one of my focus groups to learn what’s on the minds of the American 
voter. His response: ‘Heavens no. What makes you think I want to know what “real people” are thinking?’” 
Luntz, Words that Work, 115. 
15 Nunberg, Talking Right, 203. 
16 Roderick P. Hart et al., Political Keywords: Using Language That Uses Us (New York: Oxford, 
2005), 5.  
29
an era when courts were seen as partners in the project of righting society’s wrongs.17 With 
two more conservatives now on the Court, the most interesting and relevant discussions may 
not even be between the legal liberals and conservatives—they will be among conservatives. 
In many ways, they’re the only game in town. 
 
To set the stage for my discussion of conservative legal rhetoric and of the role 
played by the Federalist Society in its emergence, I will first take a look at six “rhetorical 
moments” showing how the modern conservative movement seized on circumstances to 
expand its national audience and persuasively articulate its vision in terms of the events and 
controversies of the times. Rather than discuss events that might come more readily to mind 
(Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign, for example), I’ve chosen moments that are 
representative of the history movement conservatives tell about themselves, and that reflect 
the importance rhetorical strategy has played in the long-term conservative project.18 
Drawing on the conservative literature and my own conversations with leaders of the 
movement, I include here the founding of National Review in 1955; the formation of the 
student group “Young Americans for Freedom” in 1960; the Draft Goldwater campaign of 
1961-64; the American Conservative Union’s opposition to the Nixon administration’s 1970 
welfare plan; the Panama Canal debate of 1976-1979; and finally the founding of the Moral 
Majority in 1979.  
 
17 Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (New York: Vintage, 
2006). 
18 In the “Conservatism 101” Introduction to his memoir, longtime conservative activist Richard 
Viguerie chronicles the importance of events such as those I include here. Richard Viguerie, Conservatives 
Betrayed: How George W. Bush and Other Big Government Republicans Hijacked the Conservative Cause (Los 
Angeles: Bonus Books, 2006), xi-xxi. 
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Each of these came to function strategically as a core around which a broader series 
of arguments could revolve. Each exerted a pull on the others. Despite its eventual failure, 
the Moral Majority, for example, established a literal and metaphorical center of gravity for a 
whole series of arguments about moral crises in the nation. The group’s institutional structure 
created a kind of rhetorical inertia that gave persuasive coherence to festering social 
opposition to events like the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Roe v. Wade19 and Phyllis 
Schlafly’s fiercely waged campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment. But let us begin at 
the beginning. 
 
The Founding of National Review 
 From the audience-based rhetorical point of view, this first “moment” is a natural. For 
the conservative movement to truly get off the ground, the creation of a national forum for 
discussion was pretty much indispensable. The pages of National Review would become a 
place where like-minded activists and intellectuals could communicate with each other, as 
well as a kind of broadcasting system for the dissemination of conservative arguments. The 
group of individuals who came together in the early and mid-fifties to found the magazine 
would remain as the movement’s hard core, both within the rhetorical confines of the 
magazine and beyond it. National Review remains at the center of conservative discourse 
today, although in comparison with the grittier and more aggressive tone of the magazine’s 
sister website www.nro.com, the pages of the magazine do come off a bit more staid (a bit 
more…conservative). 
 
19 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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NR’s founding editor William F. Buckley Jr., aptly called the “patron saint of the 
conservatives” by his (liberal) biographer John Judis, had already emerged as a spokesman 
for the movement by 1955. In one sense, the movement as such had started  with Buckley—
and his publisher of 50 years, Alfred Regnery. In 1951, Regnery published the first of 
Buckley’s many books, God and Man at Yale less than a year after his graduation from 
college; it was followed by the equally controversial McCarthy and His Enemies three years 
later. The first of these announced a theme still echoed by conservatives today, that “liberal 
academia” is hostile to religion; the second was a somewhat dubious defense of the 
reactionary Wisconsin senator who claimed, to his ultimate undoing, that there were 
bountiful communist enemies lurking in our midst. The two books stand in nicely for two 
strands of conservative thought that Buckley articulated, but by no means invented: 
traditionalist resistance to the secularization of society and ardent anti-Communism. These 
two themes remained constants in conservative discourse for decades, and National Review 
was the first large-scale soapbox from which they were seriously and coherently articulated. 
NR was the first major conservative forum. Though it exists not in print but in person, the 
Federalist Society is heir to the tradition of debate and discussion launched by Buckley’s 
magazine. 
 Early conservatism’s two themes—anti-secularization and anti-Communism—are 
also analogous to a clashing set of ideas that haunted the conservative movement every bit as 
much in 1955 as they do now: libertarianism and cultural conservatism. Buckley’s defense of 
religion in God and Man at Yale is socially conservative in the same sense as modern-day 
cultural conservative David Limbaugh’s best-selling book Persecution: How Liberals Are 
Waging War Against Christianity. And his brand of anti-statist anti-Communism 
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simultaneously paralleled the libertarianism today espoused by the legion of policy strategists 
at the Cato Institute, an influential Washington think tank—not to mention by Ronald Reagan 
himself, who mocked a New Deal truism by famously suggesting that the words “I’m from 
the government, and I’m here to help” could not be taken as anything other than a joke. 
Reagan, aided by Buckley and his National Review colleagues, created a conservative fusion 
that endured in spite of its many contradictions. 
Under Buckley’s watchful eye the two camps were brought together in large part by 
another NR founding alum, Frank Meyer. Meyer, an ex-Trotskyite Jew who had a talent for 
brokering compromise, is credited with creating the libertarian-conservative “fusionism,” 
viewed by most historians as having made modern conservatism possible. The ideological 
distance between the “libs” and “cons” could easily have been a permanent stumbling 
block—and it remains a major division today; one need look no further than the fractured 
Republican response to certain provisions of the PATRIOT Act.  
Frank Meyer’s son Gene, who has served as President of the Federalist Society since 
not long after its founding, has continued his father’s fusionism, although as Gene told me, 
his father was never comfortable with the label—for reasons that might be equally applied to 
the tensions Gene presides over among the Federalists. The “libs” and “cons” were never 
really fused. They learned to cohabitate, to live together and work toward common goals. As 
Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute told me, Gene Meyer has “played the good rabbi, like his 
father before him.”  
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Together with William Rusher, a lawyer who had founded the first Young 
Republicans chapter at Harvard University in the late 1940s,20 Buckley gathered a cadre of 
conservative writers and editors, launching NR into a market dominated entirely by 
established liberal-consensus magazines such as The New Republic, Commentary, and 
Harper’s. Having had his two books savaged by reviewers in magazines like these probably 
contributed to the young Buckley’s determination to fix the new magazine’s identity. Rusher 
recalls that from the very first issue, Buckley “flung down the gauntlet and practically dared 
his opponents to pick it up,” “declar[ing] war on ‘the Liberals who run this country.’”21 The 
author of books on persuasion as well as politics, Rusher writes in his memoir that “for 
several years National Review continued to capitalize the word Liberal, simply for the sake 
of emphasis.” In such small gestures are future social trends revealed. Decades later, “liberal” 
was to become the dreaded “L-word” of the 1988 presidential campaign and beyond—recall 
Michael Dukakis’s flustered denials. Even today, Howard Dean and other national 
democratic leaders dodge questions about whether they support “liberal” policies—or 
“liberal” readings of the Constitution. 
Launching National Review required more than networking and a suitable staff—it 
required money. Buckley was point man here as well. Coming from a wealthy and 
cosmopolitan Texas oil family, he received support from his parents and also took his pitch 
on the road, selling thousands of dollars worth of shares and debentures to politically 
sympathetic investors.22 The personal, ideological, and financial networking that made 
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National Review possible would remain an indispensable source of support for the 
conservative movement in the decades ahead. Criss-crossing the worlds of finance capital, 
business, politics, and media during those early, formative years, Buckley and his colleagues 
at the new magazine were actively constructing networks that would endure for decades—
creating a matrix of support as well as crafting an identity, the “movement conservative.” As 
seen with the Miers debacle, movement conservatives remain a breed apart even 50 years 
after National Review opened shop. 
The magazine would become the movement conservatives’ mouthpiece, “militantly 
engagé—dedicated to waging political war against the Liberals,” rather than merely restating 
conservative principles in some “safely abstract form.”23 Their arguments would be 
marshaled toward this end, their clearly stated goal to unmake the postwar liberal consensus 
by giving voice to principles they believed lay latent in the hearts and minds of the American 
population. The NR gang had little sympathy for the so-called Modern Republicanism24 of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, a middle-of-the-road approach that irked young Turks like Buckley, 
Rusher, and the others in the Draft Goldwater camp. They had backed staunch conservative 
Sen. Robert Taft of Ohio against Ike in 1948 and again in 1952, and they remained 
committed to moving the GOP to the right.25 The political gauntlet they took up was 
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substantial in the light of the liberal, Modern Republican consensus, just as the legal order 
would be upset by the Federalist Society critique beginning in the Reagan era. 
Reception of Buckley’s magazine was hardly positive. Harper’s called it “an organ, 
not of conservatism, but radicalism”; Commentary dismissed Buckley’s audience as 
“lumpen-bourgeoisie provincials.”26 Buckley was unfazed, and the magazine managed to 
stay afloat. In short order, National Review became the site of serious political and social 
debate, much more than a forum for radical rants. As liberal critic Rick Perlstein has written, 
“National Review readers were finding each other,” in corporate offices and college dorm 
rooms across the nation.27 Years later, it would be through placing a notice in the pages of 
National Review that the founders of the Federalist Society would first attract national 
attention and decide their initially modest project had broad potential. Through the process of 
writing, reading, and identification with the articles and opinions in NR, a new identity was 
being formed: readers of this magazine came to see themselves as different, standing there 
with Bill Buckley “athwart history, yelling, ‘Stop!’”28 
Their identity was formed through argument against the postwar consensus: opposing 
containment as a strategy in the cold war on moral as well as geopolitical grounds; urging 
rejection of the New Deal as a way station on the road to socialist dependency; renouncing 
both secularism and materialism. These were new ideas, flowing against the current of the 
times. Historian John Andrew, writing about the conservative “other side of the sixties,” talks 
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of this growing identity as embodying the “thrill of treason.”29 Conservatives, too, can be 
revolutionaries.  
“National Review became the right’s debating chamber,” write John Micklethwait 
and Adrian Wooldridge in their recent chronicle of American conservatism.30 In the 
rhetorical sense, it really was a forum: a space devoted to the testing of ideas that at the time 
were far from acceptably mainstream. But the forum created by NR extended in a 
metaphorical sense—to the dining rooms, the office water coolers, bars, and classrooms 
where readers carried the conservative conversation forward. I will argue in these pages that 
today, the Federalist Society is performing a very similar rhetorically expansive function. 
The Federalists have become the new debating chamber of the right. 
What Buckley did with National Review was remarkable in a specific sense. By 
producing high quality content and forging a reputation for serious contrarian argument, he 
was able to successfully resist the labels being attached to the magazine by its critics. Far 
from being outcasts and oddballs, NR and its authors cast themselves as the “keepers of the 
tablets,” the last reasonable men in a society and world gone horribly awry. To the chagrin of 
his critics, then and now, Buckley touched a chord. The conserving being done by 
conservatives was, under the Movement Conservative narrative, the stuff of the hero legends 
of ancient times. It was to be described as a Sisyphean struggle against all odds, even—to 
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borrow a phrase from the other side of the ideological aisle—the challenge of speaking truth 
to power. And it unfolded in the pages of a magazine.31 
Young Americans for Freedom: “The Other Side of the Sixties” 
I borrow this heading from historian John Andrew, quoted above. Andrew was one of 
the few historians to take interest in the New Right, to perceive its role as a 1960s social 
movement that actively articulated arguments about politics and policy just as fiercely as the 
counterculture left. There was, indeed, a side to the sixties apart from Woodstock and draft-
dodging and the horrifics of the Chicago convention. Being conservative, the other-siders 
worked much more “within the system”—and, to an extent, one has to admit that it is thanks 
to their realism that they have been more successful.  
Five years after the first issue of National Review hit the streets, we again find 
William F. Buckley behind a critical moment in the conservative movement. Excited and 
mobilized by Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater’s immensely popular Conscience of a 
Conservative, Young Republican clubs on college campuses across the nation were 
becoming increasingly energized.32 Many young activists formally joined together in the 
“Youth for Goldwater” organizations and converged on the 1960 Chicago GOP convention 
only to see their candidate defeated by the Modern Republican—but ardent anti-
Communist—Richard Nixon. Following Nixon’s nomination, a group of college students and 
their older mentors formed an ad hoc committee with the goal of establishing a structure for 
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conservative youth activism. They caught Bill Buckley’s attention, and he offered his 
Sharon, Connecticut estate as the site for the meeting that became known among movement 
conservatives as the Sharon Conference.33 
Held September 9th through the 11th of 1960, the conference produced a manifesto 
and spawned a campus organization that would flourish through the late 1970s, spreading 
conservative ideology and recruiting activists, leaders, and future officeholders. Young 
Americans for Freedom became one more means for disseminating the conservative message 
through debate and discussion—encouraging students to speak out, to engage their peers and 
their teachers, to assert themselves and their beliefs as contrary to the dominant ideology of 
the times. This was a rhetorical project: by rejecting the dominant understandings of the 
liberal consensus, it sought to provoke debate where none existed before, and to win those 
debates. The YAFers who came to think of themselves as conservatives because they 
subscribed to the principles laid out at Sharon were indeed the “cadres of conservatism.” 
An alternative to College Republican chapters, YAF came into being as an explicitly 
ideological, philosophical entity, less concerned with practical politics than with ideas. 
Throughout the turbulent 1960s, YAF stood as a defiantly counter-countercultural presence 
on college campuses across the country, openly confronting the self-declared “progressives” 
of the anti-war New Left.34 
As one of the few chroniclers of the conservative youth movement in the sixties has 
written, Sharon and the YAFers should be viewed alongside the leftist equivalent held by 
Students for a Democratic Society two years later in Port Huron, Michigan.35 Despite 
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Goldwater’s devastating loss to Lyndon Johnson, YAF’s membership increased by 5,400 in 
1964 while SDS’s total membership for that year was only 1,500.36 Conservatives were 
proving their remarkably adept ability to reframe defeat as victory. Rhetorically, these 
membership statistics remind us that victory is in the eyes of the beholders. A defeat is a 
defeat in the sense of demoralization and failure only if you call it one; it is also a wakeup 
call, cause for redoubled efforts and increased efforts to persuade. 
The Sharon Statement is a blueprint for political and ideological struggle, expressing 
a vision of socio-political reality at odds with and directly antagonistic toward the generally 
received common sense of the era. “In this time of moral and political crisis,” it begins, “it is 
the responsibility of the youth of America to affirm certain eternal truths.”37 What follows is 
a sweeping manifesto of social and economic individualism, an attack on centralized 
government and regulation of the market economy (which “tends to reduce the moral and 
physical strength of the nation”), and the assertion that “the forces of international 
Communism” were the “greatest single threat” to individual liberty, and that “victory over,” 
not “coexistence with this menace” should be the country’s goal. By rearticulating and 
recasting issues of political, economic, and international importance, conservatives were 
literally inventing a new identity. Ronald Reagan’s 1980 victory was built on these 
arguments, though that was still many years away. But the rhetorical groundwork for his 
ability to connect with American voters was laid in these early days of the conservative 
movement.  
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The YAFers of the 1960s and ‘70s carried this gospel forth on their campuses. 
Already perceiving a “moral and political crisis” in 1960, YAF “spread like wildfire across 
the country,” as Micklethwait and Wooldridge write,38 and young conservatives were already 
in battle mode by the time the counterculture took hold.39 When the election of 1980 arrived, 
generations of YAF graduates had entered positions of power and leadership across 
American society. John Andrew concludes that the “founding of YAF was, in retrospect, 
probably the most important organizational initiative undertaken by conservatives in last 30 
years.”40 An almost identical comment was made by Constitutional lawyer and law school 
dean Rodney Smolla, who said in 2006 that the Federalist Society was “the most successful 
law school student organization in history.” YAF and the Federalist Society were both also 
important rhetorical projects, helping to spread the conservative message and persuade large 
numbers of young Americans that they were conservatives.  
 
The “Draft Goldwater” Campaign 
Both YAF and the editorial staff of National Review were up and running by the early 
sixties when a handful of conservative leaders produced one of the most stunning coups of 
modern American politics: the forced-hand candidacy of Barry Goldwater for president of 
the United States. As I mentioned as the outset of this chapter, my focus here will not be on 
the campaign of 1964 but on the period of time preceding Goldwater’s acceptance of the 
nomination. There have been many reluctant candidates in American history, and reluctance 
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itself functions rhetorically as a trope—a turn of argument aimed at producing effects based 
on its commonly understood meaning. In our culture, thus, reluctance functions as an
argument, an indication of modesty (indicating the candidate is not power hungry) and 
integrity (the candidate’s unease at involvement in the hurly burly of politics). 
Almost immediately following Nixon’s loss to Kennedy in 1960, a cluster of National 
Review conservatives led by Rusher had set about the business of persuading the feisty 
Arizona senator that he should be the party’s next nominee. They weren’t completely 
shooting in the dark. After all, In that same election year Goldwater had been persuaded by 
the NR crew to allow The Conscience of a Conservative, a short paperback book 
summarizing his policies and ideas, to be published under his name. A surprise hit that 
helped launch Goldwater into the public eye, Conscience also introduced a central theme in 
conservative discourse maintained down to this day in GOP talking points memos and 
strategy briefs from Frank Luntz: Always frame your policy proposals in terms of principles.  
Principles, those early conservatives understood, resonate well. Despite their 
loftiness, people organize their lives around them; they are the beliefs and values that  lend 
structure to our disorganized lives. And to talk of utilitarian or economic calculations, 
pragmatism, and compromise—all of this smacks of cynicism…and our ideal leaders are not 
cynical. Even if many of us ultimately make decisions on practical grounds, the aspiration to 
principle is deeply embedded in our social values and our culture. The mindful rhetorician is 
attentive to his audience’s principles and values because he wishes to relate to them, not 
exploit them; to show how they can be put into effect through policy. Framed in terms of 
highly generalized values like liberty and freedom, Goldwater’s aggressive foreign policy 
stance against communism, for example, becomes easier to agree with. Who, after all, is 
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against freedom? (Lots of people were, as it turned out—at least in the way Lyndon Johnson 
said Goldwater understood it. The most biting response from the Johnson campaign featured 
the memorable image of a mushroom cloud and the incumbent president intoning: “We must 
love one another, or we shall surely perish.”) 
But leaving the election aside, the problem for conservatives in 1960 was that most 
GOP functionaries had little interest in the National Review crew’s plan to move the party to 
the conservative right and away from Eisenhower’s amiable Modern Republicanism. 
Goldwater’s talk of extremism in the defense of liberty was seen by many as lunacy, and to 
some within the centrist core of the Republican Party as…well, mere rhetoric. The 
consummate pragmatist Nixon, I have been told, literally sat on his hands rather than applaud 
when the Senator from Arizona uttered his famous line about extremism, moderation, and 
liberty at the Republican convention in 1964. Serious politicians don’t talk that way, after 
all—they talk about problem solving, consensus, and compromise. (This critique continued 
decades later against Ronald Reagan, whose recourse to principle was taken straight out of 
the Goldwater playbook.)  
Rather than bemoan their position vis-à-vis the mainstream, however, the 
conservatives saw the exciting possibility of a direct, uncompromising frontal assault. “The 
GOP seemed ripe for a takeover,” recalls Rusher.41 Rather than launch their project as a 
nationwide social movement aimed at a national audience—the strategy used by most liberal 
movements in the 1960s—Rusher and the conservatives turned their sights on the existing 
power structures of the GOP. The party would provide them with the means to expand their 
rhetorical reach nationwide. 
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In October of 1961 Rusher called a caucus with 26 friends, former colleagues from 
the Young Republicans, business leaders, a few elected officeholders (in 1961 there weren’t 
many), and trusted political scientist and strategist F. Clifton White.42 In a Chicago motel 
room that autumn this handful of men from different walks of life pledged their lives and 
fortunes—literally, in some cases—and launched the “Draft Goldwater Committee.” With no 
real foothold in the GOP and only a few years of national exposure thanks to National 
Review, the project must have seemed a bit quixotic, even to these hard-core conservatives. 
They resolved to marshal their resources for party takeover and a national presidential 
campaign. Their would-be candidate was not informed. 
 Given the continuing popularity of Conscience of a Conservative—by 1964 it had 
sold 3.5 million copies43—the press was often heard inquiring as to the senator from 
Arizona’s ambitions for higher office. Goldwater was a defiant non-candidate. (“Writing” the 
book hadn’t even been his idea, after all.) The efforts necessary to persuade him were 
matched only by the nationwide organizational and fundraising efforts needed to persuade—
or force—the Republican Party to choose him. The story of how Rusher, White and their 
handful of self-styled revolutionaries set up a shadow national political party structure 
operating out of a secret suite of offices across the street from Grand Central Station is one of 
the great untold tales of modern American politics.44 
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Following several additional meetings, the core of 26 began expanding, with White 
acting as impresario. He spent months criss-crossing the country, flitting from boardrooms to 
country clubs, local political meetings, and chicken dinners, raising funds and spreading the 
word. White was networking with groups including the American Medical Association and 
the Republican Women’s Committee, and YAF helped set up “Youth for Goldwater” across 
the country.45 State and local “Draft Goldwater” volunteers were sowing the seed of 
grassroots politics—all outside of existing GOP state organizational structures.46 To be sure, 
this was institutional work. But it was also rhetorical work—persuading party activists and 
donors that Goldwater was their man.  
The “thrill of treason” continued to be both a motivator and a source of mistrust 
among the Republican Party elders. By positioning themselves against both the reigning 
liberal regime (the rather less-than-liberal Kennedy administration) as well as the milquetoast 
Modern Republicans of the “Eastern Establishment,” conservatives like Buckley and Rusher 
reaped the maximum rhetorical  benefits for their cause. They were not just Republicans, 
they were conservatives, a breed apart; they were not just sensible, they were principled. 
These redefinitions of identity functioned as arguments, and they continue to do so today—as 
the Miers fiasco bore out. There, as we saw, the president’s defenders were, all of a sudden, 
the Republicans. The conservatives were the ones who put a stop to it all. As John Fund put it 
in his address to the Federalist Society quoted above, “the Movement said no.”  
Goldwater was eventually drafted, but only after Clif White’s organization had 
become so extensive and capable of exerting so much leverage that the Senator had no 
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choice. When the liberal wing of the GOP was blindsided by their favored candidate Nelson 
Rockefeller’s marital troubles, the NR crew made the tactical decision to bring the Draft 
Goldwater organization fully out of the shadows. And their candidate—their hero, really—
thus moved (ever reluctantly) into the electoral spotlight. The “plunge into politics,” as 
Rusher calls it, was complete.  
From the rhetorical standpoint—and the larger historical standpoint—what happened 
at the polls that November is almost irrelevant. Conservatives had established themselves as 
legitimate participants in the national political conversation, and had done so with genuine 
force and vigor. Modern Republicanism was dead. Post-1964, any viable Republican 
candidate had to make the case for his or her genuine, principled conservatism. As one 
longtime GOP strategist put it, Goldwater fundamentally “changed the rhetoric of politics,” 
attacking the ideas underlying the post-New Deal consensus on both foreign and domestic 
policy.47 The terms of the discussion had been fundamentally shifted. Decades later, the 
project of legal conservatives would be to accomplish a similar shift in the debate over 
Constitutional interpretation and the role of the courts. First, however, came politics. 
Goldwater and his backers were instrumental in redefining Republicanism as 
essentially conservative, embodying Frank Meyer’s fusion of cultural traditionalism with 
laissez-faire, anti-government libertarianism. As Micklethwait and Wooldridge write, this 
shift coincided with (and was perhaps due to) the “growing intellectual ferment on the 
right…of autodidacts poring over Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and William F. 
Buckley’s National Review.”48 
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But to return to our theme in this section, it is most important to see how 
conservatives proceeded on a two-track plan—today the party, tomorrow the culture. As 
Stuart Hall, dean of Britain’s Cultural Studies scholars, has written about the parallel capture 
of the British conservative party, “Thatcherism thus won and transformed the Conservative 
party first, before setting about winning and transforming the country.”49 And it was rhetoric 
that provided the means for this transformation, taking ideological belief and transmitting it 
to the voters and citizens of the nation—making it theirs. It is a strategy that has worked for 
conservative politics, and it mirrors the strategy of the legal Right. Public arguments about 
the role of the judicial branch, after all, take on much more meaning—and capture much 
more public attention—when Republican presidents are in the position of power required to 
nominate judges to the bench.  
 
The American Conservative Union and Nixon’s Welfare Plan 
More than casting a pallor over movement conservatives, the primary result of 
Goldwater’s loss was to leave them without a project. And for people used to being busy, the 
main thing was to come up with a new focus for their energies. Even without a candidate, 
though, the conservative cause remained. One channel into which massive time and resources 
would be devoted was the Washington phenomenon of the “think tank,” a conservative 
invention. 
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The prototype was the American Conservative Union, envisioned in a confab just 
days after Goldwater’s defeat50 and officially chartered a month later.51 With a conservative 
member of Congress as its first director, the group aimed to “unify the conservative 
movement,” to solidify the conservative role in national politics by capitalizing on the 
Goldwater support base across the country and on Capitol Hill.52 Think tank research and 
organized lobbying—now staples of Washington’s political dynamic—were both in their 
infancy, and it would be conservatives who wrote the playbook. Forty years later, the left is 
still playing catch-up: No liberal think tank matches the reach and resources of the 
conservative triumvirate of The Heritage Foundation, The American Enterprise Institute, and 
the Cato Institute. 
Among the ACU’s lasting innovations was a rating system whereby members of 
Congress were given a 0-100 percentage-point score based on their legislative record53 and a 
“Conservative Victory Fund,” which collected and distributed campaign funds nationwide—
a predecessor to the Conservative Public Action Committee (CPAC) established in 1973.54 
While both of these innovations are interesting from what we might call a political science 
standpoint, it is their rhetorical impact that I wish to focus on here.  
Consider the 100-point score. As a rhetorical tool it is a strikingly simple—and 
tremendously important—innovation. Since the dawn of Western civilization, the precision 
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and perceived objectivity of numbers has been contrasted with the unreliability of language 
and “mere rhetoric.” The ability to cite statistics (no matter how dubious) remains a powerful 
persuasive technique, and is part of the reason the ACU ratings became so popular; 
competing liberal groups quickly devised their own matrixes for rating lawmakers. But as 
one participant in those early ACU ratings told me, the choice of votes considered in the 
calculus was often determined retroactively so that standard bearers like North Carolina 
Senator Jesse Helms would wind up with a 100% rating. As any pollster or statistician 
knows, statistics are themselves the result of a rhetorical process—how you ask the question. 
During the later 1960s the ACU evolved into a large membership organization with a 
national newsletter, state chapters, and a fundraising apparatus. As its membership grew 
(topping 40,000 by 1975)55 so grew its financial power and political leverage.56 It is worth 
noting that among those who contributed to the ACU’s direct-mail operations was Richard 
Viguerie, a man generally seen as the Godfather of direct mail and modern political 
fundraising.57 As a congressional aide to one of Viguerie’s clients once told me, the 
difference between the old way of doing business and Viguerie’s direct mail was “the same 
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as the difference between the Pony Express and Federal Express.”58 Which is also a reminder 
of an essential rhetorical truth: however sophisticated and well-honed an argument may be, 
its persuasive power is ultimately dependent on the ability to reach the audience. 
 
The key moment in this particular evolution in thinking about communication and 
persuasion arrived just shortly after Richard Nixon had assumed the presidency. The ACU 
launched what its own institutional history describes as the “first authentic lobbying 
program,”59 which probably set the model for the modern concentrated and coordinated 
media and lobbying campaign run out of a centralized political and research advocacy office. 
The target was not “the liberals” but rather the sitting Republican president, who with 
conservative acquiescence60 had eked out a plurality victory just months before introducing 
his “Family Assistance Plan,” a controversial revision of the nation’s welfare system. 
Supporters called it a “negative income tax” and saw it as visionary; detractors, including 
conservatives, labeled it a “guaranteed annual income,” a step on the slippery slope to 
socialism.61 Conservatives felt betrayed and went on the attack. Hence the ACU’s extensive 
campaign literature: research, documentation, flyers, memoranda, and pamphlets which were 
distributed among Republicans in Washington and across the nation. 
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The 25-page ACU portfolio was a genuine harbinger, a kind of prototype that sits at 
the top of the family tree of Washington think-tank lobbying as it has evolved over the past 
40 years. Released by the ACU immediately prior to Congressional action on Nixon’s 
proposal,62 the cover of the report blares: “The Nixon Welfare Plan…SOLUTION OR 
SOCIALISM?” and features an image of open hands grasping into the darkness.63 The image 
is strangely reminiscent of the stylized title for Otto Preminger’s 1955 film The Man with the 
Golden Arm,64 and though I have no reason to believe the similarity was intentional, a 
parallel would probably have been embraced by the ACU advocates. Like the junkie’s 
relationship to his drug dealer in Preminger’s film, conservatives argued that welfare creates 
a tragic system that traps poor people in a cycle of dependency. The grasping arm becomes 
the symbol of desperation and despair. 
What follows behind this evocative cover is part ad-campaign and part policy 
research: an extensive review of existing welfare policy history and a rigorous economic 
analysis of Nixon’s plan. It is an early model of what has become a common Washington 
phenomenon, the think tank policy brief—part research, part number-crunching, part talking 
points memo. Today, these types of ready-made policy and media kits are readily available 
online from the three major conservative think thanks. These organizations’ websites feature 
massive amounts of downloadable research reports, opinion columns, policy analysis, 
statistical portfolios, magazine and journal articles. The rosters of resident scholars, fellows, 
and researchers cover a comprehensive range of topics ranging from monetary policy to 
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international affairs and political philosophy. The names familiar to any reader of the op-ed 
page or viewer of cable television news programs—these are the nation’s opinion leaders.65 
The ACU functioned as a nexus for the National Review, YAF, and YR crowds as 
well as conservative members of Congress, and explicitly took up an intellectual and 
research-focused mission. While the ACU was not the first GOP think tank-type organization 
in Washington, it set the ideological tone that has come to dominate political discourse in the 
decades since. In the battle for rhetorical control of the national debate over policy and ideas, 
the think tanks as envisioned by the conservatives were, and continue to be, on the front 
lines. 
 
The Founding of the Moral Majority  
The incorporation of religious themes into conservative rhetoric did not take place 
until more than a decade after Barry Goldwater was drafted to run for president. The 
crystallizing moment was the founding of the Moral Majority, predecessor to the Christian 
Coalition of more recent times. In early 1979, the Reverend Jerry Falwell believed he was 
called by God to bring “the good people of America” together to fight permissiveness and 
moral decay.66 With prompting from leaders of what was by then being identified as the New 
Right, Falwell followed his divine call and set up the Moral Majority, an explicitly 
conservative religious organization that would assume a direct role in electoral politics. That 
said, conservative historian Lee Edwards has written that Falwell was himself chosen by 
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New Righters Paul Weyrich (founding president of the Heritage Foundation67) and Howard 
Philips (founder of the Washington-based Conservative Caucus) because he was able to 
reach 15 million Americans weekly with his television and radio programs.68 So much for 
divine inspiration; ultimately it appears to have all come down to audience. 
By election day 1980, the Moral Majority under Fallwell’s leadership had  
come to include in its membership hundreds of evangelical Christian ministries, most of them 
in the South including notable “megachurches.”69 At one pre-election ministers’ conference, 
Weyrich made the goal crystal clear to his listeners: to “mobilize their flocks to vote for 
Republican candidates in general and for Ronald Reagan in particular.”70 
“It turns out traditionalism had a genuine base among those who looked to the Bible 
rather than Edmund Burke for authority,” wrote columnist E.J. Dionne in1992.71 Dionne’s 
comment points to the same split among conservatives discussed above—libertarians and 
social conservatives, held together by the fusion of common interests (fighting government 
growth and international communism) and common enemies (liberals). What’s more, key 
events such as the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade and the proposed Equal Rights 
Amendment to the Constitution had prompted a polarization around a set of moral questions, 
“values” questions related to sexuality, gender, and social life. The Moral Majority spoke to 
these concerns.72 Once again, conservatives were rhetorically rearticulating the political 
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scene. And despite its claim to both majority and morality, the Moral Majority cast itself into 
a position of oppression and ethical obligation: Conservative Christian evangelicals needed 
to act, lest the slide toward moral decay under liberalism’s misguided rule be allowed to 
continue. We were, as Robert Bork would title a book some years later, “Slouching Toward 
Gomorrah.” 
The sermonizing by Fallwell and company was matched with political action on a 
mass scale. In the lead-up to the 1980 election, the Moral Majority and affiliated Christian 
organizations registered 2.5 million new voters.73 And while it is probably not accurate to say 
that the Religious Right single-handedly elected Ronald Reagan,74 this massive cohort of 
citizens was speedily subsumed into the conservative movement and its favored narrative of 
a traditional, Christian, neo-liberal, anti-Communist state. As former GOP chairman Haley 
Barbour of Mississippi put it, what happened with Southern evangelicals in this period was 
about much more than election results. “After 1980, they not only voted for Republican 
presidential candidates, but began thinking of themselves as Republicans.”75 This was 
happening because conservatives took up the language of evangelicals—listened to them—
and framed policy questions in terms that resonated within their system of values and 
perception of the world. The reconfiguration of Jimmy Carter’s evangelical Left—the Solid 
South was still democratic in 1976—into Ronald Reagan’s evangelical Right was, ultimately, 
rhetorical. The right’s persuasiveness extended to the ballot booth, and thanks to this the 
Moral Majority could ensure that its traditionalist, conservative Christian concerns about 
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feminism, gay rights, school prayer, and abortion would remain a central part of the national 
political dialogue.76 
It’s worth noting that all of this happened before Ralph Reed was out of college—and 
also before he became an evangelical Christian. By the 1990s, as Godfrey Hodgson writes, 
“neoconservatives, the Heritage Foundation, the Christian Right, and the rest ha[d] built a 
network of funding foundations, fundraising bodies, direct mail operations, journals, and 
channels of communication to mass media to disseminate their interpretation of the world 
and their policy prescriptions. In the process…they had gone a long way toward 
marginalizing all who disagreed with their ideas.”77 They were, in other words, rhetorically 
reshaping the terms of national political discourse.  
 
The Panama Canal, Sovereignty, and the National Will 
With the moderate wing of the GOP excised after the defeat of Gerald Ford in 1976, 
Ronald Reagan’s conservative ascendancy never looked more secure. A longtime darling of 
the NR hard core, Reagan—despite what his detractors often persist in saying—had been 
politically active and attuned since the 1950s. He came onto the national political stage as an 
eleventh-hour spokesman for Goldwater, with the foundering presidential campaign 
attempting to recover from the withering critiques invited by its own uncompromising 
(principled) rhetoric. Reagan’s televised speech on behalf of the Goldwater candidacy, 
known as “A Time for Choosing” or—in certain circles—simply “The Speech,” remains a 
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classic of the genre. One can imagine the hard core cons like Bill Rusher watching him then 
and knowing that in the long haul, Reagan—even more than Goldwater—was their man. 
Reagan’s authoritative aura and forceful persona were a perfect tonic for the sense of 
powerlessness and lost prestige that grasped late 1970s American political culture. The dots 
were all too easy to connect, one might say; rhetorically, the story was all too easy to tell—
and it was powerfully persuasive. It was a story that included those last humiliating and 
tragic days in Saigon; the incapacitation of hostages held in the Tehran embassy; the pathetic 
response to the Soviets’ invasion of Afghanistan. In part because each of these holds a more 
prominent place in our collective memory, I will focus here on a less-remembered moment: 
the return (or “surrender”) of the Panama Canal. As with the five rhetorical episodes already 
discussed, the Canal debate also holds pride of place among movement conservatives. It 
functions as what rhetoricians call a synecdoche: a part which stands in for the whole, a 
verbal and mental trigger, a code for big ideas compacted into two little words—The Canal. 
The Canal was built by the United States under Theodore Roosevelt, and negotiations 
to repatriate the territory had been under way since the Nixon administration. On this issue, 
as with many others, conservatives broke ranks with that Republican president. Reagan 
seized on the issue during the 1976 presidential campaign and conservatives, including 
Weyrich at the Heritage Foundation, hammered away at it throughout the Carter 
presidency.78 “We’re going to ride this hard,” said fundraising maven Richard Viguerie.79 
Why? Because the situation presented them with an ideal rhetorical opportunity. The 
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conservative reframing of the situation presented America as a global military power 
neglected and abused under rule by supine liberals like Jimmy Carter. 
For Reagan, Carter’s stance of conciliation and repatriation was a “giveaway” to the 
“dictator,” Panamanian General Omar Torrijo—“Castro’s good friend” to boot. “We built it, 
we paid for it, it’s ours,” was Reagan’s defiant line in 1976.80 Never mind that the Canal was 
built in an era of imperialism; never mind that from an economic standpoint, the Canal was 
hardly worth defending. Forbes magazine seems precisely to have grasped the point when it 
editorialized that the Canal “is more symbol and substance.”81 Exactly right…but the 
dichotomy is a false one. Rhetorically speaking, symbols are substantive, the very building 
blocks of our political consciousness and identity. As literary critic Kenneth Burke argued, 
language is at its root a system of symbolic action.82 
So, we have The Canal: a symbolic moment of crisis coalescing in the context of a 
weakened president and a decade of less-than-inspiring national politics. Therein lay the 
conservatives’ opportunity. Like Howard Beale in the classic 1976 film Network,83 the Canal 
“giveaway” captured a sentiment, a moment where a frustrated patriotic, nationalist citizenry 
might vent their spleen, declare (or cheer as leaders like Reagan declared for them) that they 
were mad as hell and not going to take it anymore. As E.J. Dionne summarizes the New 
Right’s argument, it was symbolism pure and simple: “The Canal was American—end of 
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argument.” Or maybe drop that last ‘n’: In conservative rhetoric, The Canal was America.
And America does not hearken to tinhorn dictators. 
So staunch was the New Right leadership’s commitment to the Canal issue that 
Reagan—who went as far as publicly facing down Buckley, a supporter of Canal 
repatriation, on his Firing Line television debate show—eventually became seen as soft on 
the issue. The short-lived New Right favorite for president in 1980 was not Reagan but 
Congressman Philip Crane of Illinois, a debonair history professor who had contributed to 
the ACU’s political research and who flanked right of Reagan on the Canal.84 Crane released 
a popular paperback just prior to election season, Surrender In Panama—the title says it 
all.85 Crane and his argument lost out, a Supreme Court challenge over the matter by none 
other than Barry Goldwater notwithstanding.86 We will revisit the broader questions of 
international law and state sovereignty in Chapter Eight. 
The Symbolic meaning of the Canal controversy cannot be overestimated. By 1979, 
the President of the United States was being described as hostage in the White House, 
impotent against a mob of hostage-takers in Iran; South Vietnam had fallen to the 
Communists; the American response to the massive Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was…a 
boycott of the Olympics. But it was with the Canal controversy that foreign policy was 
finally and specifically incorporated into conservative discourse. While the nascent NR 
coterie had raised foreign policy concerns as early as the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, it 
was not until conservatives had established themselves rhetorically and politically that their 
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aggressive foreign policy message could be articulated to a wider audience. And find an 
audience it did: An ACU-financed television documentary-cum-telethon on The Canal 
generated half a million dollars—and half a million new names for Viguerie’s ever 
expanding database 87 
Nothing the conservatives have achieved in reshaping attitudes toward Constitutional 
interpretation and the courts could have come to pass without the groundwork laid by 50 
years of activism, organizing, and rhetorical strategizing. The Federalist Society can only be 
understood in this context, and brief as this introduction has been, it serves to highlight the 
tactical acumen and coherence of the conservative movement of which the Federalist project 
is a part.  
The project was, from the outset, an ambitious one. Through the efforts of its 
advocates and organizers, the conservative message has reached into more and more domains 
of our national life. With the founding of National Review the project was launched in the 
realms of news media and mass communication. Young Americans for Freedom pushed the 
movement and its ideology on to fertile ground of the college campus. In mounting the 
“Draft Goldwater” campaign, conservatives took the plunge into party politics, which has 
ever since borne their stamp. In establishing the ACU conservative intellectuals and policy 
advocates began aggressively translating their ideology to the project of governance and 
legislation. The Moral Majority incorporated religion into conservative discourse, 
reconfiguring the identities of millions of evangelical Christians into Christian conservatives. 
And in the Panama Canal episode, conservatives seized on a moment of seemingly obscure 
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foreign policy as a symbolic example of the nation’s decreasing stature on the world stage. In 
doing so they prefigured the New Sovereignty of a later generation of legal conservatives, 
discussed in Chapter Eight. 
The Federalist Society would never have been possible—or even imaginable—were 
the fields of social, political, and legal life not made fertile by the conservative movement. 
The Society was created by children of the conservative era, literally so in the case of Gene 
Meyer, son of NR guru Frank Meyer. The Federalists continue to foster the kind of sharply 
strategic rhetorical invention that has characterized the movement from its earliest days. Like 
the profession of law, the Society is an institution built on debate and argument—but plugged 
into a network of political conservatism. Like NR, the Federalists function as a forum, the 
debating chamber of the right. And as with Buckley’s magazine, the Federalists operate their 
debating chamber for the benefit of a politically and ideologically interested project. In the 
following chapters we will examine how these interests—how the conservative project—is 
advanced by the Federalist Society. Their story begins with three friends at Yale University. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE BIRTH OF AN IDEA 
 
The Federalist Society is the brainchild of a small, tight-knit group of Yale 
undergraduate friends who came of age in the 1970s, years when the New Right—as we have 
just seen—was working to change the way Americans thought about politics and culture. The 
Federalist Society was, in a sense, a natural outgrowth of their shared experience as 
precocious and politically attuned undergraduates, though hindsight always tends to make 
such developments seem natural. At the time, Lee Liberman, David McIntosh, and Steve 
Calabresi were simply three Yalies who met in a campus debating club, the Yale Political 
Union…as opponents.  
McIntosh, a quiet kid from Indiana raised mostly by his widowed mother, was 
something of a leftist radical. Liberman, a more sophisticated East-coaster who volunteered 
in the Washington office of Ronald Reagan’s 1976 campaign for president, was already fairly 
conservative. She was a member of the debate union’s Party of the right, through which she 
got to know Gene Meyer, an older student who would later become the Federalist Society’s 
President. Calabresi, the child of upper-class liberals who, he told me, started following 
politics “at about age ten,” was head of the Union’s moderate Independent Party. While Lee 
was volunteering for Reagan years before he even made it onto the ballot, Steve cast his first 
presidential vote for Jimmy Carter in 1976. The Federalist founders didn’t all start off on the 
same page. 
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In a moment that foretold the kind of coalition building that the three friends would 
put into action with the Federalist Society, these three odd-people-out in the debate union 
(none of their respective “parties” was very large) put together a strange bedfellows majority 
that in 1978 ousted the reigning officers. Calabresi assumed the presidency that year, 
succeeded by McIntosh in 1979.  
That said, the three friends found their political views increasingly converging during 
their time at New Haven. In spending time together, talking and debating politics and 
schoolwork, their views evolved together. After graduation, several of them decided to live 
together in Arlington, Virginia while working across the Potomac River in Washington D.C. 
Steve joined the staff of U.S. Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island, Lee was hired by Senator 
Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania, and Gene Meyer was with the National Tax Limitation 
Committee. They shared the house with another future Federalist activist, Richard Vigilante, 
as well as Gene’s brother, John, who continues working in politics today; David was around 
the Beltway in Maryland, and the group hung together.  
The Arlington house became a site of constant political bull sessions, with the trend 
moving in an increasingly conservative direction. This was hardly a new environment for 
Gene and John Meyer who, of course, had grown up in the rarest of all conservative air—
their father Frank having been Bill Buckley’s right hand man at National Review. There must 
have been some persuasion going on: Calabresi abandoned his 1976 candidate, Jimmy 
Carter, in favor of Lee’s man, Ronald Reagan. The two volunteered together for Reagan in 
1980, a formative moment for so many young conservatives. And David credits Lee with 
“convincing him that he was conservative.” As with the rest of the Yale gang, Lee and Steve 
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carried their campaign enthusiasm with them to law school in 1981. The Federalist Society 
would result. 
 
For Calabresi—probably the most intellectual of the founding group—Reagan’s 
campaign became an almost existential exercise that stretched into the past and the future, 
tapping into his own family history and his hopes for the future in the Cold War era. “The 
Carter administration was a complete and utter fiasco,” he told me, focusing particularly on 
the foreign policy failures in Iran—abandoning the Shah and then proving unable to secure 
the release of American hostages—and in Afghanistan, where the Soviet invasion went 
almost unnoticed. Calabresi faulted Carter for a failed energy policy, economic policy—
everything, really. Reagan seized on this feeling of “malaise,” as it became known, and 
Calabresi was hardly alone in feeling that the man at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue was 
incapable of doing anything right. “His presidency absolutely went through the roof,” Steve 
told me. Carter’s gloomy visage in his final months in office was more befitting a kind of 
political prophet of doom, not the leader of one of two world superpowers, supposed leader 
of the free world. He paid the price. 
Young Calabresi rarely talked politics with his parents, but—as with so many future 
leaders in the conservative movement—he had an outlet in likeminded friends who were 
motivated enough to become active at a time when their ideas were not in the mainstream. 
Steve’s family was not without politics, however. His uncle Guido—eventually dean of the 
Yale Law School, appointed to the federal bench by President Bill Clinton—has been a 
lifelong sparring partner, from childhood on. Indeed, Guido and Steve still duke it out on 
Federalist Society panels. “He drives his uncle crazy,” said Professor Richard Epstein, an 
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early Federalist Society booster and leading conservative scholar. In a wonderful example of 
the concentric circles that govern so much of the worlds of politics and law, it also happens 
that the liberal Guido taught the conservative Epstein years earlier at Yale; he still insists on 
addressing his one-time student as “Richie.” Epstein in turn taught both Lee Liberman and 
David McIntosh at Chicago in the early ‘80s, when the Federalist Society was still an idea 
waiting to be born. 
Calabresi remembers taking on Uncle Guido almost as long as he remembers doing 
anything; at age twelve he recalls a Red Sox game that provided the background for a debate 
on the Vietnam War (Steven for, Guido against). Guido’s father, Steven points out, “was 
even more to the left”—but was an important figure in the younger Calabresi’s emerging 
political worldview. Calabresi’s ancestor agitated against Benito Mussolini in the 1920s and 
eventually fled Italy to escape political persecution. “I thought that the Vietnam war was the 
right thing for the country to be involved in,” Calabresi said. “I saw the struggle against 
communism as a continuation of the struggle against fascism my family had been involved 
with.” This was exactly the line conservatives like Reagan and Goldwater had been taking 
for the previous 25 years, equating communism with fascism. When Truman and Eisenhower 
said “containment,” these conservatives asked, with Goldwater, “why not victory”? In our 
own time, George W. Bush has attempted to extend this metaphor of moral and military 
struggle to the “War on Terror,” and Calabresi support him just as strongly. As we will see, 
however, his view is by no means the Federalist Society party line.  
 
Calabresi arrived at Yale law school less than a year into the Reagan presidency. He 
would study Constitutional law with Reagan judicial nominee Robert Bork. Bork, who had 
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served in the Nixon and Ford Justice Departments, had taught at Yale since 1962 and was 
one of the few well-known conservative legal intellectuals of that period. Calabresi 
gravitated toward him, as Lee Liberman and David McIntosh gravitated toward Epstein at 
Chicago. Bork “was a tremendous teacher, very outspoken, very friendly,” Calabresi said. He 
invited his students to take him on, and as Calabresi recalls, they did so. In one memorable 
incident, Gary Lawson (one of Calabresi’s few conservative Federalist allies) tacked to the 
professor’s door a list of 98 theses on why Bork was too liberal on anti-trust—the area of law 
in which he’d staked his firmest conservative claim, publishing a book that remains today a 
definitive work on the topic. A few years after law school Bork recommended Calabresi to 
future Attorney General Edwin Meese’s chief counsel. “There is one person you must hire,” 
Ken Cribb remembered Bork telling him, “and that person is Steven Calabresi.” Bork and 
Cribb have served in leadership capacities with the Federalist Society practically since Steve 
and his friends created the group in 1981. 
 Hot off the campaign trail with the Reagan Revolution and a thorough immersion in 
the world of conservative activism, Steve and his friends were in for a rude awakening upon 
their arrivals at Yale and Chicago—the New Right had hardly, if at all, penetrated the 
protective ivied walls of the ivory tower. The energy and enthusiasm Reagan stirred up 
among young people of this era, Calabresi told me, should be understood as being in the 
same category as the passion inspired by the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. And in 
fairness, our understanding of Reagan’s place in contemporary culture and history remains 
obscured by the shrillness of his critics on the left who insist the man was either stupid or evil 
or both. Then, as now, this type of attack only stands to fuel conservatives, including young 
conservatives, who respond to the right’s idealism. 
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In the early eighties there was a pervasive feeling of electricity among the young 
Turks who had backed Reagan, the man the liberal (and academic) establishment loved to 
hate. If the Yale debate gang expected to find kindred spirits on their Ivy-walled law school 
campuses, they had another thing coming. 
“There was no student organization that seemed interested in Reagan’s legal ideas,” 
Lee Liberman—now Lee Otis—told me, “and this seemed a little odd given that he had just 
won the presidency.” This sense of cognitive dissonance, we might call it, was a big part of 
what drove the Federalist Society’s founders to bring it into existence. “The fact was that all 
of the student groups seemed to be talking about legal ideas in somewhat the same way as 
they might have been talking about them in the early seventies,” Otis says, “without any kind 
of acknowledgement that there was anything other than racism and sexism going on in the 
whole world.” There was something going on—Reagan was going on. She and her friends 
from the house in Arlington had been batting around the idea of forming some kind of 
conservative law students’ organization, and their experiences as first-year law students 
would prompt them to turn that idea into reality. 
William Bradford “Brad” Reynolds, Reagan’s controversial Civil Rights chief and an 
early backer of the Federalist Society, recalled his impressions of Otis and her friends, the 
Society’s founders. This younger generation of conservatives, he said, seemed “frustrated.” 
“All they were hearing was the same old same old—and it didn’t sound right to them, it 
didn’t sound well-reasoned.” As all of the Federalist conservatives of Otis’ generation I 
spoke with confirmed, the Reaganites provided them with an alternative—both in the ballot 
box and rhetorically, as exemplars of how arguments against the liberal consensus could be 
made. “These kids were hearing from Ronald Reagan, from Ed Meese, from Ted Olson, from 
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Brad Reynolds, from Nino Scalia before he went on the bench, and from Bob Bork,” 
Reynolds said. “They were hearing people who were bold enough to stand up and say ‘that 
doesn’t make sense’. I think that was attracting them more than anything else.”  
Bork is even more forceful, suggesting that the contextual frame must be widened a 
bit to include the effects of the 1960s and early 1970s student movements, what he calls the 
“troubles”—and its effects on the tone and atmosphere of college campuses. “The Federalist 
Society is in a sense a reaction to the student turmoil and the radicalization of the faculty,” 
Bork told me. “It was not only the professors who got tenure after having been student 
revolutionaries or rebels or whatever they were,” he told me, “but some faculty members at 
the time decided to run with the students—maybe radicalized is too strong a word. I think 
these kids were disgusted by that atmosphere and formed the Federalist Society as a way of 
bringing some other ideas into what was not a discussion up to that point. They wanted to 
create a discussion.” Randall Rader, a federal appellate judge appointed by President Reagan 
after working as counsel to Senator Orrin Hatch, personalized his own experience in almost 
exactly this way. His story is similar to what I heard from dozens of other Federalists, both 
rank-and-file practitioners and political appointees in Washington. 
“I can remember being taught Constitutional law, and the professor asked if anyone 
had any contrary views on a particularly important Constitutional case,” he said,  “and I 
raised my hand and promptly got chewed to death by the professor and by the students.” The 
incident provided Rader with what he now sees as valuable motivation to educate himself on 
the issues in question. And he sees the Federalist Society as helping young conservatives no 
longer face such situations on their own. “I didn’t have any place to go in 1974,” he said, “I
was it.” Things are different now, he says, thanks to the Federalist Society and the network it 
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has built up. The student in Rader’s situation would, if he chose to avail himself of it, have 
access to information, publications, and people (perhaps even some professors on his 
campus) who could help him articulate the argument Rader expressed mostly as an intuition. 
Many conservatives think back to formative experiences like Rader’s; Bork, for example, 
recalls a standout student of his named John Bolton, who as far as the professor can 
remember was the only conservative in his Constitutional law class at Yale that year in the 
early 1970s.  
When I reached this point in conversation with many Federalists, I often found them 
turning to an economic or market metaphor. “The Federalist Society was really responding to 
a market void because in the legal academy, the ideological left had almost a total monopoly 
upon the faculty and the range of discussion—and much the same is true of the organized bar 
for practicing lawyers,” said Ted Cruz, a clerk to former Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
and now Solicitor General of Texas. “The Federalist Society was filling this yawning 
vacuum,” he said. “In many law schools it can be difficult to be the lone voice on campus, 
and one of the things the Federalist Society provided was fellowship and discourse for 
conservatives and libertarians.” 
The notion of postwar liberal consensus as a bad thing—as foreclosing conversation 
and shutting down debate—is a theme of conservative discourse that owes much to Buckley 
and his National Review contingent; their project, staged in an age of consensus, was 
explicitly anti-consensual. Conservatives owe much to Reagan and his acolytes for providing 
political leadership, but movement conservatism really began with Buckley, even before he 
founded National Review. Reagan’s first appearance as a political spokesman was on behalf 
of Goldwater, after all, and it was Buckley and his NR crew who managed to convince him to 
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run for president in the first place. But Buckley’s first book, published barely a year after he 
left college, 1951’s God and Man at Yale,88 was more concerned with education than 
presidential politics.  
His critique of an insular, liberal academia out of touch with political reality remains 
a staple of conservative criticism, still being recycled by contemporary anti-academic 
crusaders like David Horowitz. Horowitz and his ilk perceive a nefarious ivory tower plot 
every bit as expansive and liberal as was Hillary Clinton’s vast right-wing conspiracy. 
Neither, the reasonable critic must conclude, is accurate; both are extreme views resulting 
from a kind of pathology that sees unified conspiratorial motives where there are, at best, 
only contingent alliances—if there are alliances at all, and not just superficial similarities. All 
this might explain why Calabresi and his Ivy League friends did not really attempt turning 
themselves into Buckley’s torch carriers, despite the Yale connection. Calabresi says he 
never met the NR founder until years later, though another of his projects did figure—
subconsciously, perhaps—in the Federalist Society’s genesis.  
 
This was Firing Line, Buckley’s hour-long television debate show, which a young 
Calabresi watched, we might imagine, along with Sesame Street and Captain Kangaroo. 
What Calabresi says he took in from Firing Line was not only Buckley’s crackling repartee 
and debating skill, but his willingness to take on the best the other side had to offer. The 
Panama Canal controversy is a case in point: Buckley, who supported the return of the Canal, 
might have invited some lesser-known figure. But he chose Reagan, the front-runner for the 
Presidential nomination and perhaps second only to himself in terms of cache among the 
 
88 William F. Buckley Jr., God and Man at Yale (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1986 [1951]). 
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conservative hard core. Left or right, the bottom line for Buckley was that one should be able 
to defend one’s positions against the most articulate, intelligent opponents. In that case, it 
meant taking on Reagan.  
“Buckley was very articulate, very conservative, very interested in ideas,” Calabresi 
says, “but he was completely unafraid”—an interesting dichotomy there, between ideas and 
fear, and an insightful one. “I didn’t think of that when we were forming the Federalist 
Society,” he adds, “but when I look back I think the example Buckley set was probably quite 
important. One of the lessons I took away from it, besides becoming a conservative myself, 
was the value of debate.”  
And here is the birth of the idea: rather than having law school classrooms function 
only as glorified podiums for lecture and “Socratic” inquisition by the professoriate, have 
them function as forums. Take the Firing Line model and replicate it; let a million little 
Buckleys bloom, Calabresi nephews taking on their many figurative uncles in the academy. It 
was that simple, in a sense—and it’s stayed that simple. By replicating the Firing Line model 
across the country in law schools and in countless—now almost daily—panel events, 
luncheons, and dinners, the Federalists have opened a kind of national debate tournament. 
Rhetoric is at its core, for the point of all these debates and panels and questions-from-the-
audience is both intellectual and strategic. “People show up,” one national Federalist official 
told me, because “they want to hear the arguments from the other side and be able to dissect 
them.”  
These conservatives, like Frank Luntz, are very good listeners. And the results pays 
real dividends when it comes to legal, political, and social change. Like any good activist, the 
average Federalist will still tell you the cause has miles to go, and things may or may not 
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even have improved since the project got off the ground. (The difference between 
conservative and Republican success means all the difference here—this is why the Miers 
nomination mattered.) At a minimum, however, legal conservatives now have a “seat at the 
table,” as Meese told me.  
 
Getting off the Ground 
 The first Federalist Society conference came after the friends had been at law school 
for a year. Despite being separated by thousands of miles, Steve, Lee, and David were in 
almost daily contact—all this before the Internet made the work of organizational activism so 
much easier. “We were so overwhelmed during our first year that nothing happened,” 
Calabresi recalls. During the summer they talked about organizing some kind of group a bit 
more, he says, and the following fall semester they started trying to get people together to 
do…something—at this point there was still no plan for a national organization. But even 
manpower seemed lacking. “I was able to find about four other people at Yale,” Calabresi 
says. “So the five of us met as a kind of steering committee.”  
 The “steering committee” helped coordinate with Lee and David at Chicago, and the 
first conference was eventually planned for Spring 1982, at Yale, where Uncle Guido was 
teaching (he would become Dean in 1985). The Yale club, the first to be officially known as 
the Federalist Society, hosted a 1981 debate over Roe v. Wade between two academics. It did 
not attract much attention, but success would come the following semester with the 
conference hosted in conjunction with Lee and David at Chicago and Spencer Abraham’s 
fledgling journal at Harvard. 
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Lee and David had recruited their own faculty advisor at Chicago. At that time, 
neither of them had taken a class with Professor Scalia, who was not even on campus that 
semester—he was visiting at Stanford. But, Otis recalls, they had looked into his background 
and felt he would be a good intellectual fit for the club they were looking to get off the 
ground. “We were looking for an academic with a somewhat practical cast of mind,” she 
said, “and it seemed like based on his reputation and experience that he would be a good 
choice.” It was Scalia’s ability to cross the boundary between academia and politics that 
particularly attracted her attention.  
“He’d done things. He’d been in government,” Otis said, pointing to his work in the 
Justice Department under President Ford. As would continue to be the case for the Federalist 
Society, knowledge is always paired with practical application. And Scalia had done this—
he’d bridged the gap between theory and practice. That was what these kids wanted to do, 
too. “So anyway, I called him up and he said he would do it,” Otis said. The rest is history. 
Antonin Scalia’s involvement with the Federalist Society had remained constant, before and 
after his appointment to the Supreme Court. As with Bork, Scalia remains committed to his 
students long after they left his classroom or his campus. “I was not a moving force behind 
it,” he told me in an interview. “I don’t want to take credit for that. They brought the project 
to me and needed a faculty sponsor. And I was happy to do that, because I thought there was 
a need for such an organization.” 
As a teacher, Otis says Scalia was good at calibrating the level of sophistication in 
presenting material to students, often arguing that “Life is simpler than it seems.” She also 
recalls a “Joe Six-Pack” character that often appeared in his lectures. “How would Joe Six-
Pack react to this?” he would ask—a kind of populist interruption very much in keeping with 
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his future jurisprudence, explored in a later chapter. And as Otis recalls, Joe Six-Pack was 
also “a kind of a healthy correction to some of the more esoteric ways to talk about legal 
issues.”  
 Scalia recommended speakers for the club’s first conference, including Ted Olson—a 
Reaganite from the California days who was then in the Justice Department, and who would 
go on to become Solicitor General under President George W. Bush. Scalia also suggested 
funding sources, which included the conservative John M. Olin Foundation, which in the 
coming two decades would contribute over $2 million toward the Society’s projects.89 
Olson accepted the Society’s invitation, as did Professors Bork and Epstein. Calabresi 
credits Bork with helping the conference become more of a success than the Yale club’s first 
event. “It was Bork who had the star power,” he said. “At the time Scalia was still a professor 
at Chicago and relatively unknown.”  
The Yale event was well publicized and attended by nearly as many faculty members 
as students. To maximize interest and exposure, Otis had contacted law student Spence 
Abraham at Harvard after having learned of his similarly conservative project in a 
conservative newspaper. Abraham, a future member of Congress and Secretary of Energy 
under George W. Bush, has started the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy as a 
conservative alternative to mainstream academic law reviews. “I must have seen his name in 
the article or found a copy of the journal,” Otis recalls, “and told him we were starting this 
thing and were holding this conference—and they really ought to cosponsor it and they also 
ought to publish the proceedings. He tells me I was extremely definitive about that!” The 
partnership that was initiated with that first conference continues to this day. The HJLPP 
 
89 John J. Miller, How Two Foundations Reshaped America (Washington, D.C.: The Philanthropy 
Roundtable, 2003), 29. 
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publishes transcripts of most major Federalist Society conventions and is widely recognized 
as the journal of choice among conservative legal academics. In many ways, it is the legal 
equivalent of National Review—a kind of clearinghouse for serious academic critique among 
those in the conservative camp. A free subscription is included with every Federalist Society 
membership. 
 So the Harvard journal was brought on board as a co-sponsor, as was a similar group 
at Stanford that Prof. Scalia had brought to the attention of Lee and David. By all accounts 
the event was a success. There were lively debates, very much following the Firing Line 
formula. “We believed, from our undergraduate days, that debate was more interesting than 
speeches,” McIntosh recalls. Epstein did his part, particularly riling the professoriate in the 
audience by defending the pre-New Deal jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. During that 
era the Court recognized much wider “economic liberties” and struck down many of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s policies as interfering with those liberties, particularly the freedom to enter into 
contracts unencumbered by government rules and regulations.90 I will consider Epstein’s 
arguments in detail in Chapter Seven. 
 “There was a lot of faculty in that room, and a lot of students—but more faculty than 
students,” Epstein remembers, noting the hostile and dismissive reaction of some of the more 
liberal attendees. “It went over its appointed time. People like [Guido] Calabresi and [liberal 
professor Bruce] Ackerman sort of looked at me and realized that this was obviously 
heretical in a very deep sense. And I would say, to their credit, they tried to land a knockout 
 
90 Progressives of that earlier era presaged their 20th century successors in arguing against the 
orthodox formalist reading of the law favored by the Supreme Court until 1937, when Justice Owen J. Roberts’ 
“switch in time saved nine.” Roberts’ change of heart staved off Roosevelt’s infamous court-packing scheme by 
flipping the 5-4 vote in favor of FDR’s ever-expansive administrative state. Ronald Reagan often cited 
Roosevelt as his favorite president, for somewhat obscure reasons; his youthful Federalist acolytes, to be sure, 
can hardly be considered New Dealers. Their first conference was something of a broadside against FDR’s 
expanded welfare state, and it sticks in the minds of attendees decades later.  
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blow to let this thing die on its birthday. And it didn’t die.” He says that his own work, 
focused on economic liberty and particularly on the Takings clause of the Constitution, was 
facilitated by the Federalist Society debates, from that very first conference onward.  
Reagan’s Solicitor General Charles Fried, who was also on the program that Spring 
day in 1982, has similarly vivid memories of that first Federalist Society event. “It had the 
smell of success right from the beginning,” he said, recalling the students’ enthusiasm. “They 
were very confident of themselves.” But they also impressed him with “a good natured 
willingness to involve people who didn’t agree with them.” Fried is currently the advisor to 
the Harvard chapter of the Society, which—to the surprise of some—has the most active 
student chapter in the nation. A recent article in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy effectively makes the claim that the Federalists have demonstrably changed the tenor 
of academic life at the most iconically left-wing of the Ivy League schools, beginning with 
their involvement in the confrontation with leftist Critical Legal Studies law faculty and 
continuing to the present day.91 
CLS was largely the project of the generation that came of age during the 1960s, 
heavily influenced by Marxist-materialist critiques grounded in the concepts of race, gender, 
and class, as well as European poststructuralist philosophy—where rhetorical theory plays an 
important part. For the “crits,” as for all of us involved in the project of rhetoric, texts obtain 
meaning through acts of interpretation.  
The impact of the radical anti-authoritarian, anti-traditionalist critique of the 1960s on 
law as in other humanist disciplines, including rhetoric, cannot be underestimated. Fueled by 
the idealism of the sixties social movements, the generation of legal academics who came of 
 
91 George W. Hicks Jr., “The Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the Harvard Law 
School Student Body,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 29 (2006). 
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age during the years of the counterculture turned their sights on what they viewed as the 
institutionalized myopia and discrimination of both the law schools and the broader legal 
culture. As one recent survey concludes, CLS writers believed that “legal doctrine sustains 
the established social or political order by disguising its contradictions and by rationalizing 
its outcomes as logically necessary and politically neutral.”92 Though it has opened up some 
possibility for different modes of analysis, CLS has not changed the course of traditional, 
mainstream legal scholarship.93 As law professor Gerald Wetlaufer wrote in a searing 
critique, legal education is still dominated by a positivist outlook. “The lawyer will do 
everything in his power,” Wetlaufer writes, “to speak in objective and authoritative tones.”94 
Legal critics, he argues, adopt “a voice that is objective, neutral, impersonal, 
authoritative, judgmental, and certain.”95 Legal pedagogy instills these norms—and does so 
through “a pedagogy of assault.”96 There are Right Answers to legal questions, and students 
either identify them or they do not.97 “Our rhetoric operates by predisposing us to render as 
black and white that which is gray,” he concludes.98 
Wetlaufer’s critical voice is a lonely one. Many of the idealistic ‘60s generation in 
academia were influenced by the deconstructionist and Marxist-materialist philosophies 
 
92 Arthur F. McEvoy, “A New Realism for Legal Studies.” University of Wisconsin Law Review 2005 
(2005): 444. 
93 Two general surveys are James Boyle, ed., Critical Legal Studies (New York: NYU Press, 1992) and 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986). Perhaps tellingly, both are out of print. 
94 Gerald B. Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse.” Virginia Law Review 76 (1990): 
1558. 
95 Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial,” 1568. 
96 Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial,” 1578. 
97 Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial,” 1577-1587. 
98 Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial,” 1589-1590. 
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emerging from continental Europe—thinkers like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and 
others. These thinkers emphasized the traditional Leftist categories of race, gender, and class 
as organizing principles; the broader failure of CLS notwithstanding, many legal scholars 
continue work in these areas. But continental philosophy also influenced many young 
scholars’ thinking on the nature of texts and interpretation in general. As Yale Professor Jack 
Balkin writes, deconstruction took on an explicitly political and persuasive role for the young 
leftist lions of the academy. “Deconstruction would become a series of rhetorical strategies 
for criticizing certain legal doctrines…in order to show that they were unjust, ideologically 
biased, or incoherent.”99 
Balkin and others associated with CLS sometimes express surprise that their theories 
have been seized upon by conservative critics as inviting legal and intellectual chaos. In a 
recent article, for example, Balkin calls it “something of a mystery” that the deconstructionist 
project has been “translated into the claim that people can make texts mean whatever they 
want.”100 Why this is so mysterious for Balkin is itself a mystery: As Wetlaufer’s withering 
critique makes clear, legal scholarship (not to mention legal practice) subsists on a steady 
diet of essentialized, fixed meanings. Could Balkin really still be shocked at the unfriendly 
welcome deconstructionists have met with in the law, let alone from politically and 
ideologically motivated critics like those in the Federalist Society? Whatever the merits of 
the deconstructionist project, Balkin’s arguments fail in achieving much other than 
reassurance for those who already agree with him.  
 
99 Jack Balkin, “Deconstruction’s Legal Career.” Cardozo Law Review 27 (2005): 721. 
100 Balkin, “Deconstruction’s Legal Career,” 720.  
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Consider this passage, a nicely condensed definition of deconstruction: 
“Deconstructive readings do not assert that texts have no meaning or that their meanings are 
undecipherable. Rather, deconstruction argues that texts are always overflowing with 
complicated and often contradictory meanings.”101 For the non-academic audience not versed 
in critical theory and notions of linguistic contingency, these two sentences would surely 
seem to contradict each other. Indeed, once law is admitted to be indeterminate, and 
overflowing with contradictions, it ceases to function as law. Intellectual and political 
conservatives have seized on this argument and, for thirty years, turned it against CLS and 
deconstruction in the legal academy and the legal profession. That Balkin and others persist 
in making their arguments in ways that play directly into the critiques of their opponents does 
not speak well of their rhetorical choices. Indeed, it gives conservatives a sword.  
Later in the same article I’ve been quoting here, Balkin seems to half-acknowledge 
this point. “If deconstruction meant incoherence,” he says, “then it also meant the 
incoherence of any positive progressive program for Critical Legal Studies and any radical 
alternatives to mainstream legal thought.”102 The problem is that whatever Balkin or anyone 
else believes, for many deconstruction has come to mean incoherence.   
In a democracy that purports to operated under “the rule of law,” legal rules, while 
changeable, depend to a large extent upon their perceived determinacy for their popular 
legitimacy. I emphasize perception here: perceptions shaped by context and history—and by 
argument.  
 
101 Balkin, “Deconstruction’s Legal Career,” 727. 
102 Balkin, “Deconstruction’s Legal Career,” 735. 
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In the legal academy, unlike in some other humanities disciplines, the “crits” 
probably overplayed their hand, and paid for it. At Harvard and other law schools, their 
radical critiques struck many students, faculty, and alumni as both wrong-headed (from a 
conservative point of view) and counterproductive to achieving change (from the traditional 
liberal side). Federalists and many traditional legal scholars launched a broadside attack, 
often lapsing into hyperbole—charging CLS with “nihilism” and denying their legitimacy as 
legal thinkers. At Harvard, they certainly seem to have succeeded—at least insofar as an  
avowedly anti-CLS professor, Robert Clark, was chosen to be the Dean. He held the post 
from 1989 until 2003. 
So much for liberal Harvard? The editor of that law review article on the Federalist 
chapter, on her way to clerk for Judge Bill Pryor, who was nominated to the 11th Circuit 
Court of Appeals by President Bush in 2005 and confirmed as part of the compromise 
reached after a Democratic filibuster, assured me that conservatives have by no means 
captured the majority. “The law school is so overwhelmingly liberal that Federalists unite 
against that,” she told me, mentioning a professor left over from the Critical Legal Studies 
crew who “thrust our class into a sort of existential despair.”  
The phrase echoes Rorty, who has written that the left’s retreat into theory, away 
from politics and its necessary acts of compromise, represents a “gesture of despair.” And 
within the community of liberal-minded rhetoricians there are those who follow Rorty’s lead. 
The silence on the left is deafening, concludes rhetorical critic Maurice Charland, and “is 
symptomatic of a reluctance to deal with practical politics and realistic terms.”103 But there is 
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more than just rejection of gloomy CLS to the Federalists’ success, I was assured. 
“Federalists share more than ‘not being liberal’; there’s also a positive commitment among 
Federalists of all stripes to its core values of limited government, freedom, and judicial 
restraint.”  
Discussing these debates, Judge Pryor described the unifying effect CLS played for 
the various factions of the right at Harvard and elsewhere. The attitude that interpretation 
creates meaning, for many conservatives, is the same as saying that “politics” determines 
meaning; and politics, grounded in popular opinion and majority rule, is fickle. We wouldn’t 
want to turn interpretation of our free speech rights over to a referendum, would we? Thus 
the tendency among conservatives to often insist on fixity and certainty of meaning. Not to 
do so brands one a “relativist,” that nastiest of intellectual epithets. Progressive legal thinkers 
of an earlier generation embraced this label as a pragmatic fact of life, if not a moral guide—
conservatives raged against the idea 100 years ago, as they do today. “There can be no 
wisdom in the choice of a path unless we know where it will lead,” wrote the unabashedly 
realist Judge Benjamin Cardozo in 1921, in a work that set off fireworks among his 
conservative critics. “The juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy 
of pragmatism,” Cardozo wrote. “Its truth is relative, not absolute.”104 Conservatives like 
Scalia cringe at the label “pragmatist” almost as much as they do “relativist”—though 
Federalist conservatives often acknowledge that the Courts do not proclaim the Law of the 
Land, only the Law of the Case. Pragmatism by any other name may still not yet smell as 
sweet, particularly in our hyperpoliticized current environment. 
 
104 Quoted in Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of 
Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 190. The quotation is from Cardozo’s 1921 book 
The Nature of the Judicial Process.. 
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The Federalist Society’s statement of purpose says it all: the role of the judge is to say 
what the law is, not what it should be. But…even in saying what the law is, there is 
interpretation going on. It is not unknown to occur, in fact, that good conservatives like 
Scalia and Clarence Thomas will disagree on what the law is. They may even both claim to 
be referring to “objective” history and the original meaning of a law—but even these two 
committed conservatives sometimes disagree. They interpret differently. 
Pragmatists shrug their shoulders at all of this—it’s rather obvious, and 
unremarkable. Of course there will be disagreement, because that’s what judges do: they 
interpret texts and events, applying the former to the latter.105 For that matter, interpretation 
is what we all do when we try to figure out the meaning of complicated situations and texts, 
and to persuade each other of the right interpretation.  
The distinction between meaning as inherent and meaning as produced by 
interpretation may seem a fine one but it is of deep importance in the practice of law, as 
Wetlaufer argues. I come down in the middle of two extreme positions—conservatives who 
claim meanings are fixed, knowable and concrete, and radical contextualists who consider 
meaning to be wholly context-dependent and ungeneralizable. As a pragmatist, I would argue 
that what matters is not so much the philosophical underpinnings of some justification of a 
text’s meaning, which in a democracy is almost always the result of consensus arrived at 
through debate, but its practical effects.106 Effects, after all, are what most of us have to go 
on. In the world of the law, particularly Constitutional law, effects manifest themselves in the 
most essential building blocks of a free society: freedom of speech and assembly; civil rights; 
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privacy and autonomy. As citizens, we observe judges and politicians interpreting texts and 
affecting our lives; we come to our own conclusions about whether they deserve to be voted 
out of office. Or in the case of non-elected judges, whether politicians who appoint such 
judges deserve to be voted out of office. 
Textual meaning is always already, and always necessarily contextual—when pushed, 
even the most conservative Federalists acknowledge this point. Asked about differing 
interpretations of law among conservatives, Federalist Society Vice President Leonard Leo 
said something quite telling. Sure, it is language, and text, that matters—but, “It’s not the 
language in a vacuum.”  
“Where conservatives and libertarians end up getting into debate amongst themselves 
is not generally over just a specific clause or piece of language,” he said, “but the way in 
which that clause or language is supposed to interrelate to some other part of the 
document”—context, in other words. For textualists like Scalia and Leonard Leo, the context 
stops at the bounds of the text itself, what lawyers call the “four corners”—at least until they 
begin discussing intent, which necessarily involves going beyond the text. Intent—knowing 
someone else’s mental purpose—is not a foreign concept to the law. Criminal law revolves 
around intent, which separates murder from manslaughter. Determining intent requires 
consulting outside sources, and when dealing with the Constitution, that means sources over 
200 years old, like The Federalist Papers. This is what Meese’s “originalism” is all about, as 
a way of determining meaning, and we take this up in detail in Chapter Four. 
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Law and Politics, Text and Context 
For the crits and the postmodernists, the very notion of the bounded text, of the “four 
corners,” is artificial and illegitimate, a rhetorical gimmick used to justify imbalances in 
power that often perpetuate social and legal inequality. Consider it this way. Does taking 
interpretive context seriously mean just thinking about the tensions between the two religion 
clauses of the first Amendment (“free exercise of religion” and “establishment of religion”) 
or does it mean thinking about the ways these social processes affect individuals’ lives? Does 
it mean taking the history of religious practice into account? If so, whose version of history? 
And how comprehensive? When it comes to Constitutional law, why include The Federalist 
Papers, which, after all, have no legal standing? From whose perspective should history be 
considered? Whose side of the story, whose history, are we leaving out, and how does that 
exclusion affect our understandings of textual meaning—of what the text itself is? And so 
on.107 
Drawing these interpretive lines is judges’ work, and it is deeply rhetorical, bearing 
on the adjudicator’s ability to persuade that a right decision has been arrived at, that justice 
has been done. It also bears directly on the advocate’s ability to persuade judges and juries of 
the proper context; and again when appellate judges on the Supreme Court and elsewhere 
must negotiate majorities from their uneven numbers. That law is rhetorical in this sense 
doesn’t mean law is “just” politics carried out by other means. Pragmatists feel this way 
because we don’t have a problem with the adversarial, rhetorical nature of democratic 
politics, as some on the far left do—those who see our system of representation as inherently 
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repressive. Some even see the Constitution as itself an artifact of repression, with its 
infamous “three-fifths” clause declaring slaves were to be counted in the census as less than 
whole persons. In a remarkable moment, a student who described himself to me as a “liberal 
federalist” raised exactly this point with Steven Calabresi following his presentation at the 
Society’s 2005 national student conference. Does not the legitimacy of this text fall away in 
light of the inequalities and immoralities embedded within it?  
No, he responded. The text still matters, and the text includes its amendments, which 
rectified its immoralities. The text is ultimately the source of law, the boundary of context for 
a court of law. Again and again Federalists tell me, from the rank-and-file lawyer to judges 
who sit on courts of appeal, that what binds the group together is their view of the 
Constitution as the law. “For the left,” as Leo says, “it’s ‘Well gosh, I don’t know if I like 
that interpretation of the Establishment Clause, because what happens to this guy over here?’ 
Suddenly you’ve left the four corners of the document and you’re having a debate or dispute 
over what this means.” Social consequences—“what happens to this guy over here”—are off 
limits, in other words. Social consequences are not unimportant, but they are questions of 
policy for the legislature to consider and act upon. This interpretation (and that’s what it is!) 
is rooted in the conservative reading of the Constitutional separation of powers, and explains 
in part why many on the right wince at the notion of “social justice.” From their standpoint 
it’s an oxymoron. Or, as libertarian economist Friedrich Hayek wrote, “a mirage.”108 
CLS questioned this attitude, demanding an accounting of law’s actual outcomes for 
“this guy over here”—who, if you take the time to study the situation, might turn out to be a 
member of a much larger group of guys over here, who just might happen to be poor, 
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uneducated, or marginalized. And this might just mean that their ability to effect change 
through the legislative channel is practically impossible. Fundamental issues of fairness are 
implicated, and conservatives have long been labeled uncaring or cold precisely because of 
their dismissal of what happens to society’s many “guys over here.” These critiques are 
legitimate, I think; but so too is the conservative rebuttal—that ultimately, fairness of process 
is the best way to ensure fairness of results. CLS raised the question of procedural fairness 
and went far beyond it, arguing that the very way legal education is structured undermines 
fundamental (social) justice. And CLS was torpedoed, at Harvard in particular.109 
The debate over textualism will be considered in greater depth in a later chapters, 
where we will look the influence of conservatives like Scalia and Meese on the way judges 
read the Constitution, other laws, and other court opinions—just how much of a difference 
they may have made. While it is safe to say CLS never made much of a dent on the dominant 
schools of legal thought, one of their fellow travelers continues to write for a wide academic 
and popular audience: Professor Stanley Fish, a lifelong academic who has taught at some of 
the country’s most prominent institutions. As a literary critic Fish has engaged with rhetoric 
and law through most of his career. Often stressing radically pragmatic views on the deeper 
philosophical aspects of interpretation and meaning, Fish works with a somewhat lighter 
touch than the boldest of the CLS professors, particularly because he does not take issue with 
the notion of intent.  
As he writes in one of his most recent articles, “a text means what its author 
intends...If you are not trying to determine intention, you are not interpreting”—though Fish 
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says that intent answers a question and does not establish a method.110 At the same time he 
refuses to consider texts as things that exist independent of their contexts. “The text,” he 
writes, “has no independence; it is an entirely derivative entity.” Context, in other words, 
makes the text what it is. In a pragmatic vein he goes on to suggest that the important 
question is not really “what does this text mean,” but “what can we do with this text?”111 
Fish gets slippery on this issue, though. He goes on to immediately address the fears 
of conservative textualists like Scalia who “fear that searching for intention runs the risk of 
legitimizing the interpreter’s desires”—implicating the conservative shift away from original 
intention (an unknowable psychological phenomenon) to original meaning (an audience-
centered phenomenon)—an important distinction we will explore further in later chapters. 
But for now we can point to Fish’s answer to this objection.  
He argues that the “stopping rules” that constrain a judge’s power to legitimize his 
own desires—to read his or her own agenda into the inherently unknowable intent of past 
lawmakers or judges—these “are not rules of interpretation, but rules that tell you when the 
effort to interpret should cease and something else should take over.”112 Balkin makes a 
similar point when he writes that “the possibilities of deconstruction are endless, but, in 
practice…must come—at least temporarily—to a halt,” demonstrating the ultimately 
pragmatic nature of all legal interpretation.113 In Fish’s formulation, we see a clever 
rhetorical maneuver at work, establishing categories of “interpretation” and “something 
else,” categories we will see again (oddly enough) when considering a conservative take on 
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the judge’s role from Attorney General Edwin Meese. It’s striking that Fish here seems 
almost to be resisting his own pragmatism; to say that cutting off interpretation is not an act 
of interpretation but “something else” is a bit mysterious, but in a scholarly way St. Thomas 
himself might admire.   
As many conservatives see things, the Federalists are making their stand against Fish 
and the postmodern critics’ delicate parsing, which is often derided as “relativism”—though 
in Fish’s case, at least it is not quite that simple.114 Sure, conservatives place a primacy on 
process. But process, by its very impersonal quality, ensures fairness (unless…unless the 
process itself is unfair). Federalists, Judge Pryor told me, “were interested in taking the 
Constitution seriously,” not as an interesting relic of a racist past, with (perhaps) some 
bearing on aspects of modern law. “Taking the Constitution seriously” in this sense means 
viewing it as the fundamental law, from which all other law and the political process itself 
derives its legitimacy. Our system of representation is established by the Constitution, as are 
the domains of each of the three coordinate branches of government. And for conservatives 
this means rejecting the view of “the Constitution or the law as just another form of politics.”  
There is question begging at work here, though. Winning elections (politics) means 
getting to appoint judges (law) who subscribe to your theories of interpretation. The lines 
blur in the sense that politics is so often (if not always) about law—passing new laws, 
opposing old laws, confirming judges to sit in adjudication of those laws, and attempting 
correctives when those judges interpret a law in a manner unsatisfactory to the legislators 
who passed it to begin with. Procedurally, law and politics are two sides of the same coin. As 
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Morton Horwitz wrote in his landmark history, the trope of a law-politics divide was central 
to legal debates dating back over a hundred years. Orthodox legal thinkers of the 19th 
century, he writes, “sought to represent legal reasoning as fundamentally different from 
political reasoning.”115 The realist critique paved the way for their twentieth century 
successors; that law is just politics carried on in another form was the central thesis of the 
realists like Holmes and his acolytes such as the prolific and provocative Karl Llewellyn, 
author of the Universal Commercial Code. What Horwitz writes of the defenders of 
orthodoxy against the realists sounds a lot like the rhetoric of Bork, Meese, and their 
Federalist protégés: “If political reasoning was subjective, legal reasoning was objective; if 
the one was discretionary and a matter of opinion, the other was non-discretionary and not 
subject to the whims of the judge.”116 As Horwitz puts it, realism was less a coherent 
movement than “an intellectual mood,” as much concerned with progressive politics as with 
legal doctrine and methodology;117 it was in fact the New Deal, and the Supreme Court’s 
eventual upholding of its major tenets, that represented the full flowering of this “mood.” 
Countering the realists, orthodox traditionalists and positivists emerged, including 
legendary law professor H.L.A. Hart. Hart’s positivism dovetailed with the broader trends in 
logical positivist philosophy, trends drastically challenged by the postmodernists who 
rejected absolutes and “logical” proofs existing independent of context and culture. Hart’s 
emphasis on law as positively knowable through cognizable texts is clearly at odds with the 
contextualism (or relativism) of the theoretical critics—though it bears mentioning once 
more that positivist textualism with its four corners is itself a theory and a way of discerning 
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meaning. As we shall continue to see, the realist style in legal rhetoric is not the restricted 
realm of postmodern theorists. Conservatives, too, are realists in their assertions about the 
“plain meanings” of texts. But they have never had much appetite for the sophisticated, 
context-dependent approach that was first fully voiced by 19th century progressive thinkers 
like the Sociologist and philosopher William James, whose works included the 
groundbreaking Varieties of Religious Experience—perhaps the opening salvo in the Culture 
Wars, suggesting, as it did, that all religious belief is in some sense culturally dependent. The 
legal realists of this period read James and other progressives. But as Horwitz puts it, 
“Existential doubt has never been welcome within the oracular culture of American legal 
discourse.”118 
Whether or not one thinks judges make decisions on the basis of anything more than 
their political views, the structural relationship between the executive and judicial branches 
remains independently significant. Federal judges are appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, both of whom are elected by the people. “It’s a harmonious circle,” 
is how John Fund put it. “The more you win elections, the more judges you get to appoint.” 
And when those judges decide cases in ways that respond to popular or political sentiment, 
more people win more elections. Balkin, the liberal Yale Law professor, acknowledges this 
point in a recent article. “The New Deal settlement occurred because the Democrats kept 
winning elections,” he writes, “and eventually replaced all of the older justices with 
committed New Dealers.”119 When I asked Democratic Senator Diane Feinstein, then the 
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only woman on the Senate Judiciary Committee, about this, she was strikingly direct. 
“You’ve got it,” she said. “Elections do matter.”  
Perhaps conservatives have reached this stage, where their electoral victories are 
genuinely affecting the balance of power on the Supreme Court—though the Miers fiasco 
complicates that conclusion. When the Federalist Society was just getting off the ground, 
however, the muscle-flexing that put an end to her nomination would have been unthinkable. 
 
Building the Organization 
Attendance at that first two-day student conference may or may not have been 
bolstered by a brief ad taken out by the organizers in the April 2, 1982 edition of National 
Review. The blurb gave the conference’s official title, “The New Federalism: Legal and 
Political Ramifications” and mentioned Bork and Scalia as speakers. “The point of 
announcing the thing in National Review was to let people know about the conference, 
people in the area who might want to come,” Otis recalls. But the actual effect was quite 
different—and illustrates the function National Review had come to play in the conservative 
community. “In fact what happened was that we started getting letters from all around the 
country saying, ‘How do I start a chapter of the Federalist Society’?” Now we didn’t even 
know we had chapters, frankly!” These missives prompted Lee and David to consider, for the 
first time, an organization of national scope. “If you would have asked us at the time,” she 
says, “we would have said the Yale organization was called the Federalist Society.” As for 
the club she and McIntosh were promoting with Prof. Scalia’s guidance, “I’m not sure we 
even had a name…we didn’t really anticipate that we’d start getting these letters wanting to 
start chapters of an organization that didn’t exist.” 
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With a certain sense of pride, some of the Society’s early supporters thus refer to its 
emergence as “market-driven.” Lee and David responded eagerly to the demand presented by 
the “market” and promptly set about assembling a how-to manual for other law students 
wishing to set up their own chapters of the Federalist Society, which by late 1982 would 
indeed exist as a national, non-profit corporation. McIntosh, the organization man, handled 
the particulars. Around fifteen chapters were up and running by then; by 1984 there were 
thirty-two. “I remember very well staying up all night a couple of nights with Lee, drafting a 
membership manual that basically said how you can set up a Federalist Society chapter at 
your law school,” McIntosh recalls. “That was the first point that we started thinking about 
the demand for a conservative-libertarian legal organization.” Twenty-five years later there 
are chapters at nearly all accredited law schools in the country. The demand has been met—
or, as a good supply-sider might say, the supply has created demand. 
Thus did the Society emerge: two brainy second-year law students in a Chicago dorm 
room working and talking late into the morning hours, thinking about how they would write 
grants to fund this new “thing” and how it would be structured, how the logistical side would 
work along side the political and rhetorical side. Today, the lawyers’ division dwarfs the 
student division in terms of numbers, but most of the leaders I spoke with insist that the heart 
of the organization remains the law school chapters. By maintaining this focus, the 
Federalists keep their eye always on the future, in a sense—there will always be new students 
arriving in the Fall. This perpetual turnover presents challenges, such as when a strong 
chapter withers and dies when its leaders graduate without a strong set of successors. But it 
also means that the Society has a kind of fountain of youth from which to derive both energy 
and—more practically—talent. The law school chapters are the front end of a pipeline, as 
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Leonard Leo, the Society’s Vice-President, puts it. The pipeline runs through law school, into 
the lawyers’ chapter, and from thence into the world of legal practice, public policy, and the 
judicial bench. 
Compared to today, with a Federalist chapter at every accredited law school, in those 
early days it took real entrepreneurial efforts to get a chapter up and running. Ask around at 
any Federalist Society event, however, and it isn’t hard to find chapter founders or charter 
members.  
Pryor is a good example. Confirmed as part of the compromise reached after a 
Democratic filibuster in 2005, Pryor showed up at Tulane Law School twenty-one years 
earlier with experience in Republican activism. A former head of the College Republicans 
and regular reader of National Review, he says he first learned about the Federalist Society 
through Buckley’s magazine. He arrived at law school itching for a fight, and ready to hoist 
the Federalist banner. “I arrived at orientation and an upperclassman stood up and told 
everyone about the newly formed chapter of the National Lawyers’ Guild,” he told me, 
referring to the prominent liberal lawyers’ organization. “I thought then that I might be 
interested in the organization about which I had read in National Review.”
So he called the national office, which at that time was operating out of donated space 
at the Washington offices of the American Enterprise Institute, a major conservative think 
tank. The national office got Pryor in touch with an older student who had also been 
interested in starting a chapter and had a commitment from a faculty member to serve as the 
inaugural advisor. The group proved almost immediately successful, and by Pryor’s third 
year, they were hosting a private reception for Attorney General Meese, who had been 
invited to delivered a speech on campus. The Tulane Speech, which many interpreted as 
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attacking the Supreme Court’s right to say what was “the law of the land,” provoked no small 
amount of controversy—which we will explore in a later chapter. Pryor, then serving as 
editor of the Tulane Law Review, approached Meese at the reception before his talk to ask 
whether he would like to have it published in his journal. “It was quite a coup,” he recalls.  
After clerking for federal appellate Judge John Minor Wisdom, a liberal Republican 
who famously wrote in a Civil Rights case that the Constitution must be “both color blind 
and color conscious,”120 Pryor went on to practice law in Birmingham. Having stayed active 
with the Federalist Society, he helped found its Birmingham chapter. Such local chapters 
were not chartered by the national office; there was no map in the Washington office with the 
nation divided into precinct territories and membership districts. Whether a city or state had a 
lawyers’ division chapter (or law school chapter, as well) was entirely a result of local 
initiative. Pryor came up with a plan to assemble an “advisory board” to the chapter, mostly 
as a way to be taken seriously. “If we send something out about our first event to the 
Birmingham bar, they’re going to ask, who are these guys?” Working with a friend, he came 
up with a list of potential board members— prominent members of the local legal community 
whom they’d heard of or identified through research—their target list included members of 
the state supreme court (“it wasn’t hard to identify who they were!”) as well as academics 
and prominent lawyers. Washington sent them some promotional materials, which were 
included along with the invitation letters. Pryor’s idea worked: every single person accepted.  
 
The intellectual cast of the Federalist Society is pervasive and has been central to its 
identity since the founding. McIntosh, now a Washington attorney, lights up when the talk 
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turns to the more philosophical aspects of what the Federalist Society is about—despite the 
fact that compared to the more cerebral Calabresi he has assumed more organizational 
responsibilities. But McIntosh has the glow of the idealist to him, as do so many of the 
Federalist contingent. It strikes one almost immediately that most of these people care deeply 
about and understand the Constitution, though by day they may be managing mergers and 
acquisitions. In conversation after conversation over several years of research, it is clear to 
me that the commitment held by the overwhelming majority of the Federalists is 
intellectually earnest. “Here is an organization formed to have an impact on the intellectual 
underpinnings of law,” McIntosh says. For twenty-five years, the key to the formula has been 
debate—the testing of ideas. Debate, not speeches; debate provides feedback, pushback, and 
rhetorical challenge. Their time in the Yale Political Union had convinced them of that, as 
Firing Line had convinced Steve years before.  
It is a formula that has endured. “I have far less interest in listening to people who I 
agree with talking about something,” Ted Cruz, who had served as editor of the Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy, told me. “It’s far more interesting to see debate.” GOP 
Chairman Ken Mehlman, another Harvard Law Federalist and HJLPP editor, agrees. “My 
experience when I was at the law school was that the idealism, the intellectual rigor, the 
debating of new ides, the desire for discussion was much more on the right than on the left,” 
he said. Mehlman stayed involved with the Society after graduating and joining a law firm in 
Washington. The proving grounds served him well; though not formally trained as a debater 
he rose to a position that demands constant political debate—national party chairman. 
Mehlman was also active with his fellow Federalists as a Washington attorney practicing 
property law; such interactions are typical and involve both professionally related networking 
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as well as informal social interactions—though even the Society’s luncheon events feature 
panel presentations from representatives of various positions on a currently topical issue. 
Debate is part of almost all Federalist events, which necessarily involve inviting some 
member of the loyal opposition to present the proverbial other side. But the “other side” 
sometimes comes from within the ranks; the libertarian-conservative split is as alive and well 
today as it was when Gene’s father was engineering fusionism at National Review. Erik Jaffe, 
a committed libertarian and longtime head of the Society’s First Amendment Practice Group, 
suggested with a wry grin that I ought to ask the much more conservative Leonard Leo, “why 
they keep me around.”  
Jaffe, a rare solo practitioner of Constitutional law in Washington, D.C., holds views 
that—as he puts it—“would make Robert Bork’s head explode.” I asked Leo this question, 
and he basically confirmed what Jaffe had predicted—as predicted. “I think Leonard actually 
takes this debate thing seriously,” Jaffe said. A nonchalant way of putting it, but an accurate 
one. “How can it be that this libertarian Erik Jaffe is all for smoking pot and whatever,” Leo 
said, “and you’ve got a Christian conservative sitting across the room from him who is in 
favor of legislating various aspects of public morality?”  
The answer, he went on, is that the organization itself does not itself put forward a 
view. It provides a forum where the Erik Jaffes can duke it out with the Borks and the Robert 
Borks, the more socially conservative types. The libertarian-conservative split within the 
Federalist Society mirrors the proxy duel between the major Washington think-tanks, The 
Cato Institute (libertarian) and The Heritage Foundation (social conservative). The divide has 
been a fact of life for movement conservatism since the days of National Review’s Frank 
Meyer and fusionism. It has held together in part because of the willingness to support an 
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environment in which reasoned debate was the rule and no one was forced out because of 
principled disagreement. No less important, it has held together because the right’s factions 
perceive more in common with each other than with the left. 
The Federalists’ rationalist model can hardly be said to be the rule for all conservative 
commentators or all conservative forums. Although some law school chapters of the Society 
aim more to provoke liberal ire than to actually engage in discussion, the environment in the 
Lawyers’ Division, at least, is a very long way from the polemical attacks and partisan name-
calling practiced daily by people like Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity. The continuum of 
conservative discourse runs a long gamut. The shrill, hyperbolic noise that passes for 
discussion on conservative talk radio is, by and large, far removed from the Federalists’ 
formalism. At times it seems almost genteel by comparison to the invective of popular 
writers like Ann Coulter and Mark Levin, a radio host and lawyer whose bestselling book 
Men In Black attacks the Supreme Court in a barely-controlled 230 page rant. The subtitle is 
“How the Supreme Court is Destroying America.”121 
“I think the Federalist Society is the acme of an intellectual approach, whereas 
Mark’s book was written largely for a popular audience, which has eaten it up,” Meese told 
me when I asked him about the apparent disconnect between Federalists and the popularly 
directed voice of conservative legal critique. “You need to have the materials that will appeal 
to a very broad audience,” he said. Including, apparently, the audience that Meese wants to 
believe that the Supreme Court is “destroying America.” 
Although Bork has become a kind of conservative eminence gris, he insists in putting 
his work in a different class from the popular right-wing critics of the blogosphere and talk 
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radio. “I couldn’t do what Rush Limbaugh does, even if I had the showmanship,” he said. 
“And I don’t think he could do what I do. We’re talking to very different audiences.” 
Reynolds agreed. “We have different people who talk in different terms…in [Levin’s] view 
you have to be a little bit strident in order to be heard through the din. There are a lot of 
different people who approach these issues differently, and I say hallelujah.” 
The concept is a simple one, but key to conservatives’ success—even as it opens 
them up to charges of hypocrisy. Different audiences exist in different places within 
American society, and the same message will not resonate equally in each rhetorical 
situation. All audiences, and all people, do not think alike or perceive the world in the same 
way; if you want to go about the business of effecting large-scale political and social change, 
it behooves you to take account of these differences. Conservatives have, even if it means 
there exist vast intellectual and stylistic chasms between the arguments that are put forward 
by sophisticated, engaging Federalist debaters and the unabashedly anti-intellectual know-
nothing polemicists of talk radio and Fox News. 
That said, the Federalist Society plays a positively vital part in the larger conservative 
project, and for its first quarter century it has managed to maintain its specific identity, 
providing forums for a certain kind of debate and discourse that connects up with the broader 
aims of the movement. Even as he applauded the more polemical strategies of other 
conservative critics, Reynolds declared, “We haven’t allowed ourselves to be pushed in the 
direction of the more provocative spokesmen.” One of the ways the right has held together at
its core—its idea factories like the Federalist Society—is by maintaining the decorum 
necessary for the neo-cons and the paleo-cons, the libertarians and social conservatives and 
the majoritarians to coexist, to feed off of each others’ shared enthusiasm for the cause. 
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Leo also points out something deeply rhetorical that links the libertarians and the 
social conservatives they deride as “majoritarians.” As Leo sees it, the glue holding the 
factions together is a “textual” approach to law, a topic we will explore in more detail in later 
chapters. “Language can be open-textured, language can be open to different interpretations,” 
he told me. “There are libertarians who are perfectly fine with abortion, who are perfectly 
fine with saying homosexual sodomy can be found in the Constitution…or a muscular 
interpretation of the Takings Clause, or varying and conflicting interpretations of the 
commerce power. But all of them are textually based,” he said, “We’re within the four 
corners of the document, more or less.” Here come the “four corners” again, the “text itself,” 
the “plain meaning.” But this absolute—or this more-or-less absolute, anyway—is not what it 
seems. The disparate views of individualist libertarians, populist majoritarians, traditionalist 
social conservatives, Goldwaterite paleo-conservatives, and so on, all claim to explain 
themselves “textually.” This implies, of course, that other readings—illegitimate liberal 
“activist” readings—are somehow extra-textual.  
Even among conservatives in the Federalist Society, though, there is no agreement 
about what the four corners hold. Conceptually, setting those four corners down makes all the 
difference. How much context should the judge consider? How much original understanding 
should we take into account? Should the infamous 3/5 Clause be read “out” of the 
Constitution because in light of later events, its racist implications were held to be legally and 
culturally unacceptable? The problems of interpretation occur when a libertarian and a social 
conservative—let alone a liberal and a conservative—look at the same text (the separation of 
church and state provisions in the Bill of Rights, for example) and end up with very different 
conclusions for public policy; school prayer or no school prayer, Under God or Not Under 
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God. The debate between these opposing camps—very much alive among the Federalists—is 
what keeps the Constitutional debate alive. One might even say that it keeps our civic culture 
alive.  
If we ever stop having these debates, we risk everything—we risk democracy, we risk 
the value democracy puts on listening to each other, trying for consensus, and when 
consensus proves unreachable, agreeing to disagree. Since Buckley’s conservative project got 
under way in the 1950s, conservatives understood this and put it into action far more 
effectively than most on the left. When I asked Epstein about his conflicts with the social 
conservatives or “majoritarians,” as he calls them, those in the Federalist Society like Bork 
who take serious issue with his classical-liberal views, he was both typically frank and 
typically wise. “I don’t vote to expel people from Societies. I vote to debate.” Ultimately it is 
that commitment to debate that sustains the tensions within the organization.  
 
When the founders of the Federalist Society graduated from law school in the early 
1980s, the “Reagan Revolution” was up and running at full tilt, despite some legislative 
defeats in the president’s first term. Lee Liberman Otis landed a career track job at the Justice 
Department—Ed Meese was not yet Attorney General; when he did move into that position, 
Otis would join his team. As Reagan’s chief policy advisor, Meese would prove a vital 
sponsor (and employer) for the early leaders of the Federalist Society. It was Meese’s deputy, 
Ken Cribb, who first made the Federalist connection. A self-described talent scout for the 
administration, Cribb would end the Reagan era as Assistant to the President for Domestic 
Affairs. Among his final acts in that office was convincing President Reagan to deliver the 
keynote address at the second Federalist Society National Lawyers’ Convention in 1988. The 
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coverage of Reagan’s speech in the Society’s newsletter The Federalist Paper concluded 
with this description of the convention’s purpose: “It enables lawyers from the many 
Federalist Society chapters across the country, and those from areas which do not yet have 
Federalist Society chapters established, to meet each other, share ideas, and return to their 
own cities and states with increased enthusiasm which should yield a substantial return in 
Society activity at the local level all over the country.” In that same issue of the newsletter, 
the number of law school chapters was listed as having risen to 91. 
Cribb understood that having Reagan present at that event was important on both a 
symbolic level, for the wider audience, and on a motivational on,  for the membership. 
Cribb’s personal history says much about the ways conservatives have bridged the gap 
between theory and practice—a strategy certainly not pioneered by the Federalists. Since his 
first day as an undergraduate, he says, Cribb had been active with a group called the 
Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI) founded in 1953 by Frank Chodorov, a hard-core 
libertarian academic and writer.122 Like Steve Calabresi, Cribb was a precocious political 
critic; as he tells it, his mother would regularly claim that young Ken’s first political act was 
to “paint a moustache on Adlai Stevenson in the Weekly Reader!”  
Cribb was active as a youth volunteer in South Carolina GOP politics, but it was ISI 
that introduced him to the intellectual side of conservatism. “It gave me the pedigree,” he 
said. “I found out what conservatism meant back to Kirk and Burke.” In a scene that suggests 
a kind of conservative take on The Dead Poets Society, he recalls dinner gatherings with his 
ISI college friends where they would read and discuss Kirk’s then recently-published 
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magnum opus The Conservative Mind from Burke to Eliot. Cribb would later travel with Kirk 
to the moors of Scotland, and remains one of the keepers of the philosopher’s flame.  
It was Bill Buckley himself who served as ISI’s first president, the position Cribb 
now holds. ISI currently claims 50,000 members nationwide and hosts several hundred 
panels and conferences yearly, in addition to publishing books and offering an array of 
fellowships. For Cribb, involvement with ISI in the 1970s led to his introduction to Meese, 
when the Reagan campaign was in need of lawyers to help it navigate the intricate new 
campaign finance laws enacted in the wake of Watergate. He had also been involved with 
CPAC, the Conservative Political Action Committee—one of the first “PACs,” the now 
notorious fundraising and lobbying organizations targeted by campaign finance laws. As with 
the ACU’s innovations in lobbying and research, CPAC was also largely a conservative 
innovation. During the mid 1970s CPAC helped accelerate the move away from Ford’s 
moderate policies in foreign and domestic policy and towards Reagan’s aggressive 
conservatism. After Nixon’s self-destruction in 1974, “conservatives decided they weren’t 
going to take it any more,” Cribb recalls.  
Cribb learned of the Federalist Society in the early 1980s not long after its founding, 
through mutual friends. “I ran into Gene Meyer at a cocktail party,” he told me. “Gene was a 
little surprised that I knew about the Society, and I offered to be helpful.” “Being helpful” 
would eventually mean hiring both McIntosh and Calabresi—and a cadre of committed 
young conservative lawyers who would go on to careers in all legal walks of life, in politics, 
academia, legal practice, and the bench. Some have risen further than others, in business as 
well as government and public office. As Ted Olson recalls, “One of the people who walked 
into the Justice Department in 1981 was John Roberts. Another was Sam Alito.”  
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“Ed Meese asked me to hire experienced people, ‘gray hairs’,” Cribb explained. 
“Well, there were no conservatives among the gray hairs,” he continued. “The typical 
assistant in the Meese Justice Department was in his mid thirties. We did the same thing with 
judges, we put a lot of young judges on the bench.” This investment in youth would pay 
off—and is just plain smart thinking for any social movement that is looking to effect long-
terms change. “We filled up those slots all across the Department with people who were in 
the Federalist Society or just like people who were,” Cribb said, “and it made a difference. 
For the period from 1986-1987 the spark of the whole administration was at Justice, because 
that’s where the brainpower was.”  
His enthusiasm helped encourage these young lawyers. “Ken is bubbly, intellectual, 
and full of ideas,” Calabresi told me, “and when he heard about the Federalist Society and 
heard what we were doing he became very interested.” Others did as well, including 
Reagan’s Civil Rights chief Brad Reynolds. “I thought the Federalist Society was the best 
damn idea that had come along in 20 years,” Reynolds told me. “I don’t deserve credit for it,” 
he quickly added. “I was there; I was supportive. I was helping to take it from a brilliant idea 
to a reality…I’ve been on the Board of Visitors from the beginning, someone who was 
pushing this as the best idea since sliced bread.”  
“The strength of the Federalist Society today, as it always has been, is to force a 
debate,” Reynolds said. “I think that the weakness of our adversarial system, especially now, 
is that it does not force debate. It allows for conversation by sound bites; it allows for people 
to come out and state a position on a television show and then—no pushback unless you look 
at another show…but no confrontational pushback or direct engagement. That is a weakness 
in our political process and in our discourse generally.” Reynolds had plenty of experience 
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with political confrontation himself, and often seemed to thrive on it—something common 
among the breed of lawyers and debaters who populate the Federalist Society. And in those 
crucial early years, Reynolds, Meese, Olson, Bork, and other nationally known personalities 
from conservative circles and from the Reagan administration gave generously of their time, 
speaking at Federalist Society events across the country. Bork, particularly, “helped down in 
Washington, where he knew a lot of people,” McIntosh said. Although he had maintained his 
teaching role at Yale, Bork had served as Solicitor General during the Ford Administration. 
It was Bork’s cache with the incoming Reagan administration, in fact, that introduced 
these younger Reaganites to the older generation that had come into power. Ultimately, as 
Brad Reynolds put it, the question was how to support the Federalist Society project, “how to 
we make this a bigger deal?” The logistical end was left to McIntosh and the other co-
founders who were continuing to grow the national organization. But the presence of top 
Reagan deputies was vital to the establishment of the Society as a viable and serious force in 
the legal culture, and Reynolds and others were by all accounts extremely generous with their 
time. They knew talent when they saw it, though, and considered their investment 
worthwhile. Pryor, for example, remembers how awed he was as a law student that the 
Attorney General would come to a reception at Tulane, and when asked to make some 
informal remarks to the group—which was mixed company, politically speaking—all he 
talked about was the Federalist Society. Pryor also remembers who Meese had with him that 
afternoon in 1987. “The first time I met him was with Steve Calabresi, and that should tell 
you something,” he said. “Meese was hiring members of the Federalist Society because they 
were bright and able people…here he was, willing to meet with or speak to student chapters 
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around the country.” It left an impression, and made young conservatives like Pryor feel like 
they were part of something bigger than themselves. 
Meese, who at age 75 still works overtime in Washington as a Senior Fellow at the 
Heritage Foundation, remembers seizing on the project of the young deputies Ken Cribb was 
hiring for him. “I thought what they were doing was doing was a great idea,” he told me. 
Meese particularly recalls the impact his 1985 speech to the American Bar Association—
outlining his theory of “originalism”—had on the Federalist contingent. “They picked up on 
that at a very early stage,” he said. One of the Federalist Society’s first publications, a 
monograph collection of several speeches entitled The Great Debate, included Meese’s ABA 
speech. The pamphlet, Meese noted, was widely distributed to the fledgling student chapters 
around the country. The current director of the Society’s Student Division credits it with first 
interesting him in legal conservatism. Meese says that the pamphlet “was the device that 
really capsulized the argument.” Thinking of rhetoric and its focus on audience, he added, 
“The distribution of that facilitated getting more people involved…The Federalist Society 
was a catalytic influence.” Or, as Otis put it, Meese had the same project she and her friends  
had, “and we were all working on it together, and were influencing each other.” The timing 
was fortuitous, and as Bork told me, the idea of a Federalist Society would have been 
unthinkable just a decade earlier. “They were riding the crest of a wave,” said Judge Alex 
Kozinsky of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a longtime Federalist booster. “The 
organization performed a great service, but I think it would not have been nearly as 
successful in raising money or gaining the hearts and minds of people if the country were not 
going in the same direction.” And part of that movement has been registered at the polls, of 
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course—the Federalist crowd has been playing with a home team advantage for quite a while 
now.  
Liberal critics often point this out as a way of suggesting the Federalists’ claims to 
minority status are blatantly disingenuous. “Even though they’ve got the President, both 
houses of Congress and the Supreme Court,” their refrain remains the same, said Professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky—who has appeared many times as an invited Federalist Society panelist. 
“It’s still ‘the liberal domination of law’ that they’re out to get,” he adds, “the ascendancy of 
the Federalist Society happens when Reagan is president and Republicans take control.” 
 
Law and Culture 
The project of changing legal culture—distinct from the political project of 
Reaganism—was a daunting one, and remains so. Holding power opens many avenues for 
intellectuals, of course. “How do you approach the challenge of translating theory into 
practice?” Roger Pilon, a Ph.D. and the Cato Institute’s top Constitutional lawyer, asked 
rhetorically. “You do it through being in power!” Still, some cultural terrain is less affected 
by electoral politics—including higher education. “Law schools are very insulated from the 
political process,” Calabresi said. The Federalists have always seen themselves as actively 
engaged in a struggle over the academy and education in general. Politics and policy are a 
part of their project, but the pipeline, to use Leo’s phrase, begins in the universities. It ends in 
politics or policymaking or business. 
The law is a rhetorical enterprise, grounded in argument and concerned with the 
structure of society, and cultural change often parallels legal change. Legal cases have 
winners and losers, real results. “Part of Reagan’s policy was to build up forces in 
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battleground nations in order to help topple enemy regimes,” Calabresi told me, “and I 
thought of us as kind of the same equivalent in law schools.” There remains a kind of Contra 
mentality to the Federalist project, the “thrill of treason” when confronting the liberal legal 
establishment, whether on campuses or on the bench. The Society’s statement of purpose 
does in fact begin by declaring, “Law schools and the legal profession are currently strongly 
dominated by a form of orthodox liberal ideology which advocates a centralized and uniform 
society.” 
“What value do we contribute?”—Leo poses the central question. “We contribute 
human capital. We’re building a community of lawyers who embrace a set of principles; 
we’re cultivating them in law school; we’re moving them out of law school and into the legal 
profession. They’re becoming citizen-lawyers. Human capital is an important byproduct of 
what we do. But what else is? Well, the answer is ideas.”  
Where do these ideas come from? In the most basic sense, they are the byproduct of 
the interactions facilitated by the Society’s incessant programming. Take every luncheon-
with-panel-debate or guest speaker or cocktail reception and multiply all the ensuing 
conversations by the number of attendees at a given Federalist event, and then by the number 
of times they each recount those debates with their law partners, faculty colleagues, 
coworkers, fellow students. Local lawyers’ chapters schedule events on their own, sometimes 
coordinating with Washington to increase publicity via email, attain funding, or identify 
possible respondents for debates; the Firing Line formula makes it virtually taboo to not have 
a 50-50 liberal/conservative presence at Federalist events. As a longtime supporter of the 
group, Judge Rader of the Court of Appeals for the Washington, D.C. Circuit, told me, “If 
you’re going to have Robert Bork, somebody’s got to go get Larry Tribe.” The culture of the 
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Federalist Society is a culture of debate—even if the Larry Tribes are unlikely to persuade 
many of the Robert Borks they go up against. “These people enjoy the clash and thrust and 
parry of ideas,” longtime Federalist booster John Fund of The Wall Street Journal told me, 
“these are people who love to argue.”  
The Society has developed a small but loyal band of liberal guest speakers, including 
ACLU President Nadine Strossen and Bill Clinton’s Solicitor General Walter Dellinger; 
Strossen recently told the Washington Post “the Federalist Society has become kind of 
mythologized.”123 That is to say, the name “ACLU” has itself become an argument, in the 
guilt-by-association sense, thanks in part to President George H.W. Bush’s “card-carrying 
member” attacks against Michael Dukakis. But the effect runs deeper, giving the lie to “mere 
rhetoric” critiques. In a broader, rhetorical sense, “ACLU” has come to mean something that 
may or may not be divorced from what the organization sets forth as its mission. It becomes a 
stand-in for the worst nightmares of social conservatives: an irreligious, immoral, 
iconoclastic machine, working to undermine traditional society, family and gender 
relationships, and capital punishment. Conversely, Strossen said, “Federalist Society” has 
become an argument in certain circles, a way of pointing to the nightmare vision in what Sen. 
Edward Kennedy once described as “Robert Bork’s America” in the speech that many 
consider to have sunk the ill-fated 1987 nomination.124 
Robert Bork’s America would be governed by judges who denied that the 
Constitution stood for living, evolving values, Kennedy announced in a widely covered 
speech just moments after the Bork nomination. It would be a land without civil liberties, 
 
123 Michael Fletcher, “What the Federalist Society Stands For,” The Washington Post, July 29, 2005, 
A21. 
124 Congressional Record, July 1, 1987. 
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affirmative action or even desegregation; it was a land without abortion rights or privacy 
rights of any kind. The attack stuck, whether or not it was accurate; Bork received little 
support from the White House, then mired in Iran-Contra.  
Twenty years after the Bork meltdown, Federalist Society member Samuel Alito was 
asked if he still believed that that man, Robert H. Bork, was one of the finest Supreme Court 
nominees of the century.125 He did what Bork didn’t do. He dodged. He’d made it through 
the pipeline.  
 
125 Alito said this in 1988. Democratic senators raised the matter in Alito’s 2006 confirmation hearings. 
Responding to Senator Herb Kohl of Minnesota on January 10, 2006, Alito said, “When I made that statement 
in 1988 I was an appointee in the Reagan administration and Judge Bork had been a nominee of the 
administration and I had been a supporter of the nomination. I do not think the statement goes beyond that. 
There are issues with respect to which I probably agree with Judge Bork and there are a number of issues with 
which—on which I disagree with him.” Hearing transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011001087.html. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE PIPELINE DELIVERS 
 
Robert Bork: The Dispensable (and Indispensable) Man 
In order to deliver its fuel, every pipeline needs its pumping stations. During the 
lifetime of the Federalist Society, certain events have helped infuse the membership with new 
zeal and boost recruitment on campuses and among conservatively inclined lawyers. The first 
of these was the defeat of Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987. 
Many of the founders and otherwise “first generation” members of the Society were 
working for the Reagan administration at the time, and even more had been students of 
Bork’s at Yale (some, like John Bolton, were both). Known as being exceptionally generous 
with his time and attention, several of his former students told me, Bork inspired intense 
loyalty. By 1987 he had taught at the nation’s finest law school for a quarter of a century, 
reshaped the antitrust law through his academic work, and served as a federal appellate judge 
for six years. He was a rare role model for conservatives of Calabresi’s generation, and when 
their hero Ronald Reagan nominated him to the Supreme Court it seemed like his ship was 
finally coming in. It was not to be. 
The defeat of Bork’s nomination, which began with Kennedy’s speech and never 
really let up until the final vote was cast, was not helped by good planning or organization. 
“The White House basically disappeared because of Iran Contra,” future judge A. Raymond 
Randolph, who was helping shepherd the nomination through Congress, told me. He said that 
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at one point the White House apparently even began forwarding press calls to his home 
number. Bork was basically left to fend for himself—and he didn’t seem to be much in the 
mood for fending. Randall Rader, then counsel to Orrin Hatch on the Judiciary Committee, 
remembers the frustration of those difficult days which, as he sees it, had Bork winning the 
debate on the merits but losing it “politically”—the law/politics divide again, so much a part 
of the way conservatives see things. Rader tells of a meeting with Brad Reynolds and Bork in 
the midst of the hearings. Reynolds asks Rader to repeat a comment to Bork, which he does. 
“Judge Bork,” the young aide says,  
 
…You’re debating marvelously. But you simply have to get a little 
tear in your eye and look at the camera and say, “I wish to go on the Court to 
defend the equal rights of all citizens, man and woman, Black and white, 
whoever, in our society, and they will know that in me they have a 
champion.” And don’t talk about all of these cases, Bolling and Maryland and 
the third footnote. You need to appeal better to the public in the political 
sense. And he turned to me—and this line I can quote: “Randy, I’m a judge, 
not a politician.” And Brad pulls me away and says “We’ve been beating on 
him for months and he won’t move.” 
 
Thus in the minds of many conservatives Bork becomes a kind of latter-day Thomas 
More, who went to his death rather than betray the law at the behest of King Henry VIII. In 
Robert Bolt’s famous play A Man for All Seasons, More utters a line that echoes the theme 
Bork would take up in the years following the failed nomination: “the political seduction of 
the law.” Bork uses the line for the subtitle of his first bestselling book, The Tempting of 
America.126 The “temptation,” with all of its Biblical referents, depends greatly upon the 
law/politics dichotomy: law (pure, objective, nonpolitical, the realm of the judge) and politics 
 
126 Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1990). 
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(fickle, dependent on the popular will, the realm of the legislator). From Bolt’s play: “The 
currents and eddies of right and wrong…I can’t navigate,” More says. “I’m no voyager. But 
in the thickets of the law, I’m a forester.”127 
Here we see Moore the lawgiver disavowing fickle morality in favor of the knowable 
certainty of law grounded in texts, with their plain meanings. Morality and public whim is on 
one side, law on the other. In the forest of the law, Moore finds no currents and eddies, but 
rather (with skill) the certain knowledge of a way through. Moore’s own purposes are served 
by this, of course—he plays the ethical trump card of principle by setting up the straw man of 
flimsy, unreliable public opinion. Bolt’s Moore is a hero because he remains true to a law 
that allows for no compromise, that is ethical per se. Bork takes on this mantle for modern 
conservatives.  
At a 1989 Federalist event Cribb in fact quoted from Bolt’s play in introducing Bork, 
though not the passage I cite above. Cribb’s passage also focuses on objectivity, though—
Moore’s claim that he would fairly give the devil the benefit of the law, if the law 
commanded him to do so (again: no moral agency at work; apply the law, whether to the 
devil or not). “This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast—man’s laws, not 
God’s,” Moore says. “And if you cut them down…do you really think you could stand 
upright in the winds that blow then? Yes, I’d give the devil the benefit of the law, for my 
own safety’s sake.”128 One is prompted to wonder what Sir Thomas would have made of the 
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. 
 
127 Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons (New York: Random House, 1990 [1960]), 66. 
128 T. Kenneth Cribb, “Robert Bork: A Man for All Seasons.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy 12 (1989): 126. See also Robert Bork, “Thomas More for Our Season.” First Things 94 (1999): 17-21 
(“In the culture war of the sixteenth century, More was an active combatant for the binding force of law and the 
uniformity of religion  under the Catholic Church. Our culture was is more confusing and diffuse, but at its 
center it too is a struggle over the uniformity and stability of law.”). 
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After defeat in the Senate in 1987, of course, Bork went on to great success as an 
author and cultural critic. He shares with many on the left an explicit concern with the 
concept of culture—in his 1990 memoir, he addresses it directly in the context of his 
nomination battle with Senator Kennedy, presaging the “Culture Wars” of the 1990s and 
beyond. Resigning from the federal bench after the nomination vote, Bork sent a remarkable 
letter to Reagan which explained his decision to take the conservative fight from the judicial 
to the cultural arena. “I wish to speak, write, and teach about law and other issues of public 
policy more extensively and freely,” Bork wrote. “My decision to participate in the public 
debate…is what prompts my decision to leave the bench at this time.”129 And Bork took the 
fight to another audience, a much broader audience.  
On the spectrum of conservative rhetoric, Bork at his finest straddles the intellectual, 
political, and polemical domains. His post-nomination memoir The Tempting of America, for 
example, combines critiques of legal theory with political commentary. In more recent years 
he has drifted from the George F. Will audience and toward the hyperbole of Coulter and 
Limbaugh—“the grumpy old man of the right,” as one otherwise conservative ally put it. “He 
did point to the cultural battle that was going on, but cast the battle in such a way that 
probably undermined his efficicacy,” adds Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute. “He came across 
as too stern.” 
His star power was already established among movement conservatives (most of all 
his students), but Bork’s fame—or infamy—only grew following his defeat. “I think the 
nomination itself gave him a forum where he wound up convincing a good many people,” 
Randolph told me; in other words, there’s no such thing as bad publicity. In his books, Bork 
 
129 Bork, The Tempting of America, 320. 
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would expand on his legal and cultural critiques, lambasting liberals with polemical force, 
eventually becoming—in the minds of some conservatives—a bit too curmudgeonly to be 
persuasive.  
He has never lost his appeal to the Federalist faithful, though, and has been a constant 
presence at events over the twenty-five years since the group was founded. Grouchy or not, 
one of my teachers suggested provocatively that the worst mistake the modern American left 
had made was to prevent Bork from getting that seat on the Supreme Court, perhaps keeping 
him from advancing his cultural agenda, being turned not only into a verb but a symbol. 
Everyone I asked about this except Bork himself agreed. 
“He has become an icon of the conservative legal movement,” Randolph said, but he 
was bound for other things. “He wanted to have the freedom to write. He didn’t want to have 
to keep deciding whether some county commissioner was acting ‘reasonably’ or not.” Bork 
maintains his impact would have been greater on the Court, where he believes he could have 
provided the crucial vote to overturn Roe v. Wade and flip the balance in several other key 
cases. We will never know what Justice Robert Bork’s America would have looked like. We 
do know what bestselling-author Robert Bork’s America looks like.  
 
Building and Managing the Pipeline 
In part because of their ability to draw speakers with the credentials and conservative 
star power of Bork, the Federalist Society has grown consistently over time to its current 
level of over 40,000 participants in the three divisions: student, lawyer, and faculty. The 
student division is the smallest of the three—at approximately 5,000, it includes chapters all 
ABA-accredited law schools. These numbers are almost certainly conservative estimates of 
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actual numbers of lawyers, judges, and other professionals who participate in Society events. 
As with any membership organization, many members are lax in paying their dues; the 
Society’s mailing list, from which these figures derive, is much longer than its dues-paying-
members roster. Many of the judges and government officials I spoke with, for example, 
maintained very credibly that they had no idea whether they were members of the Federalist 
Society or not. Several of them started asking me questions about membership (“Are there 
dues? How much are they? Should I be paying dues if I get the magazine?”) and eventually I 
became persuaded that membership per se did not matter as an indicator of the Society’s 
development. It is a gauge, but it is not the key.  
For practical purposes, it is the mailing list and donors list that matter for the 
Society’s survival and growth. It is audiences, dues paying or not, who make its continual 
growth possible. Programming draws audiences, exposes them to varying conservative 
viewpoints and direct confrontation with liberals; “everyone loves blood,” as one longtime 
Federalist told me. According to the Society’s most recent annual report, student chapters 
hosted 581 events during the 2004-2005 academic year. Among these were three appearances 
by Justice Scalia, who has never abandoned the role he first assumed in 1981, when Lee 
Liberman called him up to ask if he’d be interested in serving as faculty advisor to their new 
club. 
Since its inception, the Society has spent the overwhelming majority of its budget on 
programming. In fiscal 2005, 88% of its $6.8 million revenues were spent on events, a 
percentage that has been relatively stable for most of the group’s existence. Growth in recent 
years has boomed—revenues more than doubled between 2000 and 2005, as they had 
between 1995 and 2000. Federalist president Eugene Meyer estimates the 2007 budget to be 
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close to $9 million, yet another increase from the previous year. Out of this vast sum almost 
nothing is spent on recruitment; in a sense, though, the events themselves serve as recruiting 
devices. Law students and faculty are naturally drawn to events where they can hear 
administration officials and judges speak or debate on contemporary issues and also have the 
opportunity to ask questions of their own. 
 The national office supports three staff members to coordinate with the student 
chapters—the entire Federalist Society workforce is only 21 people. Peter Redpath, the 
student division’s director since 2000, founded the Baylor University Law School chapter 
and arrived in Washington with aspirations to work for a member of Congress on Capitol 
Hill. He connected up with the Federalists, though, and quickly moved into his current role. 
Redpath interacts daily with students at the nearly 200 student chapters, and says that despite 
the workload he prefers working with students than with the other divisions. “When you’re 
dealing with the lawyers’ chapters, in large part, if you call them up during work hours 
you’re taking away from their billable hours. If you’re calling the students, they don’t 
actually mind the study break,” he says. “They might ask you for advice on anything from 
their law school classes to studying for the bar exam.”  
Email is the communicative mode of choice, and Redpath says it literally never ends; 
this is understandable given the numbers of students involved (thousands) and the size of his 
staff (three). The endless email, he says, can pertain to anything from “can I get more money 
for pizza for this meeting” to “our speaker cancelled, what do we do,” or “we heard that 
judge so-and-so is going to be on town on this date, can you see if we can get him to come?” 
Drawing on the extensive Federalist network, he says, with a little nudging most of the pieces 
seem to fall into place. Redpath helps identify speakers, and the national organization will 
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fund one speaker per event, up to $1,000. “We mention the 501(c)(3) status in our memos,” 
he told me, referring to the Society’s tax-exempt status. “We emphasize not inviting 
politicians to speak, particularly before an election; that they’re not to give stump speeches; 
that they should have a debate opponent.”  
 The national office does not coordinate campus events but it does offer vital  financial 
and logistical assistance to the student chapters. The Society maintains a list of past speakers 
drawn from legal academics, policymakers, and practitioners—“It’s a quality control kind of 
thing,” Redpath says. A partial excerpt of student division speakers in the Society’s 2005 
Annual Report reads like a who’s-who of conservatism, from talk radio host Michael 
Medved and John Fund of the Wall Street Journal to Justice Antonin Scalia and Bill Kristol 
and Phyllis Schlafly. There are neo-cons  and paleo-cons, libertarians and social 
conservatives. The age of the speakers varies widely, from the older generation like Schlafly, 
whose credentials date back to the Goldwater days, and younger, less-known figures such as 
Solicitor General Paul Clement and Peter Kirsanow, a Bush appointee to the Civil Rights 
commission. There are representatives of the major Washington think tanks, AEI, The 
Heritage Foundation, and the Cato Institute, as well as a host of academics.  
Part of what the Federalist Society has done is create a space—literally and 
figuratively—where this collection of leading conservative thinkers can come together, on 
campuses and elsewhere. Bork offered a similar analysis, thinking back to the earlier days of 
the movement. “There was a lot of generalized discontent with the Warren Court floating 
through the society, but there was no focus for it, no focal point.” The Society has become 
the focal point. While the Supreme Court has long been the subject of political critique, from 
both the left and the right, the Federalist Society represented a new step in focusing 
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conservative criticism. Moving away from the ad-hoc attacks of candidates or fringe groups 
like the Birchers, the Federalists have worked to provide intellectual coherence to their 
criticism. Grounded in a broader conservative worldview, it entails a view of Constitutional 
governance rooted in the idea of separation of powers, a preference for limited government, 
and dissemination of theories of interpretation such as originalism and textualism. There is 
disagreement over how these broad themes should translate into policy, but they provide the 
intellectual foundation for those debates to go forward among conservatives—and for 
conservatives to engage with their opponents of other political persuasions.  
“They’ve been able to be a gathering point for intellectualism in law among 
conservatives,” Chemerinsky said, “and have been able to bridge the difference between, 
from the libertarians to the evangelicals, and the various stands that they all take.” Though 
the Federalists have faced bountiful logistical challenges, the project is, and always has been, 
intellectual. “It takes a theory to beat a theory,” as Epstein put it. 
Sure, the John Birch Society put up billboards in California calling for the 
impeachment of Earl Warren, but if anything—as we have seen—this aggressive approach 
proved a liability rather than a boost for Buckley and the conservatives of that era. With 
Reagan’s election and the mainstreaming of the movement, though, it became possible to 
begin focusing the disparate strands of legal conservatism and critiques of New Deal-era 
jurisprudence and the Living Constitution of the Warren Court liberals. “The Federalist 
Society provided a focus point for people who were unhappy with the way things were going 
in the development of the law,” Bork says. It continues doing this today, and a good part of 
the “value added”—to use economics jargon—for Federalist Society participants today is 
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that they are able to network and strategize with like-minded individuals from other walks of 
life, many of whom are quite powerful.  
 Flipping through back issues of The Federalist Paper provides a kind of kinetiscope 
version of how the Society gathered momentum during the Reagan years, was propelled 
through the Clinton presidency by frustration and even anger, and then ultimately was 
vindicated and welcomed by a more conservative Bush administration in 2000. On the one 
hand, there is continuity: then-Judge Antonin Scalia is on the front cover of the Spring 1985 
issue, which discusses the recent student symposium held at Georgetown University, themed 
around the question of equality—a dicey issue we will take up in a later chapter. Brad 
Reynolds, who was then very much in the heat of battle defending his opposition to 
affirmative action, also spoke at the 1985 equality conference. Interestingly and typically 
provocative was another guest, Ronald Krietmeyer of the U.S. Catholic Conference, who 
defended a statement by the national Bishops’ conference calling for greater equality in 
American society. “Comments from Judges Bork and Scalia suggested that much more 
remains for the bishops to consider,” the Federalist Paper concludes.  
On the four-page newsletter’s back page one learns that then-Harvard professor Bill 
Kristol had recently appeared at the University of Buffalo to give remarks on the Supreme 
Court. Although not a lawyer, Kristol’s Ph.D. dissertation was a massive 500-page textual 
exegesis of the Federalist Papers, heavily influenced by conservative literary critic and 
philosopher Leo Strauss.130 Kristol’s father, Irving, was one of the original neoconservatives, 
and his support helped secure some of the initial funding that got the Federalist Society off 
the ground; he would later say that the seed money given to the Society by the Institute for 
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Educational Affairs was “the best money we ever spent.”131 Among the Society’s other initial 
backers was the Olin foundation, which, it just so happened, also sponsored Kristol’s 1985 
Buffalo talk. Kristol has remained a frequent Federalist panelist and guest speaker. 
 Scalia is back on the cover of the Summer 1986 Federalist Paper, which discusses 
that year’s student symposium, which focused on the First Amendment. Milton Friedman, 
one of the godfathers of conservative supply-side economics, was the keynote speaker, and 
his remarks echoed the theme of his book Capitalism and Freedom132—the newsletter says 
he asked the audience a rhetorical question, ‘Do free men make markets, or do free markets 
make free men.’” For Friedman and many other conservatives, it is a matter of gospel truth 
that the second formulation is the right one.  
 The 1986 newsletter also includes an article announcing the establishment of the first 
four lawyers’ division chapters in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. 
By 1988 the New York chapter had grown to 500 members, and by the following year total 
membership passed 2,000—a figure that would nearly double in the following 12 months 
and, astoundingly, hit 6,000 by late 1991 and 10,000 by late 1995. The word was getting 
around. 
Washington was the site of the first national lawyers’ convention and has remained so 
with one exception. The capital city has been home to the most active of all lawyers’ 
chapters—the reason isn’t hard to understand. “In some ways starting a lawyers chapter in 
Washington was easier than starting a lawyers’ chapter in other cities,” Calabresi said, 
mentioning some of the first luncheon discussions and debates. Some members I talked to 
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132 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002 [1962]). 
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expressed a tinge of resentment about the Washington chapter’s high profile. But there is a 
practical fit with the Society’s project that is hard to ignore. “Compared to people doing 
corporate transactions in Manhattan,” Calabresi said, “for lawyers in Washington, going to 
these events was often related to doing their jobs.” Washington is, after all, where the action 
is—where laws are written, policy formulated, and Supreme Court decisions handed down.  
A brief internal Federalist Society history describes the first meeting of the 
Washington chapter, in May 1984, as a “small pilot project,” whose first meeting included a 
speaker from the Office of Management and Budget. “Membership in the group cost a 
meager five dollars,” we are told. “A small band of about 30 attended.” By 2005, there were 
65 lawyers’ division chapters, “the next step in the Society’s pipeline for fueling a 
community committed to fostering the application of traditional legal principles.” The 
lawyers’ division hosted 230 events in 2005, with an average of 60 attendees per event. 
 
As more and more Federalist law students graduated and the organization continued 
to prosper, it became clear that a stronger lawyers’ division was needed. Part of the planning 
for the newly populated ranks of Federalist alumni included the fifteen “Practice Groups” 
that would cluster the lawyer membership by area of legal expertise. The groups were 
formalized in 1997 and have maintained the same groupings ever since: Administrative Law; 
Civil Rights; Corporations; Criminal Law and Procedure; Environmental Law and Property 
Rights; Federalism and Separation of Powers; Financial Services and E-commerce; Free 
Speech and Election Law; Intellectual Property; International and National Security Law; 
Labor and Employment Law; Litigation; Professional Responsibility; Religious Liberties; 
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and Telecommunications. The Practice Groups were jump started with a funding grant 
secured from the E.L. Wiegand Foundation, a Nevada-based trust. 
Practice Groups each have an executive committee who on average talk once a month 
on a conference call with the national office. Dean Reuter has served as the Director of the 
Practice Groups since 2001, and as with Redpath and the Student Division, has one deputy 
and shared access to a small support staff. Like so many other Federalists, Reuter tells how 
feeling marginalized as a young conservative in law school eventually led him to the Society. 
At Northwestern University in the early 1980s he remembers taking Constitutional law with 
prominent scholar Michael Perry. “He started talking about the Living Constitution and why 
the Constitution needs to evolve, to change,” Reuter told me. “It was a seminar class of 
maybe a dozen people and I had arguments with him consistently: what are the standards 
there, what does it become? How do you know what the living Constitution is? Who gets to 
decide, and to whom are they accountable? And none of his answers were satisfactory.” For 
Reuter as for many other conservatives in the Society, this feeling of alienation led to a 
commitment to the organization that has put forth an alternative view—that has said “your 
view is not the only one.” 
The Practice Groups take the intellectual mission of the Society in a more applied 
direction—but still hewing to the group’s academic, intellectual tone. Bringing together 
practitioners with policymakers in the specific areas of law and litigation does mean that 
there is greater possibility for practical application: Separation of powers exists as an abstract 
Constitutional idea, but it also affects the way the Federal Communications Commission 
regulates cable providers, or the way elections are conducted—though again the Washington 
divide affects the relevance of the intellectual project to the actual work Federalist lawyers do 
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on a daily basis. For the Washingtonians, there is often a clear “value added.” The groups 
sometimes hold their own conventions and meetings and may schedule other events with 
programs specifically related to their areas of legal practice. 
These interactions are particularly valuable “for somebody in Washington, especially 
for someone who has an appellate practice,” said Jeffrey Clark, a former Justice Department 
official and now a partner at the prestigious firm of Kirkland and Ellis. “These issues that 
come up are issues I get to work on. So these conferences are not just, for me, wistfully 
looking at great things I might get to work on. These are actually things I can apply…These 
things keep the saw sharp, the saw that I use on a daily basis.” For those outside the Beltway 
and its rarified political air, though, the Federalist Society provides a link to the policy 
process—a connectivity that has civic if not career-advancing value. What members take 
away from events is often “much less nuts and bolts,” Reuter said.  
As an example he points to the telecommunications practice group. “Rewriting the 
Telecommunications Act is something people are very interested in, if they are practicing in 
that area, and we’ll have 50 people show up. But it is still probably a higher level discussion 
than talking about whether, say, you want to go with Section 201(5.7)(b) then you take this 
form, and you flip it over because on the back…we don’t do that. But we do talk about the 
Telecommunications Act, the Bank Secrecy Act, or the Endangered Species Act. And people 
do find some practical application for that in their practice.”  
A similar theme was echoed by Hans von Spakovsky, a recent Bush appointee to the 
Federal Elections Committee who had formerly served in a career position at Justice. Prior to 
coming to Washington, Spakovksy had been active with the Federalist chapter in Atlanta as 
well as nurturing an academic interest by writing papers for the Georgia Public Policy 
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Foundation. “By going to these Federalist Society lunches in Atlanta, I got to know a lot of 
other lawyers who weren’t just interested in representing their clients,” he told me, “but who 
were really interested in public policy, how and why laws are written and implemented and 
how to fix problems that are caused by bad laws.” The Federalist Society helped him bridge 
that gap between theory and practice and find a community of people who were interested in 
doing so. 
By 1989 The Federalist Paper is informing its readers of ever-increasing numbers of 
events and new chapters across the country; Phoenix joined the Lawyers’ Division roster that 
March and kicked off by hosting a debate between the state Attorney General and an Arizona 
State law professor on habeas corpus. The article also mentions an appearance at the 
Chicago lawyers’ chapter by Congressman Henry Hyde, who would go on to chair the 
International Relations Committee in the House of Representatives, as well as Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals Judge Edith Jones’s talk with the Dallas chapter. Jones was widely 
discussed as having been on President Bush’s short-list of potential Supreme Court nominees 
in 2006.133 
The same 1989 issue also contains an important, though rather mundane development 
in the Society’s evolution: a change of address form for graduating law school students. The 
“pipeline” was hitting a snag around this time. For all of its rhetorical success in reaching—
and creating—an audience, the logistical side was coming under stress. The number of 
graduating Federalists began to overwhelm the ability of the organizational structure to 
coordinate their continued participation, and many law school “Feddies” were getting lost in 
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the transition from the campus to legal practice. Several strategies were developed, including 
waiving the first year of membership fees in the Lawyers’ Division.  
Better programming would help make continued membership attractive, as would 
opportunities for networking through the Practice Groups—which were at this point still 
several years in the offing. Publications beyond the rather light fare of The Federalist Paper 
were added to increase the Society’s profile and disseminate its members’ writings. These 
would eventually include Engage, a biannual journal containing academic law review-styled 
articles (begun 1999); the ABA Watch newsletter, scrutinizing the activities of the Bar 
Association (begun 1996); as well as an increasing number of white papers and monographs 
prepared by members. With the advent of the Internet the availability of all of these 
publications was made exponentially easier. But in 1990, more traditional modes of 
organization-building were still important; the August issue of The Federalist Paper was the 
first to include a center-insert pre-addressed membership envelope. In a rather amusing 
economic commentary, membership rates were $5 for students, $25 for lawyers, $10 for 
faculty, and $25 for “other.” The form also featured a write-in line for tax-deducible 
donations and a check-box for aspiring chapter founders. “I am interested in forming a 
chapter at/in _____________.” 
In 1990 the Society’s continued growth led to the creation of a Board of Trustees, in 
part to build development and increase funding—which would allow more publications, 
speakers’ fees, and other programming. The trustees’ first meeting took place on May 30th of 
1990, and the Federalist Paper reported that they “formulated plans to secure both individual 
and corporate contributions.” That initial board was made up of nine prominent conservatives 
including Meese, Bork, Reynolds, Holly Coors (wife of brewing magnate Joseph Coors), and 
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Senator Orrin Hatch. They fulfilled their fundraising mission well; programming—and 
perhaps as a result, membership—shot upward at a furious pace during the 1990s. In 1994, 
The Federalist Paper reports another significant effort aimed at expanding the Society’s 
connections to the broader conservative community. Former Bush I White House Counsel C. 
Boyden Gray organized the Society’s new Business Advisory Council, an “outreach group” 
including executives from Wachovia, Lowe’s, Media General, and others. The pipeline kept 
expanding into new territory.  
Responding to the boom in Lawyers’ Division membership was among Leonard 
Leo’s initial tasks when he was hired in Fall 1991. Leo had founded the Cornell University 
student chapter in 1986 and worked to have the national Student Symposium hosted on his 
home turf two years later. He particularly caught the attention of Stephen Markman, head of 
the Washington lawyers’ chapter and now a justice on the Michigan Supreme Court. He also 
made a mark on Randall Rader, whom he invited to speak at Cornell. Rader would bring Leo 
to Washington as an intern with the Senate Judiciary Committee and then as newly appointed 
Judge Rader’s first law clerk. Thus functions the network; later, with the Federalist Society, 
Leo would work to make it possible for more and more young conservatives to be given the 
kinds of opportunities he had been afforded. 
After his term with Rader finished Leo went on to clerk for Judge Randolph, who had 
been appointed to the bench by the first President Bush in 1990. Leo decided against the 
lucrative fast-track open to former clerks by many top law firms. “I was quite surprised when 
he left Ray Randolph,” Rader said. “Instead of going into practice he went to the Federalist 
Society. He called me and consulted with me about it, and I thought it was very good for 
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him. It was what he wanted to do…I’ve been very proud that he’s developed into someone 
who has an impact.”  
Leo, the Society’s Executive Vice President, joined Gene Meyer in shepherding  the 
Society as it continued to grow. Gene had been brought on board in 1983 after the Society 
had officially incorporated and it became clear a national director was needed. Lee Liberman 
first approached her older friend from Yale to ask his advice on who might be up to the job. 
“He said, well—I might be interested!” The one other candidate under consideration for the 
position was rejected, and Meyer has remained in the post ever since. 
Meyer and Leo are something of an odd couple, a yin-yang pair if ever there was one. 
Where Gene seems perpetually ruffled, laid-back and unimposing, Leonard is all business—
as impeccably dressed as he is intense, not a word wasted or a hair out of place; the kind of 
person who, when seated, intuitively readjusts his tie to assure it properly covers the buttons 
of his Oxford shirt. Together they are joint yeomen of the guard, covering between them the 
full spectrum of political and interpersonal skills required to run a national organization. 
“The Federalist Society is the clearing house, the Grand Central Station for legal 
conservatives,” John Fund told me. “Leonard and Eugene are the station masters.”  
Professor Epstein goes further. “Gene Meyer is a genius,” he said. “He understands 
that if you wish to run an organization like this it has to be decentralized. And I’ve never 
seen him hog the spotlight; I’ve never seen him speak at the Federalist Society on any 
substantive issues. To this day I could not tell you how libertarian or how majoritarian he is. 
He has decided to put his own private views on hold for the good of an organization that he 
has run for twenty-five years.” Leo, on the other hand, “is involved in every darn thing,” 
Epstein says. “I first met him when he invited me to Cornell, and I said this is a man who’s 
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going to go far…with most Federalist Society kids, they do it, they’ll graduate and they’ll do 
something else. As for Leonard—this man clearly has a commitment.” He certainly does 
have that, even his critics will concede. 
Leo encountered major media attention in 2005 when he took a leave of absence from 
the Society to advise the White House on selection of a nominee to succeed retiring Supreme 
Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. The move was necessary for legal reasons—as a non-
profit group, Federalist Society officers cannot endorse candidates or engage in directly 
political activity. But Leo was often identified in the media as “Leonard Leo of The 
Federalist Society.” Whether or not he was on the payroll at that given moment, it is clear 
that the reason Leo’s opinions were considered was precisely because he was Leonard Leo of
the Federalist Society. Having helped preside over the booming growth of the organization 
for 15 years, he has a finger on the pulse of conservatives in American legal practice. “It says 
a lot about the success of our movement that people with our ideas are no longer just talking 
about them, but are in a position to do something about them,” Leo said.  
A phrase the Federalists like to use in this regard is “citizen lawyer,” and based on my 
several years of interaction with members at various levels, it’s a good one. Even the rank 
and file Federalists tend to be someone who views himself or herself as part of a social and 
political project, always on the lookout for ways to put their ideas into practice. And given 
that the law tends to attract people who enjoy debate and activism, it often doesn’t take much 
to spur them into action. “If you convince a lawyer of something, you’ve done more than 
convince one average member of the public,” Reuter said. “They’re more likely to turn 
around and argue with people, to try to convince other people, to write letters to the editor, 
run for office.” The Federalist Society, in a sense, is a jump-starting device—or to use a 
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military metaphor, a base camp. As Bork suggested, it provides a focal point, a forum for 
provocative debate, networking and the development of personal, professional, and political 
ties. “Our members are armed with ideas and enthusiasm that I think they get by going to our 
programs,” Reuter adds. “Our people are the kind of people that will try to change the world, 
or to change their little part of it.” 
 
Branching Out: The Role of Judges  
The Society’s programming was expanded in 1992 to include continuing legal 
education workshops—accredited seminars required on an annual basis by most state bar 
associations. CLE events are often hosted by law schools or professional associations; they 
typically involve a couple days of intense instruction and discussion covering materials in 
some current area of law. The first Federalist Society CLE workshop dealt with the Takings 
Clause and environmental law—a hotly debated topic, regarding whether certain 
environmental regulations, which may result in landowners being unable to use their property 
for farming or other purposes, represent a “taking” under the Constitution, therefore require 
monetary compensation by the government. Lecturers at the CLE event included a federal 
judge and several government lawyers as well as Michael Greve of the American Enterprise 
Institute, who remains today one of the most outspoken opponents of government regulation 
in general. 
The Society has continued sponsoring CLE events, one of which produced a boomlet 
of controversy in late 2005 when Justice Scalia co-taught a seminar held at the Ritz-Carlton 
in Vail, Colorado. Scalia had appeared several times before at Federalist CLE events, but this 
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was this first time a media dustup ensued.134 The episode reflects deeper questions about the 
participation of judges in the Federalist Society, an issue often raised by critics and fodder for 
some of the more extreme, conspiratorial accounts of what goes on in the secret Federalist 
cabal. The pipeline sometimes delivers some very rich fuel to its members—though of course 
anyone can join. Inflation seems to have taken its toll since the 1990 mail-in envelope; or 
perhaps, as Epstein would say, the market price has adjusted to the value. Current rates are 
$50 for lawyers as well as nonlawyer general members; $25 for faculty, public sector, or 
nonprofit; and $5 for students. There is no ideological questionnaire or political test 
involved—membership and its privileges are a point and a click away.  
The Vail CLE event was attended by about 100 lawyers, including myself, and was 
closed to the press and public. ABC News’ Nightline program had an undercover reporter 
and camera operator at the event and ran an exposé-style piece on the workshop in late 
January of 2006. “We’ve heard a lot about junkets for Congressmen, which they like to call 
fact finding missions,” reporter Brain Ross said in the piece’s opening. “The justices call 
them educational seminars. They are held at fancy resorts with someone else picking up the 
tab.” As undercover video of Scalia playing tennis at the Ritz rolls, Ross intones that the 
Justice just happened to be absent from Washington on the day John Roberts was sworn in as 
the Supreme Court’s new Chief—an “apparent snub.”135 
The piece identifies the Federalists as “a conservative activist group,” some of whose 
members practice law before the Supreme Court. It then features several law professors 
critiquing Scalia’s involvement with the Society. “He’s using the prestige of his office to 
 
134 According to Federalist Society President Eugene Meyer he is scheduled to appear again at a CLE 
course in 2007. 
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advance the interests of a group with a decided political-slash-judicial profile,” Stephen 
Gillers of New York University told Ross. “The issue,” Ross concluded in his report, was 
“not bribery or influence, but the appearance of lack of justice, of fair-mindedness, for people 
who can’t afford to fly a justice out for a fancy three-day trip.” 
As one might imagine, the Federalist Society took sharp exception to this 
characterization of the CLE event, and a sharp series of accusatory letters changed hands. But 
as a former reporter myself—and as someone present at the Vail event—what stands out 
most in the ABC report is the decision to include nothing about the two full days of teaching 
that were the reason Scalia, the former professor, was there in the first place. The undercover 
cameramen weren’t in the closed-door teaching sessions (several U.S. Marshalls guards kept 
that from happening), and Ross must not have thought it important to speak with any of the 
100 attendees who were. Although I was rather bowled over by the luxurious 
accommodations, what struck me most about the three days in Vail was the fact that this 
Justice of the Supreme Court was genuinely engaging with lawyers, almost all of whom he’d 
never met and would never see before his Court. The teaching sessions were intense and 
yes—as the RSVP cover letter had said—Justice Scalia did expect you to have done your 
readings (all 500 pages!).  
Seated on the dais in a medium-size banquet room, Scalia and Professor John Baker 
of Louisiana State University alternated turns at a podium, reviewing the history of 
separation-of-powers cases dating back to Marbury v. Madison136 in 1803, which established 
judicial review as we know it and also entailed a dispute between the executive and judicial 
branches. Throughout the workshop, attendees constantly raised their hands and even 
 
136 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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interrupted Scalia, who responded to and engaged their questions. Particularly when we 
began examining more modern cases, including some written by Scalia, the “class” was 
hardly looking to brown-nose the professor.  
There were some very intense back-and-forth exchanges between teachers and 
students. Both in the teaching sessions and the informal receptions, Scalia engaged in 
conversation as any teacher would. Sure, he has a rather elite position on the subject matter. 
But he did not attempt to use his authority to shut down discussion, belittle students, or, for 
that matter, to provide “tips” for winning Clarence Thomas’s vote. The one time he 
mentioned Thomas was in reference to a case where they disagreed. In short, Ross and ABC 
got the story almost completely wrong. The audience was members-only but anyone can be a 
member, and Scalia actually was there to teach law, not to play tennis.  
While it is true, as ABC also reported, that Supreme Court justices are not bound by 
the official code of judicial ethics, even if they were, what Scalia was doing at that seminar 
would have passed muster. Ross didn’t look into this, apparently, or find it worthy of 
including in his report. Canon Four of the ethics code states, “A judge may speak, write, 
lecture, teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the 
administration of justice.” It continues in commentary, “As a judicial officer and person 
specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement 
of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice…the judge is encouraged to do 
so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or other 
organization dedicated to the improvement of the law.”137 
137 Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon Four, “A Judge May Engage in Extra-Judicial 
Activities To Improve the Law, the Legal System, and the Administration of Justice.” 
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ch1.html#4 (accessed April 14, 2007). 
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Improvement of the law is, to be sure, seen differently by liberals and conservatives. 
A liberal would probably not view Scalia’s take on separation of powers—well established in 
his opinions—as an “improvement.” The same goes for his view of the opposing position 
held by the more liberal members of the Court. But as Judge Randolph, who helped draft the 
ethics code, pointed out, Canon Four seems to clearly support the case for judges’ 
participation in Federalist events. 
Randolph, who has taught for the past eight years at George Mason University in 
Virginia, sees the Society as a kind of  permanent CLE seminar—with a particular 
conservative bent, of course. And the intellectual aspect is what keeps him coming back. “I 
don’t think I’ve ever been to a Federalist Society panel and not learned something,” 
Randolph told me. “It’s almost like teaching…you get to delve deeply into something; we on 
the court here hit the top of the wave all the time,” he said. “We are generalists.” This 
intellectual theme is echoed again and again by attendees at Federalist events, many of which 
read like CLE-approved seminars, even if they’re not (and most of them are not). A few 
examples from recent years: “Copyright, Creativity, and Commerce”; “Turning Private 
Property into Public Trusts”; “Race and the Individual”; “Is There Any Room Left for 
Federalism in Financial Services.” The judges I spoke with had much the same things to say 
about their reasons for participation in these conference panels: intellectual engagement is a 
good thing, whether you are a Manhattan lawyer doing mergers and acquisitions or a judge 
on the Ninth Circuit. 
“Approaching it academically,” Judge Rader said, “there’s a broad range of ways my 
colleagues on this court and throughout the judiciary approach legal debates. Some of them 
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say, ‘I must avoid any debate because I might disclose my thinking which would intimate 
how I might act in the future’.” To Rader this view is somewhat disingenuous, since 
“everybody knows what they think and how they’re going to act in the future, just from 
reading their opinions in the past.” He strongly defends his participation in Federalist events. 
“As long as we’re avoiding any particular case pending before us,” he says, “the debate 
broadens our minds and helps us be better informed as legal arbiters.” The arguments against 
engagement are, Rader suggests, motivated by political and intellectual animus—an end-run 
around actual debate. “I think there’s an agenda for those who are in the Nightline camp: 
They can create this sense of conflict of interest when I think one does not exist.”  
For his part, Scalia is adamant in defending his extra-curricular appearances like the 
Federalist event in Vail. “The day that the judiciary ceases to be part of the intellectual 
ferment of the society, when we are drummed out of the intellectual life of the society—I get 
off the train,” he told me in an interview. “We’ve always been part of the intellectual life of 
the society, from Joseph Story on. He taught, he wrote the first commentaries on the 
Constitution and so forth. How can you possibly say this is an improper activity? It’s 
ridiculous.” 
He even appears to have pulled at least one liberal on the Court along with him in his 
public opinionizing. Though they are often at odds in their judgments from the bench, Scalia 
and his fellow former professor Stephen Breyer have of late been appearing in a series of 
public discussions (it would be unseemly to call them “debates”), usually with the two 
adversaries seated in high-backed easy chairs on a dais before an audience of law students or 
lawyers, and moderated in their “discussion” by a news anchor or scholar. At one such 
event—co-sponsored by the Federalists and the American Constitution Society in 2006—an 
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emblematic and genuinely funny exchange occurred: Scalia responds to a questions from the 
moderator regarding his opinion in a recent Court opinion, and then looks to Breyer for his 
reply. Breyer politely suggests, in the traditional mold, that it would be “improper” to expand 
on his written opinion. A brief, awkward silence ensues. The audience—some 600 of the 
Washington, D.C. legal elite—shifts its eyes back to Scalia. “Try it,” he says, leaning 
forward toward Breyer and cracking a broad grin, “you’ll like it!” There is a ripple of 
laughter and then, somewhat to the surprise of many, Breyer takes the lead. One can only 
speculate that as a former teacher himself, the liberal Justice sees somewhat reluctantly eye-
to-eye with his conservative colleague when it comes to the role of the judge as civic 
participant, as continuing educator. 
Judge Kozinsky, who has written more than a few op-eds for the Wall Street Journal,
echoed Scalia’s tone in telling me about his appearances at Federalist events over the years. 
“I think it would be pretty far-fetched for someone to say that I shouldn’t be present,” he 
said. “It’s almost an un-American point of view…I think it’s never wrong to go and express 
your view.” Like the professor cited by Nightline, there are those who would disagree with 
Kozinsky on ethical grounds, seemingly suggesting that in order to preserve his or her role as 
impartial arbiter, the judge must maintain no views of his own, or at least never talk about 
them anywhere except in published opinions. It’s ironic that this critique, often heard from 
liberals who don’t like Scalia’s speechifying, are often the same critics who accuse the right 
of espousing artificial notions of judicial “objectivity.” Kozinsky and other Federalists I 
spoke with were perfectly willing to admit they have a point of view, and are willing to share 
it with law students and other organizations, be it the conservative Federalists or the liberals 
in the more recently-established American Constitution Society, known in legal circles as the 
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ACS (to the Federalist Society’s FedSoc, or, more familiarly, Feddies or Federalistas). 
Kozinsky says he is just as willing to accepts ACS invitations as ones from the Federalists; 
and in either case, the project is a good one. “I think that to discuss the law is what we want,” 
he said. “We want engaged, thinking people in our judicial posts.”  
ACS president Lisa Brown, a former advisor to presidential candidate Al Gore, has 
no problem with this kind of analogy. The organization, she told me, “is in part a recognition 
of the effectiveness of the model they built, in terms of generating ideas and the means of 
implementing them.” 
Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain, also of the Ninth Circuit, agreed, noting that the ACS 
events appeared to be following the same balanced-debate protocols as the Federalists. For 
O’Scannlain neutrality is the key, and that seems to put him in a somewhat different position 
than his colleague Kozinsky. “I will never put myself in a position where I’m taking a point 
of view,” he told me. “I think people that aren’t careful about that are fairly criticized.” 
 
National Conventions: The Pipeline’s Central Pumping Station 
Judges have served frequently as panel moderators at the national conventions—the 
value of which goes well beyond the celebrity factor. As anyone who has attended an 
academic conference knows, panelists rarely stick to their allotted time limitations. But when 
a federal judge starts to bring the gavel down, most speakers will wrap up pretty quickly. The 
2005 conference featured a total of twenty panels each with four or five panelists, eleven of 
which had sitting or former federal judges, as moderators.  
Panelists are drawn from academia, legal practice, and government, presenting 
different perspectives on the topic as well as different positions on the issue. At the 2005 
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panel on international law, for example, one finds Robert Bork facing off with prominent 
human rights lawyer Francisco Forrest Martin, president of the group Rights International; 
their moderator was Judge Edith Jones. A 2003 panel had conservative Professor John 
McGinnis seated alongside liberal Mark Tushnet debating “ideology and the legal academy,” 
two of the most prominent scholars in the field of Constitutional law, moderated by Judge 
Douglas Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. A few years earlier, a panel on 
judicial nominations featured two former White House counsel, Republican Fred Fielding 
and Democrat Lloyd Cutler, as well as the heads of two prominent non-profit activist groups 
(one liberal, one conservative), with a Wall Street Journal editor moderating.  
These are not exceptional examples. The list of interesting and impressive 
combinations of panelists could fill a whole chapter. Convention panelists over the past 
twenty years contain most of the nation’s leading scholars—liberal and conservative—and 
top political appointees from both parties. Since their inception, the conventions have been 
planned explicitly to secure top-tier panelists and to produce provocative debate.  
For most of the years since the first convention in 1987, the gatherings have been held 
at the Mayflower Hotel, one of Washington’s more prestigious locations. The 2005 
convention, centered around originalism as a textual and legal methodology, ran from a 
Thursday morning to Saturday evening. It followed what has become a fairly standard 
formula in recent years, similar to the way most academic conferences are organized. Gene 
Meyer opens the event on Thursday morning with short remarks and introduces the first 
“showcase panel” tied to the convention theme and featuring participants with broad name 
recognition.  
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The first of several speeches is then given by a prominent political or legal figure; in 
2005 this was Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, a GOP presidential hopeful who used 
the occasion mainly to test-drive his stump-speech—rather outside the norm for Federalist 
speakers. Past speakers have included Attorney General John Ashcroft, John Fund of the 
Wall Street Journal, future U.N. ambassador John Bolton, and Labor Secretary Elaine Chao. 
Romney’s appearance in 2005 produced a minor controversy not because of anything the 
Governor said, but because Leonard Leo in his introduction referred to his home state of 
Massachusetts as being run by the “KKK…the Kerry Kennedy Klan.” News media ran the 
clips, and Romney disavowed any knowledge of the remarks, calling them inappropriate.138 
Before 2001 there was a keynoter on day two at the banquet dinner, but no headliner speech 
on day one—an indication of the Society’s increased ability in recent years to draw more and 
more prominent speakers.  
After the first day’s headliner there is a buffet luncheon, the atmosphere of which has 
at times seemed somewhat akin to the awkward social hierarchy of a high school cafeteria. 
Attendees jump to grab seats next to federal judges or political figures, hoping to ask a 
question or make a career connection. The mood is excited not just because one might get to 
chat with high-profile Federalists, but because of the common bond and friendship a visitor 
comes to realize exists among the members, whether or not their names are familiar to 
readers of the Washington Post. “There’s a certain positive energy,” said Jan Berlage, a 
private practitioner who founded the Connecticut chapter in 1996. “It’s not about winning or 
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losing, it’s about being part of a juggernaut organization. It builds confidence, it build 
success. It’s positive energy.” 
 
Afternoon panels follow on day one, with attendees either choosing one or “panel-
hopping.” Topics are usually grouped by area of legal practice and coordinated with the 
Practice Group divisions. With judges keeping speakers on a fairly tight rhetorical leash, time 
is almost always left for questions, and the grilling can get fairly hot. It is worth noting that 
the questions at these conference events come almost exclusively from the conference-
goers—that is to say, from conservatives. But as we will see more in the following chapters, 
there is plenty of friction to go around on the right, without even bringing in liberals’ 
opposing views. That is to say, not every question is directed toward the panel’s liberal 
representatives, accusing them of heresy, idiocy, or worse. I have seen fierce debates 
between libertarians and conservatives at conventions and other Federalist events on a wide 
array of topics from abortion to the war in Iraq to Bush’s budget deficits and fiscal policy.  
Indeed, Bush is hardly a unifying rallying figure the way Ronald Reagan once was. 
“The Bush administration has been a setback because it is bereft of ideas, even hostile to 
ideas unlike the Reagan administration when Washington was alive with intellectual 
ferment,” said the Cato Institute’s Pilon. On the other side of the libertarian-conservative 
divide one finds little more sympathy. “I don’t think George Bush is much of a 
conservative,” declared Robert Bork. “I’m disgusted with Republicans in Congress. They’re 
off spending and boondoggling worse than the Democrats did.” While he supported the war 
in Iraq, Bork says it has not been carried out well; while Bush’s tax cuts fit with his social 
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conservative views, any benefit is undercut by his spending. “I think Bush is terrible,” he 
said, exasperated.  
These kinds of internecine disagreements often come down to different readings of a 
text, be it the Constitution of the United States or the October 2002 resolution authorizing the 
use of force against Iraq—and there is plenty of disagreement about those two texts. “The 
practicing bar element of the Society is extraordinarily thoughtful about law,” one 
Constitutional law professor told me. “Even for the people who don’t have it as their job to 
teach students or write law review articles…people bring to these conferences the same kind 
of philosophical bent that we do.” 
A banquet dinner is held on Friday night, consisting of the typical chicken-or-fish 
entrée and free-flowing mid-grade California wine. (A fine facilitator of good debate and 
conversation!) Keynote addresses have been delivered by a similar list of high-profile figures 
such as Vice Presidents Dan Quayle and Dick Cheney, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Senate 
Majority Leader Bill Frist. In 2005 the keynote speaker was Karl Rove, who at the time was 
under investigation by independent prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald in connection with the leak 
of CIA operative Valerie Plame’s identity. While Rove drew sustained applause from the 
crowd, one longtime Federalist member I spoke to took issue with Rove’s presence. “I was 
disappointed to see Karl Rove as the keynote speaker,” she told me. “While I understand he 
plays a significant political role in the current administration, I would prefer to have the focus 
of the society remain on the open marketplace of ideas and the way in which the power of 
those ideas can influence thoughtful members of our profession.”  
When at the conventions I often found myself thinking that for all the talk of the 
Federalists’ secrecy and cabalistic plotting, it would be easy enough to walk up Connecticut 
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Avenue, into the Mayflower and up to the microphone in one of the panel rooms. The 
conventions are not private or closed to the press, and particularly during panels such as the 
Bork-Martin face-off over international law and human rights, I found myself wondering 
why it was that no liberal-minded law students in Washington would avail themselves to ask 
questions (with CNN’s cameras rolling) of the speakers—U.S. Solicitor General Paul 
Clement was also on the panel. Martin went after Bork aggressively on a variety of issues, 
making some very strong accusations about the consequences of U.S. foreign policy and the 
War on Terror. There were no boos or hisses from the standing-room only audience—but 
there were not even enough questions from the audience to fill up the allotted time.  
Aside from panels, since 2001 the conventions have featured not only the first day 
headliner and second day banquet keynote, but a third formal speech, the Barbara Olson 
memorial lecture. The wife of Federalist stalwart Ted Olson, Barbara was a well-known 
conservative commentator and author before she perished aboard United Airlines flight 93 on 
September 11, 2001. Olson gave the inaugural address memorializing his wife: he has been 
followed by Kenneth Starr, Bork, Scalia, and Judge Randolph. Speaking to a packed house in 
the Mayflower’s main lecture hall—a long, ornate, gilded chamber reminiscent of the Vienna 
Philharmonic’s famously lavish concert hall—Scalia in 2004 used the occasion to reinforce 
the themes echoed in his opinions, particularly “judicial restraint.” A central theme of 
conservative legal theory and Federalist Society discourse, it argues against courts’ 
“encroachment” onto the legislature’s asserted Constitutional right to regulate society—
hence the label “majoritarians” used by skeptical libertarians who argue against the absolute 
right of majorities to determine all rules for individual conduct and liberty.  
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Scalia urged judges to adhere strictly to legal texts, but to also consider the original 
meanings of those texts and their relation to society’s traditions. A memorable moment of 
laughter came when he described the horror liberals would encounter should he be nominated 
to succeed Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who would in fact pass away within a year. 
Standing rigid, arms outstretched Frankenstein-style, the Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court asked the Federalists to imagine the terror of…Chieeeef… Juuuuustice…Scaliiiiiia! It 
brought the house down, of course. 
In 2005 Randolph, Bork’s friend and ally during the 1987 nomination, spoke on Roe 
v. Wade, challenging the legitimacy of the landmark decision and quoting from previously 
unreleased memorandums from the appellate judge who handled a similar case prior to Roe.
Randolph was restrained but passionate; his criticism was less of abortion as a practice than 
of the legal reasoning in the opinion itself and the social divisiveness it has produced. 
 
Strangers in a Strange Land? 
The Society’s smaller Faculty Division hosts its own events, which are even more 
intensely oriented toward academic issues in the law. While Judges have a very practical 
insulation from critique—lifetime appointments—many professors active in the Federalist 
Society face their own kind of professional dilemma, given perceptions of the group by their 
colleagues on the academic left. Scalia or any of his colleagues on the bench are essentially 
impervious to critique, save for the possibility of impeachment. The same goes, for the most 
part, for tenured faculty. Asked about this, one federal judge told me, “I got tenure the day I 
was confirmed by the Senate.” 
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As Chemerinsky pointed out, the narrative of conservatives as beleaguered minority 
serves a strategic function—“It’s always rhetorically advantageous to portray yourselves as 
the victim.” Chemerinsky, who supports the ACS, is skeptical of these types of claims made 
by conservative professors. “I’ve always been amused by their claim that there’s this liberal 
domination of academia,” he says—while also acknowledging, generally, that Federalist 
views of law are not widely held among law professors.  
From my own experience and what I’ve gathered over the years, I would say it’s 
probably true that the average law student is further left of center than average. This varies 
by school, of course. My alma mater, The University of Virginia, was relatively more 
hospitable to conservatives and has had an active Federalist Society chapter since the very 
beginning. I was not a member when in law school there, but I was certainly aware of their 
presence and their ability to draw high-profile speakers. Law professors experience the same 
phenomena: some schools are friendlier than others, but on balance conservatives remain a 
sliver of the academic pie.  
Depending on whom you ask, you will hear that conservatives in general and 
Federalists in particular are blackballed, discriminated against, marginalized, or…they are 
treated the same as anyone else. Situations differ from school to school, but based on the 
many conversations I’ve had with faculty members, there is much truth to the “beleaguered 
minority” version of events. Many of the untenured faculty I spoke with refused to go on the 
record with their comments, fearing consequences from their tenure committees. While some 
leading administrators, such as the Dean Elena Kagan of Harvard, Dean David Schizer of 
Columbia (a Federalist Society member and former Kozinsky law clerk), and Dean Rodney 
Smolla of the University of Richmond have made positive public statements about the role 
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the Society plays on their campus, a negative view of conservative legal theory still exists 
among many on the faculties themselves. “People will say things like ‘only idiots and Nazis 
would hang out with a group like that’,” one untenured law professor active with the Society 
told me. “Most law schools are like this; I don’t think mine is unique. This is real old-school 
McCarthyism.” 
The McCarthy comparison was picked up on by Cato’s libertarian guru Pilon, during 
the dustup over whether Chief Justice nominee John Roberts was a Federalist member. “Are 
you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Federalist Society?”—a great pull quote if 
ever there was one; Pilon’s line was quickly picked up by the chattering class. Calabresi 
agrees with the analogy. “I think that the activist groups on the left decided that the best way 
to attack nominees was through guilt by association”—by which he meant association “with 
the writings of some of our more conservative members like Professor Epstein or Judge 
Bork.” This was both unfair and ironic, Calabresi said, because “people disagree with 
Professor Epstein and with Judge Bork on all kinds of things.”  
On Capitol Hill, liberal firebrand Sen. Dick Durbin, a leading liberal critic of the 
Federalists, has similarly had to contend with the fallout from his conspiracy-talk. “Fewer 
than one percent of lawyers across America are members of this Federalist Society. Yet over 
one-third of President Bush’s circuit court nominees are members of the Federalist Society,” 
Durbin, the Senate Democratic whip, claimed during debate on the nomination of Priscilla 
Owen to the Federal bench in 2005. “If you do not have a Federalist Society secret 
handshake, then, frankly, you may not even have a chance to be considered seriously by the 
Bush White House.”139 During the Judiciary Committee’s hearings to confirm Alito a year 
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later, it was Durbin’s turn to play the victim. “I won't get into the Federalist Society,” he said, 
“because every time I say those words, they go into a rage that I’m somehow guilty of 
McCarthy-like tactics, asking, Who are these people in the Federalist Society? I won’t touch 
it.”140 
And so he didn’t. Neither did anybody else. 
 
A visit to any Federalist event would almost surely refute all of this talk of 
McCarthyism, intolerance, and lack of openness. The revered Judge Bork, for example, told 
me that he was literally booed down at a Federalist Society event—something I’ve never 
seen or heard of happening—because he had the audacity to declare that a return to the 
Federalist dream of a truly limited government restricted entirely to the enumerated powers 
in the Constitution was a pipe dream. “They might as well get over it, it’s never coming 
back,” he said to his audience’s dismay. “The American people want a large government, a 
national government that can do all kinds of things for them. And they’re not going to stand 
for some wacko judge trying to go back,” he told me. “A judge who wants to destroy society 
in order to return to purity is a little bit fanatical.” This sounds like a rather different Robert 
Bork from the public persona developed since the 1987 nomination: the eminence gris, the 
embodiment of uncompromising atavistic conservatism. Myth and reality do not always 
converge. 
 
To be sure, not every conservative law professor’s experience in “liberal academia” is 
a harsh, ostracizing ordeal. “I’ve never really felt beleaguered in the academy,” Professor 
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Nicole Garnett, the Federalists’ student advisor at Notre Dame, said. “I know others who do, 
but I’ve never had that experience.” Judge Rader, who has taught seminars at several law 
schools, has seen a range of environments. “It varies by school,” he said. “I’m very well 
accepted at George Washington University, though my Federalist Society connection is 
probably somewhat notorious.”  
“Most of the faculty doesn’t agree with conservatives but like the idea that we’re 
here, they like the intellectual diversity,” said Michael Dimino, a law professor at Widener 
University and an active Federalist. “But there are others who feel that the only good 
conservative is a dead conservative—and even dead white male conservatives aren’t good 
because they maintain an influence over the law.”  
 Beleaguered minority though they may yet claim to be, the Federalists are asserting 
an influence over legal culture—on campuses, in courtrooms, and in Washington. Thanks to 
the enormous growth of the Society, the conservative voice at law schools is gaining 
legitimacy—a “seat at the table,” as Meese put it. It’s happened thanks to 25 years of intense 
organization building, paired with the serious intellectual engagement and practical career 
networking that goes on at Federalist events. The pipeline is up and running, and it continues 
to deliver fuel for the conservative movement in the form of ideas and of people who are in 
positions to advance those ideas as policy.  
After my interview with Meese, an assistant of his entered the room and handed him a 
phone message. A high school textbook publisher had asked for copyright permission to 
reprint Meese’s 1985 speech on originalism, which we’ll be considering in the next chapter. 
Meese grinned and then looked in my direction. “Yes, of course—I’m happy to give it 
away!”  
CHAPTER 4 
EDWIN MEESE, THE FOUNDERS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
 
In the remaining chapters we move from consideration of the history and operation of 
the Federalist Society into examination of a series of theories and topics of particular 
importance to the Legal Right. In this chapter and the following two I consider two leading 
conservative methodologies, originalism and textualism. In each case I use the public 
statements, speeches, and opinions of leading Federalist conservatives as a way to open up 
the discussion. In considering former Attorney General Edwin Meese’s arguments, I will be 
engaging in rhetorical criticism as a way of reading—a way of engaging his arguments, 
which are themselves arguments about ways of reading. Unlike later chapters that are more 
directly concerned with policy (Affirmative Action, international law) the matter of 
“originalism” and “textualism” explored in this and the next chapter are doubly rhetorical: 
interpretation of arguments about interpretation. 
In this chapter our protagonist is a Reaganite of the first order and a longtime booster 
of the Federalist Society. After considering Meese’s originalism in the context of Civil 
Rights and Affirmative Action in the next chapter, we move to a consideration of Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s textualism and traditionalism. Along with Judge Bork and others, the 
personalities highlighted here are significant not only for their roles in shaping conservative 
legal culture, but for their direct involvement with the Federalist Society. 
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Edwin Meese III graduated from Yale in 1953, two years after Bill Buckley and 26 
before Federalist founder Steve Calabresi. Like Calabresi, Meese cut his teeth as president of 
the Political Union. When the Attorney General hired the youthful Reaganite years later one 
has to imagine that this common experience was noticed. It couldn’t have hurt. 
Meese went to law school after two years in the Army and graduated from the 
University of California at Berkeley’s Boalt Hall School of Law in 1958. He joined the 
administration of Governor Ronald Reagan not long after the former actor’s election in 1966. 
In a variety of advisory positions and ultimately as Attorney General of the United States, 
Meese became known as a thoroughgoing social conservative and unwavering Reaganite. 
Even after the Iran-Contra meltdown threw the Reagan White House into chaos and resulted 
in more than a few kiss-and-tell memoirs by jilted staff members, Meese remained 
unwaveringly loyal. In the words of one prominent Reagan biographer, he was a cheerleader 
as much as a counselor—and was viewed skeptically by a press corps often severely allergic 
to sycophants.141 
But Meese’s adulation was, by all accounts, sincere. He was probably Reagan’s most 
trusted aide, and when he launched his public campaign against “judicial activism” in the 
early 1980s he spoke with the full imprimatur of the White House. Although his name may 
today be more commonly linked with the Iran-Contra affair, his “tough on crime” attitude, or 
the crackdown on pornography, Meese’s intellectual legacy lies with his nationalization of 
the debate over the role of judges. Working with his young allies in the Federalist Society, 
Meese popularized ideas and phrases which have become the common parlance of the 
national conversation on law and justice: “original intent”; “activist judges”; “legislating 
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from the bench”; “strict constructionist.” Although he was certainly not the first person to use 
these terms, Meese made them meaningful to a broad national audience—and turned them 
into political weapons. Along with his aides Ken Cribb and Brad Reynolds, Meese also did 
everything he could to boost the stature and effectiveness of the Federalist Society.  
“Reagan and Meese had a lot of these ideas in one form or another before we were 
even interested in looking at them,” Lee Otis told me. “In a way, we were helping develop 
ideas that they already had.” Otis points here to the problem faced, in a sense, by all 
chroniclers of history: did one of these things cause the other, or did they both simply happen 
at the same time? In the case of the Federalist Society, it certainly was fortuitous that the core 
founding members entered the workforce just as Ed Meese was assuming control of the 
Justice Department. (Just as it was fortuitous that Ken Cribb ran into soon-to-be Federalist 
National Director Gene Meyer at that cocktail party.) Lawyers talk about these things in 
terms of “but-for” causation, as in “but for that banana peel on the floor, I wouldn’t have 
slipped and broken my back.”  
So, we might ask: But for Reagan and Meese, no Federalist Society? Or the other way 
‘round—but for the Federalists and their farm-team of eager young legal talent, no Reagan 
Revolution? Or, at least, no lasting Reagan legal legacy 25 years later? “Would Meese have 
given some of the speeches,” Otis asked, “had he not had other people around, people 
interested in the same set of ideas? Maybe not.” 
As a way of thinking these questions through, we will consider two of Meese’s most 
important speeches, encapsulating as they do many of the core ideas of legal conservatism 
and which remain central to the Federalist Society’s project. The first of these is his 1985 
speech to the American Bar Association, where he gives substance to the idea of “original 
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intent” as a governing legal and political principle. Meese lays out a kind of schematic for all 
ensuing conservative arguments against “activist judges,” a rhetorical road map for the 
political debates to come. 
Far more broad in its reach is his 1987 speech at Tulane University, which finds 
Meese addressing the foundational question of interpretation itself—a question with 
rhetorical implications. In reading and applying the Constitution, are judges engaged in 
“persuasion”? And how far may they be permitted to move us and their fellow judges, as 
their audiences, in their interpretation? What should we accept as “the law”—their 
interpretations of the foundational text (the Constitution) or only the foundational text itself? 
Meese also expands his argument, hinted at in the ABA address, that American law suffered 
a betrayal during the years of the Warren Court—and that the Reagan-conservative project 
was aimed at returning things to the way they used to be, the way they should be, with the 
courts performing their properly limited duties. Meese gets to the core of conservatism here 
in both its nostalgia and its idealism: we are not what we once were—that which we might 
become again. Although he speaks in a voice of staunch objectivity, his vision of the past, 
present, and future are all deeply rhetorical: he acts inventively to craft a narrative resonating 
with American idealism, patriotism, and common sense. He tells a story that works to 
persuade. As Professor Nunberg writes, the right’s effectiveness is telling these stories is in 
their evocation, their ability to symbolize our ideals and aspirations.142 
In a talk given between the ABA and Tulane speeches Meese framed his argument 
about original intention in striking terms, echoing what candidate Barry Goldwater had said 
22 years before in his address to the GOP convention. “We must, and we shall, return to 
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proven ways—not because they are old, but because they are true.” In 1986 Meese told his 
audience at the University of Dallas that “A jurisprudence of original intention seeks to 
explicate not simply what is old, but what is basic, what is true.”143 
“A Jurisprudence of Original Intention” 
Meese’s speech to the American Bar Association marked the opening salvo in the 
Reagan administration’s battle over Constitutional interpretation—a debate that was to some 
extent already well under way in the law schools. But Meese’s talk turned an academic and 
methodological question into a political one. “It has been and will continue to be the policy 
of this administration to press for a jurisprudence of original intention,” he said. “In the cases 
we file and those we join…we will endeavor to resurrect the original meaning of 
constitutional provisions and statutes as the only reliable guide for judgment.”144 
This “resurrection” implies a fork in the road Meese explores further at Tulane—a 
point in history when the Court went wrong, departing from the original meaning, detouring 
in favor of a revisionist new path tainted with “ideological predilection.”145 For Meese, as for 
Ken Cribb (and his teacher Russell Kirk), conservatism is a refutation of ideology. 
Rhetorically, conservatism is normalized; it becomes “principle”-driven rather than 
politically driven, the neutral position rather than an ideological derivation. Meese defines his 
jurisprudence of original intention in exactly these terms, claiming the high ground of 
principle and denying “politics.” “By seeking to judge politics in light of principles, rather 
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than remold principles in light of policies,” he said, “the Court could avoid…the charge of 
being either too conservative or too liberal.”146 Thus are the figurative goalposts moved. 
The key word in this broadside attack is “liberal.” As he works to normalize the 
conservative, intentionalist position, Meese implies that the liberal contextualist, “living 
constitution,” position is political and therefore a disgrace to the Court’s duty. The 
conservative is true to the authors’ intent, to what they proposed, what was voted upon and 
accepted in their context, not ours. To disregard this original context is to let loose the 
reckless judge’s imagination and to deny the very idea of what a Constitution is—at least as 
Meese sets up the argument. “A constitution that is viewed as only what the judges say it is, 
is no longer a constitution in the true sense of the term,” he told the ABA,147 without further 
defining the “true sense of the term.”  
 
It is arguable that Meese’s “true sense” departs substantially from what Chief Justice 
John Marshall laid out in his 1819 opinion that cemented the power of judicial review and 
elaborated on his conception of Constitutional law. Meese even quotes  Marshall in that case, 
which finds the great Virginian admonishing Courts of posterity to “never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding.”148 The italics are Marshall’s.  
In that early case, Marshall in fact extrapolates a governmental power—the hotly 
contested power to incorporate a Bank of the United States—not enumerated in the 
Constitutional text. Under this reading, Marshall might even be seen here to be endorsing the 
reasoning utilized by later justices to uphold a right to privacy in the text’s “emanations and 
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penumbras.” “We do not find the word ‘bank’ or ‘incorporation’, we find the great powers, to 
lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; 
and to raise and support armies and navies,” Marshall wrote.149 Later in the opinion he goes 
on to reflect on the nature of language itself; he can be read to undermine the objectivist 
reading implied by Meese’s intentionalism. “Such is the character of human language, that 
no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single definite idea,” Marshall said. 
“Almost all compositions contain words, which, taken in their rigorous sense, would convey 
a meaning different from that which is obviously intended.”150 For Marshall, the “Necessary 
and Proper” clause of the Constitution was a case in point of such language and legally 
justified Congress’ charter of a national bank. 
 
Meese’s quotations and citations are selective—all quotations are—and his rhetoric is 
clearly arrayed with the goal of persuading his audience that he has the only defensible 
position. In an intriguing move, Meese seems to acknowledge the precariousness of his 
position even as he acts rhetorically to deny it: He introduces his argument by declaring that 
“the judicial process is, at its most fundamental level, a political process…in the truest sense 
of the word …wherein public deliberations occur over what constitutes the common good 
under the terms of a written constitution.”151 But as soon as he grants this “public 
deliberation” he seems to take it away, denying the open, political nature of interpretation in 
favor of his Goldwaterite quest for getting back to the real capital-T Truth.  
 
149 17 U.S. 316, 407. 
150 17 U.S. 316, 414 (emphasis added). 
151 Meese, “Bulwark of a Limited Constitution,” 457. 
152
What I think Meese actually signals here—as do many thoughtful conservatives—is 
an awareness that their position is, in fact, not the only legitimate one. Meese simply believes 
that his position on Constitutional law is the right one. Public deliberation and politics are not 
to be shut down; Meese just thinks his views are correct and will win out. Thus all of his 
public speeches; thus his support for the Federalist Society. The ABA speech does at times 
smack of tautology and foregone-conclusionism, presented in the guise of objectivity (no 
taint of “ideological predilection,” no need for interpretation when the text is “plain and 
clear”). But such a narrow reading misses the most interesting point of the address: Meese, 
like his Federalist Society acolytes, believes in debate and the plurality of politics. But he 
also believes his ideas are the right ones.  
The ABA speech is interesting for another seeming contradiction, also thematic in the 
broader rhetoric of conservatism. On the one hand Meese speaks in a voice of objectivity and 
neutrality, arguing for a jurisprudence that looks to the factual historical record when faced 
with questions of meaning—the complexities and gray areas of which he simply doesn’t get 
into. Alongside this ideal of a neutral, non-ideological Court, however, comes Meese’s 
pronouncement that the Court is “the primary moral force in American politics” and that the 
Court is “a political body.”152 But…how can the Court be both neutral and political?   
Meese does not bridge these rhetorical gaps, but his conclusion makes the answer 
clear: Neutrality means neutrality on his terms, the terms of original intention. By implicitly 
connecting these two ideas, he works on a deeply rhetorical level, connecting concepts and 
ideas in a newly persuasive manner: originalism becomes synonymous with objectivity, it 
becomes a wholly naturalized anti-ideology. Even as he acknowledges the political nature of 
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legal deliberation and interpretation, Meese artfully leads us to see his preferred method as 
the antithesis of interpretation. This theme is central to the Tulane speech, considered below. 
Audiences at the time drew different conclusions on how far this rhetorical turn moves away 
from a “meeting of the minds” toward mere deception, a legal cover for atavistic policy 
goals.  
Meese’s critics were legion, led by a cadre of legal academics who decried 
originalism as one more example of the “dead hand of the past,” a futile and often  pernicious 
way to cloak opposition to social progress in scholarly jargon. As Stanford Law dean Paul 
Brest wrote several years before Meese made headlines with his ABA talk, “the originalist 
Constitutional historian may be questing after a chimera.” Brest’s position remains the 
principal line of opposition to originalism and historicism: that judges should stick to law, 
not history. “The interpreter’s understanding of the original understanding may be so 
indeterminate as to undermine the rationale for originalism.”153 
But when is law not historical, counters the originalist, in terms oddly similar to the 
leftists in Cultural Studies who view themselves as radical contextualists. When is any text 
not historical? When is it not produced by the meanings understood to attach to those words 
at those times they were uttered or written down? But… Brest quotes the philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer for the proposition that “we can never understand the past in its own terms,” 
that “we are hopelessly imprisoned in our own world views.”154 So much for objectivity. As 
Brest goes on to say, this view tends toward a solipsistic denial of the possibility of any 
historical understanding. And as legal historian H. Jefferson Powell has argued throughout 
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his career, conservatives do not “own” legal history; one can interpret history to support non-
originalism—Powell even suggests that the Founders themselves would not have agreed with 
Meese’s ideas.155 
In place of originalism, Brest puts forth his own multi-part standard for Constitutional 
decision-making containing noble but vague provisions like “does the practice contribute to 
the well-being of our society” and does it “foster democratic government.”156 For 
conservatives, these kind of vagaries are typical of the left’s habit of advancing aspirational 
ideals as legal standards. On the one hand, liberals like Brest debunk the legitimacy of 
originalism by pointing to the indeterminacy of history (if not all knowledge in general)—
and on the other, assert freshly conceived judicial standards with no democratic provenance, 
no origin in laws adopted by a legislature of the peoples’ representatives. So—why does this 
matter?  
It matters because a hypothetical Chief Justice Paul Brest and a hypothetical Chief 
Justice Robert Bork would almost certainly have drastically different notions of what laws 
“foster democratic government.” While all linguistic formulations are contextual, one might 
say that some linguistic formulations are more contextual than others. The conservative 
argument for “judicial restraint” is rooted in this idea: While Brest declares he is not out to 
set up judges as Platonic guardians, entrusting them to evaluate whether laws “contribute to 
the well-being of our society” sure seems like he would do exactly that. As one conservative 
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judge told me, conservatives simply do not see these types of questions as “lawyers’ 
questions”: they are questions about  social mores and priorities, about policy choices, not 
legal interpretation. Attorney General Meese, for example, attempted repeatedly to have the 
landmark Miranda decision overturned. While it may or may not be good policy to warn 
arrested suspects of their right to remain silent, there is no provision of U.S. law 
(Constitutional or otherwise) that can justify the judicial branch’s order to this effect. For 
Meese, Miranda was as good an example of judicial activism as any.157 
Another case-in-point for conservatives is the death penalty, which liberals 
continually oppose as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments. The question presents a good example of how originalist 
reasoning operates: As originally intended, conservatives argue, the Constitution cannot 
conceivably have prohibited capital punishment—it is mentioned numerous times throughout 
the document and never described as illegal. Whether or not a majority of contemporary 
society opposes the death penalty, the text as enacted and voted upon by then-elected 
legislatures allows it. No law or constitutional amendment to the contrary has been adopted.  
Republican Senator Jeff Sessions, a former judge and Alabama State’s Attorney who 
has been an active spokesman for the conservative position on legal issues, honed in on the 
death penalty as the high point of legal liberalism. “It peaked when Blackmun and Brennan 
and Marshall dissented on every death penalty case saying it violated cruel and unusual 
punishment, when the Constitution has half a dozen references to the death penalty,” he told 
me. “That is activism.” Sessions also recalled when Meese’s ABA speech reached his desk in 
1985. “It blew up,” he said. “I couldn’t understand what this was all about.” 
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Meese’s address was met with an aggressive response not from just academics and 
pundits but from justices of the Supreme Court. Justice William J. Brennan’s reply was 
assertive and aggressive, a far cry from the lukewarm responses we hear today from the 
Supreme Court’s liberals and their academic counterparts. Brennan’s response to Meese 
served to open a nationwide discussion—“The Great Debate,” as the Federalist Society titled 
its pamphlet republishing the Meese and Brennan speeches along with the subsequent 
speeches from Justice John Paul Stevens, Judge Robert Bork, and Ronald Reagan.  
Addressing an audience at Georgetown University several months after Meese gave 
his ABA speech, Brennan was unabashed in dismissing originalism. Countering Meese’s 
mantra of “the written Constitution” with all of its four-cornered textualist implications, 
Brennan refers repeatedly to the “amended Constitution,” highlighting the changing nature of 
the fundamental law.158 “Like every text worth reading,” Brennan said, “it is not 
crystalline…Its majestic generalities and ennobling pronouncements are both luminous and 
obscure. This ambiguity of course calls for interpretation.”159 
Brennan goes on to dismiss Meese’s originalism as misguided as “arrogance cloaked 
as humility,” a “chorus of lamentations” from unqualified courtroom historians.160 (“Law 
office history” is a phrase familiar to most lawyers—commonly manifested in the 
background statement-of- facts that makes it into legal briefs and usually unencumbered by 
actual engagement with historical literature.) Brennan accuses Meese of being not only a 
dead-hand conservative but a reactionary Luddite. “Those who would restrict claims of right 
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to the values of 1789 specifically articulated in the Constitution turn a blind eye to social 
progress and eschew adaptation of overarching principles to changes of social 
circumstance.”161 Context for Brennan in not merely textual, it is social. 
In a manner far more articulate than the liberals of our time, Brennan boldly defies 
the central premise of conservatism’s backward-looking textualism, asserting that “the 
ultimate question must be, What do the words of the text mean in our time?”162 The focus on 
“principle” is well known to conservatives, who since Brennan’s time have largely silenced 
the broader political Left on this score; consider the weak response of democrats after the 
2004 presidential election when “values voters” tipped the scales for George W. Bush. In its 
latest iteration George Lakoff’s rather formulaic attempt to “reframe” issues with a liberal 
slant reflects this same “We Have Values Too!” defensiveness. The book’s subtitle says it 
all: “Communicating Our American Values and Vision.”  
Brennan’s principled response to Meese is of a different cast. He presents the 
Attorney General as the “reframer” and asserts the proven need for a Constitution that 
provides for the “adaptability of great principles to cope with current problems”163 has given 
way to the desperate throes of liberal advocacy groups whose only reply is…Roe v. Wade 
and abortion. Much of the public advertising campaign mounted against nominees John 
Roberts Jr. and Samuel Alito Jr., was directly and exclusively related to Roe and the right to 
abortion.164 And as if to play directly into these kind of fears, leading liberal spokespeople 
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such as Professor Chemerinsky and Ralph Neas of People for the American Way do indeed 
retreat to abortion as a final argument.  
Rather than defend the “modern activist state” in point-blank fashion as Brennan 
did,165 contemporary liberals—when not resorting to scare tactics—too often find themselves 
flailing about when faced with the conservative dominance of popular discourse. “For fifty 
years, we had a set idea of what mainstream judges were, what kind of forward progress was 
necessary,” Hillary Clinton told me when I asked her about the predicament of the legal left. 
“The intellectual energy and the governmental, historical forces were all moving in the same 
direction,” the direction of the liberal consensus. For a generation or more, liberals hadn’t 
needed to organize, to mobilize in the legal world, “because there was an inside seat that 
many people had, on the courts, in the government, in law firms and elsewhere,” she told me. 
As we have seen, the right was organizing, mobilizing, laying the groundwork for its political 
revolution—rhetorical and electoral. As Clinton suggests, the left just plain got lazy, and 
Brennan’s fire has gone out. Conservatives have unmade the consensus. “They deliberately 
set out to do so,” Clinton said. “I think you have to respect that.” 
 
What Exactly Is “The Law,” and Who Gets to Say So? 
Meese’s 1987 Tulane speech is less well-known than the ABA speech or some of 
Meese’s public pronouncements on pornography. But here we find a richly developed 
explanation of the central tenets of legal conservatism: A skepticism about the act of 
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interpretation itself and a view of Constitutional history deeply rooted in American 
Exceptionalism, which Meese as rhetor makes directly relevant to the contemporary 
conservative project. The Tulane speech tells us not only what Meese thinks about the role of 
the judge. It tells us what he believes conservatives should think about themselves. 
It is also important to remember that as Attorney General, Meese was in a position to 
put his theories into practice—these speeches were not indulgences in a part-time academic 
hobby. His “practice” as Attorney General was intimately related to his theoretical beliefs 
about the nature of law, the act of judicial interpretation, and the constraints of a common 
law regime within a constitutional system of government. One contemporary account 
referred to Meese as “a synthesis of conservative thought and activism” who politicized his 
office to an extent not seen since Robert F. Kennedy mobilized the Justice Department 
behind the Civil Rights agenda.166 What was true in the Civil Rights era was true for the 
Reaganites as well: The ways in which we perceive the law—our duty to obey its dictates, 
our arguments for its alteration, our challenges to its authority—all of these depend 
necessarily on our views of legal theory, on the place of the courts in society and in 
government. 
The law is a force in both theory and practice—if one buys into that rather scholastic 
distinction at all. As professors Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns have written, law is “the 
author of history, not just in the instrumental sense in which [it] can be said to make a 
difference in society, but in the ways that law constructs and uses history to authorize itself 
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and justify its results.”167 It was the judicial theory informing these results addressed by 
Meese at Tulane: the hierarchy of juridical authority and the processes of textual 
interpretation—a hermeneutic engine delineating the boundaries of the legal and illegal, the 
permissible and the impermissible, in our society.  
But what caught reporters’ attention at Tulane was not so much Meese’s nuanced 
views on the interpretive process, but his apparent suggestion that Supreme Court rulings—
particularly those which did not follow his jurisprudence of original intention—need not be 
considered “the law of the land.”168 
Meese opened his speech with a scene embodying the transformation of the Supreme 
Court, the swearing-in of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia as 
Associate Justice. This was a moment of great hope and excitement for conservatives—hope 
that the liberal tide of the Warren Court and its lukewarm successor, the Court under Warren 
Burger, would finally be turned. Meese tells us that the scene was presided over by Ronald 
Reagan in the East Room of the White House and quotes Reagan, who had in turn invoked 
the authority of the Founding Fathers. He concludes with a fusillade of American 
exceptionalism which sets the tone for the remainder of Meese’s address: “If the American 
Constitution shall fall there will be anarchy throughout the world.”  
What follows are two main sections. First, a section amplifying the exceptionalist 
theme and laying out a Constitutional narrative that informs his critique of contemporary 
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judicial interpretation, and second, an argument about the place and authority of 
Constitutional law. 
 
The Mythic Constitutional Narrative 
“Mythic” in this sense need not have the immediately pejorative meaning probably 
assumed—“fictional.” All history is mythic, to some extent. History, like myth, teaches us 
who we are and where we have come from, necessarily omitting a large chunk of the world’s 
humdrum events in the process. (In this necessary selectivity it gives up much in the way of 
“objectivity.”) Even the postmodern “historians of everyday life” are in their own way 
mythologizers, choosing to focus on certain peoples’ experiences, inspiring or futile as they 
may be; they instruct us to pay attention to the marginalized member of society and apply the 
lessons of the past to the present. Like good history, myths are teaching stories: sometimes 
cautionary, sometimes heroic, sometimes tragic. The stories we tell about ourselves in both 
everyday life and in national political life are also political in the true meaning of the word: 
they define the polis, the body politic.169 In this they are also acting rhetoric actors, offering 
arguments not just for how we should imagine our future. And history is hardly immune from 
politics; conservative disdain for leftist professor Howard Zinn’s (in)famous Peoples’ 
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History of the United States170 is matched tit-for-tat with liberal dismissal of Larry 
Schweikart and Micahel Allen’s Patriot’s History of the United States.171 
Meese spends a good amount of time establishing historical context, which will serve 
to frame his reading of Constitutional law and the conservative project. After amplifying the 
exceptionalist mood by quoting William Gladstone, who called the Constitution “the most 
wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man,” Meese 
launches into a narrative beginning with the 1787 convention where the document was 
drafted. He acknowledges the arguments and disagreements among the drafters. This gloss 
on the document’s contentious creation, however, is immediately dispensed with: the focus is 
to be unity, not controversy. “No sooner was the Constitution adopted then it became an 
object of astonishing reverence.” Indeed, the Civil War—characterized by Meese as a contest 
over the idea of federalism—marked the end of “the almost giddy, almost unqualified 
adoration of the Constitution.”  
The Civil War marks a break with the mythic past, when society (White society, at 
least) was full of “vast public enthusiasm” for, “reverence” and “adoration” of the 
Constitution. This historical context is so embedded in conservative ideology today, 20 years 
after the Tulane speech, it often goes unspoken. It is a typically mythic narrative of exile and 
return, often Biblical in its overtones: As Bork wrote in his memoir, the unfolding of 
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American law has been a case of “temptation” and “fall,” a morality play of “fallen” judges 
seduced by the forbidden fruits of political power.172 
At the time and for many years following, a strong response has been put forward by 
legal historian Powell, who argues that deep divisions in constitutional interpretation have 
persisted throughout the nation’s history—including its very first decades. Historian Jack 
Rakove has also argued against the conservatives’ “intentionalism”: “[T]he appeal to original 
intent cannot be justified on its own terms,” he has written. “There is no reason to believe 
that the framers thought their intentions should guide later interpretations of Constitution.”173 
In an article evaluating Rakove’s expanded argument in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book 
Original Meanings, conservative Judge Kozinski and his law clerk co-author look rather 
skeptically at “the historian who delights in ambiguity,” but do agree with him that 
assumptions of originalism are often undone by history. “Rakove’s ultimate point,” they 
conclude, “is to remind constitutional interpreters to appreciate the context in which they 
work and the degree to which that context may prevent a truly neutral inquiry.”174 Many 
judges, particularly conservatives like Kozinsky, could do well to take note of this reminder.  
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The Constitution vs. Constitutional Law 
Turning to the legally significant heart of his argument, Meese adopts a realist style 
similar to the naturalizing moves made in the ABA speech. Realism in law means something 
completely different from what is meant here as a term of rhetorical critique—the Legal 
Realists were a school of thought prevalent in American law during the first half of the 
twentieth century. Generally speaking, Legal Realists like Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
rejected idealism in the sense that they focused on what they saw as “actual experience” 
rather than aspirational forms and theories. In the caricatured description of their many 
detractors—including many conservatives and Federalists—Realists were cynics who gave 
up on ideals because of the difficulty of achieving them, and postmodernist critics are their 
contemporary successors. 
But realism as a rhetorical style is another matter, one which has dominated Western 
politics for hundreds of years. Rhetorical scholar Robert Hariman makes a convincing case 
that the realist style was essentially invented by Niccolo Machiavelli, who really (pun 
intended) did write the book on the matter with The Prince. Hariman shows that Machiavelli 
inaugurated a “radically nonideological political vernacular,”175 a style readily embraced by 
conservatives who (sometimes on the advice of Frank Luntz) talk readily and easily about 
their principles in terms of common sense and popular conservative sentiment. In claiming 
common sense the Prince implies that his opponents are dissemblers, out of touch with and 
contemptuous of the people. But the realist style is, Hariman stresses, just that—a style. It is 
no less “objective” or “real” than any dressed-up wonky academic critique. It just works 
better rhetorically; it is far more persuasive—as a Venetian consiglieri or a Presidential 
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aide—to describe oneself as cutting through nuance and ambiguity as opposed to heaping it 
on. The conservative argument on Constitutional law as laid out by Meese and others is 
steeped in this realist style. The text says what it says.  Brennan and his liberals can have 
their luminous obscurities, emanations and penumbras, evolving standards, and totalities of 
circumstances. The rest of us will try to get on with the business of being lawyers. 
Meese at Tulane is arch-realist in style. That the Constitution and Constitutional law 
are separate domains is a “simple” observation; the former “begins ‘We the People of the 
United States…’ and ends up, some 6,000 words later, with the 26th amendment.” The law—
the literal words on the page—is different from what the Supreme Court interprets the law to 
mean. Constitution here, Supreme Court opinions there.  
In drawing this distinction Meese extends Bork’s idea that some kind of falling from 
grace is implicit in all interpretation. The profligacy of Court interpretations, a kind of vulgar 
excess, is presented as ipso facto evidence. The Court, Meese tells us, “has had a great deal 
to say…produc[ing] nearly 500 volumes of reports of cases.” The contrast to this interpretive 
bulk is “the few, slim paragraphs that have been added to the original Constitution as 
amendments.” The “bulk” of interpretation “overwhelms” the Constitutional “substance” 
itself. To get at this idea, Meese invokes constitutional scholar Charles Warren, who wrote in 
1923 that “however the court may interpret the provisions of the Constitution, it is still the 
Constitution which is the law and not the decision of the Court.” Meese slides from a 
normative position to a positivistic one: Interpretation should not be viewed as law and 
(under his interpretation!) is not legally enforceable in the way that Constitutional provisions 
are. 
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Meese’s pumps are now primed and the central idea of his address emerges: that a 
Supreme Court decision “does not establish a supreme law of the land that is binding on all 
persons and parts of government henceforth and forevermore…This point should seem so 
obvious as to not need elaboration.”  
 
Here Meese was wrong. Critics from both within and without the legal academic 
community pounced hard, demanding elaboration and pouring objection and critique into 
editorial pages, op-ed columns, as well as the more reserved discourse of the law reviews.176 
Generally, the political and academic left responded by arguing that in seeming to describe 
compliance with Supreme Court decisions as somehow optional, Meese was offering an 
“invitation to lawlessness”177 and “inviting anarchy.”178 
“Surely a sweeping pronouncement that segregated schools are unconstitutional is 
binding…on Little Rock as well as Topeka,” was the Washington Post editorial board’s 
contribution. Meese was forced to clarify his position, writing several weeks later in the Post 
that Supreme Court decisions “do indeed have general applicability and deserve the greatest 
respect from all Americans.” Note the parsing here: general applicability is not the same as 
binding authority; many laws are applicable in a given situation, few are binding. The point 
about law vs. interpretation remains intact. 
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Aspects of the logic at work in Meese’s argument about this distinction do have an 
intuitive truth to them and are important to our broader understanding of how the Court fits 
into the broader governmental scheme. Like Congress, which can always undo one law by 
passing another, the Supreme Court can overrule itself. This is the fundamental 
distinguishing fact about our common-law system, a fact Meese does not focus on. The 
Anglo-American common-law system is grounded in both precedent and stare decisis—the 
notion that old rules govern new cases and must be respected. This tension lurks in the 
background of Meese’s speech, and of conservative legal discourse in general.179 The realist 
scowls and says “just read the text, it’s that simple”…but it never is—not in a common-law 
system, anyway. Unlike the French and other European civil-law systems, common law 
nations require courts to respect both the foundational text and its interpretation by prior 
courts. This is where Burke meets Bork.  
Conservatives’ attitude toward Roe v. Wade exemplifies this tension: On one hand, it 
is argued that judges should refrain from “legislating,” respecting precedent and not deciding 
cases based on what their personal preferences would have been had they been on the Court 
when the case was decided. On the other, the originalist purist would argue that constitutional 
interpretations—upholding a right to privacy for example—should be overturned because of 
its essentially illegitimate nature as a political, not legal judgment. Scalia has conceded that 
respecting stare decisis is a “pragmatic exception” to his judicial philosophy.180 Bork made a 
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similar point in an important, wide-ranging 1971 essay discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Six. “Recognizing stare decisis is seemingly even more incompatible with nonoriginalist 
theory,” he argues, suggesting that under a “living Constitution” view focusing on the 
evolutionary meaning of the text in light of current values, there would be even less reason to 
bind courts to prior decisions from earlier eras. Precedent is a compromise Scalia says he is 
willing to make—as he says, in most cases. 
For Meese—who approaches these questions as an advocate and not a judge—the 
bottom line is clear. “Correcting a wrongly decided decision is not activism,” he told me in a 
discussion about the Tulane speech. “Activism is when you depart from the Constitution and 
substitute your own policy preferences, your own agenda, your own political biases, for what 
the Constitution says.” 
In the Tulane speech, Meese makes prominent reference to the Court’s most 
egregious failure, Dred Scott v. Sanford,181 which held slavery to be Constitutional—
aligning, conservatives are quick to say, with the personal preferences of slave-holding Chief 
Justice Roger B. Taney. The case unarguably demonstrates the Court’s ability to “get it 
wrong,” and is for Meese also proof positive that The Constitution (fixed, stable, obvious of 
meaning) is fundamentally different from Constitutional law (manipulable, suspect, a 
creation of interpretation). That is to say, despite its notorious 3/5 Clause, which treats 
Blacks as less than human, the principles embedded in The Constitution rightly understood 
do not legitimate slavery—the interpretation offered in Dred Scott does. As Meese said in a 
later speech to the Federalist Society, Dred Scott shows that “there is danger in seeing the 
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Constitution as an empty vessel into which each generation may pour its passion and 
prejudice.”182 
In making the case against the Supreme Court’s supremacy Meese quotes Abraham 
Lincoln’s longtime adversary Stephen Douglas, who justified slavery in part by portraying 
Dred Scott as the law of the land. “It plainly was Douglas’ view that Constitutional decisions 
by the court were authoritative, controlling, and final,” Meese says, “binding on all persons 
and parts of government the instant they are made—from then on.” Implying a parallel with 
controversial modern cases—most notably Roe—Meese cites Lincoln for the proposition that 
Supreme Court cases may in fact only be binding on “the actual parties in the case.” Hence 
the furor over whether Meese felt the Court’s decision in Brown was applicable anywhere 
other than Topeka. We’ll explore the deeply racial implications of this argument in the next 
chapter, which considers how originalist conservatives have tackled the problem of race, and 
how Meese’s Civil Rights Deputy Brad Reynolds made the conservative case against 
Affirmative Actions and “quotas.” 
 
The Historical Stage 
For Meese and other conservatives the Reagan Revolution was not so much about 
undoing settled legal practices as it was righting wrongs that had crept into our system of 
jurisprudence since the Civil War. It is vitally important to understand this point, which 
positions the conservative project as “correctional” more than “revolutionary.” As we will 
see in a later chapter, it is the New Sovereigntist faction, including the so-called  
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neoconservatives, who are truly pushing for revolutionary interpretations of the law—
particularly when it comes to foreign policy.  
As one rhetorical critic has written, the Biblical parallel with legal interpretation can 
be extended to include this point about context. “Like the ancient prophets of the Bible, 
Meese finds himself surrounded by false prophets living in the sanctuary of the law.”183 The 
Reaganite project was to cast them out. This held for the young Reaganites like Steven 
Calabresi, who drew an analogy to Reagan’s Cold War foreign policy. “Part of Reagan’s 
policy was to build up forces to topple enemy regimes,” he told me. “I thought of us as kind 
of the same equivalent in law schools.” Long after Meese left office this project would 
continue in both the academic and courtroom setting. 
Meese’s linguistic choices exemplify the realist style favored by conservatives and 
demonstrate a directness increasingly foreign to liberals—exemplified by Justice Breyer’s 
on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand approach in Active Liberty or Professor Sunstein’s 
mistrust of conviction in Radicals In Robes. Meese has no trouble with vagaries; he is sure of 
himself—to a fault, perhaps. This shines through at Tulane. “Once we understand” what 
Lincoln really meant; “once we see”; “once we comprehend”; “once we see” (again)—once 
we stop bothering with all this interpretation, “we can grasp a correlative point: 
Constitutional interpretation is not the business of the court only, but also the business of all 
branches of government” (my emphasis). And here the plot thickens.  
To set up our later discussion of international law and the theory of the “unitary 
executive,” we pause here briefly to flag the implications of this idea. To the layperson, the 
idea of having “all branches of government” involved in legal interpretation might seem to 
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run against the basic concept of the separation of powers—surely Constitutional 
interpretation is the Court’s business. Administrations and legislators work to overturn 
Supreme Court rulings by statute all the time—from the Lincoln administration’s efforts to 
reverse Dred Scott to the Bush administration’s support for Congress’ ban on “partial-birth” 
abortions. These efforts are politically charged, but not unconstitutional.184 
The Line Between Law and Politics 
The mantra “Legislating from the Bench” sees a distinction between the judge’s job 
and the politician’s. The distinction runs both ways, and conservatives since Meese have 
been asserting the Executive’s right to interpret the Constitution alongside the Courts’.185 
Start asking whether this position politicizes law, or turns politicians into judges—and the 
conversation gets pretty tricky. 
184 See John Harrison, “The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the 
Constitution,” Cornell Law Review 73 (1988): 372-373 (“The argument that the Constitution allocates the 
interpretive power to the courts is wrong. The Constitution allocates to the courts the case deciding power, the 
power to issue judgments…the power to interpret the Constitution, however, comes from the case-deciding 
power. To suggest that the power to interpret is primary and the case deciding power secondary, is to 
misinterpret the Constitution and to confuse cause and effect.”); Steven Calabresi, “The President, the Supreme 
Court, and the Constitution: A Brief Positive Account of the Role of Lawyers in the Development of 
Constitutional law,” Law and Contemporary Problems 61 (1998): 66ff 29 (“I have long believed that Presidents 
are obligated to interpret the Constitution independently of the Supreme Court, and I assisted in the 
development and editing of General Meese’s Tulane speech when I served as his Special Assistant”); 
Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, 1 (“The Supreme Court represents an important requirement of 
American government, the need to interpret the Constitution. It is not alone in that task. Other courts interpret. 
More important, other government officials, and ultimately engaged citizens, share the responsibility for 
interpreting the text.”). 
185 The law/politics divide is explored by Marouf Hasian, Jr., Celeste Condit, and John Lucaites in 
“The Rhetorical Boundaries of ‘The Law’: A Consideration of the Rhetorical Culture of Legal Practice and the 
Case of the Separate but Equal Doctrine,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 82 (1996): 324-325 and 337 (“We 
believe…the judiciary would be served better if it gave up the attempt to present the courts as outside of time 
and ‘above politics’…we believe that the judiciary should promote itself as an institution that attempts to 
generate reasonable decisions, often entailing reasonable compromises, about important political issues. It is a 
further a body charged with estimating when old principles must be supplanted or supplemented with new”). 
One can imagine Meese and other conservatives chafing at this boldfaced assertion of the judicial branch’s right 
to establish, on its own “estimation,” the proper rules of social and political life. Shall we establish our judges as 
sociologists as well as jurists? 
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Meese, like Bork and other legal conservatives, views law and politics as inherently 
separate domains—with law usually portrayed as the victim of a manipulative, murky, 
polluting political process. In Bork’s overtly religious terms, the law has been “tempted” and 
“seduced” by politics—by which he means liberal politics. Responding to the critical legal 
studies movement, Constitutional law professor Owen Fiss sounded a similar note in a 
seminal 1982 article, “Objectivity and Interpretation.”186 The young turks of postmodernism, 
whom Fiss accuses of intellectual nihilism, “have turned their backs on adjudication and have 
begun a romance with politics.”187 Fiss argues persuasively, I believe, that the bugbear of 
“legal objectivity” is not nearly as impossible as the crits would sometimes have us believe. 
Objectivity rightly understood does not—indeed, cannot—rule out the inevitable differences 
in interpretation. Adjudication is interpretation, Fiss writes.188 But accepting this attitude 
toward objectivity need not send one skating down the slippery slope to relativism and the 
impossibility of any “right” reading. Fiss is right, I would argue, to stress that we should not 
lose sight of the “analytic distinction between objectivity and correctness.”189 “The 
question,” he writes, “is whether we can insist that adjudication is an interpretive activity and 
still find that it possesses an objective character…I think we can.”190 One need not begin a 
“romance with politics.” 
 
186 Owen Fiss, “Objectivity and Interpretation,” in Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic 
Reader, ed. Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press): 229-
249. 
187 Fiss, “Objectivity and Interpretation,” 230. 
188 Fiss, “Objectivity and Interpretation,” 229. 
189 Fiss, “Objectivity and Interpretation,” 236. 
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Meese takes the same view, arguing that since the 1960s, the political left has 
“captured” the federal courts and gone on to use them for political (not legal) purposes, 
advancing their agenda against what would otherwise be the will of the American people.191 
“Lawsuits in federal courts had become a method of conducting an end run around 
legislators,” Meese writes.192 
Echoing Stephen Douglas’ pro-slavery “popular sovereignty” argument from a 
century before,193 Meese notes that  “the policies mandated by the courts were frequently 
opposed by vast majorities of the public—up to 80 percent and many more in some cases.”194 
For Meese, the issue is not slavery, of course, but abortion. Lincoln’s response to Douglas, 
which might similarly be applied to Meese’s version, involves a direct undoing of his 
populist/majoritarian argument. What matters is not the abstracted right to popular 
sovereignty and self-determination, Lincoln argued, but the morality and constitutionality of
the ends toward which that popular sovereignty is exercised. For Douglas, the legal 
 
191 Edwin Meese III, With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington: Regnery, 1992), 314-317. Keith 
Whittington offers a less rhetorically charged version of this argument. “The originalist effort to ‘depoliticize 
the law’ by ensuring ‘fidelity to the Constitution’ depends on a limited conception of the constitutional 
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Political “construction” of constitutional meaning is not something to be eliminated altogether under 
Whittington’s conception of “originalism”—it is simply not within the purview of the judicial branch. 
Constitutional Interpretation, 171-174, 204-208.  
192 Meese, With Reagan, 316. 
193 Douglas used the term in the specific context of the debate over whether new territories, such as 
Kansas and Nebraska, should be permitted to hold referendum votes on allowing slavery within their borders.  
194 Meese, With Reagan, 316. 
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ownership of slaves;195 for Meese, “abortion,…busing and ‘affirmative action’[,]… school 
prayer, crime, and other matters.”196 
The blurring of the law/politics line has not been lost on critics. Noting particularly 
Meese’s expansive—and extra-textual—reading of the Fourth Amendment to allow searches 
and seizures, Constitutional law professor Peter Shotten has written, “The flaw of Meese’s 
constitutional interpretation…is not that he cannot conceive of the Constitution in principled 
terms, it is that he cannot apply his understanding neutrally when the Constitution’s 
principles contradict his policy preferences.”197 
The Law of the Land? 
At the heart of Meese’s argument is a very specific villain—the Supreme Court. 
Specifically, Meese attacks the 1958 case Cooper v. Aaron where the Court under Chief 
Justice Warren “appeared to arrive at conclusions about its own power that would have 
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shocked men like John Marshall.” And why? Because it was Cooper where the Court set 
forth the view that its decisions were “the supreme law of the land.”  
The Warren Court, in Meese’s view, was therefore “at war” with Marshall and with 
the Constitution itself. Meese drastically extends the metaphor, launching into hyperbole: 
The Warren Court’s declaration places it “at war with the basic principles of democratic 
government, and at war with the very meaning of the rule of law.” This is not a new theme 
for conservatives, and a softer line had been advanced earlier at a Federalist Society 
conference by Frank Easterbrook, a professor soon to be named judge on the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals by Ronald Reagan. “The statement in Cooper was dictum,” Easterbrook 
said, using the technical term for statements in Court opinions that do not function as 
precedent to bind future Courts. “The power of judges to have the last word on the meaning 
of statutes and constitutions has carried the day only in the courts of history, not in the court 
of logic.”198 In asserting that the Supreme Court’s opinions do not function as binding in the 
same manner as a statute, Meese is to the right of many conservatives both then and now.199 
In a footnote, Meese indicates he has no quarrel with the holding in Cooper—a
successor to Brown aimed at enforcing compliance—but rather only with the perceived 
conflict between the Court’s “supreme law” pronouncement and the supremacy clause of the 
Constitution, which establishes the Constitution as superior to state and local law. Here, 
again, Meese’s argument provides insight into his view of interpretation as a suspect or 
 
198 Frank H. Easterbrook, “Legal Interpretations and the Power of the Judiciary,” Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy, 7 (1984): 96-97. 
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illegitimate process. Surely, one must agree with John Stick’s view that, “If officials are 
bound to obey the law, then they are bound to obey under someone’s interpretation.”200 
From a rhetorical perspective, this conclusion may seem obvious—one need not go 
over to the far left crits’ camp to acknowledge that all readings are interpretive, that all texts 
exist in and derive meaning from their context. But the law’s hyperrationalistic norms and 
ideals, particularly among idealistic originalists and strict constructionists, make such a 
conclusion rather less intuitive. Conservatives are by no means of one mind on this important 
issue. In fact, the back issues of Federalist Society conference transcripts reveal some 
intriguing exchanges between conservatives like Prof. Epstein and Judge Easterbrook. “All 
interpretation involves meaning added by the reader,” the Judge said at a 1984 Federalist 
conference.201 Epstein disagrees with his otherwise similarly minded University of Chicago 
colleague. “The entire pattern of social and historical discourse takes place not because of the 
occasional unreliability of language, but because of its magnificent reliability.”202 While 
there are disagreements on such question, they do not prevent the right’s organization and 
cooperation on political and intellectual projects; though as Bork told me, it is likely that if 
the right ever does fully capture the legal culture—and the Supreme Court—the various 
factions may well turn on each other. For the time being, though, the factions of the right 
perceive more in common with each other than with the left and its Living Constitution.  
In Meese’s view, the crisis of the “politicized” Court should be countermanded by a 
response from the political branches. Again invoking Lincoln—this time putting words into 
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his mouth rather than quoting him—Meese ratchets up the stakes in the metaphorical “war.” 
Lincoln, Meese tells us, fought to “keep the lamp of freedom burning bright in the dark moral 
shadows cast by the court in the Dred Scott case.” For the political branches to forgo 
opposition to the judgment would be—this time quoting accurately—“to submit to 
government by Judiciary.”203 
The Attorney General comes perilously close to painting himself into a corner with 
this argument. On one hand, he and his fellow Federalist conservatives like Bork decry the 
politicization of the courts; on the other, they call for judicial interpretation by the two 
political branches as a remedy. “The issues raised by Meese are troubling,” writes Mark 
Tushnet, “because, on analysis, they seem to imply that politics determines the line between 
politics and law.”204 This is a legitimate if not definitive critique, to which majoritarian 
conservatives like Meese would likely reply that the Constitution—not politics—sets those 
boundaries. But that is not a sufficient response either. Indeed, as all good Federalists know, 
the Constitution is full of divided duties, separated powers, checks and balances; it is 
Madison in the Federalist Papers who over and over again argues for the importance of 
faction: the importance of…politics.  
203 Meese’s imprecise footnote cites the entire first Inaugural. Lincoln says nothing about a lamp of 
freedom illuminating moral darkness, but does state, “[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions 
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are 
made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own 
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.” 
Abraham Lincoln, 1861 Inaugural Address, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/lincoln1.htm 
(accessed April 15, 2007). 
204 Tushnet, “The Supreme Court, The Supreme Law of the Land,” 1018. See also Harrison, “The Role 
of the Legislative and Executive Branches,” 373, arguing effectively that there is an important difference 
between “the commands of the Constitution [and] what we might call its expectations.” Expectations, 
incentivized through formal structures of political power established by the Constitution, are, of course, 
necessarily political.  
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Derelicts and Power 
Meese concluded at Tulane by dreading the addition of more Dred Scotts and Plessy 
v. Fergusons—the “derelicts” of Constitutional law, opinions whose legal and moral 
reasoning is flawed enough to have earned them universal dismissal as both intellectual and 
ethical embarrassments. It is worth noting that Meese’s emphasis on Dred Scott has special 
significance to movement conservatives who view Roe v. Wade as its modern-day 
equivalent—a case with no credible textual underpinning and even less moral force.205 As he 
said in his ABA speech, the Supreme Court is for Meese “the primary moral force in 
American politics”206—but this moral force is to be exercised in protection of the status quo, 
not a means to social change. When one hears conservatives invoke the importance of 
“separation of powers,” this is usually what they mean. 
“Proper change, and the place for change, is through the peoples’ representatives and 
not through the courts,” he told me. “Change in the sense of new ideas, new laws, new 
practices, within the context of what is permitted by the Constitution, is the role of the 
peoples’ elected representatives…the court is there to interpret and not to change things.” As 
we will see in examining Justice Antonin Scalia’s views on tradition, this attitude toward 
change is central to the conservative project—though by no means the unanimous view 
within the Federalist Society, where libertarians vigorously dispute the Meese/Scalia social-
conservative view. Meese and the more libertarian conservatives do agree on the concept of 
limited government, though, as Schotten writes, “Like [John Stuart] Mill and [Henry David] 
Thoreau before him, Meese believes that political power is dangerous, and additionally 
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thinks that there exists something like an inverse relationship between the government, the 
government's power, and individual liberty.”207 The primacy of liberty—as viewed against 
the concept of equality—is something we will take up in the next chapter. 
Conservative leaders continue advancing the argument laid out by Meese at Tulane, 
and one might even argue it has become more “mainstream.” “[T]he  justices (and their 
apologists) now believe that the authority of the Court’s decisions are more important than 
the authority of our fundamental law,” writes Constitutional scholar Robert F. Nagel in a 
recent article in the conservative magazine The Weekly Standard.208 And in a 2005 interview 
on the MSNBC program Hardball with Chris Matthews, the Rev. Pat Robertson (a lawyer as 
well as a minister) reiterated Meese’s suggestions about the limited nature of Supreme Court 
jurisdiction and the inherently illegitimate nature of its Constitutional interpretations. 
“You know,” Robertson said, “it used to be, I have a case against you and we’re 
fighting about something, whatever it is, and a court decides, OK, Chris wins. All right, you 
win. Cool. But now we’re saying that decision binds the whole nation.” Robertson even 
repeats Meese’s Lincoln reference, somewhat mangling the quotation from the first 
inaugural: “Abraham Lincoln said this is not something we shall do and we would have 
surrendered our liberties to that eminent body. And that’s the thing that worries me, is that—
the overreach of cases.” Robertson and Matthews proceed to consider nothing less than the 
elimination of judicial review. “That would be a feast day,” Matthews joked; “I can hardly 
wait,” replied Robertson.  
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It may yet be upon us. As even a Meese skeptic from the libertarian Cato Institute 
acknowledged, the conservative revolution is the “triumph of the Meese justice department.” 
And in turn, much of the triumph of the Meese justice department was thanks to the 
Federalist Society and its emerging pipeline of talented young conservative lawyers. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE PROBLEM OF RACE: 
ORIGINALISM, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION,
AND THE RHETORIC OF EQUALITY  
 
The conservative case for originalism is hardly airtight, as thoughtful originalists like 
Scalia are quick to admit. And as we will see in the next chapter, Scalia justifies his appeal to 
the extralegal practices of tradition as a kind of stopgap measure when originalism fails—
when we either don’t know or can’t figure out some law’s original meaning or its drafters’ 
intention. For many on the left, though, originalism never makes it out of the gates.  
Recall Justice Brennan’s response to Meese, arguing that originalism rejects the very 
possibility of progress, the idea that standards of justice might evolve to include more rights 
for more people—minorities, women, and others whose equality was not contemplated by the 
Founders and the Constitution they produced. The first place many of originalism’s critics 
usually point is race—as Senator Ted Kennedy so vociferously—if unfairly—argued that 
“Robert Bork’s America” was frozen in time before the Civil Rights movement. Kennedy 
argued then, as do his successors today, that conservatives like Bork wanted to “wind back 
the clock” to the days before the Warren Court issued opinions like Roe v. Wade and Brown 
v. Board. As Congressman Bobby Scott, an African-American and a ranking Democratic 
member on the House Judiciary Committee told me, “As one who would have been three-
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fifths of a person under the original understanding, you’ll excuse me if I don’t sign up for the 
originalism caucus.”  
This is a problem for conservatives. How can one subscribe to originalism and not 
justify the racism of the Constitution?181 How can one decry the “activism” of the Warren 
Court and still support the outcome in Brown v. Board of Education, probably the most 
important case of the 20th Century? Conservatives have answers to both questions, some 
more satisfactory than others—answers we will consider here. The conservative position on 
Affirmative Action, in particular, reveals the continuing difficulties posed by the problem of 
racial equality and racial history in this country. More so in this chapter than in previous 
sections, we’ll take a close look at the way legal arguments and precedents have evolved over 
the years and evaluate the success conservatives have had in moving the law closer to their 
position.182 Rhetoric serves us here as a way or reading and evaluating, but with more policy 
results coming into consideration here than in the last chapter—taking up Meese’s specific 
concerns with the mode of interpretation.  
My analysis in this chapter reflects the depth as well as the breadth of conservative 
thinking about equality; to understand the legal and policy positions held by the legal right it 
is important to explore deeper questions of theory and even philosophy. My specific focus on 
Affirmative Action law is contextualized by these larger concerns. Intellectual aspects of the 
debate over equality in conservative thought run back hundreds of years, predating Civil 
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Rights, Affirmative Action, and the accompanying metaphors of the “level playing field.” 
Equality before the law is a procedural and legal matter, but equality as a philosophical 
concept is another. What I will do here is place a legal question (Affirmative Action) in a 
cultural context. Law does not exist in a vacuum, and I conclude that conservatives 
understand this: they have tailored both their legal and political strategies accordingly.  
 
Race has always played an important role in American politics, right from the very 
beginning when the compromise was made over that embarrassing 3/5 Clause. In 
contemporary times, the Civil Rights movement was opposed by many conservatives, 
leading many pro-segregation Democrats to switch parties—a “Southern Strategy” exploited 
by savvy Republican strategists to bring the old Democratic Solid South into the GOP 
column. But party politics don’t always track racial politics; it was Republican votes in the 
Congress that finally passed President Lyndon Johnson’s landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 
after the bill had been held up for months by obstructionist Southern democrats. Republican 
Majority Leader Everett Dirksen led the charge to break the standoff, famously quoting 
Victor Hugo on the Senate floor: “Stronger than all the armies in the world is an idea whose 
time has come.” Among Dirksen’s opponents were not only the Dixiecrat Southerners but 
also Barry Goldwater, who opposed the bill because of what he saw as its violation of 
individual property rights.183 
During the Civil Rights era, as we will consider below, the broad debate over Black 
equality morphed into a panoply of specific problems and solutions—some legal, some 
cultural, some political, some all of the above. By the time Ronald Reagan was elected in 
 
183 Paul Gilroy, Against Race (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard/Belknap, 2000), 6; Part 1 passim.
184
1980—when the Federalist Society founders were coming of age—perhaps the most debated 
Civil Rights issue was Affirmative Action, decried by conservatives as a quota system that 
legitimized reverse-discrimination and fostered a culture of dependency and entitlement 
among minorities. This debate played out with two Federalist Society boosters at the helm of 
the Reagan Justice Department, Ed Meese and William Bradford Reynolds, chief of the Civil 
Rights division. Today, Meese remains active with the Heritage Foundation and Reynolds is 
in private practice. Both serve on the Federalist Society’s Board of Visitors.  
“When we came in, in the Reagan era, quotas and busing were sacred terms; that was 
the definition of race,” Reynolds told me. “Now you have a much different discourse,” he 
said. “The biggest challenge we had was to move that discourse to ‘equal opportunity’ from 
‘equal numbers’. If there was anything we accomplished in eight years, it was that.” 
 
As Reynolds and many of his adversaries understand, race is itself a rhetorical matter. 
To the dismay of many in the Civil Rights establishment, liberal cultural theorist Paul Gilroy 
has repeatedly argued that “race”—the term always appears in quotation marks in his 
writings—is just one more social construct, no more (or less) absolutely real than any other, a 
cultural construct with “no ethically defensible place.” Identity, including racial identity, is 
incredibly important as a rhetorical tool, though, allowing leaders to form common bonds 
with their audiences based on shared self-perception. “Revitalizing ethical sensibilities in this 
area,” Gilroy writes,” requires moving away from antiracism’s tarnished vocabulary while 
retaining many of the hopes to which it was tied.”184 As Gilroy all too well understands, 
identity is the currency of cultural politics, in academia and often in the voting booth.  
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“Equality” was, and is, an incredibly important legal word. And like most legally 
important words it has commonly understood meanings which do not always correspond to 
its formal legal meanings—when, as legal critic James Boyd White would say, it is 
“translated” into law.185 Equality as understood by the drafters of the Constitution meant 
something quite different than it means today; as Justice John Paul Stevens has also pointed 
out in a response to Meese, there was diversity of opinion just among the founders.186 
Aside from its legal significance in texts like the Constitution, equality is also an idea, 
a concept with social implications for human relations and governance. It is an idea that has 
been a driving force in modern history, sparking wars and overturning cultures. For modern 
American conservatives as for their British progenitors over 200 years ago, “equality” is a 
revolutionary spur, the sign of unnatural attempts to remake human society. For movement 
conservatives, including many Federalists, the judicial activism of the Supreme Court’s civil 
rights cases reflects a clear, but misguided quest for judicially engineered egalitarianism. As 
Ronald Reagan said in a 1984 campaign speech, school busing for racial balance as ordered 
by the courts “takes innocent children…and makes them pawns in a social experiment 
nobody wants.”187 
To understand how American conservatives have talked about equality in the context 
of civil rights—both in and out of the courtroom—we need to understand the meaning of 
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equality in the conservative mind. This means we go all the way back to Edmund Burke and 
his reaction to the revolution in France.188 
“Equality is the product of art, not of nature,” is how conservative intellectual 
historian Russell Kirk interpreted Burke’s key insight.189 “If social leveling is carried so far 
as to obliterate order and class,” he wrote in The Conservative Mind, “art will have been 
employed to deface God’s design…[Burke] predicted that such societies must presently sink 
into a fresh condition of inequality—that of one master, or a handful of masters, and a people 
of slaves.”190 Egalitarianism, in other words, puts us on what conservative economist 
Friedrich von Hayek would famously call the “road to serfdom.”191 In its socialist guise, 
state-enforced egalitarianism is “the death of progress,” stifling innovation, competition, and 
creativity.192 It is destructive of civilization, of the heritage and traditions which hold society 
together. As Richard Weaver wrote, “Where equality obtains, no one knows where he 
belongs.”193 
Kirk, Hayek, and Weaver were all enormously influential with modern American 
conservative leaders194 such as William F. Buckley Jr.,195 who in turn influenced Reagan and 
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his acolytes like Meese, Cribb, and Reynolds. The philosophically anti-egalitarian roots of 
first-generation conservative leaders informed their political project from the outset. The 
conservatives’ response to Civil Rights jurisprudence from Brown v. Board196 onward 
sprouted from fertile ground, with roots reaching back to Edmund Burke’s reaction to the 
revolutionaries of the First Republic. 
 What follows is a narrative of legal and rhetorical evolution, tracking court decisions 
as well as political developments—including the rise of the modern Washington think tanks, 
which, unlike the Federalist Society, actively lobby Congress and advocate policy positions.   
 
Interpreting Brown v. Board: The Debate Begins 
 As Harvard Law School professor Randall Kennedy has written, among the 
frustrations of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s opinion for the Court in Brown—despite its civic 
virtue and inspiring prose—is that it “invited a rather narrow reading.”197 Warren’s goal of a 
unanimous vote led him to make numerous compromises within the text of the opinion, thus 
opening the door to varying interpretations by lower courts.198 Among these was the “Briggs 
doctrine,” a nickname derived from the decision of an appellate court holding that the 
vaguely worded Brown required no active efforts at school desegregation—no “affirmative” 
action. Chief Justice Warren’s vague opinion, concerned more with lofty pronouncements of 
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national virtue than legal brass tacks, left enough wiggle room for this reading to pass 
muster. It was a classic rhetorical and political compromise, sacrificing precision for 
unanimity. 
Not surprisingly, Briggs became the touchstone for many Southern courts.199 Because 
Brown did not explicitly overrule the 1896 case Plessy v. Ferguson,200 it was unclear whether 
the notorious “separate but equal” doctrine established in that ruling still applied in non-
public education settings. Plessy, as it turns out, was overruled only indirectly in Gayle v. 
Browder,201 the Alabama District Court case which upheld the constitutionality of the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott led by Martin Luther King, Jr.202 
According to political scientist Thomas  Keck, the turning point in the shift of the 
conservative segregationist South from the democrats to the GOP was when the discourse 
over equality changed, “when affirmative action started to displace school desegregation as 
the key constitutional debate in the area of racial equality.”203 Affirmative Action fit easily 
into conservatism’s longstanding, Burkean anti-egalitarianism—one more example of a 
bloated state led by socialist-leaning liberals who thought they could remake society, casting 
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aside tradition and culture when it didn’t conform to their idea of the way things ought to 
be.204 
It would be a mistake, however, to focus only on the negative aspects of the 
conservative opposition to Affirmative Action. In the years since the demise of the explicit 
racism that was obvious among many opposed to the Civil Rights Movement, the principled 
conservative case against racial preferences has become more clear. One neat way to sum it 
up is to go back to the terms the Founders themselves knew to be in tension; the ideals of the 
French Revolution so loathed by Burke. Rather than the revolutionary ideal of egalité,
conservatives favored liberté. Particularly for the libertarian wing of the conservative 
movement, liberty would be understood as the freedom of the individual.205 As Clarence 
Thomas said in a 1989 address to the Federalist Society, conservatism’s appeal is grounded 
in its belief in “freedom as the main source of all that is good politically.”206 And legal 
historian James Staab has written bluntly of Thomas’s senior colleague, “Scalia’s 
jurisprudence in no way resembles the political principles of the Sage from Monticello, an 
egalitarians if ever there was one—of those inalienable truths, of course, is the business of all 
being created equal. In contrast to Jefferson, Scalia has a strong distrust of popular 
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democracy and is less enamored with states’ rights…he believes in a strong executive with 
numerous implied and inherent powers,” a subject we will revisit later.207 
Another example can be found in a George F. Will column from 2005. “The unending 
argument in political philosophy concerns constantly adjusting society's balance between 
freedom and equality,” he writes. “The primary goal of collectivism—of socialism in Europe 
and contemporary liberalism in America—is to enlarge governmental supervision of 
individuals’ lives. This is done in the name of equality” In a recent law review article on 
American exceptionalism Steven Calabresi notes that the “golden door” of Ellis Island is 
home to a statue of liberty, “and not a statue of ‘equality’ or ‘fraternity’.” That is he writes, 
“after all, what this country stands for.”208 
The ideal of equality announced in Brown was grounded not only in freedom but in 
racial integration, of “non-separateness” and antisubordination as a principle of human 
decency and American democracy. The student plaintiffs in Brown were held to have been 
denied the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, but this specific 
issue of Constitutional law was not elaborated upon in the lofty civic prose of Chief Justice 
Warren’s opinion. In the ensuing desegregation decisions issued by the Warren Court209 this 
Equal Protection rationale continued to go unexplained; the doctrinal, textual rationale for the 
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decision was simply disregarded. As one scholar has written, the Warren Court “left Brown 
relatively devoid of interpretation for at least ten years” during which conservatives on and 
off the bench moved to fill the void, redefining Brown’s meaning and “canonizing” it—
neutering its doctrinal force as a matter of law.210 
In the post-Brown era some otherwise liberal legal academics began turning their 
critiques against the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence.211 By 1970 Philip Kurland of 
the University of Chicago was sounding very much like Friedrich von Hayek: “Those too 
young to remember what happened to Europe immediately prior to World War II, as country 
after country fell under the thrall of equality, may yet find the allegory in George Orwell’s 
Animal Farm instructive.”212 In that same year Alexander Bickel, a mainstream liberal who 
had taught Constitutional law at Yale with Robert Bork, was denouncing the Warren Court’s 
“egalitarian revolution.”213 
Bork’s own career was taking off at this point, his 1971 essay on “neutral principles” 
gaining increased attention.214 Bork specifically speaks to the question of equality, writing 
that “the bare concept of equality provides no guide for courts. All law discriminates,” he 
argues, “and thereby creates inequality.”215 He moves from here to his justification for 
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Brown, a position he has maintained consistently throughout his career.216 His harmonizing 
of Warren’s conclusion with an avowedly conservative methodology has had lasting 
influence among scholars on the right who have also tackled this knotty problem; 
Congressman Scott’s charge about the Three-fifths Clause echoes loudly.217 Bork’s argument 
that the result in Brown was justifiable under a textualist consideration of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is tendentious, and other conservatives have posed other alternatives. Michael 
McConnell, for example, offers a more nuanced argument. He argues that votes on the 1875 
Civil Rights Act, which in certain proposed versions would have outlawed segregated 
schools, show that strong Congressional majorities felt they were acting within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which many of them had voted on several years before.218 But 
Bork’s more direct argument has had the most traction: Plessy was wrong precisely because 
the Court tried to indulge in sociology and not just stick to the text. The Warren Court in 
Brown committed the same error, though the outcome in that case was the right one. 
By rearticulating Brown as part of a different narrative—the historical project of 
understanding the original intent of the framers, Bork achieved what we might call a 
rhetorical “inoculation.” As one legal critic has persuasively argued, Bork helped to 
“eliminat[e] opposition from the decision’s most likely detractors.” He reframed and 
rearticulated it as an extension of the first Justice John Harlan’s dissent in Plessy which 
declared, “Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
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citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.”219 Conservatives 
would go on to “canonize” Brown and convert it into an argument for Harlan’s 
“colorblindness.”220 
Bork’s support for the outcome in Brown is about the extent of his sympathy with the 
Warren Court. In his memoir he writes that the Court’s “catalogue of…legislative alterations 
of the Constitution is a thick one and is organized by the theme of egalitarianism.”221 The 
first generation of neoconservatives also joined this anti-egalitarian discourse, which reached 
fever pitch during the 1970s. Nathan Glazer, editor of The Public Interest, wrote in 1971 that 
he rejected “the revolution of equality [which] not only expresses a demand for equality in 
political rights and political power, [but] also…in economic power, in social status, in 
authority in every sphere”—specifically citing affirmative action programs in college 
admission which he saw as counter to the traditional American notion of meritocracy.222 
Daniel Bell, the liberal author of  The Radical Right,223 similarly denounced “racial quotas” 
as a move toward the “socialist ethic” and away from classical liberal individualism.224 The 
conservative case against Affirmative Action was gaining ground. 
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Nixon, Nixon’s Court, and the Emergence of the Think Tanks 
Richard Nixon campaigned against the “activism” of the Supreme Court under his old 
political foe Earl Warren225 but was seen by conservatives at the time, as he still is now, as an 
unreliable ally in the fight against “racial quotas.” Mark Levin, Ed Meese’s former Chief of 
Staff and author of the 2005 bestseller Men In Black, argues that Nixon was essentially no 
better than the architect of the Great Society, Lyndon Johnson, for setting up the Minority 
Business Enterprise contracting program—also known as The Philadelphia Plan, the first set-
aside plan for government contractors.226 
Nixon’s election and arrival in Washington marks an important moment in the history 
of contemporary conservatism, which already by 1968 had a long-established love-hate 
relationship with the former Vice President. Nixon was a bundle of contradictions and 
represented the kind of pragmatic pol for whom the hard core Goldwaterites had little 
sympathy.227 By 1968, there were already two conservative “think tanks” in Washington—
though neither had achieved anything close to the eventual prominence such institutions 
would take on. The American Conservative Union, founded by Goldwaterites just days after 
the 1964 defeat, was the prototype, and the American Enterprise Institute, founded in New 
York in 1943 as a business-policy research forum,228 would take decades to emerge as a real 
force.  
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As we have seen, the ACU launched its  “first authentic lobbying program”229 against 
Nixon’s “Family Assistance Plan,” a controversial revision of the nation’s welfare system. 
The ACU’s model set the standard for the think tanks, which pioneered a blend of academic 
policy research, persuasive political advocacy, and media savvy. Today, the major 
conservative think tanks feature dozens of in-house experts and visiting scholars—much like 
any liberal arts college campus. 
On the Internet one finds these experts presented on think tank home pages in media-
friendly category menus along with contact information and publication lists.230 
Conspicuously absent from website menus of AEI231 and The Heritage Foundation232 is—
civil rights; the libertarians at the CATO Institute buck the trend and do include it as a 
subject heading. The omission is itself a rhetorical act, a denial of the category’s basic 
legitimacy. While materials on Affirmative Action and Equal Protection are available from 
Heritage and AEI, these policy areas are not presented as legitimate in their own right, 
alongside foreign policy, taxation, or property rights.233 The think tanks, unlike the Federalist 
Society, function as advocates for specific policies—and draw on their experts to make these 
arguments to the public and to lawmakers.  
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“The think tanks are permanent institutions, very much inside the Beltway,” 
Congressman Dan Lungren, a Federalist Society supporter and former California Attorney 
General, told me. The Federalist Society, he said, isn’t a “think-tank bureaucracy”; “by its 
very nature cannot be just ‘inside the Beltway’.” Lungren is right to point out the Federalists’ 
decentralized structure has served it well in ways quite different from the think tanks—which 
is not to de-emphasize the importance these conservative groups play or the influence they 
have. Their role is quite different from the Federalists’, though.  “We are in a somewhat 
similar work in terms of purpose, but I think the way in which we go about it is different,” 
said Meese. “Heritage is in the policy information business,” he told me. “It’s our job to 
develop the policy documents that are useful to policymakers, to the news media, to other 
people that either make policy or influence policy.” 
“We have direct contact on a regular basis with Members of Congress, we have much 
greater direct contact with members of the news media,” Meese added. The Federalist 
Society is not a competitor, but is rather the common territory Heritage shares with the other 
conservative think tanks and with allies in academia and government, a forum for intra-
conservative dialog and idea-testing. The Society provides “the intellectual backdrop, the 
legal policy backdrop, for a lot of the things we do here,” Meese said. As John Fund put it, 
they are the intellectual “clearing house,” the Grand Central Station for ideas. Those ideas 
then percolate through the more instrumentally focused mechanisms of the think tanks, who 
lobby Congress and try to get them written into policy.  
The think tanks do more than lobby, though. Writes liberal critic Nunberg: “Those 
groups have been enormously successful in shaping the issues and terms of political debate 
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and disseminating conservative views in the media.”234 They also help build the conservative 
movement from the ground up, as does the Federalist Society.235 “We believe ideas have 
consequences,” declares the Heritage homepage, “but that those ideas must be promoted 
aggressively.”236 The idea echoes the gauntlet thrown down by the youthful William F. 
Buckley in God and Man at Yale. “Truth does not necessarily vanquish,” he wrote, “truth can 
never win unless it is promulgated…The cause of truth must be championed, and it must be 
championed dynamically.”237 The conservative think tanks have done this with vigor and 
efficiency. And whether or not their websites include parallel subject headings, ideas about 
equality and civil rights are featured prominently. For decades, conservatives have been 
railing against Affirmative Action—the stigma of a racist opposition to Civil Rights fading as 
the years go by, and as more Black conservatives come to the fore as spokespeople for the 
right. With their contrarian views these speakers often attract news coverage and attention; 
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they include the likes of former Secretary of Education Rodney Paige,238 economics 
professor Glenn Loury,239 and Civil Rights Commissioner Peter Kirsanow.240 
Reshaping Civil Rights and the Discourse of “Equality” 
Conservatives moved to reshape the legal discourse of equality during the Nixon 
presidency.241 In particular, Supreme Court nominee William Rehnquist used his acceptance 
of Brown as a way to inoculate himself against racially tinged accusations deriving from a 
memorandum he wrote while clerking for Justice Robert Jackson.242 Support for Brown—
with its vague, though inspirational language and ambiguous holding—became a trump-card 
defense and an opportunity for conservatives to redefine its meaning.  
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Shortly before Rehnquist joined the court, Chief Justice Burger—Nixon’s first 
nominee—authored the opinion for the Court in the racial discrimination case Griggs v. Duke 
Power.243 The case marked an important point of doctrinal departure, holding that 
discriminatory intent was unnecessary for there to be liability under the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.244 Five years later, this appeared to change. The Nixon appointees were joined by John 
Paul Stevens and Byron White in Washington v. Davis,245 an Equal Protection ruling that 
raises the burden on a plaintiff, requiring that discriminatory intent be shown, not just 
discriminatory results. The opinion also explicitly rejects “strict scrutiny”246—a nearly 
impossible interpretive standard of judicial review—as the proper standard for anything 
except “facially” discriminatory rules.247 Conservatives, as the saying goes, kept on working 
to move the goalposts. 
An argument can be made that the conservative Court’s opinion in Davis mirrors the 
effects of the Supreme Court’s first review of Civil Rights law in the Slaughter House 
Cases248 a century before: Validity was conceded so that meaning might be controlled.249 In 
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Davis, the Nixon Court essentially read Harlan’s Plessy dissent and its “colorblind” ideal into 
the common law, creating what liberal Yale Law School Professor Reva Siegel describes as a 
tense relationship between the core principles of anticlassification and antisubordination.250 
“Talking about the wrongs of classification was not merely a cooler way of justifying Brown,
it was simultaneously an effective way of limiting Brown,” she concludes.251 As a frustrated 
Justice William Brennan wrote in his dissent in University Of California Board of Regents v. 
Bakke,252 “[C]laims that law must be ‘color-blind’ or that the datum of race is no longer 
relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of reality.”253 
David Frum, President George W. Bush’s former speechwriter and a keen cultural 
critic, writes in his recent study of the 1970s of how the Court’s decisions in Griggs and 
Bakke prompted a widespread defensive response in the business and educational 
community. “The white resentment provoked by quotas may explain the strong mood of 
racial pessimism that gripped Blacks in the 1970s,” Frum writes.254 Bakke upheld a minority 
preference system in college admissions, attacked relentlessly by critics as an explicitly race-
based quota plan. Frum also draws attention to many white communities’ resistance to court-
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ordered busing schemes aimed at achieving racial balance. “The Supreme Court disregarded 
the promises by the authors of the 1964 [Civil Rights] Act,” in Frum’s view, and  
 
...gave the federal government  permission to proceed with virtually 
any busing scheme it liked. The government liked them all. The public did 
not…Busing was truly a revolution imposed from above, and as expected, it 
met with violent resistance from below.255 
“Busing” as used by Frum in this passage is indicative of the conceptual power this 
word took on. In the context of court-ordered integration, “busing” came to function as a 
super-significant word, a part that stood in for the whole—the broader conservative themes 
of “big government” and judicial overreach. “Busing to achieve racial balance” was reduced 
to busing, a “revolution imposed from above.”256 In his comprehensive study of the Reagan 
administration’s Civil Rights policies, Raymond Wolters astutely observes that Reagan 
“knew that the yellow school bus had become a symbol of intrusive social engineering and 
sensed that, for many people, the buses might have been emblazoned with words like liberal 
or Democrat.”257 By the end of the ‘70s, statistics do show that white public opinion had 
turned decisively against busing.258 
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The Court’s rulings aligned with the conservatives’ long-held beliefs about the 
tensions between equality and freedom. “Most Americans, though they are thoroughly in 
favor of civil rights, are opposed to quotas,” Bork writes. “When non-whites who have not 
suffered discrimination are preferred to whites who have not inflicted discrimination, racial 
resentments are sure to be aroused.”259 The conservative narrative functions here to explain 
as well as to define. The Civil Rights Movement was about “equality,” but at some point in 
the late 1960s, “the civil rights organizations changed direction,” Bork writes in a later book. 
“They insisted over and over again they wanted no special status for minorities. Now they 
sought special status and preferential treatment.”260 State protected equality as an ideal has 
been abandoned—at least social equality.261 
Conservative Senator Jeff Sessions agrees that the Civil Rights era was pivotal in the 
shift in popular opinion supporting the Warren Court’s decisions. “The Civil Rights 
Movement gave momentum to what was perceived as legitimacy for activist judges,” 
Sessions told me,  “so that great judges were perceived as the judges who were acting, and 
who challenged the status quo, who broke new ground and defended rights.” The 
complications brought on by what Professor Wolters calls “second-generation Civil Rights 
problems” would serve to advance the conservative call against Warren Court-styled 
“activism.”262 Harvard Federalist and GOP chairman Ken Mehlman eagerly explained his 
own reading of Brown and its legacy. “The legislative reforms made in the sixties under the 
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rubric of Civil Rights were among the most important and good and overdue in American 
history,” he said, “and they were necessary because of an enormous act of judicial activism 
in Plessy.” Brown, he joins Bork in arguing, was correctly decided in light of the Civil War 
Amendments.  
Mehlman carried Sessions’ point about the “activism” of the Supreme Court during 
the Civil Rights era a step further. “Because of the nature of Brown,” he told me, “what most 
people would think of as anti-democratic became seen as the ultimate guarantor of 
democracy.” That is to say, judicial activism. 
 
The Reagan Era and Colorblindness 
A key linkage emerged in the 1970s in legal and political conservative discourse, as 
opinion leaders like Jeane Kirkpatrick began describing Affirmative Action as just one more 
example of “big government” and “planning” in the socialist, Hayekian road-to-serfdom 
sense.263 As David Frum writes, “Busing triggered a whole new perception among ordinary 
middle-class people of the malignity of public authority.”264 
This theme continues down to the present day, which finds popular press 
conservatives writing that “‘diversity’ is just the clever label the Court gives to reverse 
discrimination. Besides, Americans don’t need “government-orchestrated discrimination,” as 
Mark Levin writes.265 The notion that there can be no Constitutionally enforced racial 
“equality” without fundamental, illegal unfairness represents a full-tilt rejection of the 
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principle articulated by Judge John Minor Wisdom in the heat of the Civil Rights era: that the 
“Constitution is both color blind and color conscious.”266 
The conservative interpretation of equality moved further away from Brown’s famous 
footnote eleven—wherein sociologist Kenneth Clarke detailed his research on the 
psychological damage inflicted by segregation—with McKleskey v. Kemp,267 a Supreme 
Court ruling rejecting the use of aggregated data to prove discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause. The holding comports generally with conservative textualist and 
originalist interpretations of the “actual harm” standard for causes of action, under the Equal 
Protection Clause or otherwise: membership in an afflicted or harmed groups is not 
enough—specific harm in a specific instance must be proven.268 As Levin argues in a more 
populist vein, specificity should seem an obvious requirement. “The Fourteenth Amendment 
is not about charts and indexes and statistics.”269 Professor Horwitz puts this kind of 
argument into historical perspective, noting that hostility toward a sociological approach was 
a hallmark of legal orthodoxy generations before the Federalist Society existed. Progressives 
in the late 19th and early 20th century, he writes, “treated social science research as 
providing a necessary demystifying first step toward the goal of social reform…another way 
of undermining disembodied formalism.”270 
We can have little doubt about which side of this debate Mark Levin and his mentor 
Edwin Meese would have come down on. Under Levin’s reading, the Fourteenth 
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Amendment is not about race at all—it is, in fact, anti-race. And this appears to be the view 
of the Court’s two most conservative justices, Scalia and Thomas, in such important Civil 
Rights cases as City of Richmond v. Croson (rejecting rules that required hiring of minority-
owned contracting firms)271, Missouri v. Jenkins, (rejecting a salary equity plan based on 
public school disparities)272 and Adarand v. Peña (requiring an extremely high standard for 
any governmental consideration of race in public policy).273 Here we find continual argument 
that any consideration of race is pernicious, threatening “to reinforce and preserve for future 
mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege, and race hatred.”274 
As one observer writes, “Adarand basically overruled the race-consciousness of Swann,”275 
the 1971 case that was one of the most important busing-plan desegregation decisions. 
Jenkins included an opinion by Justice Thomas notable for its implicit reliance upon Harlan’s 
Plessy dissent. “Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have caused 
psychological feelings of inferiority,” Thomas wrote, implicating Clarke’s sociological 
research and Warren’s footnote eleven. “Public school systems that separated blacks and 
provided them with superior educational resources—making blacks ‘feel’ superior to whites 
sent to lesser schools—would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether or not the white 
students felt stigmatized.”276 This is Bork’s argument, as we have seen. 
 
271 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
272 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
273 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
274 515 U.S. 200, 239. 
275 Snyder, “How the Conservatives Canonized Brown,” 486, citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
276 495 U.S. 33, 121. 
206
As liberal law professor—and not infrequent Federalist Society panelist—Jamin 
Raskin writes, “conservatives gathered excitedly around the mantra of ‘color blindness’, a 
magical turn of phrase that justified not only the dismantling of affirmative action 
programs…but judicial disengagement from the project of active school desegregation.”277 
Another magical turn of phrase comes, of course, from Martin Luther King Jr.’s famed “I 
Have a Dream” speech, which has similarly entered the canon of Civil Rights discourse. 
King’s vision of an America where people are not “judged by the color of their skin but by 
the content of their character”278 has been smoothly integrated into the conservative rhetoric 
of colorblindness. The leading proponents of this reading of King make their arguments from 
the podium of the conservative think tanks, none more so than former Secretary of Education 
William J. Bennett. Bennett’s co-opting of King’s rhetoric must be regarded as masterful, 
whether or not one agrees with liberals who see it as illegitimate. 
“Well, Dr. King, we’re not going to make it with your children, maybe your 
grandchildren maybe your great-grandchildren,” he said at a 1993 Heritage Foundation panel 
discussion on “The Conservative Virtues of Dr. Martin Luther King.”279 “We are further 
away from being colorblind today than we were when Dr. King [gave his “I Have a Dream” 
speech], because race-norming, counting by race, reverse discrimination, racial identification, 
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talking about oneself and one identity in terms of race is much more popular and much more 
a part of the intellectual and political mainstream than it ever was.”280 
Some liberal Republicans feel that conservatives on and off the bench have taken this 
argument too far; it is worth pointing out that the recent chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, voted against both Robert Bork in 1986 and 
William Bradford Reynolds the year before, in his nomination for a higher post in the 
Department of Justice. “Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable,” 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote in one of the recent college admission Affirmative 
Action cases.281 Another prominent Republican woman, former New Jersey Governor 
Christine Todd Whitman, is more direct. “Republicans do not know how to think racially,” 
she wrote in her memoir.282 In Whitman’s analysis, the conservatives’ “Southern Strategy” of 
appealing to anti-Civil Rights constituencies is directly to blame. “As the Republicans have 
solidified their base in the South, they have also solidified the resentment of African 
Americans nationwide.”283 
But Christy Whitman is not to be found on the rosters of the Heritage Foundation’s 
policy fellows, and hers is a distinctly minority position in the conservative Civil Rights 
discourse. The more common refrain is that “The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all state 
discrimination on race, without exception”; Alan Bakke lost his case “because over the years 
the Supreme Court has taken the clear language of the Fourteenth Amendment and twisted it 
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into a pretzel.”284 This conservative attack is shared not only by legal observers but by 
literary critics as well, sometimes connecting up Stanley Fish and critical theory with what 
they believe to be unjustifiable readings of Constitutional text. Writing for a different 
audience with much the same theme, English professor R.V. Young declares that “the 
postmodernist has abandoned even the pretense of straightening things out and is committed 
to nothing but twistedness.”285 He then immediately shifts into a discussion of Roe. “The 
factor linking Roe v. Wade to contemporary literary theory is that the actual words of a text, 
as well as the truth represented by the text, are simply irrelevant in the face of political 
zealotry.”286 The emphasis is mine here, meant to highlight the importance, in the 
conservative mind, of the linkage between texts and truth, and interpretation and politics (and 
zeal). While privacy and Roe are another matter altogether, I think it is important to respond 
to these conservative critics that “colorblind” is not a term one can find in the text of the 
Constitution.287 It is a term drawn from Constitutional interpretation, and from a dissent, at 
that. On this matter the conservative argument is wide open to critique. 
It bears noting at the conclusion of this discussion that another historical narrative is 
always possible; such is the nature of history—there’s a lot of it to go around. Just as 
Jefferson Powell has shown that Meese’s account of the Founding period is fraught with 
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historical flaws, Cass Sunstein argues that it is possible to understand the creation of the post-
Civil War Freedmen’s Bureau as direct evidence against the conservative anti-Affirmative 
Action argument. Although “forty acres and a mule” has become a cliché, the point is a clear 
one: Following the Civil War, it sure seemed as though Congress intended to provide direct 
and affirmative support to the formerly enslaved population. 288 Sunstein’s history may 
indeed by a better one, but it has not been effectively articulated.  
 
The End of Civil Rights? 
 The conservative narrative of equality and the Civil Rights movement is one of 
fulfillment by Meese and his cavaliers—and a tale of elitist exploitation by unscrupulous 
liberals. The end product for the law and for the broader public dialog is ambiguous and 
confusing, and likely to be complicated by future rulings by the Roberts Court on 
Affirmative Action related issues.  
But in one sense, we have seen a full-fledged return to Plessy—not, I would argue, in 
some cheap racist sense, but in terms of the colorblind standard of Harlan’s dissent and the  
“self-inflicted psychology” rationale nested deep in the majority opinion. In 1896 the Court 
held that any harms produced by segregation were the result of a willful self-perception, a 
“construction” that “the colored race chooses.”289 This is the second half of the modern 
conservative view, holding that the Civil Rights era is over. The perpetuation of Civil Rights 
litigation and political contestation is at best misguided, at worst a fraud. “Memories of 
aggressive discrimination and oppression do not fade so quickly,” writes Robert Bork. “But 
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in another way, the intensely unsatisfactory state of race relations is a mystery. The 
opportunities for blacks to advance in the United States have never been greater.”290 
And what is to blame for this mysterious disquiet, this continued agitation? 
Liberalism, of course, and its faith in the possibility of absolute equality. And so at AEI we 
find anti-egalitarian messenger par excellence, Charles Murray, co-author of the much-
maligned Bell Curve.291 In an AEI speech in 1994, he could not have been more clear: “That 
people are unequal is not in doubt, now as ever before…but we have been deeply 
indoctrinated throughout the twentieth century that they shouldn’t be.” Ultimately, ideology 
is to blame, and equality is just one more ideological formation. “The perversions of the 
egalitarian ideal.” Murray reminds us, “began with the French Revolution.”292 Revolution 
and ideology. As with Meese, Murray plays the realist card: we’re not trying to promote 
some ideology, those other folks are. We’re not ideologues, we’re telling you the way it 
really is. Just the facts. 
 When it comes to current legal doctrine we are left with the complexity of Grutter,
the Michigan University Affirmative Action case: It “transforms the diversity rationale in the 
course of adopting it, expanding the concept of diversity so that it explicitly embraces 
antisubordination values,” but is in the final analysis contradictory.293 “Grutter fervently 
warns against interpreting the Equal Protection Clause in terms of the very values the 
decision in fact vindicates,” writes Reva Siegel. “Protestations to the contrary 
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notwithstanding, Grutter embodies an antisubordination understanding.”294 All this may 
change before this book goes to press, of course. The wheels of justice may or may not turn 
so slowly. 
As the law moves further away from Brown’s ideals of antisubordination, 
conservative think tanks marshal their research and media power to push the public discourse 
further away from racism as a cause of social ills. Witness Heritage’s 2002 project 
countering a high-profile report on racial disparities in health care, “Is Racism the Real 
Culprit?”295 The final report concludes that “race per se is not a factor in producing child 
poverty,” and that “the major underlying factors producing child poverty in the United States 
are welfare dependence and single parenthood.”296 Thus is equality deracialized, the social 
problem at issue wholly reframed in terms of a favored conservative narrative, the 
breakdown of the nuclear family. 
 
Through the arguments of conservatives in courtrooms, think tanks, and in the media, 
Brown has become a trope, its ideal of equality through racial integration rearticulated both 
legally and culturally through the lens of Plessy—both Harlan’s dissent and the majority 
opinion. “Thirty years ago, affirmative action may have been a necessary step,” writes Dana 
White, a syndicated columnist and Heritage Foundation associate. But today, “It’s a new day 
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in America.”297 “Too many blacks do remain oppressed,” she writes, “but not by white 
Americans. Rather, it is by blacks who relish a perverse sub-culture of low standards and 
perpetual victimization. No longer do white racists tell black children books are for white 
people. Today, black people do this.”
In other words, the majority opinion in Plessy might have been wrong in 1896, but—
at least in this sense, and to this conservative—it is right today. “Black leaders have done in 
40 years what white people could not do in 400,” she concludes, “they’ve made us accept 
inferior status.” Or as Civil Rights Commissioner Peter Kirsanow said in a Heritage 
Foundation lecture in 2002, “the continued advancement of the condition of minorities in this 
country no longer has much to do with traditional civil rights,” it has to do with “individual 
responsibility—and that is a function of attitude.”298 For hard-core activists like Kirsanow 
and White, the path from a Burkean, philosophical rejection of equality leads to a staunch 
anti-Affirmative Action position. The ambiguity of the concept, for them, produces a wholly 
unambiguous policy result.  
In the next chapter we consider how Justice Antonin Scalia, a tough opponent of 
Affirmative Action, has laid out a judicial method grounded in text but also cognizant of 
intention (like Meese) and tradition.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ANTONIN SCALIA’S TEXTS AND TRADITIONS  
 
Textualism and Originalism: The Problem of Intent 
 The originalist views laid out by Meese in the early 1980s found their first major 
proponent on the Supreme Court in Antonin Scalia, nominated by President Ronald Reagan 
in 1986. The first faculty sponsor of the Federalist Society had come a long way since his 
days as a young faculty member at the University of Chicago. He would be the first serious 
legal conservative to put his ideas into action on the high court—the ultimate arbiter of 
Constitutional law in the United States. 
Meese’s cultural conservatism and American exceptionalism were tied to his ideas 
about judicial interpretation, his veneration for the Founders informing his emphasis on their 
intent as authors of the Constitution. As a practical tool for lawyering work, asking what was 
on the minds of 18th century politicians is of rather limited value; most law is far more 
mundane—reviewing intricate statutory schemes; evaluating compliance with federal 
regulations; deciding on the enforceability of contracts, wills, deeds, trademarks, and so on. It 
is the odd case that presents a truly meaningful question of Constitutional law. But it is the 
odd case that affects us all, because the Constitution affects us all. 
As expressed by Meese and others, originalism as a mode of interpretation had as one 
of its core tenets the notion of the bounded text, the “four corners” approach which limited 
the judge’s field of vision. Meese’s rhetoric focused less on this idea, though, than it did on 
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the importance of remaining true to the Framers’ original intentions and what he viewed as 
the timeless principles they wrote into law. Meese, and Scalia, are engaged in deeply 
rhetorical arguments about ways of reading and interpreting—less attached to policy results 
like Affirmative Action as considered in the previous chapter. This is not to say that the 
theories of Meese or Scalia do not implicate social outcomes. Surely they do. But in this 
chapter, again, I will be reading and interpreting arguments about ways of reading and 
interpreting. 
As we have seen, Meese framed his “originalism” in terms of not allowing “judge-
made law” to trump the “fundamental law” of the Constitution—a heretical act and an affront 
to those timeless principles. Meese’s public arguments, and the responses they drew from 
people like Justice Brennan, were focused on a truly conservative view: we need to get back 
to the ways things were meant to be before the metaphorical fall from grace, before the 
Warren Court began fundamentally altering the ways judges perform their jobs and usurping 
the legislative power. As we will see in the next chapter, Professor Richard Epstein pushes 
this golden yardstick another generation backwards, to the New Deal court under Franklin 
Roosevelt, which upheld his revolutionary programs like Social Security by offering 
expansive readings of certain key segments of Constitutional text.  
In the originalist worldview, part of the danger in allowing judges to “go outside” of 
the text is that context is by its nature boundless. This is why rhetoric matters for the judge, 
as it matters for any plaintiff and any defendant: no one arrives before a court unless they 
disagree about what really happened. Every single court proceeding involves at least two 
versions of a story—whether it is a story of a broken contract, an abusive spouse, an illegal 
FBI wiretap, or a president encroaching upon the powers of Congress. The judge (or jury) 
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must weigh these competing versions of what happened against some legal standard, usually 
taking the form of a text. For conservatives, the murky world of advocacy and litigation, with 
all of its doubt and indeterminacy must remain separate from the objective process of legal 
judgment. To let the judge depart from the four corners of the text and its (original) meaning 
is to unleash another unreliable, subjective participant into the melee. This is why a specific 
legal formulation, known as the “totality of the circumstances test,”327 strikes horror into the 
hearts of conservatives—it seems to require judges to go outside of the “four corners.” 
Textualism keeps the judge in his place, or so the theory goes, protecting the fairness of the 
adversarial system and maintaining the balance of power between the three branches of 
government. 
Textualism emerged during the 1980s as an outgrowth of Meese’s originalism and 
Bork’s earlier writings on the role of the courts, which centered on the need for judicial 
“objectivity” in the face of Warren Court-style “activism.” In constructing this opposition, 
Bork established the dominant frame in the modern debate over Constitutional law and 
judicial interpretation.328 As these ideas evolved—and it should be stressed much of the 
evolution unfolded within the forum of the Federalist Society—textualism moved beyond 
originalism’s concern with history and began focusing specifically on the importance of the 
separation of powers. To keep judges from “legislating from the bench,” as the now-
commonplace phrase goes, they should be strictly required to work only with the text. After 
all, that’s all the legislative branch has given them to work with, and it is the legislative 
branch’s task to…legislate. The conservatives’ answer to the obvious next question—“what 
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do you mean by ‘don’t legislate’?” is relentlessly formalist. The text, “the narrow, deadening 
text,” as Scalia has written.329 As Meese said of the Constitution: It starts with “We the 
People” and ends a fixed number of words later.  
In a speech delivered a couple of years into his tenure on the Supreme Court, Scalia 
described originalism as “the lesser evil,” an alternative to the dreaded “subjectivism” that 
results when judges substituting their own purposes for those of the Constitution’s authors.330 
Still—and Scalia acknowledges this—even if we stay “inside” the text we have to figure out 
what the text means. Just saying “start with We the People…” does not produce meaning. 
And while contemporary originalists and textualists, Scalia included, seek solace in the pages 
of Merriam-Webster, even then we find multiple definitions; the dictionary does not always 
make the judges’ job a matter of rote comparison. In a dissent that wonderfully illustrates the 
invariable contextualism of language, Scalia wrote, “When you ask someone if they ‘use a 
cane’, you are not inquiring whether he has hung his grandfather’s antique cane in the 
hallway as a decoration.”331 The language itself (“to use,” a verb) does not alone tell us 
everything. We need context. As Scalia would say, we need to know the intent motivating the 
use.  
Scalia chose this example because it parallels an actual case that came before the high 
court in 1993, involving a law making it a crime to “use a gun” in conjunction with an illegal 
drug transaction. In the case before the court, a man had handed over his semiautomatic 
weapon in exchange for drugs and was nabbed by undercover FBI agents. He did not shoot 
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anyone. He was bartering with a valuable firearm, and a majority on the Supreme Court said 
he was “using” a gun. Scalia dissented. For him, the defendant’s use of the gun (barter) was 
obviously not the meaning intended by the law’s authors, or the meaning an average person 
would understand the law to suggest (shooting at someone). The fact that the penalty was a 
provision of a law regulating drug trafficking provided all the context he needed. Textualism 
to the rescue. 
As Constitutional law professor John Harrison has argued, originalism has evolved 
into textualism—intent still matters, but the primary focus of conservative theories of 
interpretation have moved away from intent as a motivating theme.332 Looking at the 
scholarly literature and the titles of debates held by the Federalist Society one sees the 
“intent” in “original intent” replaced with “understanding” as in “original understanding.” 
Thus a judge considering whether a prisoner’s claim of torture violating his Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment would inquire into the original 
understanding of that phrase was when adopted, not the original intent of its authors. Critics 
point out that while attractive on a superficial level, there’s nothing that necessarily makes 
the search for understanding easier than the search for intention. After all, what makes 
ordinary meaning ordinary other than some judge-as-linguist saying so?333 
Intent has always been a problem in the world of rhetoric and criticism whether in the 
consideration of legal texts, works of literature and art (does it matter what Picasso thought 
he was painting?) and even music (what did Beethoven, or the Sex Pistols, want us to hear 
 
332 John Harrison, “Forms of Originalism and the Study of History,” Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 26 (2003): 83-94. 
333 Lawrence Solan, “The New Textualists New Text,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 38 (2005), 
2027-2062. 
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and feel?)334 Rhetorical critics W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley coined the term 
“intentional fallacy” in a seminal 1954 article that dealt mostly with the interpretation of 
poetry—though it is entirely relevant to Scalia’s legal textualism.335 For Wimsatt and 
Beardsley, trying to get at intent was flawed in both theory and practice, requiring critics—or 
readers or listeners or judges, for that matter—to “consult the oracle” and divine something 
essentially unknowable: the contents of someone else’s mind. As we have seen, Meese ran 
into exactly these same kinds of criticisms during the 1980s; not only was he trying to look 
into somebody’s mind—he was trying to look into the minds of people who had been dead 
for 200 years. 
 The move toward textualism as the dominant conservative legal methodology has 
decidedly tackled the problem of the intentional fallacy, but it has by no means eliminated 
originalism and the historical/mythical veneration of the Founders. Contemporary 
conservative talk is, by all means, still replete with talk of original intent and The Founders—
very much a reflection of Meese’s success in penetrating the popular discourse.  
But compared to Meese’s keen formulation, linking national pride and judicial 
integrity, “textualism” just doesn’t have quite the same ring to it. Its overtones are decidedly 
more academic and it may never become catchphrase like strict constructionism or original 
intent. Conservative scholars, often operating within the forum of the Federalist Society, 
have been working to harmonize the competing versions of interpretive theories—as has 
 
334 For a wonderfully creative take on the problem of intentionality and textualism in music see Daniel 
Barenboim and Edward M. Said, Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society (New York: 
Pantheon, 2002). Barenboim argues that a musical text (e.g. the score of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony) should 
not be considered the measure of fidelity in performance; the Fifth Symphony is not the score—the Fifth 
Symphony is the sound produced in performance. The example might get even more complicated in considering 
a later symphony composed when the author was deaf; his ability to hear performance was eliminated, and the 
score becomes then even less of an embodiment of his intended sonic experience. 
335 In W.K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954). 
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Justice Scalia on the Court. One noteworthy figure in this intellectual movement is 
conservative political scientist Keith Whittington, who advances a theory oddly similar to 
liberal Stanley Fish’s ideas introduced in Chapter One: that intent is embedded in texts; that 
the distinction between text and intent is an artificial one.336 In other words: no intent, no 
text. Someone, at some point in time, intended to write something—a law, a poem, a 
symphony. Discerning textual meaning always already implicates a search for intent—as 
Fish said, “If you are not trying to determine intention, you are not interpreting.”337 
Scalia’s Textualism 
Judge Rader of the D.C. Circuit told me about a conversation he had with Scalia in 
2006. “‘So, it’s been twenty years. How do you feel?’” Rader asked. “He said, with some 
chagrin, ‘Disappointed. I had hoped to preside over a great revolution in legal philosophy and 
thought, and it hasn’t happened. And I can now see that it’s not likely to happen in my 
tenure. So I’m disappointed’.” Rader quickly suggested this might be a rather modest 
assessment. “That the great revolution of Meese and Reagan and Scalia and Rehnquist and 
others—that these thinkers had hoped to bring to pass, really hasn’t,” he said. “So that’s one 
angle on it…Nonetheless, every single one of my colleagues will tell you that they are more 
influenced by statutory language and less enamored of legislative history and the like than 
they were in the past. And so yes, I think it’s had a bigger effect that Nino perceives.”  
Though he may not feel he helped to accomplish the great revolution in jurisprudence 
that seemed possible when he was appointed to the Court in 1986, Scalia and his acolytes 
 
336 Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, 6, 59 (the text as itself a “symbol of intent” where 
“meaning” is “embedded in the language itself”), 99-102. 
337 Fish, “There Is No Textualist Position,” 643. 
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have made a mark when it comes to textualism.338 In particular, legal terms, this has meant 
the exclusion of extratextual materials from legal argument—in particular, the “legislative 
histories” of laws passed by Congress and the state legislatures. At times, Scalia’s textualist 
influence has also meant that consideration of social context was excluded—or at least had to 
be justified by reference to the text itself. 
In the glory days of the Warren Court, social context seemed at times to be the 
starting point and the ending point for legal analysis—think of Brown v. Board with its 
discussion of the socializing effects on Black children in segregated schools. Things have 
changed. Following Scalia, the norm in legal reasoning and analysis is increasingly to start 
with the text and to move from there to context—whether that means, for a conservative, 
consulting sources related to original meanings; or as a liberal, bringing in data on the social 
effects of one reading of a law versus another. “We differ in the degrees in which we depart 
from the text—some people go to intent—but nobody skips over it,” said Judge Alex 
Kozinsky of the Ninth Circuit. “There is a discipline that’s been imposed by originalist and 
textualist thinkers.” 
In the continuing debates over affirmative action, for example, one finds both 
conservatives and liberals beginning their arguments with the texts of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race. Conservatives argue that 
this prohibition is textually clear on its face—equal protection means equal protection, 
regardless of whether the person being discriminated against is Black or not. Although 
liberals appealed to contextual arguments about the value of diversity as such (drawing on 
the 1978 Bakke decision) they also countered by appealing to original intent, attempting to 
 
338 See, e.g., Solan, “The New Textualists New Text.” 
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show that the drafters of the Civil War amendments clearly intended the antidiscrimination 
provisions to apply to Blacks only. The arguments made by the two sides in the 2004 cases 
challenging the University of Michigan’s admissions policy find the liberal defenders of 
affirmative action talking and arguing very much on textualist and originalist terms. Social 
context no longer means as much in the courtroom—but at least Scalian textualism doesn’t 
ignore the relationality of one part of text to another, and the relation of the various clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment have become so important to modern Constitutional law that the 
precedent cases usually take up several chapters in most law school textbooks.  
Lawrence Solan, director of Brooklyn Law School’s Center for the Study of Law, 
Language, and Cognition, notes that Scalia’s approach “incorporates a context-sensitive 
perspective on word meaning that helps blunt the bite of reducing the universe of evidence 
permitted in the interpretive process.”339 Context matters, but only within the world of the 
text itself, “embedded” there. Even if one wants to consider such immaterial concepts as 
ideology, under the textualist method one must seek it in the text. Within the confines of the 
judicial opinion, text and context are irrevocably intertwined, the product of an author’s 
readings of other texts—including precedents and the controversy before his or her court. As 
we will see, for Scalia, tradition comes into play here as well.  
“Textualism seems to have been so successful—indeed, far more successful than its 
defenders or detractors care to admit” writes Constitutional law professor Jonathan Molot, 
“that we are all textualists in an important sense.” Molot cites a body of empirical research 
 
339 Solan, “The New Textualists New Text,” 2030. 
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that has shown the shift toward textualism, measuring references in court opinions.340 For 
conservatives, one might say that this is a victory as big as the defeat decades earlier when 
Republican president Richard Nixon declared “we’re all Keynesians now.” Movement 
conservatives reacted with outrage at hearing one of their own seemingly capitulate to 
Keynesian economics, given their view that its theories ultimately stood for socialistic, 
completely planned societies where wealth was redistributed and individualism was lost.341 
But whereas Nixon’s position spurred the Reaganite conservatives to action (and victory), 
contemporary liberals have accepted the dawn of the textualist era with little or no resistance 
to speak of. We’re all textualists now, it seems. 
Jeffrey Clark, the longtime Federalist and partner at Kirkland and Ellis, also teaches 
at George Mason University—a law school building its reputation by attracting top-shelf 
conservative scholars and teachers. When discussing the textualist shift with his students 
Clark uses two examples drawn from the opinions of the great liberal jurist Thurgood 
Marshall. In a 1971 opinion for the Court, Marshall essentially took the point of view that 
legislative history is the starting point for determining meaning, with the text itself an 
outcome of this process and therefore secondary. In this particular case legislative history 
was ambiguous, and Marshall reasoned that “because of this ambiguity it is clear that we 
must look primarily to the statutes themselves.”342 “Fast-forward to the mid-eighties, when 
Scalia’s influence on the Court has begun to take hold,” Clark says, and we find Marshall 
singing a different tune. “It is well settled that the starting point for interpreting a statute is 
the language of the statute itself,” Marshall wrote in a 1987 majority opinion for the Court. 
 
340 Jonathan Molot, “The Rise and Fall of Textualism” Columbia Law Review 106 (2006): 32-33, 43.  
341 Hayward, The Age of Reagan, 258, 261-262. 
342 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 401 U.S. 402, 412 n29 (1971). 
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Scalia signed on.343 Constitutional scholar Ralph Rossum agrees, and has presented extensive 
statistical and qualitative evidence344 to show that in his two decades on the bench, Scalia’s 
rejection of legislative history has not been comprehensively revolutionary – but it has 
“produced dramatic results,”345 and “major change.”346 
“There’s a common understanding that you have to acknowledge a text, though you 
might depart from it,” Judge Kozinsky told me. “There’s been a huge change, a fundamental 
change in the way people view the process of interpretation.” Solan argues that Scalia’s 
textualism, “so influential in American jurisprudence, is a departure from the legal 
tradition”—and thus provides us with a segue to our next topic, Scalia’s simultaneous effort 
to read a thoroughly contextual factor into the law: tradition. 
 
Tradition and Text 
Over the past 15 years Scalia has advanced a new reading of “tradition” as a 
definitive factor in the adjudication of Constitutional law claims in a wide range of areas. 
Aside from the potentially vast implications this practice holds for the Court’s jurisprudence, 
tradition-as-precedent represents a significant effort on the part of conservatives to declaim a 
particular vision of American identity and history. It also exists in dramatic tension with the 
notion of a bounded text, whose meaning is to be found only within its “four corners.” It is a 
theoretical jump to assert, as some thoughtful conservatives (and liberals) do, that intent is 
 
343 Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987). Scalia also wrote a 
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“embedded” in a text, but traditions certainly are not. Texts may refer to traditions, but for 
the textualist this is a jump into social context he is usually not prepared to make. 
What could be more social than a tradition? What, indeed, could be less textual in its 
nature? (Or legal?) Traditions tend to be grounded in practice and ritual, are often 
untraceable in their origins and incomprehensible to those not in the know. They may be 
widely shared and semi-official (turkey on Thanksgiving) or obscure and limited to a tiny 
community (gags left over from your college days). As Tevye tells us in one of the many 
memorable lines from Fiddler on the Roof, asking (rhetorically) where the Jewish tradition of 
wearing prayer shawls comes from: “I can tell you. I don’t know.”347 
As we will see, however, Scalia’s textualism leaves ample room for tradition to enter 
into his deliberative process and his method of interpretation. While claiming to remain 
rooted in the ideal of judicial objectivity that has been at the core of legal conservatism since 
Bork’s seminal article on the topic in 1971, Scalia sees no problem in setting up the judge as 
social critic and protector of tradition. As we shall see, he makes this move by claiming that a 
static, unchanging Constitution must refer to a changing body of law—for example, he says, 
the Constitution protects property rights, but does not define them; modern property laws 
complete the legal picture.348 Tradition is also one of the other things the unchanging 
Constitution can point to. And the judge, apparently, is entrusted with safeguarding tradition.  
By invoking tradition, conservatives also define it—they perform a rhetorical 
function. We mean rhetorical here in an important sense: the judge as guardian-of-tradition 
selects which traditions are relevant to a given case, and attempts to persuade us (and his 
 
347 Opened on Broadway September 22, 1964. Libretto by Joseph Stein, lyrics by Sheldon Harnick. 
348 Georgia v. Randolph 547 U.S. __ (2006) (slip opinion), Scalia, J., dissenting. 
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fellow judges) of that tradition’s relevance. This is in a sense no different than the process 
judges face when deciding which precedent cases apply to a new situation; while their 
choices at times may seem clearer than at others, a certain amount of creativity is always 
involved—the same case never appears twice. In the judge’s construction of opinions, as 
with lawyers in the construction of their arguments, the entire enterprise of law is deeply 
rhetorical, grounded in argument and persuasion—as much as the culture of legal 
“objectivity” would seem to the contrary. Recall Chief Justice-nominee John Roberts 
analogizing himself to a referee. “Judges are like umpires,” he told the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in his confirmation hearing. “Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them.”349 
But hang on a second…show me a sports fan, or an athlete, and I’ll show you someone who 
thinks a referee’s “objectivity” is a myth (to put it politely). Any baseball player knows that 
different umpires have different ideas of where the strike zone is—for some it starts at the 
knees; for some it goes up to the letters; for some it depends on the score of the game or (it 
often seems) what side of bed they got out of that morning…regardless of what the rulebook 
says. In a sense probably quite divorced from what he intended, Roberts’ analogy was a very 
good one.  
At least with strike zones and legal precedent there are rules, in theory—even if in 
practice they wind up morphing into a range of variations on a theme. But there is not any 
unifying theme to a concept as enormously diverse and subjective as “tradition.” There is no 
guarantee judges will agree about what the relevant tradition is—indeed, the same arguments 
textualists usually make about allowing judges “free rein” to write their own opinions and 
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values into law would seem to apply here; you’ve got your tradition, I’ve got mine. And 
besides that, one can certainly think of more than a few despicable social practices once 
defended as “traditional.”  
As we will see later, these very problems were borne out in the extremely 
controversial 2003 case striking down a Texas law banning homosexual sodomy. The case 
became a flashpoint for conservatives, who were also engaged in a battle to enact a 
Constitutional amendment defining marriage as existing exclusively between a man and a 
woman. Scalia dissented, saying he would have followed an earlier 1986 case upholding bans 
on homosexual sodomy because of the long tradition of such laws and their relationship to 
traditional marriage structures. The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy (a Catholic 
Republican, it’s worth noting) essentially said to Scalia and the conservative dissenters: 
You’ve got your tradition (bans on homosexual activity) and we’ve got ours (a tradition of 
expanding freedoms and liberties). Kennedy just moved the level of generality up a couple of 
notches and presto, his tradition becomes the deciding factor. The problems with doing law 
this way are daunting, and should be instantly clear to any conservative: there’s nothing to 
stop a court from hunting around for some tradition to fit its preconceived ideas, or even 
inventing one—there’s no appendix of recognized traditions at the end of the Constitution. 
This should be a problem for textualists. 
 It is worth pausing here to point to the work of two scholars, Sanford Levinson and 
Thomas Grey, who have made some perceptive and provocative connections between 
textualism and religious textual interpretation. In his book Constitutional Faith, Levinson 
makes the interesting analogy between conservative textualists and Lutheran Protestants who 
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made sola scriptura their motto—only scripture.350 Rejecting the traditions of the Roman 
church, which he saw as corrupt in both a worldly and spiritual sense, Luther made the text 
alone the arbiter of all spiritual inquiry.  
Catholics, on the other hand, have always viewed the institutions of the church as part 
of its doctrine. “Over time,” Grey writes, “this hardened into a firm insistence that tradition 
did not merely interpret revelation but constituted part of it—the doctrine of ‘the material 
insufficiency of scripture’.”351 Levinson quotes 16th Century Jesuit Cardinal St. Robert 
Bellarmine, who wrote that “Because scripture is often ‘ambiguous and perplexing’, there are 
‘many places in which we shall be unable to reach certainty’ unless the text is supplemented 
‘by accepting the traditions of the Church’.”352 
The two most vocal conservatives on the Court, Scalia and Thomas, are both 
Catholic—and for Scalia, traditionalism seems all the more oddly paired with a sola 
scriptura attitude toward texts. Religion may or may not have anything to do with the 
Justices’ behavior; Kennedy is a Catholic too, and as we will see, it is he who meets Scalia 
on the battlefield of tradition and carries the day for what would otherwise be seen as a 
progressive liberal conception of individual rights. 
 
To some extent, courts have always made reference to tradition, grappling with the 
balance between text and context in the process of judicial judgment. The bellwether was the 
1798 case Calder v. Bull, which found two of the era’s most prominent jurists, Samuel Chase 
and James Iredell facing off on exactly this issue—Iredell’s “marked and settled boundaries” 
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of textual interpretation against with Chase’s “natural law” principles that exist independent 
of the text.353 The debate has popped and fizzled throughout the nation’s history, with duels 
emerging in the New Deal era (more on that in the next chapter) and then somewhat later 
between the thoroughly “Protestant”—maybe even textualist—Hugo Black and the 
progressive but restrained Felix Frankfurter. Black, for example, famously declared himself a 
First Amendment fundamentalist because, following the text, “no law” abridging speech 
means…no law. Period.354 Frankfurter, on the other hand, wrote with words that would 
surely make Scalia wince that the Constitution is the “most significantly not a document but 
a stream of history.”355 For our purposes here, though, it is most important to draw attention 
to the shift in the debate during the post-World War II period with the Warren Court’s 
expansive reading of a “living” Constitution.356 
From Brown v. Board of Education to Roe v. Wade and, most recently the Texas 
sodomy case, Lawrence v. Texas,357 the opinions of the Supreme Court take on a social 
meaning far beyond their specifically legal holdings, functioning as touchstones for 
quintessentially American ideals of freedom, equality, and justice.358 For many social 
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conservatives, though, these decisions are perceived as something else altogether: a betrayal 
of fundamental jurisprudential principles, “wrongly decided cases” and errors of 
Constitutional interpretation—but also, importantly, an attempt by “activist judges” to 
remake society, steering it away from its roots in traditional morality. As Bork has written, 
this betrayal is about much more than misguided legal theory; it is a specifically moral 
failure, a giving in to the “temptation” of politics, a realm reserved for the legislatures, not 
the Courts.  
 
Looking to Tradition  
Scalia’s textualist traditionalism first attracted widespread attention in 1990 with his 
opinion in the child custody case Michael H. v. Gerald D.359—declaring that any 
Constitutional claim grounded in personal liberty must be “rooted” in “traditionally 
protected” “values.”360 The liberal response came most strongly from Harvard Professor 
Laurence Tribe, who sounded the alarm that “Scalia’s method is designed to overrule 
virtually all of the Court’s decisions protecting individual rights.”361 A debate over the 
significance of tradition-as-precedent has proceeded apace in the pages of the law reviews, 
marked by lively and, at times, partisan exchange.362 
359 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
360 491 U.S. 110, 122-123. It is important to note that Scalia arrives at this formulation by cobbling 
together bits and pieces of earlier opinions, in which discussions of “tradition” and “values” appeared in dicta. 
Snyder v. Massachusetts 291 U.S. 97 105 (1934); Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965). 
361 Laurence H. Tribe and Michael Dorf, On Reading the Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), 109. 
362 See, e.g., The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia (symposium). Cardozo Law Review 12 (June 
1991); David Luban,  “Legal Traditionalism,” Stanford Law Review 43 (1991): 1035-1060; Michael W. 
McConnell, “The right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition,” Utah Law Review 1997 (1997): 665-708; 
David M. Ziotnick, “Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to his Constitutional 
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Michael H. was a convoluted case that pitted the ex-husband of a fashion model 
against her male companion, with both men claiming custody rights to the child fathered by 
the first husband but cared for by the second. Despite a state law that seemed to apply 
directly to the matter as well as a seemingly contradictory line of Supreme Court precedent 
cases, Scalia’s opinion denied the claim of the stepfather.363 He justifies this move because of 
the “fundamental liberty interest” at stake in the case—the ability of a (biological) father to 
claim custody of his child. Although “liberty interests” are derived from the Court’s 
enormously expansive Fourteenth Amendment cases, including the 1934 case that provided 
Scalia the rhetorical opening onto which he would graft his tradition-based textualism: that 
the Due Process clause of that amendment provides protection only when the matter at stake 
is “so rooted in tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”364 
The open, indefinite nature of Due Process claims in general—the 1934 precedent sets out 
only one of many avenues—has (usually) made them a Conservative whipping boy, but for 
Scalia in this case, it provides a perfect opening. Scalia’s argument, which takes off from this 
case law, is decidedly not grounded in the Constitution, the California Code (which seems to 
say otherwise), or any other legal text. It is grounded in tradition.365 Here is how Scalia 
describes the burden on Michael, the stepfather: 
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What Michael asserts here is a right to have himself declared the 
natural father and thereby to obtain parental prerogatives. What he must 
establish, therefore, is not that our society has traditionally allowed a natural 
father in his circumstances to establish paternity, but that it has traditionally 
accorded such a father parental rights, or at least has not traditionally denied 
them.366 
For a textualist this seems an odd way to approach the situation. But no matter. To his credit, 
Scalia does make two important observations about the invocation of tradition-as-precedent: 
first, some clarifying methodology is needed if this new test is to be applied, and second, his 
new tradition-test was hardly the first time history had been invoked by members of the 
Court.  
On the methodological issue, Scalia tells us that when invoking tradition—here, the 
“deeply rooted” “traditional” right of biological fathers to claim custody of their children, 
regardless of whether another man has been cohabiting with the biological mother and 
holding himself out as the child’s father—a judge must focus on “the most specific level at 
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be 
identified.”367 And under Scalia’s view, a tradition pertaining to fathers in general is less 
specific to a tradition pertaining to fathers of bastard children;368 why this should be so is 
never explained—why, for example, a tradition of protecting families, regardless of 
bloodlines, should be trumped by a more “specific” tradition regarding out-of-wedlock 
 
done if confronted with a blood test showing a 98.07% probability that Michael H. was the father of Victoria.” 
Spitko, “A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Approach,” 1352. 
366 491 U.S. 110, 126. 
367 491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6. 
368 491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6. 
232
births. To accept Scalia’s view is to see the problem as one of the level of generality, a 
problematic decision left up to the judge.369 And furthermore, why, as Justice William 
Brennan wrote in dissent, should we be considering traditions—of whatever “level of 
generality”—rather than the traditional source of precedent, prior court decisions?370 Why 
should we trust Scalia’s pronouncements on tradition? He is not a historian or sociologist; his 
evidence is scanty and old. “Given the radical changes that have occurred in the law of 
domestic relations during the last two and a half decades,” wrote one legal scholar, 
“reference to sources as old as the ones upon which Justice Scalia relies can only be termed 
specious.”371 
Some have defended Scalia’s traditionalism on (Edmund) Burkean grounds, arguing 
that we should revere the past for its own sake; honoring traditional practices because we 
owe a debt to the past.372 Others have suggested simply that the Justice harbors an antipathy 
toward change: “This is the voice of conservative traditionalism protesting contemporary 
Enlightenment’s penchant for moral revision,” wrote one critic.373 James Staab, a more 
sympathetic scholar, wrote a deeply researched book arguing comprehensively that Scalia is 
neither a Burkean, nor a Madisonian, but a Hamiltonian.374 Staab properly, if rather 
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inauspiciously, explains Scalia’s assertion of authority on grounds of tradition as a logical 
methodological move—a way to fill in the blanks when the text is unclear “on its face.”375 
I would argue there is something else more sophisticated at work in this move as a 
matter of rhetorical invention and a mode of persuasion. As Scalia and his allies hoist the 
banner of tradition they deeply betray their claims to “textualism” or, as Meese would have 
said, the intent of the Framers. Scalia has always defended his appeals to tradition as a 
deferential move, a signification of his modest view of the judge’s role. Under this view, 
however, Scalia (or any traditionalist judge) gets to decide not only when the text is “not 
clear” but also what traditions apply, and what they are.  
 
In Michael H. the case revolved around the family structure and its “traditional” 
definition—and while the opinion does not cite precedent for its conclusion, it does cite 
precedent for its methodology: namely, Roe v. Wade, which established a woman’s right to 
abortion, and Bowers v. Hardwick,376 which upheld a state law against homosexual sodomy. 
In justifying his new “deeply rooted tradition” test, Scalia points directly to Blackmun’s own 
opinion for the Court in Roe, where “we spent about a fifth of our opinion negating the 
proposition that there was a longstanding tradition of laws proscribing abortion,”377 as well as 
the majority opinion in the 1986 homosexual sodomy case, Bowers (then still valid law), 
where the majority concluded, “regarding that very specific aspect of sexual conduct, to 
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claim that a right to engage in such conduct is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty is, at best, facetious.”378 
There is a pattern here. Roe, Bowers, and Michael H. all considered traditions relating 
to intimately personal and familial aspects of our lives, and the extent to which the state may 
regulate them: Can a woman be denied the right to an abortion because of a vote by her 
state’s legislative body? (When there is no explicit Constitutional abortion provision?) Can a 
state deny custodial claims by a biological parent when a step-parent has adopted a child in 
all but name? (When there is no Constitutional explicit parental-rights provision?) Can a state 
criminalize homosexual sex acts? (When there is no explicit Constitutional sex-acts 
provision?) These are not unrelated questions—indeed, they are all part of an ideology that 
has been articulated by postwar American conservatives under the rubric of “family values” 
and moral traditionalism. They divide popular American opinion, and they also divide the 
Federalist Society’s libertarian and conservative camps. “If you’re a real strong believer in 
the right to life, it’s hard to be very active in an organization where they don’t take a position 
[on the issue], and somebody might be a speaker there who is pro-choice, making those 
arguments,” Federalist Society David McIntosh told me. “But it is these hard choices that 
challenge your commitment to the ideal.” McIntosh is himself strongly pro-life, and his 
unsuccessful 1999 campaign for governor of Indiana featured a strong anti-abortion message. 
 
By explicitly calling for tradition to fill in important Constitutional vacuums—which 
Bork once called the “ink blots” of law—Scalia opens the door to the unbridled judicial 
activism he supposedly deplores. Indeed, Bork has been sharply critical of Scalia’s 
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traditionalism. “History and tradition are very capacious suitcases,” he has written, “and a 
judge may find a good deal pleasing to himself packed into them, if only because he has 
packed the bags himself.”379 I think Bork wins on this point, and though he is something of a 
bogeyman for the left, on this point Bork would make a strategic, and surprising, ally.  
Through sheer persistence beginning with his opinion in Michael H., Scalia has taken 
up the mantle of protector of tradition—a surprising role, perhaps, for someone who 
normally berates “unelected judges” for offering their philosophizing as antidote to the 
results of deliberative democracy.380 In a 1998 case finding a certain police practice 
“shocking,” a dissenting Scalia quipped, “rather than ask whether the police conduct here at 
issue shocks my unelected conscience, I would ask whether our Nation has traditionally 
protected the right respondents assert.”381 
For Scalia and his allies, tradition is empirically knowable in a way that philosophy 
and conscience are not. In the words of conservative law professor and filibustered Bush 
judicial nominee Michael W. McConnell, “the traditionalist approach…is inductive and 
experiential.” It is about “historical rather than philosophical inquiry,” leading to decisions 
“hing[ing] on objective historical fact rather than on normative judgment.”382 Tradition is 
knowable, empirical, unitary, and concrete,383 thereby forming a check on “judicial 
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activism,” a “check against particular states or local jurisdictions whose practices contradict 
what most Americans would deem to be fundamental rights, but…without licensing courts to 
second-guess democratic judgments on the basis of their own ideological or philosophical 
preferences.”384 
As is so often the case with political and legal rhetoric, what goes unsaid here is 
perhaps more important than the text itself: In the words of one legal critic, the problem with 
Scalia’s tradition-as-precedent is not just the matter of determining which tradition to point to 
when considering the case at hand but the more elemental assumption that there is a tradition 
“out there” in the first place, “waiting to be identified.”385 And even if traditions exist and are 
in some way empirically knowable, are they necessarily national in their scope? Meese’s 
arguments notwithstanding, most Americans do believe that the Supreme Court propounds 
the law of the land. As one legal critic has written, the dilemma inherent in any concept of 
tradition is “that our traditions are formed by many overlapping communities…the traditions 
of a geographical, ethnic, religious, or political community will run at cross purposes with 
the traditions of the larger communities-state and national-in which they are nested.”386 
Tradition, under this view, is always traditions—always plural. 
Needless to say, Scalia does not get bogged down in such postmodern quandaries. 
There are traditions—only the loony left would question such a basic idea—and they need 
protecting against the havoc wrecked by liberal judges like the majority on the Massachusetts 
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Supreme Judicial Court that declared gay marriage to be Constitutional. The tradition test in 
Michael H. is explicitly offered “to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside 
important traditional values—not to enable this Court to invent new ones.”387 
For conservatives, the objectivity-relativism dichotomy once again underpins their 
entire argument, with objectivity the conservative virtue and relativism the fault of 
sentimentalist liberals. Traditions are identified though “objective” analysis of history. In a 
recent case, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the use of objective history as a measure 
of tradition is an “approach [that] tends to rein in the subjective elements” of judicial review, 
“lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy 
preferences of the members of this Court.”388 As for how to measure tradition—that’s not up 
for discussion. The stakes are too high. 
As Bork has written, decades of misguided legal scholarship and the “moral 
imperialism” of the Warren Court had distorted the judicial landscape in a way that demands 
radical redress.389 In the landmark case ordering the Virginia Military Institute to allow 
female cadets into its ranks, Scalia wrote in a scalding dissent: 
 
[I]n my view the function of this Court is to preserve our society’s 
values regarding (among other things) equal protection, not to revise them; to 
prevent backsliding from the degree of restriction the Constitution imposed 
upon democratic government, not to prescribe, on our own authority, 
progressively higher degrees. For that reason it is my view that, whatever 
abstract tests we may choose to devise, they cannot supersede—and indeed 
ought to be crafted so as to reflect—those constant and unbroken national 
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traditions that embody the people’s understanding of ambiguous constitutional 
text.390 
Coming from the leading proponent of “textualism” and “originalism” who actually 
works as a judge, this announcement might seem, at the very least, surprising. Is the Court to 
become a panel of Platonic guardians, providing a counterbalance to the ever-shifting winds 
of change391—in this case, defending “the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of 
men’s military colleges supported by both States and the Federal Government”?392 Or, in the 
alternative, perhaps the Court should be more methodical in its assessment of tradition—the 
approach explicated by Scalia in his citations to Bowers, when the majority opinion surveyed 
cultural and legal postures toward homosexual sodomy through the totality of Western 
civilization. But would this not turn the Court, unelected interpreters of delineated texts, into 
a committee of social scientists, surveying and analyzing popular opinion and practice? 
Indeed, when a judge rattles off the statistics on homosexual sodomy statutes as implicit 
evidence of some form of “tradition,” is he offering up, as one legal critic has written, 
“Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence made easy?”—jurisprudence as a matter 
of surveys, polls, and legislative tabulations?393 
There are echoes here: this is precisely the objection raised by conservatives against 
the methodology employed in cases they see as wrongly reasoned, such as Brown and its 
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reliance on the testimony of child psychologists394 and Roe v. Wade with its discussion of 
evolving social acceptance of abortion.395 In these and other cases, conservatives argue that 
explorations and judgments about societal impact should be left up to the popularly elected 
legislatures; courts should act as interpreters of the legal texts they produce, nothing 
more…except, as we are beginning to see, when it comes to the notion of tradition, an 
inherently extra-textual source of authority.  
In that same VMI case, Scalia had this to add: “Whatever abstract tests we may 
choose to devise, they cannot supersede—and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect—
those constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the people’s understanding of 
ambiguous constitutional texts.”396 Here he does genuinely begin to approach a Burkean idea 
of obligation to the past for its own sake, in that command to craft “abstract tests” in a way 
reflecting past practice; of course his own test, from Michael H., is itself reflective of 
tradition. As we shall see, Scalia’s view has triumphed almost unconditionally with the 5-4 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, despite the fact that he was writing for the dissent, not the 
majority. The Court in that case overturned Bowers, striking down a state law outlawing 
homosexual sodomy—and the way they went about it was by posing the primacy of one 
tradition, privacy and personal freedom, over another, rejection of homosexuality. So much 
for textualism. 
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In his defense of traditional single-sex military cadet education in the VMI case, 
Scalia cites as precedent one of his many dissenting opinions, Rutan v. Republican Party,397 a 
1990 case which found him in the odd position of defending political patronage jobs. The 
rationale? You guessed it: tradition—in this case, a tradition, “dat[ing] back to the beginning 
of the republic.”398 Tradition, “the stuff out of which the Court’s principles are to be formed,” 
is no match for “the personal (and necessarily shifting) philosophical dispositions of a 
majority of this Court”399; regardless of whether one’s conscience is shocked or not, “the 
desirability of patronage is a policy question to be decided by the people’s representatives,” 
not the Court.400 
The actual Constitutional claim raised in that case—concerning the way a hiring 
freeze may have penalized state employees for exercising their right to free speech—was not 
dispositive for Scalia; rather, it was, once again, all about tradition. Because there was no 
“express prohibition” on patronage in the Constitution, and the practice (political patronage) 
“bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use…we 
have no basis for striking it down.”401 Herein lies a striking jurisprudential challenge—“no 
basis”—but also, notably, a historical one: namely, that political patronage has always been 
“open, widespread, and unchallenged.” Could that really be so? As one critic has noted, 
Scalia includes no citation to any sources which might back up this claim.402 
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Justice John Paul Stevens took the opportunity to express his bafflement at Scalia’s 
evolving deeply rooted tradition test, writing in a separate opinion that it would appear to 
“immunize” any long-standing practice from Constitutional scrutiny.403 His critics on and off 
the Court seem to sense this, but often get bogged down in disputes over legal doctrine—
despite Scalia’s admonitions that this is not what he is most concerned with. Like his fellow 
social conservative Bork, Scalia is concerned with the culture; it is part of what has led to the 
enduring relationship he has had with the Federalists, for theirs is a cultural project too. 
“When it appears that the latest ‘rule’, or ‘three-part test’, or ‘balancing test’ devised by the 
court has placed us on a collision course with a landmark [traditional] practice, it is the 
former that must be calculated by us, and not the latter that must be abandoned by our 
citizens,” he wrote in the patronage case.404 Formalism is out, it seems, when tradition is at 
stake. Stevens’s rebuttal quoted above goes on to make the predictable next move: O.K., but 
how about those nasty traditions like slavery and segregation? Or, as Bork writes, “History is 
not binding, and tradition is useful to remind us of the wisdom and folly of the past, not to 
chain us to either.”405 
The question has been taken up in some detail by law professor Ronald Turner in an 
article asking whether racial segregation and anti-miscegenation laws would have been found 
unconstitutional if cases such as Michael H. and Rutan had been in place as governing 
precedent at the time.406 Brown is the inevitable trump card in the broader debate over 
“originalism” as a methodology—after all, Thomas Jefferson did own slaves; the argument 
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over original meanings is off and running from there. Responding to accusations about 
whether his jurisprudence would have led to a different results in Brown, Scalia has 
countered that segregation was properly held to be unconstitutional, but not for the same 
rationale given by the Warren Court. For him, this is a matter of texts not traditions;407 “the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of ‘equal protection of the laws,’ combined with the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of the institution of Black slavery, leaves no room for 
doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race are invalid.”408 It is perhaps 
relevant here to quote a comment from Professor McConnell, usually a Scalia booster. 
Considering Scalia’s employment of “traditionalism” as well as “originalism” and 
“textualism,” he has written that  
 
These various methods have something very important in 
common…they all respect the will of the people, as expressed at various 
points in time. But by failing to articulate the connection between these 
methods, or to explain how to decide cases when they are in conflict, Justice 
Scalia leaves himself open to the charge of inconsistency.409 
According to his less amicable critics, Scalia’s inconsistency runs much deeper. It  is 
the sense in which allowing the judge the power to select the “legally relevant tradition” 
seems as arbitrary as the “activist judges” the right believes are wantonly imposing their 
personal moralities under the cloak of law. “The problems faced by a 
jurist/historian/sociologist who scours the pages of history in search of our most specific 
relevant traditions are greater than the problems faced by an interpretivist jurist who 
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struggles to divine the original intents of the Constitution’s framers,” writes one critic. “The 
deeply rooted traditions of this nation are not directly accessible to a jurist, but instead must 
be constructed by him.”410 
Scalia would scoff; there is a deeply rooted tradition of biological, two-parent 
families; there is a deeply rooted tradition of scorning and criminalizing homosexuality; there 
is a deeply rooted tradition of male military academies; there is a deeply rooted tradition of 
political patronage—and all merit protection. Indeed, for Scalia, traditions like these are the 
“stuff” of legal principle. Scalia has explained his broad interpretation of the First 
Amendment by stressing that the meaning of a textual phrase like “freedom of speech” is 
determined by the “practices” of the people; in that case and others, he perceives a long 
existing—“traditional”—tolerance for speech even when a community deems it to be of 
objectionable character (the case concerned liquor advertising).411 So, another tradition is 
added to the Scalian vision of America: a tolerant people, at least when it comes to free 
speech.  
But still…that meddlesome problem of history, the “capacious suitcase,” as Bork put 
it. Has America really traditionally been tolerant of free speech? Is this tradition “constant 
and unbroken”?412 What about the Alien and Sedition acts? The Pentagon Papers? “Hate 
speech”? Huckleberry Finn? As one legal critic has asked, “Inasmuch as every ‘tradition’ 
harbors the trace of a ‘counter-tradition,’”—that every social action tends to produce an 
opposite one, equal or not—“the notion that any given ‘tradition’ may be reduced to an 
objective, determinate reality is undermined.” And as Rebecca Brown adds, “[W]hen we 
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examined the origins of traditions, it becomes apparent that the source of tradition is largely 
majoritarian. Traditions are not formed by the few, the eccentric, the outcast, the 
marginalized.”413 Scalia would surely respond that this is as it should be, in a democracy. A 
libertarian like Epstein, we will see, would probably think otherwise. Sandwiched in-between 
these two contemporary, disagreeing conservatives is one of the earlier giants of American 
law, Oliver Wendell Holmes. A realist, pragmatist, and a lower-case-“r” republican, Holmes 
was, as we have seen, a predecessor to the Critical Legal Studies folk that both Scalia and 
Epstein still claim served as common enemies. But Holmes also professed a very anti-
majoritarian distrust of The People. “I loathe the thick-fingered clowns we call the people,” 
he wrote during the Civil War. “Especially as the beasts are represented at political centers—
vulgar, selfish, and base.”414 
More Traditions 
 Let us now consider some additional aspects of “our” traditions as perceived by the 
Court’s conservatives. In a 1997 decision upholding a state law that prohibited assisted 
suicide, the tradition-as-precedent baton was notably passed off to Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Writing for the Court, Rehnquist proclaimed that the asserted right—once again, a Due 
Process Clause “liberty” interest—had no place in the country’s traditions. To bolster this 
claim, a vast historical survey ensues—from Henry de Bracton in 13th century England, to 
William Penn in Pennsylvania and from there two centuries of evolving American state 
law.415 
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A telling conclusion provides some insight into the structure and scope of the 
“tradition” under investigation: “Attitudes toward suicide itself have changed since Bracton,” 
Rehnquist writes, “but our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, 
assisting suicide. Despite changes in medical technology and notwithstanding an increased 
emphasis on the importance of end-of-life decision-making, we have not retreated from this 
prohibition.”416 Note the pronouns: “our laws”; “we have not retreated.” This is not 
anonymous history, it is ours. It is particular: the history of our Anglo-American society, as 
measured through certain categories of artifacts accumulated over 700 years—laws, legal 
treatises, learned commentaries, votes of representative legislatures. To Rehnquist and the 
conservatives, this is objective history, proof positive of a deeply rooted tradition.417 As with 
all history, much is left out; what is kept in comes to constitute our collective memory. 
“Traditionalism,” writes legal philosopher David Luban, “which argues that the past claims 
us, overlooks the fact that it claims us only once we have colluded by claiming it.”418 
The traditions expounded by Scalia and Rehnquist in the right-to-die cases 
Glucksberg and its predecessor Cruzan are part of the rubric—the penumbra, one might even 
say—of decisions which implicate the touchstone of conservative ire, Roe v. Wade. It is a 
commonplace among conservatives to declare that there is no right to abortion “in” the 
Constitution; the question is what to do about it, with Roe on the books. The traditional thing 
to do is to follow precedent—though Scalia and his brethren are free to eschew that practice 
when another tradition or another legal mandate instructs otherwise. With overturning Roe 
not a practical goal in the current political moment, what Scalia can do is move the battle 
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from the domain of doctrine to the terrain of tradition; after all, Blackmun’s opinion contains 
lots of history.  
Writing in dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which upheld Roe’s central 
holdings, Scalia, argues that the issue in Roe is  
 
…not whether the power of a woman to abort her unborn child is a 
“liberty” in the absolute sense; or even whether it is a liberty of great 
importance to many women. Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a 
liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not…I 
reach it for the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy is not 
constitutionally protected—because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution 
says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of 
American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed.419 
Scalia here is expanding his methodology as well as the stock of values and practices 
that he claims to factor into his decision-making—practices which are beyond the scope of 
legal protection the Court stands to offer.  
Elsewhere in his dissent Scalia scoffs at the philosophic musings of the majority 
opinion—which, in the same eloquent vein as Warren in Brown, declares, “At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life.”420 This language is the antithesis of Scalia’s style—his history, 
objectivity, or any kind of realistically workable, and fair, jurisprudence. It does appeal to a 
Catholic sense of the mystery of faith and life.  
After all, Scalia continues, compared with abortion, “homosexual sodomy, polygamy, 
adult incest, and suicide, [are] all…equally ‘intimate’ and ‘deep[ly] personal’ decisions 
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involving ‘personal autonomy and bodily integrity,’ which can constitutionally be proscribed 
because it is our unquestionable constitutional tradition that they are proscribable.”421 So, we 
can add these practices to the list—or at least the practice of traditionally allowing them to be 
criminalized, which, it must be said, necessarily involves some moral judgment. The Court’s 
majority in this case, sensing perhaps that Scalia’s arguments from tradition demanded some 
attention, offered their own counter-tradition: the tradition of the Court’s “reasoned 
judgment.”422 This move promptly sends Scalia into an apoplectic fit; that tradition is not 
specific enough!423 And surely he has a point: Chief Justice Taney doubtless felt his opinion 
for the court in Dred Scott v. Sanford was a reflection of “reasoned judgment.” 
 While Scalia has defended a “traditionally” expansive reading of the First 
Amendment’s free-speech clause, his readings of the religion clauses place him outside of the 
civil libertarian tradition. Dissenting from a ruling that held that including clergy at a public 
school graduation ceremony was unconstitutional, Scalia fumed that the Court was 
“oblivious to our history,” a history that (objectively, we may assume) shows that “[f]rom 
our Nation’s origin, prayer has been a prominent part of governmental ceremonies and 
proclamations.”424 In a “brief account” of this tradition of prayerfulness, Scalia points to the 
words of George Washington and James Madison and proceedings at “the first public high 
school graduation ceremony took place in Connecticut in July 1868.”425 Scalia also rails 
against the majority’s concern about the way peer pressure may operate during religious 
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rituals at ceremonial school events, referring to the Court’s opinion as a “psycho-journey”426:
clearly, these issues are “subjective” and foreign to the “objective” processes which guide 
Scalia’ analysis of tradition and historical practice. “His tone of outrage,” writes one legal 
critic, “appears to be based on the idea that the court’s judgment in the case undermined a 
government power that was created by long-standing tradition: an accretion of power.”427 
Tradition—and precedent, when it agrees with tradition—should govern the jurisprudence of 
the high court.428 
Lawrence v. Texas: Law on The Terrain of Tradition 
By establishing his own line of precedential cases beginning with Michael H., Scalia 
has been able to push the rest of the Court toward a jurisprudence of tradition-as-precedent. 
His textualist views, which have had wide effect across the legal community, have evolved 
alongside his traditionalist ones, which reached apotheosis on the high Court in 2003. We 
find it in the starkly contrasting traditions that undergird the majority and dissenting opinions 
in Lawrence v. Texas, the controversial 2003 case striking down a Texas anti-sodomy law.429 
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Justice Anthony Kennedy, a Catholic appointed by Ronald Reagan,  was chosen to 
write the opinion for the Court. Signaling the place which tradition has come to play in the 
Court’s jurisprudence, the opinion opens with the declaration that “Liberty protects the 
person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In 
our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home.” Our tradition: a communal and 
political practice which describes the relations between the state and the person; the public 
and the private. From here, Kennedy immediately begins to use the language of the Court’s 
previous privacy cases, notably Roe and Griswold v. Connecticut, the case which struck 
down a state’s ban on contraception: most importantly, the protection of an “autonomy of 
self” extending “beyond [the] spatial bounds” of the home into the realm of the 
“transcendent,” including “freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.”430 
All of these high concepts, Kennedy asserts, constitute our tradition—and they are 
what is at issue. Not our precedential decisions here in the Supreme Court but our traditions 
here in this Nation. To the dismay and frustration of Scalia and his allies, Kennedy and the 
majority prove in Lawrence they’re perfectly able to reframe the legal questions as cultural 
ones; you have your tradition—we have ours. This is a rhetorical move if ever there was one, 
unpersuasive to Scalia but certainly put down on paper with an eye toward the broader 
societal audience.  
Precedent is consulted to support the initial claim of traditional personal autonomy, 
but throughout the opinion the master frame is tradition. Kennedy not only puts forth an 
alternative or “counter-” tradition (private personal autonomy), but attacks the validity of the 
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tradition asserted by Scalia and Bowers, the earlier sodomy case (proscription of 
homosexuality).  
“[T]here is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual 
conduct as a distinct matter,” he writes at the outset of an extensive historical survey. Though 
he finds ample “objective” evidence from the distant past to support his claim about tradition, 
he suggests there is a deeper flaw with Scalia’s analysis. “We think that our laws and 
traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here,” he writes, before offering up a 
claim that has become fodder for criticism from the right: “These references [to recent laws 
and traditions] show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”431 
Kennedy’s suggestion is of deep importance as we think about the role the Court performs as 
our ultimate arbiter of justice. He is arguing that there can be, and indeed there is in this 
nation a tradition of change—of “emergence”—deeply rooted in the freedom which our 
Constitution is designed to protect.432 On the Roberts Court, long after the departures of the 
liberal lions like Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, Kennedy may be the closest thing to an 
assertive liberal—or libertarian. If the Court is going to consider tradition, his tradition of 
 
431 539 U.S. 558, 571-572 n. 4. 
432 Kennedy’s notions of “emergence” is, in a quite logical sense, rooted in the conception  of the 
common law as a precedent-based, but evolving, corpus. As it relates to tradition, change, and democracy, 
“emergence” is also deeply rhetorical and epistemological in its implications. Cf. Chaim Perelman and Lucie 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric (Chicago: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 514: “If freedom was 
no more than necessary adherence to a previously given natural order, it would exclude all possibility of choice; 
and if the exercise of freedom were not based on reasons, every choice would be irrational and would be 
reduced to an arbitrary decision operating in an intellectual void…[we should strive] to develop what a logic of 
value judgments has tried in vain to provide, namely the justification of the possibility of a human community 
in the sphere of action when this justification cannot be based on a reality or objective truth.” 
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“emergence” deserves to be posed against Scalia’s supposed objectivity, with its necessarily 
populist, majoritarian, morally conservative version of American identity.433 
Kennedy’s opinion, as one might expect, drives Scalia up a wall and back down 
again. Scalia stands by the Court’s existing precedent, Bowers, which contained its own 
survey of anti-sodomy “traditions,” and declares that the overruling of that case represents a 
“massive disruption of the current social order.”434 Linking up once again with Roe, he
suggests that unlike these terrible consequences, overturning Roe would simply “restore the 
régime that existed for centuries before 1973.” Thirty years does not a tradition make.  
Furthermore, Scalia attacks Kennedy’s central idea that there is—and that there ever 
can be—a tradition of emergence and change. “In any event, an ‘emerging awareness’ is by 
definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’,” he declares. This is the 
crux of the matter, then, and a very Edmund Burkean crux it is: traditions, by definition, have 
nothing to do with change; they are the very antithesis of change. Under this view, 
Kennedy’s opinion and concept of tradition simply make no sense. In a very immediate way, 
the opinions in Lawrence are a case study in the way rhetoric operates to frame issues, 
contextualizing the phenomena of the world in particular ways, and with deep moral and 
social consequences. 
Kennedy has the audacity to go further, expanding the context of the tradition he 
invokes by arguing that the “emerging awareness” in our American society relates to “values 
 
433 Kennedy also argues this notion of emergence should translate into jurisprudential practice. 
Following that esteemed judicial practice of quoting oneself, he cites an earlier opinion where he was also 
arguing (more tacitly) against Scalia, that “History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the 
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857. 
434 539 U.S. 558, 591. 
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we share with a wider civilization.”435 “The Bowers majority opinion never relied on ‘values 
we share with a wider civilization’,” Scalia writes, “but rather rejected the claimed right to 
sodomy on the ground that such a right was not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition’”—the emphasis is Scalia’s. Traditions, for Scalia, appear in this instance to be per 
se national. Thus a final note on the American identity Scalia has been putting forth: tradition 
stops at the water’s edge. More of this later, when we consider the move led by Federalists 
like Bork, and his students Steven Calabresi and John Bolton, attacking the citation of 
foreign law in Court opinions. 
 
What are we to make of this remarkable two-track Scalian project, then? By all 
accounts, his textualist attitudes have genuinely affected the way law is practiced in this 
country, with argument rooted in text taking precedence and contextual materials like 
legislative histories or social effects coming in later, if at all. On the other hand, he has 
advanced traditionalism grounded in social practice and context. Along with other 
conservatives of both libertarian and conservative backgrounds he denounces judicial 
activism, “legislating from the bench,” and defends textualism as being first and foremost a 
way to rein in judges looking to cherry pick from endless contextual materials in order to 
write their own preferences into law. But why should the judge as guardian-of-tradition not 
be susceptible to exactly these same temptations? Kennedy and Scalia present two traditions, 
one undoubtedly operating at a higher level of generality than the other.  
 
435 539 U.S. 558, 576-577. 
253
Which is it, then? Which story shall we tell about ourselves?436 What are our
traditions, and how should we expect our Court to hold them up, having the force of law? 
The Lawrence opinions by Kennedy and Scalia pose these questions, and the debate played 
out among their pages epitomizes two quite different ways to answer. Whether one agrees 
more with Scalia or with Kennedy, the fact that this is the way the case was decided—that it 
became a dispute over how to think about our past, our traditions, and our place in the 
world—is quite remarkable.437 The consequences for legal theory and jurisprudence are 
substantial, the full impact of which only time will reveal. Scalia’s relentless intellectual 
work over the past two decades has had real effects on the way law is done today, despite his 
disappointment at not presiding over a revolution. “He still has to dissent, so he thinks he’s 
still losing,” Judge Rader quipped. “Maybe he’s not.” 
Scalia’s dissents have been numerous—and it can hardly be said that he is following 
the early precedents in this regard; early in the nation’s history, dissenting opinions were 
extremely unusual. Of his 564 opinions, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote one.438 Scalia, 
 
436 I am reminded of Richard Rorty’s remark in a conversation about the left’s inability to effectively 
respond to conservative politics: “They have out-narrated us.” Rorty, attacked by the radical left for his 
unabashed pragmatism and Americanism, offered a re-framed (meta-)narrative of American identity, tradition, 
and progress in his 1997 book Achieving Our Country (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Rorty’s vision 
parallels Kennedy’s, emphasizing our society’s ability to change, to “emerge” toward a fuller realization of our 
ideals, for the Nation to “live up to the true meaning of its creed,” as Martin Luther King so memorably put it. 
437 A similar dispute over the selection of relevant traditions plays out in Georgia v. Randolph, supra 
note 345. Scalia dissented in a separate opinion in order to take issue with Justice Stevens’ concurrence, which 
offered his own reading of tradition and history as partial justification of the case’s outcome. That Stevens 
would write separately for this express purpose—as a justification for his opinion—is an indication of the 
authority renditions of tradition now hold on the Court. That said, he begins his brief concurrence with a jab at 
Scalia’s crusade against legislative histories, as discussed at the outset of this chapter. “The study of history for 
the purpose of ascertaining  the original understanding of Constitutional provisions is much like the study of 
legislative history for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the lawmakers who enact statutes” 547 U.S. __ 
(2005) (Stevens, concurring). Scalia fires back that Stevens’ “attempted critique of originalism confuses the 
original import of the Fourth Amendment with the background sources of law to which the Amendment, on its 
original meaning, referred” 547 U.S. __ (2005) (Scalia, dissenting).  
438 Ogden v. Saunders 25 U.S. 213 (1827). 
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who has written more dissents than any other conservative on the current Court,439 
understands his role to be that of both a jurist and a teacher; his dissents are both legal and 
educational texts, as he told me. “I still consider myself a teacher. That’s the main reason I 
write my dissents,” he said. “I think the main point of the dissent is perhaps to try to change 
the future, and that will occur not by persuading my colleagues, who have made their mind 
up, but by persuading the next generation.” The Federalist Society founders were largely his 
students—and if not that, his eventual followers. His continued involvement with the group 
bespeaks his commitment to them and their project. “His strategy has succeeded brilliantly,” 
concludes scholar (and Constitutional law textbook author) Ralph Rossum, who has 
compiled statistics showing that Scalia’s dissents are the most likely to appear in law school 
hornbooks, as well as in the titles of Law Review articles.440 
“The shelf life of the great American law review article is what, ten years? It’s not 
cited after that; it’s of purely historical interest,” Scalia told me. “But I still meet people who 
I taught at the University of Virginia in 1969 who say, ‘you taught me contracts, and you lit a 
flame, and I’ve loved the law since then’. You have an enormous influence in your teaching.” 
Scalia understands, as all great leaders do, the importance of audience. No argument 
functions without one, and good arguments produce results only if they find the right one. 
His has. 
 
439 Rossum, Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence, 202.  
440 Rossum, Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence, 205-206. The score, as of 2006: Scalia, 2006; Rehnquist, 
57; O’Connor, 48; Thomas, 16; from thence to the single digits. 
CHAPTER 7 
RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE LIBERTARIANS,  
AND THE LANGUAGE OF ECONOMICS 
 
Epstein and the Federalists 
Richard Epstein has been teaching law at the University of Chicago since 1968, and 
his students have included Federalist Society founders Lee Otis and David McIntosh. Epstein 
was at that first Yale conference they organized in 1982 and is still a regular at its events 
around the country. Long after his two prodigal students left the ivy-covered walls of Hyde 
Park he continues to take the time to advise his former students successors, the up-and-
comers of the legal right. As I have seen repeatedly over my several years of research, 
Epstein’s dedication is very much the norm within the group. 
In typically sarcastic terms, Epstein put it this way—moments after his phone rang 
during my interview with him in his Chicago office. “One of the things this damn society 
does is that it leads people to think it’s perfectly O.K. to call you up 25 years later and say, I 
saw you speak at my school at the Federalist Society and can you do this favor for me,” he 
said. “And my answer’s always sure; that’s all you need. Even if they say I hated everything 
you said at the Federalist Society.” 
Perhaps even more than his Chicago colleague Richard Posner—a prolific author and 
judge on the Federal circuit—Epstein has been among the most influential scholars to bridge 
the fields of law and economics school, advocating cost-benefit analysis of legal problems—
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even Constitutional legal problems, where seemingly cold calculation might strike some as 
out of place. While Posner has written New York Times bestsellers and is a familiar name on 
op-ed pages, Epstein has stayed ensconced in the Academy and few beyond its walls know 
his name—even among GOP activists. “I’ve finally learned how to speak to lay audiences of 
all kinds,” Epstein told me, “but nobody will ever put me in front of a microphone to speak to 
all the delegates at the Republican Convention.”  
 “I’ve never written a runaway best-seller, and never will,” he said. “But what 
happens is that if there is somebody else who reads what you say and they can hit the popular 
audience—take these ideas and put them in a concrete fashion which preserves most of their 
truth and avoids all of their needless subtlety, they’re doing you a real service. I’ve decided 
you can’t be all things to all men as a scholar.” Still, his reach as a scholar has grown 
substantially; the kind of network effects he describes here are exactly what the Federalist 
Society has facilitated. Thanks to an ever larger pool of acolytes among the “Feddies” and 
elsewhere, his ideas have gained in political currency. 
Epstein is quick to note that the Federalist network had much to do with this process. 
Federalist booster Ed Meese invited him to the West House for policy discussions and the 
Society has turned him into something of an ivory tower rock star. “What they did was say, 
come and talk to us, and that gave me an opportunity,” he told me of his White House visits. 
“And I said, well, I’m going to a group of people who seem to be interested…What it did 
was give a chance to put something forward.” 
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Epstein’s career took off with the 1985 publication of his book Takings: Private 
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain.441 The book sets forth a radical critique of 
Constitutional law not only on Fifth Amendment “takings” question—the Amendment 
requires that the government provide “just compensation” for the “taking” of private 
property442—but also a broader assault on post-New Deal jurisprudence and the legitimacy of 
the modern American welfare state. Somewhat to his chagrin Epstein has become an apostle 
of the “Constitution in Exile” movement, arguing that by way of his court-packing scheme 
Franklin Roosevelt bullied the Superemes into accepting his Depression-era reforms—
everything from Social Security to the minimum wage—at the expense of legal legitimacy. 
The “real” Constitution, the argument goes, went into exile in 1937 when the Supreme Court 
began accepting Roosevelt’s expansion of government and the creation of the modern 
welfare state.443 
As we will consider below, this line of argument plays into the hands of liberal critics 
and also lays bare the cleavages between libertarians and social conservatives in the coalition 
of the right and within the Federalist ranks. Although Epstein is a constant presence in the 
Federalist milieu he is by no means its party-line spokesman; as I have been illustrating, there 
simply is none. Among the libertarian and economic-minded wing of the coalition, though, 
Epstein casts a long shadow. 
Takings was born through years of scholarship, Epstein told me, but the Federalists 
provided him a forum that helped move his ideas into a constructive, coherent argument. “I 
 
441Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
442 United States Constitution, Amendment V.  The issue was recently revisited by the Supreme Court 
in Kelo v. City of New London 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
443 See footnote 90, supra.
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went in with an early version of my Takings book,” he said of that first Federalist conference 
in 1982. “You could see the combination of amazement and fear in their eyes,” he said of the 
more liberal faculty and students there. “How could anyone put forward this kind of stuff, 
which completely tries to put this kind of accepted, complacent New Deal hegemony at risk,” 
he asked; “It’s what I was trying to do. I make no bones about it then, I make no bones about 
it now.”  
Epstein’s debt to the Federalists should not be understated. While he has remained an 
academic, his theories have dramatically impacted the legal culture—and the substantive law 
itself. As many lawyers and judges told me in the course of my research, one noticeable 
effect the conservative legal project has had on the practice of law is resulting the acceptance 
of cost-benefit, economic-styled arguments. While some courts and judges are more 
accepting of economic arguments than others there seems to be no doubt that the overall 
norm has changed. 
 
What makes Richard Epstein interesting for our purposes here is not only that he 
taught the founders of the Federalist Society or that he influenced the policies of the Reagan 
administration or that his theories on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment helped 
catapult libertarian theory to the forefront on Constitutional scholarship. Epstein is also a 
rhetorical critic: his presentations and articles are often explicitly concerned with the 
interpretive acts of lawyers and judges as they grapple with the always flexible meanings of 
words and phrases—the substance of law. In most cases Epstein comes down on the side of 
certainty, wincing at postmodern critiques of linguistic indeterminacy.  
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“Language is a marvelously subtle, powerful, persuasive tool,” he said at a 1984 
Federalist event. “The entire pattern of social and historical discourse takes place not because 
of the occasional unreliability of language, but because of its magnificent reliability.”444 For 
Epstein and his cohort, legal interpretation is to be treated “as a science,”445 a domain 
offering Right Answers to Problems. Epstein’s understanding of law is more aligned with 
mathematics than a traditionally humanistic endeavor such as history, where multiple 
understandings and perspectives always seem possible. 
 But Epstein’s rhetorical critiques—including his critiques of Judge Posner446—come 
off sounding a bit more pragmatic than he might like to admit. As he concluded in one 
article, “Texts must be clear enough to bind those who would like to violate their 
commands.”447 This view is fundamentally pragmatist, arguing that the ends (effectively 
binding those who would like to violate) should be used to judge the efficacy of the law (and 
its interpretable clarity). Later in this same article Epstein articulates a position he is 
uncomfortable with but which his realist sensibilities force him to consider: “Words are like 
the critical fortifications on a battlefield. You have to take them in order to win.”448 
Regardless of how things should be, Epstein says legal interpreters should work 
pragmatically with the way things are. He separates the normative and the positive, and 
reveals his realist but pragmatic attitude in this way: 
 
444 Epstein, “The Pitfalls of Interpretation,” 103. 
445 Epstein, “The Pitfalls of Interpretation,” 107. 
446 See generally Richard Epstein, “The Perils of Posnerian Pragmatism,” University of Chicago Law 
Review 71 (2004): 639-658. 
447 Epstein, “Some Doubts on Constitutional Indeterminacy,” 363.  
448 Epstein, “Some Doubts on Constitutional Indeterminacy,” 366. 
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Whenever we have a question about what a certain phrase means—be 
it to an author or a reader—we can ask two kinds of questions. One is the 
question of philosophical adequacy. If we had infinite time, infinite resources, 
and infinite patience, would the statement remain ambiguous after all efforts 
at clarification took place? Then you also have to ask the question of 
reliability: given this statute, these political constraints, and these historical 
circumstances, can we show that there is a bonafide ambiguity in this 
particular position?449 
Thus his acknowledgment of the controlling importance of context in producing legal 
meaning, ambiguity, and “reliability” (if not its philosophical perfection). As an example he 
points to the Constitution’s Commerce Clause,450 which figures so prominently in post-New 
Deal jurisprudence. Beginning in the 1920s he argues that the Progressive movement 
managed to capture legal language—the Commerce Clause in particular—and use it in legal 
argument, as well as crafting their political and scholarly work to turn the crucial phrase to 
their own desired policy ends—namely a more centralized Federal government regulated 
from Washington.451 But Epstein argues quite clearly that the Progressives and New Dealers 
got it wrong.  
Thus do Epstein’s libertarian critiques of political economy and the role of the state 
flow from his rhetorical critiques of law, from his reading of the Constitution. His arguments 
for a flat tax or for school vouchers, for example, are grounded in particular ways of reading 
the written law. In this, he is a lawyer/rhetorician if ever there was one—and any denial of 
his pragmatism or his rhetoricity (his persuasiveness as opposed to his stating of The Facts) 
only stands to substantiate Wetlaufer’s stinging criticisms, discussed in Chapter Two: that in 
 
449 Epstein, “The Pitfalls of Interpretation,” 102. 
450 Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, empowering the Congress “To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 
451 See generally Richard Epstein, How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution (Washington, D.C.: 
CATO  Institute, 2006). Discussion follows below. 
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this most rhetorical of disciplines, how is it that so many lawyers are afraid to admit that texts 
may be read different ways, and that their preferred reading is only one of several?  
Epstein’s bet-hedging on this question runs deep indeed, and I quote here a passage 
from his philosophical treatise defending “Classical Liberalism.” 
 
I would freely concede that all social truths are not derived from some 
inevitable principles, the truth of which can be denied only on pain of self-
contradiction. Political and moral theory, however, need not be ‘contingent’ in 
the empirical sense, which stresses their irregularity and unpredictability…the 
challenge is to identify those empirical regularities across time and space, and 
culture to which any viable legal system will have to respond.452 
I think Epstein makes one of his strongest points here—a point that, at various other 
moments, he seems less sure of when speaking the language of economics and science. 
Contingency is a fact of life, so to speak, but we in the legal community have to work with 
it—to integrate it into our work, which ultimately revolves around finding of fact, verdicts of 
guilt or innocence, and other certainties. Meaning in the philosophical sense may be 
completely contingent, ambiguous, even unknowable. But in the realm of the law, which 
demands reliability to produce fairness we should—and this is a normative claim—make use 
of language’s usual reliability. We must make philosophical concessions in order to foster a 
system that produces respected decisions and provides for predictable outcomes—including 
predictable outcomes when the existing laws are challenged. This is the essence of fairness 
within the boundaries of the common law.  
 
452 Richard A. Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 19. 
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Indeterminacy exists hand-in-hand with determinacy in our mixed system, I would 
argue; judge-made common law and statutory texts must both be considered—a 
methodological conundrum, as we have seen in the controversy caused by Meese’s Tulane 
speech. The mixed nature of our system is what defines it against the British, with their 
unwritten Constitution, and the Continental Europeans who have only the legislative code. 
Comparatively speaking it is at this point that Epstein’s theories run into trouble: If we 
eliminate our “Doubts about Constitutional Indeterminacy,” to borrow his article title, we 
eliminate the jury trial, the common law, and Anglo-American jurisprudence.  
Doubt is the linchpin in our conception of justice, I believe. Unlike Civil Law nations 
where judges mechanically search for the relevant Code passage (and dispatch letters of 
inquiry to the legislature if none exists) our Common Law system demands that judges act as 
interpreters. They must grapple with doubt and must resolve it, as must jurors when 
interpreting purported facts. Conservatives have always, in fact, been great doubters: 
Doubting courts, doubting public opinion, doubting liberalism, doubting the Revolution in 
France, doubting man’s inherent equality to his fellow man. I would argue that Epstein’s 
“doubts” are only that. As he told me, he is no libertarian, in favor of eliminating the state. 
(With “elimination” a highly relative term!)  
He is a Classical Liberal who recognizes the need for a state. “It is only the parody of 
libertarian theory that holds that no form of regulation is appropriate,” he wrote in 2002.453 
Whether regulation—such as the minimum wage—is “appropriate,” Epstein might say, is 
one question; whether it is Constitutional is another. Thus merge the realms of rhetoric and 
 
453 Richard A. Epstein, “Beyond Judicial Activism and Restraint,” Georgetown Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 1 (2002), 90.  
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law. While a persuasive political or even moral case can be made for progressive taxation, 
for example, Epstein agues that a legal one cannot. 
 
How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution 
 The horror stricken into minds of contemporary liberals by Epstein’s arguments—
gestating ever since that first Federalist conference in 1982—was given coherence by a 
phrase coined by failed Reagan Supreme Court nominee Douglas Ginsburg: the 
“Constitution in Exile.”454 In 2005 the idea was fleshed out in a controversial New York 
Times Magazine piece by Jeffrey Rosen, a professor of law at Georgetown University and a 
self-described “recovering textualist.” Rosen’s cover story in the magazine explained the 
ideas espoused by Epstein, Ginsburg, and others who believe the Supreme Court went 
unforgivably astray during the New Deal era. The Magazine’s cover photo featured a 
depiction of the Constitution literally frozen in a huge block of ice. Stern photos of Epstein 
and others were shot from low angles with low light and suggested a dark, sinister mood.455 
Conservatives went berserk. 
 “You looked at those photos, and those headlines, and you knew it was a hatchet job,” 
Epstein told me, adding that he had spent over six hours on the telephone with Rosen in 
preparation for the article. “I had at least a half a dozen people come up and say they would 
represent me in a case for defamation against the New York Times for free,” he said—though 
he took no such action. Rosen publicly apologized to the Federalists at the 2006 lawyers’ 
convention and Epstein suggested that the young professor was “double-crossed” by his 
 
454 Strictly speaking, Ginsburg was never nominated. Reagan announed his intention to nominate him, 
but the scandal that forced him to decline the nomination erupted to quickly that Reagan never formally sent the 
nomination to the Senate. 
455 Jeffrey Rosen, “The Unregulated Offensive,” New York Times Magazine, April 17, 2005, 42-53. 
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editors and had no authority over the photographic depictions of his interview subjects. “I 
thought it was a terrible commentary on how frightened people can be about ideas they don’t 
know how to deal with,” Epstein told me, “that they have to put it into this crazy frame.” 
 Just how crazy is that frame?  One of the headlines accompanying the Rosen piece 
puts it this way: “The movement has urged conservatives to get over their aversion to judicial 
activism and embrace the courts as an agents of economic and political change.”456 Epstein 
may not have been happy with the overall impact (and those grim photos) but if Roger Pilon 
of the CATO Institute can be believed, this headline is right on the money. A committed 
libertarian and a longtime Federalist, Pilon disavows “the conservatism of Bork and Scalia,” 
telling me that ideally, he would look “for the judiciary to be active [in] securing both 
enumerated and nonenumerated rights.” Not only active (as opposed to restrained) but 
securing both enumerated (i.e. textual) and nonenumerated (i.e. implied or “natural”). 
Many traditional conservatives wince at this formulation, invested as they are in the 
rhetoric of judicial restraint. “As Mr. Pilon makes very clear, scratch a libertarian and you 
find a judicial activist,” wrote Meese Justice Department veteran Gary McDowell in a Wall 
Street Journal column.457 But Pilon and his libertarian cohort see no insult here; for them, 
judicial activism in the defense of liberty is no vice.458 
456 Rosen, “The Unregulated Offensive,” 47. 
457 Gary L. McDowell, “Scratch a Libertarian: Voila! Judicial Activist,” The Wall Street Journal, April 
10, 1992, A17. 
458 Hence Pilon’s enthusiastic response to the Supreme Court’s Lopez decision, which struck down the 
Federal Gun Free Schools Act. United States v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The case was manna for the 
Constitution in Exilers, its decision specifically grounded in the lack of Congressional authority for the law. It 
might be a good idea to have gun-free schools, but the legal justification—that gun transactions affect interstate 
commerce, which Congress can regulate—was simply a bridge too far for the Court. “Could the New Deal be 
on the ropes,” asked Pilon in the Washington Post. “Not yet,” he answered (rhetorically), but after Lopez “the 
potential is there.” Pilon, Roger. “It’s Not About Guns: The Court’s Lopez Decision Is Really About Limits on 
Government.” The Washington Post, May 21, 1995. “Lopez awakened Washington from its dogmatic slumber,” 
he told me.  
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* * *
One of the brash young turks of the right, attorney Mark W. Smith, telegenic author 
of The Official Handbook of the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy,459 has taken this attitude to 
new heights. Advancing a realism that outdoes even the progressive-era theories the 
Federalists Society’s founders were reacting against, Smith argues that conservatives should 
abandon their idealistic hopes for judicial restraint, originalism, and textualism. “If 
conservatives want to thwart the liberal assault, the first thing we have to do is abandon the 
illusions we have clung to for so long,” he writes in Disrobed: The New Battle Plan to Break 
the left’s Stranglehold on the Courts.460 Smith looks askance at the theoretical projects of 
Epstein and others, reaching conclusions strangely similar to the CLS movement several 
decades before. For example, he outlines five “myths” conservatives must abandon, all of 
which one must imagine would prompt dismissal by the Federalists’ professoriate and policy 
wonks: 
 
MYTH: Courts should exercise judicial restraint. 
REALITY: Judicial restraint will never be a reality—and even if it 
could be a reality, we don’t want it now. 
 
MYTH: Judges should be apolitical. 
REALITY: Judges don’t—and can’t—check their ideology at the 
courtroom door; they often, by necessity, function as politicians 
wearing black robes. 
 
459 Mark W. Smith, The Official Handbook of the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy (Washington, D.C.: 
Regnery, 2004). 
460 Mark W. Smith, Disrobed: The New Battle Plan to Break the left’s Stranglehold on the Courts 
(New York: Crown/Randon House, 2006), 10. 
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MYTH: Judges should follow the law. 
REALITY: Deciding what the law is ain’t always easy. 
 
MYTH: Judges should defer to the elected branches. 
REALITY: Judges make law all the time, and we often want them to. 
 
MYTH: Judicial activism tramples on the rule of law. 
REALITY: Judicial activism is the rule of law.461 
For Smith the realist, “Judicial activism is nothing but a tool; what matters is for what 
purposes the tool is applied—for good or for bad.”462 
This anti-theoretical stance is of little intellectual consequence to many in the 
Federalist Society, and in conversations over the years I heard more than a few negative 
quips about certain self-promoting Fox News “legal experts.” Still, Smith is hardly alone in 
having his work criticized by fellow conservatives or fellow Federalists. He continues to 
serve as vice-president of the New York chapter and is a popular guest of Federalist chapters 
on the law school circuit. That someone who attacks the broader intellectual and political 
project of the legal Right remains a cheerleader for its largest and most influential 
organization serves to further illustrate the internal fissures with the Federalist coalition, and 
the organization’s uncanny ability to bridge them. 
 
* * *
Epstein confidently defends the project of theory: “It takes a theory to beat a theory,” 
he says. What the Progressive Left developed over a generation, beginning before the New 
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Deal, he believes, must be met on the terrain of intellectual debate and met with developed 
refutation. Epstein’s “theoretical imperative,” we might call it, requires consideration of 
history and careful grounding of legal arguments in political context as well as a grounding 
in Constitutional text. In his latest epistle he lays out the case that progressive advocates and 
politicians “rewrote” the Constitution during the upheaval years of the Great Depression. We 
will consider this argument in some detail, also looking at his landmark book on the power of 
the government to seize property in Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent 
Domain.
Even as he advances his arguments Epstein wants to distance himself from doctrinaire 
libertarianism and is at pains to distinguish his Classical Liberal position from that of CATO 
types.463 “The Classical Liberal position is not frozen in the past,” he writes, suggesting the 
icy New York Times cover photo. “The constant theme,” he says, is “small government, 
which offers as little comfort to the new generation of religious and social conservatives as it 
does to the traditional American left.”464 
Epstein echoed this theme in our interview, honing in on the sharp difference between 
social conservatives and libertarian-types (including Classical Liberals) within the coalition 
of the right. “Modern social conservatives are not interested only in organizing their own 
lives, they’re also interested in running everybody else’s,” he said. “What’s happened is that 
they’ve gained in power. They’re no longer thinking defensively, they’re thinking 
offensively…and this is of course true of the [George W. Bush] administration...this means 
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that you’re really speaking out against both parties at different times for the same reason: 
each of them wants to meddle in the lives of each other.” 
 “Meddling.” The offensiveness implied here ties up neatly with the conservative 
emphasis on liberty discussed earlier in the context of social equality. Epstein’s focus on 
political economy and commerce leads him to conceptualize “meddling” primarily as 
interference in business transactions, or to use the business transaction as a metaphor for 
virtually all aspects of decision making in private life (since “privacy” is an illegitimate legal 
category for conservatives in general). This perspective leads him to resurrect a long 
disavowed aspect of legal “liberty interests” that held strong sway in the pre-New Deal 
Supreme Court, the “liberty of entering into voluntary contracts with whomever one pleased, 
and only with such people.”465 Liberty of contract is one of the rights often cited by those 
associated with the Constitution in Exile movement, and often at peril of being labeled racist; 
the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s invalidated rights of innkeepers, for example, to refuse 
contracting with Blacks simply due to their own prejudices. 
 Epstein’s arguments on this and other controversial assertions often turn on economic 
and statistical analyses. In treating the Progressive crusade against child labor, for example, 
he argues not for the immorality of the practice or the state’s authority to police it, but for the 
Court’s unnecessary intervention into the marketplace. Under Epstein’s reading, child labor 
rates were declining “naturally” in the years leading up to the Court’s ruling on the matter.466 
To the economically-minded critic, Constitutional rights-based arguments were simply 
spurious. Epstein approaches the question from a totally different angle: “The gains from 
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child labor diminished in comparison with its costs,” he writes. “The theories of Adam Smith 
work rather well.”467 In other words, let the market function, and the laws of efficiency will 
lead to the most desirable result—morally and otherwise. It’s a strong case, if hardly an 
absolute one. As an aside, it’s also worth noting that Adam Smith’s first academic post was 
as a professor of rhetoric.468 
Viewed through the cost-benefit lens all problems become reducible to transactions 
and transaction costs. “Social justice” becomes a non sequitur, a “mirage,” as conservative 
Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek argued in the second volume of his magnum opus The 
Constitution of Liberty. As Epstein neatly summarizes, “The only programs that should 
survive are those that produce some net social improvement” (the emphasis is Epstein’s).469 
“Net gains” would likely strikes many as a rather depersonalized means by which to consider 
whether justice is or is not being done. Years of criticism notwithstanding, Epstein has stuck 
to his guns. Eschew the particular; focus on the broader, common (or “net”) good. 
 “Nothing in laissez-faire economics places people under a legal obligation to be 
selfish or greedy,” he wrote in 2003. “The system simply recognizes that giving each person 
the right to make choices about the use of his or her talents and resources is a strong spur to 
their efficient allocation.”470 That efficiency might not produce just outcomes on a case-by-
case basis is not questioned, nor is it denied. Recall what Leonard Leo told me. “For the left, 
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it’s ‘Well gosh, I don’t know if I like that interpretation of the Establishment Clause, because 
what happens to this guy over here?’ Suddenly you’ve left the four corners of the document 
and you’re having a debate or dispute over what this means.” Social consequences—“what 
happens to this guy over here”—are not the province of the judge. Or, some might say, of the 
conservative. 
 
Hayek’s “Road to Serfdom” conservatism is often cited by law-and-economics types 
and his name is bandied about at Federalist events with proud frequency. Epstein, though, 
thinks Hayek’s brand of “Night Watchman” capitalism is not necessarily to be trusted. He is 
suspicious of Hayek’s sometimes metaphysical-sounding faith in “spontaneous order,” a 
concept explicitly related to Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand, that acts to distribute the assets of 
the market based on supply and demand. In contrast to the metaphorical Smith or mystical 
Hayek, Epstein at times comes off as something of a materialist, a mindset borne out in his 
constant emphasis on net benefits, efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, and formulaic 
methodology. Consider this:  
 
At points, Hayek sounds almost mystical; the success of spontaneous 
order made Hayek deeply suspicious of rational efforts to alter the patterns of 
these social implications…The ideal Constitution within a Hayekian world 
would be the English Constitution with its unclear origins, slow growth, and 
shadowy conventions. But he should be suspicious of the quite deliberate 
architecture of the United States Constitution, with its conscious reliance on 
the staples of political theory—separation of powers, checks and balances, 
enumerated powers, federalism, and entrenched rights.471 
471 Richard A. Epstein, “Hayekian Socialism,” Maryland Law Review 58 (1999): 283. 
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Thus does Epstein dispense with the idealistic and metaphysical aspects of conservative 
theory so central to many in the movement and the Federalist Society.  
 Epstein latches on hard to Hayek’s accessions to state regulation, generally missed by 
liberal critics. As Lawrence Grossberg has noted, Hayek—writing in the context of National 
Socialism in Germany and Stalinism in Russia—seems to be giving contemporary American 
liberals ninety percent of what they want. Epstein notices this. In The Road to Serfdom,
Epstein says, “Hayek lists an impressive array of services that he is willing to let the state 
provide…in order to slay the dragon of central planning, he thought it imperative to concede 
some points to the opposition.”472 In light of Hayek’s extensive revisiting and justification of 
his views on state regulation and individual liberty in his later work, Epstein’s write-off does 
not entirely hold water. Hayek was no socialist. He wrote in a different era and from the 
perspective of a tradition (as Epstein notes) without written Constitutions. One might even 
imagine the Austrian’s bafflement at Epstein’s assertions in Takings, at once explicitly 
ideological but also grounded in textual provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the supreme law 
of our land. 
 
The libertarian and Classical Liberal wing of the conservative movement finds itself 
pitted against the majority both among today’s GOP and within the Federalist Society. Social 
and religious conservatives tend to privilege immaterial things such as spiritual beliefs and 
tradition, and to see the judge and the legislator as guardian of these legacies. In this they are 
the legatees of Edmund Burke, whose conservatism was deeply imbued with the 
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metaphysical power of tradition and practiced truth communicated from generation to 
generation, the very lifeblood of the unwritten British constitution.  
Ken Cribb, who in his youth studied Burke with Russell Kirk in Scotland, is one of 
the Federalists’ defenders of the old English conservatism. Conservatism is not an ideology, 
Cribb told me. “Kirk would say…it’s a disposition toward the openness of reality. 
Conservatism is open to new experience,” he said. “I think libertarian types would disagree 
with me violently on this, as would Christian Right types.” On that he is most certainly 
correct. He is also the Society’s chief counsel; Like Gene Meyer, we might surmise that his 
third-way position allows him to move among the factions. 
 
Takings 
 Many of the seeds of the Constitution in Exile movement were planted by Epstein—
or at least they were given fertile intellectual sustenance by his work. Takings is a case in 
point. It is a manifesto, but a distinctly professorial one: short on hyperbole and heavy on 
economic analysis. Many of its themes are restated in condensed form in How Progressives 
Rewrote the Constitution, which I have been quoting from thus far. Takings deserves 
consideration on its own, however. It was a landmark achievement and has contributed 
directly to the legitimating of a radical critique of postwar Constitutional law and the 
expansion of the welfare state. 
What Takings lacks in flourish it makes up for with its pithy sarcasm and bold 
assertion. “I argue that the eminent domain clause and parallel clauses in the Constitution 
render constitutionally infirm or suspect many of the heralded reforms of the institutions of 
the twentieth century,” Epstein writes in the book’s opening pages, going on to enumerate the 
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likely offenders: “zoning, rent control, workers’ compensation laws, transfer payments, 
progressive taxation.”473 300 pages later, one can also add the Federal minimum wage to this 
list.474 Make no mistake about it: Epstein was declaring war on the welfare state.  
And where could he look to find an incubator for this seemingly Quixotic crusade, a 
forum for its elaboration and development, and the recruiting grounds for its avant garde? 
The Federalist Society. From its very first conference Epstein used the Society as an 
intellectual proving ground. 
Epstein approaches his reading of the takings clause rhetorically, considering text, 
context, and understanding. He follows the original understanding model in acknowledging 
that the Clause “contains a set of terms that are not defined in the Constitution itself: private 
property, taken, just compensation, and public use.” The meanings of these words, he writes, 
“comes of necessity from outside the text.” Like Meese, Epstein suggests that the only 
“outside” that matters for Courts derives from the “ordinary” meanings attached to the words 
at the time they were set down.475 Epstein will have nothing to do with concerns about 
indeterminacy and multiple meanings, calling them unwarranted and the product of 
intellectual “despair.” In response to liberal critic Thomas Grey, he writes that there is “no 
reason to give up on language at the first sign of difficulty.”476 
As Epstein’s sees things, the terms of the Takings Clause are easily knowable. They 
point to common concepts just as easily defined in an 18th Century understanding as in a 
20th Century one. As an action verb, “to take” hardly requires complicated explanation. Nor 
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does “just” as in “just compensation.”477 If the government “takes” from you, it must 
compensate you “justly.” It is this requirement, specifically, that Epstein believes has been 
read out of the law. 
 One of the most controversial ways he claims this has occurred is through the 
progressive taxation of private income. Responding to one common argument—put forward 
recently by liberal consultant George Lakoff, for example—taxation cannot be justified 
simply on the grounds that everyone must pay (hence Lakoff’s analogy to membership fees) 
or that everyone of certain income brackets must pay what others in that bracket pay. “The 
process is purely additive,” Epstein writes. “No secret alchemy transforms repeated takings 
of private property into something else which is Constitutionally neutral.” As for the 
argument that taxation goes toward services enjoyed by all persons, Epstein hedges; like 
Hayek he allows for some governmental functions478 but not all of those created in the post-
New Deal era. Roads and national defense, yes; welfare no.479 As for taxation, the best and 
most realistic solution Epstein sees is a flat tax.480 
To Epstein’s economically driven mind, the current progressive system results in a 
“mismatch of taxes and benefits”; there is nothing “just” about forcing a multimillionaire to 
pay for a welfare system he will never use.481 His language is devoid of the appeals to 
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community, charity, and kindness that pervade the discourse of the liberal left. Let us parse 
one of his key sentences:  
 
Welfare remains a transfer system [a wholly depersonalized 
characterization: transfer system] whose tiny insurance component 
[insurance, evoking parallels to automobile liability not, say, a social safety 
net] does not furnish adequate compensation [compensation must be 
financial in this sense, not the benefit of living in a community with values 
that support a welfare system] to those who are taxed to support it. 
 
And when the Courts have upheld the power of government to tax and spend virtually at will, 
Epstein retorts with pithy sarcasm: “The thief who says ‘your money or your life’ has given 
his victim a choice, but he cannot keep the money on the grounds that the victim gave it to 
him.”482 
Epstein extends these same arguments to government regulations, which he reframes 
as “partial takings.”483 Considering environmental regulations requiring the preservation of 
wetlands, even when they are located on private lands, he writes that the law might well 
“identify a possible gain to the public [but] does not eliminate the constitutional 
obligation…if the state wants to use private property to benefit mankind,” it must “pay for 
the privilege.”484 Hence if a developer is forbidden from constructing condominiums on land 
because of the presence of wetlands (or an endangered species) the state must “justly” 
compensate the developer for the amount of his lost profits. One can easily see how this 
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arrangement would topple most land use regulations, environmental or otherwise. “Zoning 
stands in stark contrast to a system of private property,” he writes. “Routine judicial 
deference to local action is wholly inappropriate.”485 
For Epstein as for his senior colleague at Chicago, Milton Friedman,  private property 
is essential to ensuring freedom.486 “It allows for economic development, on one hand,” 
Epstein writes, “but on the other it has a crucial defensive function of saving the little man 
from the excesses of the imperial state.”487 When we incentivize the economic interests of the 
individual, in other words, the state is kept at bay. 
 In 1985 Epstein concluded that his arguments—legal, moral, and philosophical—had 
little chance of success. “The question then arises whether there is a political will to carry out 
these reforms, either by the courts or by the legislature. The short answer is that there is not,” 
he wrote. “And there may never be.”488 Thanks to his continued presence in the Federalist 
Society, though, Epstein can rest assured that in the intervening twenty-two  years his ideas 
have not only gained in currency and legitimacy. They have gained rhetorically adept 
proponents among a new generation of libertarian-minded lawyers. 
 
Critiques of Economic Discourse 
 Rhetorical scholar James Aune, in his book Selling the Free Market, adapts Robert 
Hariman’s work on Machiavellian realism to the realm of economics. Hariman explains how, 
following Machiavelli, realists attempt to deny the indeterminacies of interpretation by 
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“telling it like it is,” cutting through the morass of possible meanings to the meaning. Aune’s 
point aligns for the most part with Wetlaufer’s condemnations of the legal profession and 
legal education, built as they are on realist notions of “right answers to legal questions” and a 
denial of the fundamental relativity of all lawyering—that the client must be zealously 
defended regardless of the lawyer’s personal view of the case. Lawyers are taught to argue all 
sides of a case, not just one.  
 Following Wetlaufer to a degree, Edward Panetta and Marouf Hasian, Jr. criticize  
Law and Economics, claiming it is “anti-rhetoric as rhetoric,” a “foundational quest for truth 
that privileges itself as the only or primary ‘rational’, ‘objective’, or ‘neutral’ means of 
acquiring epistemic knowledge.”489 Against this critique I would suggest that Epstein, at 
least, in Takings and elsewhere is as much pragmatic as monolithic—he recognizes the limits 
of his arguments due to contextual political and social factors even as he asserts their 
nonetheless-correctness.  
Panetta and Hasian’s most effective critique has less to do with their typical scare 
quotes placed around any assertions of certitude (dreaded “objectivity”) than their wholly 
correct conclusion that the rhetoric of economics is “dehumanizing,”490 often eviscerating the 
moral, ethical, and communal aspects from our considerations of political and legal 
problems. As we have seen, welfare becomes a mere machine, a “transfer system” with an 
“insurance component”; the human experience is written out of this calculus. Still, Panetta 
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and Hasian press even this point too far by half, suggesting that “in a Law and Economics 
world one’s rights are determined via economic calibration.”491 
This mischaracterization reflects what lawyers call a category mistake: Economic 
calibrations are central to the thinking of theorists like Epstein, as we have seen. But they are 
not central to the determination of “one’s rights”; for the conservative textualist, rights derive 
from legal texts (or from their original understanding)—and whatever misgivings we might 
have with this methodology, it has nothing to do with economic calibrations. The cult of 
efficiency which many in Epstein’s camp believe should govern policy must be separated 
from questions of rights. For many on the left the distinction simply does not obtain.  
For Hasian and Panetta, economics is not only denied the legitimacy of being rhetoric 
at all, but is further accused of “acting as a brake on the extension of rights to worthy 
citizens.”492 Epstein would doubtless ask: Which rights? And from whence derived? And 
how, precisely, is my non-rhetoric functioning (rhetorically) to prevent the extension of these 
rights?  
 By far the most comprehensive critique of economic discourse comes from Deirdre 
McCloskey, a former colleague of Epstein’s at Chicago and now a professor of economics 
and history at the University of Iowa.493 McCloskey’s book The Rhetoric of Economics is not 
particular to Law and Economics, and Epstein’s work is not cited. But McCloskey’s critique 
has much to say about the use of economic language in the domain of the law and political 
economy. McCloskey, like Hariman, frames her discussion in terms of the broader trope of 
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realism particularly favored by scientists and economists who tend to view their work as the 
product of proof, not persuasion. 
It is apropos here to mention a stinging rebuke that Richard Posner offered some 
years ago when considering Robert Bork’s “originalist” methodology. “Originalism—at least 
Bork’s originalism—is not an analytic,” Posner wrote, “ but a rhetoric that can be used to 
support any result the judge wants to reach. The conservative libertarians whom Bork 
criticizes (Richard Epstein and Bernard Siegan) are originalists; his disagreements with them 
is not over methodology, but over result.”494 Indeed, one of the basic points of agreement 
between the Federalist’s libertarians and social conservatives is textualism, though Posner is 
entirely correct that this does not guarantee agreement. 
When I asked him about this splinter with Posner, Epstein, and the economists, Bork 
just shook his head. “Basic microeconomics is a certain science,” he said. “There’s no such 
certainty in Constitutional law. I can argue with you all you want about originalism, and I can 
give reasons that are decisive. But I can’t do anything like you can do with economics. 
Posner’s tried it and it doesn’t work…he wrote an article in which he tried to consider police 
entrapment in terms of the misallocations of resources.” Bork scowled dramatically at this. 
Oddly enough it is as offensive to his methodology as it is to Professor McCloskey’s.  
“There are libertarians who are perfectly fine with abortion, who are perfectly fine 
with saying homosexual sodomy can be found in the Constitution, or a muscular 
interpretation of the Takings Clause,” Federalist Executive Vice-President Leonard Leo told 
me. “But all of them are textually based…we’re within the four corners of the document, 
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more or less.” More or less is right—since, as we have seen, both Bork and Epstein do move 
outside the “four corners” in their considerations of originalism, context, history, and 
tradition. Leo correctly responds, however, that among textualists, these moves to the outside 
are almost always prompted by conflicts on the inside—the interactions of the Constitution’s 
various provisions. “It’s not really the Takings Clause that causes the problem,” he said. “It’s 
the interplay between the Takings Clause and the structural provisions of the Constitutions.” 
On the one hand the Takings Clause, on the other the broad grants of power to the state under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause495 and the traditional policing power496 to enforce the laws 
laid down. 
Originalism is a way of reading texts, but so too is it a set of rhetorical tools, a way of 
making arguments, “devices of language,” as McCloskey puts it. Just as Hariman exposes 
Machiavelli’s realist trope (“My liege, I will tell you what’s really going on in the intrigues 
of Court!”) Posner points to the originalist’s realism (“Here is what people really understood 
the First Amendment to mean in 1791”), just as McCloskey points to the economist’s (“The 
cost-benefit analysis comes out thus; the result is real, proven by the correctness of the 
data.”) McCloskey goes on to show in a series of case studies, however, that assertions of 
proofs and theorems in economics unfold just as rhetorically as those of any other discipline 
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(even—gasp!—literature) but simply make use of a different set of presuppositions and an 
exclusive lexicon.497 
She concludes with another passage, this time from Mark Perlman, one of the most 
prominent economists of the post-war era. What he says of economists in general is true of 
Law-and-Economists, Epstein included. “Economists’ self-perception is as of ‘en expert.’
But economists are not experts; they are basically persuaders.” As are we all, we scientists, 
mathematicians, and economists together.”498 
Don’t forget the lawyers! 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE “NEW SOVEREGNTY” AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
THERE’S A NEW BAD GUY IN TOWN 
 
In this final chapter I will examine a topic timely to both the Federalist agenda and 
national politics at their most consequential: the theory and practice of international law. 
Since President Bush took the nation to war in Afghanistan and Iraq following the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there has been a steady stream of international law questions before 
the public, the courts, and Congress—from the validity of the September, 2002 resolution 
authorizing Bush to use force in Iraq; the administration’s dealings with the United Nations 
and its Security Council; the detention and treatment of prisoners in U.S. custody in 
Guantanamo Bay and the Abu Ghraib prisons; and on and on. Political and legal 
controversies have plagued the administration’s foreign policy and its lawyers have been kept 
busy. In this chapter I will consider rhetorical, theoretical, and legal aspects to these ongoing 
challenges. The application of rhetoric here is markedly less theoretical than in preceding 
chapters considering Meese’s and Scalia’s arguments about interpretation in general; here we 
are concerned more directly with the application and enactment of law—more with policy 
than process. 
As an introductory matter it is important to recognize the authoritative way that the 
Bush administration reacted to September 11th. Beginning on the following day the President 
and his administration launched an aggressive foreign policy that has taken the nation into 
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two foreign wars articulated under the broad rhetorical umbrella of a “war on terror.” Their 
communications strategy was masterful, defining the terms of debate for the years to come 
and making it almost impossible for adversaries to effectively question the premises of 
Bush’s foreign policy. As with previous topics we have considered throughout this 
dissertation, it would be incorrect to say that the Federalist Society was “behind” the 
construction of Bush policy. Federalist conservatives have, however, taken up the project of 
international law with gusto: Leonard Leo told me bluntly that he and many others on the 
legal Right see international law as the successor to Constitutional law in the Warren Court 
era: “The empty vessel into which liberals would pour all sorts of concepts that they couldn’t 
get through the political process.” 
From a technical legal standpoint Bush’s military action in Iraq was justified in part 
by a national security strategy of “preemption” in conjunction with the traditional national 
right to self-defense.499 With few exceptions at the time,500 conservatives supported Bush’s 
policy, offering up both political and legal justifications for its necessity, wisdom, and 
constitutionality. Preemption combined with self-defense equated to an aggressive policy 
critiqued as “unilateralism” and defended as a basic assertion of national sovereignty. 
In the intervening years, though, Bush’s go-it-alone stance has become increasingly 
unpopular, costing him political capital and costing the nation the lives of thousands of 
young men and women. The intellectual vanguard of the post-9/11 national security 
strategy—the so-called “neo-conservatives”—are less in favor: Donald Rumsfeld and his 
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deputy Paul Wolfowitz were both cashiered as were many of their acolytes. Even high-
powered intellectual neo-conservative Francis Fukuyama repudiated the geopolitical 
ideology that was behind much of Bush’s Middle East policy.501 One of the most vocal 
proponents of Bush’s policies, John Bolton, lost his chance to become permanent 
representative to the United Nations when Democrats captured control of Congress in the 
November 2006 midterm elections. Bolton faced opposition even under the Republican 
Congress, but with the confirming committee now in the hands of democratic Sen. Joseph 
Biden, Bolton had to bow out. His nomination was “going nowhere,” Biden said.502 
Defeating Bolton was a major blow to the foreign policy wing of movement 
conservatism—if not to “neo-conservatism” per se. The broader coalition of the foreign 
policy Right concerns itself first and foremost with national self-determination and is 
extremely skeptical about the role of international bodies such as the United Nations. 
Christened the “New Sovereigntists” by critics, these scholars and policymakers were 
strongly supportive of the Bush foreign policy, particularly the toppling of Saddam Hussein 
and the earlier decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with 
Russia. Both moves were predicated on their relation to American national interests, 
regardless of international consequences.  
 
* * *
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Led by Bolton and others, New Sovereigntists fuse traditional elements of 
mainstream conservative thought with post-9/11 nationalism503 to articulate a statist, 
Bismarckian theory of international relations that questions the very premise of international 
law, treaties, and the international institutions they create. Discussing the International 
Criminal Court in 2001, Bolton put the matter in typically blunt terms: “It is one of those 
international law phenomena that just happens ‘out there’, among academics and 
activists;”504 representative of an agenda “clearly inconsistent with American standards of 
constitutional order.”505 As we will see, this perceived inconsistency is rooted in the legal 
theories of representation and interpretation examined in the preceding chapters. 
Mentioning Bismarck—the prototypical foreign policy Realist—is intentional, since I 
will also be relating the New Sovereigntists’ debt to Carl Schmitt, a 20th Century German 
political and legal theorist whose provocative insights were damaged by his complicity with 
the Nazi regime. Schmitt was interested in the conceptual frameworks of political and 
transnational conflict, conflicts at the root of the adversarial legal process and of the 
relationships of adversarial states. Just as questions over the meaning of personal autonomy 
and liberty are implicit in the split between libertarian and social conservatives, questions of 
national autonomy and transnational law implicate our particular understandings of state 
sovereignty and international law. Here too different factions exist within the Federalist 
Society—but the dominant view aligns with Bolton and the New Sovereigntists. 
 
503 See, e.g., William J. Bennett, Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism 
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2003), 1-8, 143-168.  
504 John R. Bolton, “The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America’s 
Perspective,” Law and Contemporary Problems 64 (2001): 171. 
505 Bolton, “The Risks and Weaknesses,” 169.  
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Schmitt is not necessarily the root of New Sovereigntist theory but he does help 
illuminate it.506 For one thing, for some conservatives, Schmittian realism melds with a 
utopian American exceptionalism to form a comprehensive worldview—a phenomena I will 
consider below. Believing that America is uniquely situated to lead the world, idealism melds 
with realism in a rejection of multilateral compromise and international law in favor of what 
Schmitt calls a statist nomos, or global order, where the nations of the earth look to the 
United States for the model of enlightened self-interest, constitutional democracy, and 
morally-derived nationalism. 
 
* * *
First I will consider what the New Sovereigntists have been saying in public. Bolton 
has been point man, but I will also be looking at statements from other government officials 
and Cornell University professor Jeremy Rabkin.507 Both Bolton and Rabkin are celebrities 
in Federalist circles and boast impressive conservative pedigrees. Bolton was taught 
Constitutional law at Yale by Robert Bork (who recalls him as the lone conservative in the 
class) and cut his teeth in the Reagan administration. It is not without irony that Bolton was 
put in charge of shepherding Bork’s Supreme Court nomination through the Senate in 1987; 
twenty yeas later the student faced his own political demise. 
 
506 See generally Sunic, Against Democracy and Equality, 54-64. 
507 Aside from his 2004 book The Case for Sovereignty: Why the World Should Welcome American 
Independence (Washington, AEI Press) see also Jeremy Rabkin, “In the Looking Glass: A Review of The 
Majesty of Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice by Sandra Day O’Connor,” Claremont Review of 
Books, Winter 2003; Jeremy Rabkin, “Original Dissent: Keith Whittington Makes the Case for Constitutional 
law,” The Weekly Standard, March 6, 2000, 34-36 (arguing that theory is needed to undergird the argument for 
“originalist” interpretation of the Constitution); Phyllis Schlafly, “Constitution, Not U.N., Is our Governing 
Authority,” Human Events, July 7, 2004, http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=4407 (favorably 
citing Rabkin’s work) (accessed April 15, 2007). 
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Rabkin, who has spent his entire career in academia, has less of a storied past but no 
less of a Federalist resume; he mentored a young conservative student by the name of 
Leonard Leo during his formative years. Rabkin’s scholarly arguments in favor of the New 
Sovereignty have found a ready ally in his former student, who has guided the Federalists 
toward their current focus on international law. Although the national office does not direct 
local and student chapters in their areas of focus, it does have a degree of agenda-setting 
power in its selection of topics highlighted on the website, in publications, and at national 
conventions. Bolton, for example, was the featured speaker at the 2006 student division 
conference, focused on international law. He was cheered like a rock star. 
 
* * *
Many of the barbs traded at that conference related to the Lawrence decision, 
discussed earlier in our consideration of Justice Scalia’s use of “tradition” in his opinions. In 
a key footnote, the author of the majority Lawrence opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy, cited 
opinions of the European Court of Human Rights.508 In one of his most acerbic and angry 
dissents, Scalia blasted Kennedy for the audacity of going beyond the questioning of Scalia’s 
use of history; instead, Kennedy expanded the context to a global scale. He argued in his 
majority opinion that the Court’s decision is justified by the “emerging awareness” of 
personal autonomy in American society that relates to “values we share with a wider 
civilization.”509 
508 539 U.S. 558, 576-577. 
509 539 U.S. 558, 576-577. 
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Citing Bowers v. Hardwick, the case Lawrence overturned, Scalia frames his dissent 
in global terms. “The Bowers majority opinion never relied on ‘values we share with a wider 
civilization’,” Scalia wrote, “but rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on the ground 
that such a right was not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’”—the 
emphasis here is Scalia’s. Traditions, for Scalia, are per se national: like citizenship, they 
cease at the border. Hurling the ultimate judicial epithet, Scalia refers to Kennedy’s 
invocation of global consciousness and community as dicta, language in an opinion that has 
no bearing on stare decisis—an illustrative story or anecdote, for example. Scalia sees 
Kennedy’s discussion of international law and global norms as not only “meaningless dicta” 
but—“dangerous.” The ante is upped, to his mind. He quotes a 2002 concurring opinion by 
Clarence Thomas for the proposition that “this Court … should not impose foreign moods, 
fads, or fashions on Americans.”510 
The frenzy aroused by Kennedy’s few international references in Lawrence may seem 
irrational to those not familiar with the longstanding conservative distrust of multilateralism 
or the sense of American exceptionalism vital to Ronald Reagan’s “shining city on a hill” 
articulated in the legal world by Meese and others in their Founding Fathers-centric version 
of originalism. Combined with the anti-European mood on the right in the wake of the 
invasion of Iraq, Scalia’s denunciation of Kennedy in Lawrence took on the status of a battle 
royal functioning synechdocally for broader New Sovereigntist doctrine. For the coalition of 
the legal Right, Lawrence is a perfect legal storm, providing something for both the 
libertarian formalists and social conservative majoritarians to hate. For formalists, rules about 
 
510 539 U.S. 558, 598, citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002). Mark Tushnet, a rather mellowed 
CLS veteran by 2006, responded with a critical distinction: “the recent invocations of non-U.S. law in Supreme 
Court opinions are references, not uses.” Symposium “Outsourcing Authority,” Albany Law Review 69 (2006), 
809. The distinction is perhaps a slippery one. See also Mark Tushnet, “Transnational/Domestic Constitutional 
law.” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 37 (2003). See also Rossum, Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence, 48-50. 
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judicial authority must have textualist or originalist underpinnings—clearly, European courts 
and global norms do not fit this bill. Social conservatives were additionally outraged by the 
case’s outcome: an apparent declaration of the right to homosexual sodomy under the general 
doctrine of the right to privacy. 
At this point I will move into a more theoretical mode, considering the work of a 
scholar and politician who might be thought of as a forbear to the New Sovereigntists—his 
repugnant ties to Nazi Germany notwithstanding. To invoke Grossberg’s dictum once more: 
Ideas are not responsible for the people who have them. 
 
Meet Mr. Schmitt  
 Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was among Europe’s preeminent jurists before his  
reputation was undone by collaboration with Hitler’s régime. In recent years, however, his 
works have been revisited by theorists on the liberal left interested in exploring the concepts 
of politics, identity, and the state.511 In thinking about the with-us-or-against-us nature of 
Bush’s foreign policy, it is interesting to consider the implications of his seminal work The 
Concept of the Political (1932).  
Schmitt argues here that the key notion in all politics is the distinction between friend 
and enemy—and the inevitable confrontation between the two. Without this distinction, he 
argues, there is no politics.512 “The friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their 
concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols,” Schmitt writes, “not mixed and 
 
511 See, e.g., Chantal Mouffe, ed., The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 1999); David 
Dyzenhaus, ed., Law As Politics: Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1989). 
512 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 [1932]), 26, 
35, 57 (emphasis added). 
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weakened by economic, moral, and other conceptions.”513 The notion that nations might 
build alliances based upon common interests, central to post-World War I Wilsonian 
utopianism, was in the crosshairs—and under one reading, Schmitt ultimately can be seen as 
having been correct. The League of Nations failed and World War II ensued.  
Schmitt’s politics is not only grounded in polar oppositions but suggests that all 
aspects of social life are inherently political. “Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or 
other antithesis transforms into a political one,” he writes, “if it is sufficiently strong to group 
human beings effectively according to friend and enemy.”514 Human community and identity 
are indelibly and inevitably intertwined with the friend/enemy distinction. 
For Schmitt as for the New Sovereigntists, sovereignty cannot exist without borders 
and states cannot exist without absolute sovereignty. “The concept of the state presupposes 
the concept of the political,” is the opening sentence of The Concept of the Political.515 The 
political power of naming the other, the enemy to be confronted,516 is the most essential 
power of all, the most “decisive.”517 Decisive because it determines the alignment of political 
and social existence on the globe, what Schmitt would much later describe in his essays on 
the “Nomos of the Earth.”518 As neatly summarized by political critic Tomislav Sunic, 
 
513 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 17-28. 
514 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 37. 
515 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 19. 
516 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 37. 
517 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 43-44. 
518 Carl Schmitt, “The New Nomos of the Earth,” in Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus 
Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2003), 351-355 (“First, nomos means Nahme [appropriation]; 
second, it also means division and distribution of what is taken; and third, utilization, management, and usage of 
what has been obtained as a result of the division, i.e., production and consumption. Appropriation, distribution, 
and production are the primal processes of human history, three ask of the primal drama.” Schmitt, Nomos,
351.) 
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Schmitt warns that “the process of depoliticization, undertaken by both Marxists and liberals 
in an effort to create a war-free world, is a dangerous liberal illusion that runs counter to 
human historical development. Human history in its entirety is primarily a history of 
perpetual struggle…the ocean of wars in the parentheses of peace.”519 
For conservatives the Cold War fit this model perfectly: a world divided into friends 
and enemies, of states locked in an intransigent ideological and military struggle just one 
provocation away from obliterating war. “That the state is an entity and in fact the decisive 
entity rests upon its political character,” he writes.520 For Schmitt, war is necessarily 
involved. A worthy successor to his countrymen Bismarck and Carl von Clausewitz, Schmitt 
argues not only that war is a continuation of politics by other means but that politics without 
war is meaningless. 
For Schmitt, war “underlies every political idea”521—not only for Clausewitz’s 
practical reasons, but due to a finer intellectual point: politics always necessarily implicates 
war.522 A world without war is a world without politics,523 a world without states.524 It is a 
world reimagined and reshaped under the terms of a false generic  “humanity” that eliminates 
necessarily different interests and unavoidable conflict in favor of an imperial, leveling 
liberal economism, Schmitt argues.525 And recall here the conservative rejection of the 
egalitarian principles of the French Revolution and even of Jefferson’s “All men created 
 
519 Sunic, Against Democracy and Equality, 57. 
520 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 44. 
521 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 35. 
522 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 33-34. 
523 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 35. 
524 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 55. 
525 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 54-55. 
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equal.” We are not, say the conservatives: It follows that our states are not, as they exist to 
protect of distinct interests which must necessarily differ across the globe.  
Schmitt’s ideas not only illuminate conservative New Sovereignty—they also begin 
to strangely dovetail with contemporary leftist critiques of globalization, such as the 
anonymous omnivorous corporate leviathan depicted in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s 
Empire.526 Hardt and Negri gained a surprise bestseller with their 2001 book, part philosophy 
and part leftist economic manifesto. Schmitt too saw a looming hegemonic, economic nomos 
as something to be feared. But Schmitt is no leftist, and he focuses on political relations 
rather than economic ones. In a utopian world of liberal economic humanity, a world without 
states and without others, without difference, Schmitt asks: “For what would men be 
free?”527 I have found no evidence that Richard Weaver ever read Carl Schmitt, but recall 
that conservative Southern rhetorician’s similar pronouncement about equality: “Where 
egalitarianism obtains, no one knows where he belongs.”528 Bereft of nations, bereft of 
identity, bereft of order, there can be no society, be it local or global. 
Schmitt argues for the viability of nationhood and the friend/enemy distinction as a 
means to preserving these things and against liberalism as a recipe for their demise. Conflict, 
he says, must be accepted as the necessary condition for survival. “[L]iberal concepts 
typically move between ethics (intellectuality) and economics (trade),” Schmitt writes.529 
526 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
201, 360 (“[T]he Imperial sovereignty…is organized not around one central conflict but rather through a 
flexible network of microconflicts. The contradictions of Imperial society are elusive, proliferating, and 
nonlocalizable…the concept that defines Imperial sovereignty might be omni-crisis…the royal prerogatives of 
Imperial government, its monopoly over the bomb, money, and the communicative ether, are merely destructive 
capacities and thus powers of negation.”). 
527 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 57-58. 
528 Supra, note xx [210]. 
529 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 71. 
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“From this polarity they attempt to annihilate the political as a domain of conquering power 
and repression…instead of a clear distinction between the two different states, that of war 
and that of peace, there appears the dynamic of perpetual competition and perpetual 
discussion. The state turns into society.”530 Here one is reminded of Margaret Thatcher’s 
famous dictum, itself a distillation of Friedrich Hayek’s anti-statist individualism: “There’s 
no such thing [as society]; there are individual men and women and there are families.”531 
“Everywhere in political history,” Schmitt writes, “in foreign as well as domestic 
politics, the incapacity or the unwillingness to make this distinction [friend/enemy] is a 
symptom of the political end.”532 The state, possessing the decisive power of war—the jus 
belli—must act politically to preserve internal peace and defend against foreign enemies.533 
The morass of liberal humanism, with its reliance on supranational institutions (the Holy 
Roman Empire; the League of Nations; the United Nations) and its whitewashing of the 
friend/enemy distinction—all of these are one more iteration of a similar impulse: an 
abdication of politics ultimately destructive of the people’s “way of life” and “own form of 
existence.”534 
I have just as little reason to believe that John Bolton has studied Schmitt as I do 
Richard Weaver, but Schmitt’s arguments provide a useful analytic for understanding the 
 
530 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 71-72 (emphasis added), 28 (“In the domain of economics 
there are no enemies, only competitors, and in a thoroughly moral and ethical world perhaps only debating 
adversaries”). 
531 Douglas Keay, “Aids, Education, and the Year 2000” (interview with Margaret Thatcher), Women’s 
Own, Sept. 23, 1987, 8. 
532 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 68. 
533 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 45-46. 
534 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 27. A comment of Etienne Balibar’s is relevant here: that 
“Schmitt keeps running up against the fact that while the states can be personified as a subject, the people 
cannot be” (Balibar, Etienne. We, The People of Europe? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 140. 
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implications and rhetorical posture of the New Sovereignty school that led this nation to war 
in Iraq and continues to dominate foreign policy in Republican circles (though failure in Iraq 
is threatening to change this). What’s more, the Schmittian connection points to one more 
intellectual vulnerability in the structures of conservative legal thought: that a movement so 
elementally grounded in a rejection of New Deal realism has so much in common with the 
philosophical Realpolitik of Carl Schmitt.  
 
Mr. Schmitt Goes to Washington 
 For decades, conservatives have grounded their arguments in patriotism, American 
exceptionalism, and mistrust of internationalism. This network of issues presented a problem 
as early as 1948 when “Mr. Conservative,” Ohio Senator Robert Taft, challenged Dwight 
Eisenhower over joining NATO. It presented a similar dilemma for Bill Buckley and his 
crew at National Review when they took the step to part ways with the anti-United Nations 
John Birch Society.  
The anti-U.N. argument persists today—what could better embody Schmitt’s feared 
elimination of the friend/enemy distinction?—and Bolton was frequently criticized precisely 
because he was a critic of the organization Bush appointed him to as a representative. He was 
joined by many other conservatives (not all “neo”) as well as his teacher Robert Bork, who 
has directly attacked not only the U.N. as such but international law in general. For Bork, 
international law and United Nations resolutions are fundamentally illegitimate, having no 
domestic popular genesis, no direct connection to the expression of the views of the peoples’ 
representatives.535 Outnumbered in a chamber where the smallest and least legitimate 
 
535 Robert H. Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges (Washington: AEI Press, 2003), 
18-21. 
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governments are represented on a one-to-one basis with the United States, Americans’ 
interests have no chance at reaching a fair outcome.536 “It is not just that the United Nations 
is useless,” Bork declares, “it is, in fact, almost entirely detrimental to the interests of the 
United States.”537 
Hostility to the United Nations and to international law in general is no longer the 
result of Birch Society conspiracy theories or defiant isolationism, as one might more easily 
have assumed fifty years ago. Bork’s dismissals are echoed in academia by Professor Rabkin 
and others including Federalist founder Steven Calabresi, whose recent work is focused on 
defending American exceptionalism. The Federalist Society has been home to debates over 
sovereignty and international law since its inception in an era when the conservative Cold 
War ethos promoted a stark friend/enemy barrier. The “war on terror” is a rather unwieldy 
successor, despite the Bush administration’s rhetorical efforts to relate the two. Bush’s 
mishandling of the Iraq conflict as well as its broad assertions of executive authority have 
chipped away at conservative support, however, estranging libertarians, fiscal conservatives, 
and old-guard Goldwaterites alike. Though many Federalists are now outwardly opposed to 
Bush’s foreign policy and its domestic implications, such as wiretapping, the sovereignty 
argument has remained a vibrant one. And with some scattered exceptions, it remains a point 
of Federalist unity.538 
536 The U.N. representation scheme mirrors the U.S. Senate, where every state, regardless of 
population, has two seats. There is, however, no balancing chamber, no U.N. House of Representatives where 
states are represented proportionally. The Security Council acts in some ways as a check on the General 
Assembly, but is more analogous to the American Executive Branch—though Security Council members cannot 
veto a G.A. resolution, only measures internal to the Council. 
537 Bork, Coercing Virtue, 49. 
538 For example, paleo-conservative Richard Viguerie, whose pedigree dates back to the Goldwater 
campaign, is both a fierce Bolton defender and a vigorous Bush critic; his memoir’s title says it all: 
Conservatives Betrayed. (esp. Chap. 12, “Standing up for the U.S. in a Dangerous World.”). 
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* * *
Addressing the Federalist Society’s national lawyers convention in 2003, former 
Boston University School of Law Dean Ronald Cass described the relationship of American 
sovereignty to international law as a combination of “one term that no one can define with 
another term that virtually no one believes in.539 The line surely received a chuckle, but 
Cass’s sarcasm belies the seriousness with which conservatives have addressed sovereignty 
and its implications as a fundamental theory underlying the aggressive policies of the Bush 
administration.  
At a 2004 conference on “War, International Law, and Sovereignty,” Rabkin began 
his presentation with a definition of sovereignty remarkably in line with Schmitt’s ideas. 
Rabkin was at the time completing his book The Case for Sovereignty: Why the World 
Should Welcome American Independence (published by AEI) and his remarks represent a 
succinct version of his argument. The AEI connection is notable not only because that think 
tank has become known as a bastion of neoconservative thought but also because of the 
ideological and communications apparatus the institute commands—recall our consideration 
of the way Washington think tanks have helped disseminate and popularize the conservative 
argument against Affirmative Action.  
Speaking to the Federalists Rabkin declared that “The reasonable understanding of 
sovereignty is that it is not about governance, it’s about government, and government is 
 
539 Ronald Cass, Introduction of Hon. John Bolton, 2003 Federalist Society National Lawyers 
Convention. Available at http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/bolton.pdf (last accessed April 15, 2007). 
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about force,” Rabkin said. “That is what  government is, force, coercion.”540 This “sober”541 
view, he tells us, is about certain first principles—what a state is, what a constitution is, and 
what law is. The choice to characterize his view as “sober” is a typical rhetorical move in the 
classical realist vein, as we have seen from Hariman’s critique. 
“A law which has no means of enforcement, a law which has no penalty attached, is 
not a law,” Rabkin argues, citing Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers.542 This 
argument imagines law in a wholly Schmittian manner: law as coercion, the force of the 
nomos which shapes and re-forms the boundaries between nations and persons. It aligns with 
leftist cultural theorist Etienne Balibar’s view of Schmitt, that “sovereignty is always 
established upon a border and is primarily exercised in the imposition of borders.”543 For the 
New Sovereigntists, good fences make good neighbors, even on the international scale. 
Sovereignty is “a way of promoting peace by establishing borders,” Rabkin writes.544 
In his Federalist Society remarks Rabkin goes on to relate his concept of law as 
coercion to constitutionality as law. “If we need force, who controls the force?” he asks. “We 
have a constitution precisely to define who gets to use force, [and] when. That’s what a 
constitution is.”545 Absent from his constitutional scheme is any notion of shared social 
identity or values, what communication scholars like James Boyd White call constitutive 
 
540 Jeremy Rabkin, “War, International Law, and Sovereignty.” American Enterprise Institute 
conference transcript, June 24, 2004. http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.843/transcript.asp (accessed 
April 15, 2007); see also Rabkin, The Case for Sovereignty, 14-15. 
541 Rabkin, “War, International Law, and Sovereignty.” 
542 Rabkin, “War, International Law, and Sovereignty.” 
543 Balibar, We the People of Europe?, 140.  
544 Rabkin, The Case for Sovereignty, 19. 
545 Rabkin, “War, International Law, and Sovereignty.” 
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rhetoric; what Jefferson Powell views as a political community “built on words”; what 
Sanford Levinson sees as a civic constitutional faith. For Rabkin, as for Schmitt, these ideas 
are decidedly secondary. As constituted by law the sovereign power, the fundamental 
political power, is about force and ultimately war. What is constituted, for Rabkin, “is a 
scheme of government which determines when and where and how force will be applied… 
sovereignty is fundamentally about constituting the exercise of force.”546 American 
sovereignty, the argument proceeds, is dependent upon our freedom to exercise force with or 
without the support of other sovereign states. As he writes in The Case for Sovereignty,
At its most basic level, sovereignty is an inherently limiting principle. 
A sovereign state rules here—and not there. What is done “there”—in another 
country—may be an example for “us,” or a dreadful counterexample. In the 
meantime, sovereignty allows people “here” to resolve their differences by 
focusing attention on what is needed to improve things “here”—in the here 
and now, where our actual political community operates.547 
For both Rabkin and Schmitt, the true notion of sovereignty and law as force has been 
dangerously obscured by liberal abstractions of global governance and egalitarian 
humanism—linking up to our earlier examination of equality in the context of American 
racism. Rabkin tells us that “delusions” of abstraction “were particularly powerful in the 
nineties when everybody talked about global governance.”548 This notion of global 
governance puts trust and authority in the United Nations and other supranational bodies 
such as the European Union. Rabkin will have none of this. None of its “egalitarian passion,” 
 
546 Rabkin, “War, International Law, and Sovereignty.” 
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its “socialist moralizing applied to international relations,” its claim that “Every country is 
equal, every country should be equal. Therefore, all of us need to be consulted.”549 
For Rabkin as for Schmitt, this is a kind of humanitarian “mysticism”550 denying self-
interest and the essence of politics, the enemy/friend distinction. When it comes to the use of 
force against the enemy, “No serious government is going to allow the answer to be 
determined by foreigners who don't care or don’t care as much about that country is the 
country itself,” Rabkin says.551 Self-interest is here defined as the sovereign power to 
determine who the enemy is—the political power, in Schmitt’s sense. The argument in favor 
of the Bush administration’s preemption doctrine and general disdain for the United Nations 
flows logically from this position. 
 
In the history of movement conservatism, as we saw in Chapter One, the specter of 
isolationists and United Nations conspiracy theorists has loomed long and large. To be sure, 
Know-Nothing conspiracy types are still seen among the ranks of the GOP faithful (and at 
Federalist conventions). When does legitimate opposition to U.N. corruption, inefficacy, and 
moral repugnance, as in the infamous Zionism-is-racism resolution,552 become jingoistic 
nationalism?  
The question is complicated by Rabkin’s heated rhetoric just as it is by the more 
media savvy Fox News reporter Eric Shawn, author of the fantastically polemic 300-page 
 
549 Rabkin, “War, International Law, and Sovereignty.” 
550 Rabkin, “War, International Law, and Sovereignty.” 
551 Rabkin, “War, International Law, and Sovereignty.” 
552 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted Nov. 10, 1975; repealed by Resolution 
46/86 on Dec. 16, 1991. 
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screed The U.N. Exposed: How the United Nations Sabotages America’s Security.553 
Shawn’s case is not subtle. “I am disgusted by the fact that the altruistic efforts of so many 
U.N. staff members are undercut by the greed, corruption, and ineptitude of the bureaucracy 
they serve,” he writes.554 Under this view, the corrupt U.N. was actually supporting 
America’s “enemies” in Iraq and elsewhere.555 Not only was American sovereignty 
compromised, but our interests were as well. 
Sovereignty as constituted by law is thus not about community in the sense of some 
global forum like the League of Nations or the U.N; it comes before these things and should 
not be confused with them. “It’s not the sum of either human happiness or political 
understanding,” Rabkin says, “but it’s the precondition for human happiness and also for 
political understanding both at home and abroad.”556 It is the ur-concept, and it is 
fundamentally about war, force, and determining the nature of our enemies—and it must not 
be ceded to some other power, lest law itself be abandoned. “The political enemy need not be 
morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may 
even be advantageous to engage in business transactions,” Schmitt wrote decades ago.557 
“But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger558…what always matters is only the 
possibility of conflict.”559 “Security,” in our modern sense, could be theorized this way: the 
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threat of war, which would necessarily be diminished should a consensus of other sovereigns 
be required for its execution. 
 Speaking in 2003, then-Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security Bolton addressed the Federalists’ national lawyers convention on these same issues. 
Bolton was at this point already known as an aggressive defender of the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy560 whose confrontational rhetoric had even prompted 
propagandistic responses from the Kim Jong Il régime in North Korea.561 “The decision to 
use military force is the most important decision that any nation-state faces,” Bolton told the 
Federalists, employing somewhat more nuanced language than Rabkin.562 “Limiting these 
decisions or transferring them to another source of authority is ultimately central to a 
diminution of sovereignty.”563 
The key for Bolton here is authority and from whence it derives. To be sovereign is to 
possess this authority, the war-making authority. Regarding the U.S. action against Iraq, 
Bolton goes on to say that authority rested in the president in light of the October 17, 2002 
congressional resolution which authorized the use of force.564 And the legitimacy of this 
authority derives from our constitutional system. “We should not shrink from the debates on 
legitimacy to disarm the Iraqi régime under the Constitution,” he says.565 Going on to 
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identify the issue as “a fundamental problem of Democratic theory,” Bolton argues, “we 
should not shrink from the debates on legitimacy through concern that following our own 
constitutional procedures on the use of force is somehow not enough to justify our 
actions.”566 Not doing so, he warns, “will result over time in the atrophying of our ability to 
act independently.” Mr. Schmitt has come to Washington: Surrendering the power to 
determine who the enemy is and to wage war against them is to surrender the political power, 
and with it sovereignty is sacrificed. 
 
* * *
In laying out his theoretical justification for the use of force against Iraq as a 
component of the larger Bush administration policy of preemption, Bolton makes an 
interesting detour outside the realm of Constitutional law. As Abraham Lincoln did when 
addressing the question of federal authority over the sovereign states,567 Bolton looks to the 
Declaration of Independence as an authority on questions of legitimacy, as distinguished 
from what he calls “actual political power or political impact.”568 “One can certainly have 
legitimacy without power, and vice versa,” he adds, and “for Americans, the basis of 
legitimacy for government is spelled out in the Declaration of Independence.”569 
The key concept from the Declaration (an extra-Constitutional source, we should 
remember) is that the just powers of government are derived from the consent of the 
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governed. For Bolton, this “fundamental precondition for understanding the use of any 
governmental power” has been “fundamentally misunderstood in the U.N. system.”570 Again 
he returns to the question of authority and finds that the problem lies in the perception that 
“international law does not derive directly from the consent of the governed.”571 The layers 
of representation inherent in a multinational body where states are represented equally—
Rabkin’s “egalitarian passion”—makes direct, populist “consent of the governed” 
impossible. As another Federalist Society contributor has pointed out, all international 
agreements involve a decision on whether the benefits accrued outweigh the tradeoffs in 
sovereign authority.572 The implications for sovereignty in a tradeoff with the United Nations 
are, for most Federalist conservatives, both unacceptable and unconstitutional.  
 Aside from Iraq and questions over whether the United States acted improperly in 
exercising its sovereign power to invade that nation, Bolton also cites Bush’s opposition to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a case where “legitimacy” was the driving factor in 
policy formation.573 Bolton showed no qualms in resurrecting Stephen Douglas’s old 
warhorse of “popular sovereignty,”574—the ICC not only runs contrary to this “fundamental 
American precept and basic constitutional principle,” but also to the notion of checks and 
balances and “national independence,” a fuzzier idea he leaves unexplored in the remainder 
of his address.575 The exceptions to the ICC treaty prohibiting the handing over of American 
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citizens to the international tribunal are presented by Bolton in starkly Schmittian terms: they 
serve to prevent the enemy from launching illegitimate, politically motivated prosecutions 
against American nationals. The surrender of authority and loss of legitimacy inherent in a 
supranational institution such as the ICC is a surrender of the political power—deciding who 
the enemy is and how they will be treated. Surrender that power and one has surrendered 
everything. “A basic right of any representative government [is] to protect its citizens from 
the exercise of arbitrary power,” he tells us.  
For Bolton and other conservatives, the chain of representational authority and 
legitimacy can only extend so far. If not contemplated explicitly by the Constitution or in the 
Declaration, legitimacy and legality are called into question. Rabkin, for example, refers to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—a treaty traditionally praised by human rights 
activists around the globe—as less of a legal pronouncement than a call to prayer. “One 
could say, with only slight exaggeration, that instead of an international regulatory authority, 
or a serious treaty structure, the human rights conventions sought to found a new church,” 
Rabkin writes. “The conventions appealed to the faithful to believe.”576 And for Rabkin this 
is a false church. After all, the U.N. is singularly ineffective in enforcing its resolutions, from 
Rwanda to Darfur to Iraq, conservatives are quick to point out. 
 
* * *
Bolton’s then-colleague Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State for Global 
Affairs, amplified many of his themes at that 2003 Federalist convention. After first calling 
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sovereignty “the basis of our freedom,”577 she repeated Bolton’s consent-of-the-governed 
theme. After leaving the Bush administration, in fact, Bolton broke publicly with the GOP 
party line, attacking Bush’s concessions to the North Koreans in ongoing negotiations over 
Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuits. The concessions were viewed by some as further evidence of 
the waning influence of the AEI neo-cons, but also the product of political pressures brought 
on by the November, 2006 elections and Bush’s plummeting poll numbers.578 
In an interesting rhetorical move, Dobriansky in 2003 conflated comparison of North 
and South Korea with the embrace or rejection of globalization—defined as “the increasingly 
free flow of ideas, information, goods, capital, and people across borders and around the 
globe,” which, she says, is an overall “positive development” that “entails more freedom and 
opportunity for people in every country.”579 The comparison of North Korea and South 
Korea is indicative of the ideological work going on in this rhetorical production: “Free 
flow” of ideas, capital, and people (an interesting notion, given the uproar over illegal 
immigration) is linked with the capitalist South where “the people are sovereign.” Isolation, 
repression, and “estrangement from the international community” are linked to the dictatorial 
North, where the people’s “rightful sovereignty has been usurped.”580 There the dictator is 
sovereign in the royal sense alone. 
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The sovereignty of the people, she says, is “real” sovereignty.581 As with Rabkin, who 
talked not of the conception of law or the conception of a constitution but of what law is and 
what a constitution is, Dobriansky speaks in an assertively realist voice—a voice of sureness, 
certainty, and fixity. As Hariman argued, realism is a master trope: a mode of argument 
which presents itself as eschewing argument altogether. It is not the way things can be seen 
but the way things are.582 
“Our sovereignty rests always with the American people,” Dobriansky says, “and 
never with a foreign government or international organization.”583 The pairing of these 
alternatives presents an interesting strategy: opposition to “ceding authority to the U.N.” is a 
common refrain among many on the right, but certainly no one, on the left or otherwise, has 
ever suggested that the United States should cede authority to some other foreign 
government. Equating the United Nations, a transnational membership organization to which 
the United States has treaty obligations, with a “foreign government” is a rhetorical ploy 
clearly meant to analogize an organization with the states who are its members. But with the 
United States only one member state among many (the one-state, one-vote representation 
scheme) this argument has some resonance. 
Dobriansky acknowledges that at times certain policy goals “may require the United 
States to collaborate with multilateral organizations and even be bound by decisions made by 
others”—again carefully gauging her argument so as to marginalize the obligations already 
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incumbent upon the United States as a signatory to the United Nations Charter.584 Instead she 
frames the notion of national decision-making with the rhetoric of a Lockean tabula rasa 
where cooperation with multinational or supranational organizations “may be required.” 
Even this, she says, “understandably gives rise to the concern that American sovereignty is 
being undermined.”585 Dobriansky emphasizes a critical factor into these considerations of 
sovereignty: The key reason to fear the “undermining” of American sovereignty is that 
“foreign interests that do not necessarily share our values will gain influence and power over 
us.”586 Values matter, as do traditions and cultures and identities—and these are best 
defended (and defined) within boundaries.  
Sounding very much like Robert Bork in his popular sovereignty mode, Pepperdine 
Law School professor David Davenport echoes this theme in a recent book. “State 
sovereignty protects national self-determination and cultural diversity,” he writes, “allowing 
people to keep historical languages and customs.”587 Another group of New Sovereigntists 
put it this was in a 2007 article: “Sovereignty implies that every state has the right to order its 
own preferences,” “their rights to cultural integrity, national dignity, and religious 
freedom.”588 
So, I would ask, what are the values identified by Dobriansky and these other New 
Sovereigntists? Independence, certainly—whether as established by the Declaration of, or 
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not. Independence must be the watchword, Dobriansky says, when considering our 
collaborations in interactions with “other nations and multilateral bodies.”589 For Rabkin, in 
his Schmittian vein, independence means the ability to declare the enemy and wage war 
against him is the most essential value—the ability to preserve one’s own existence against 
the threat of destruction and violence from outside; the right to determine one’s own self-
interest. Bork put the point succinctly in 2004: “There is no possibility of democratic 
accountability in international organizations.” Connecting political sovereignty and moral 
self-determination he concludes that the problems of international law are directly connected 
to what libertarians deride as “majoritarianism,” as we have seen before. “There is not 
enough agreement on morals among the various cultures of the world to support an 
international law of human rights,” Bork concludes.590 
American Exceptionalism and the New Sovereignty 
For many conservatives and New Sovereigntists self-determination is deeply 
intertwined with a sense of American Exceptionalism that relates specifically to matters we 
have discussed earlier. Attorney General Edwin Meese’s originalism venerates the Founders 
and privileges their views, creating a utopian and triumphalist history; Scalia’s textualism 
flows from this view because the Constitution was the Founders’ own; Bork’s populism is 
rooted in a moralistic common sense that he argues the American people inherently 
possess—as opposed to nattering nabob elitists. These strands of thought come together in 
the American Exceptionalism boldly defended by Federalist founder Steven Calabresi in 
 
589 Dobriansky, “Address to the Federalist Society,” 15. 
590 Robert Bork, “Address to Rome Conference on International Law, Democratic Accountability, and 
Moral Diversity,” June 13, 2004.  
309
what is probably his most culturally provocative work, sure to be the centerpiece of the 
Federalists’ 2007 national convention, which takes Exceptionalism as its theme. “Not only do 
Americans think of the United States as an exceptional country,” Calabresi writes in his most 
recent article, “but it has actually become an exceptional country.”591 Citing an extensive 
body of literature from various disciplines Calabresi argues that “Americans are much more 
individualistic, libertarian, religious, patriotic, moralistic, and opposed to unions than are 
Canadians or Europeans.”592 We are an “outlier” nation, and we ought to be proud of it.593 
Calabresi, who had a hand in Meese’s Tulane speech and worked closely with other 
top Federalists in the Reagan administration, argues that American exceptionalism is tied 
directly to the alarm over Justice Anthony Kennedy’s citations in Lawrence and to 
internationalism in general. Calabresi reasons that since most Americans “think that the 
United States is an exceptional country that differs sharply from the rest of the world…it 
must have its own laws and Constitution.”594 Under this view, integrating non-American 
legal sources into our jurisprudence not only risks ceding authority but threatens our very 
identity. “This is why I think some conservatives responded to Justice Kennedy’s reliance on 
foreign law in Lawrence v. Texas by calling for his impeachment,” Calabresi concludes.595 
As one critic points out, the exceptionalism argument can cut both ways; there is no 
reason why touting American global leadership must lead necessarily toward a New 
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Sovereigntist position on international law. “A careful and measured sacrifice of sovereignty 
by acceding to reasonable agreements and norms, reciprocated by other nations, will 
strengthen the international legal system and the United States,” writes Christopher Linde. 
“The result could be the ultimate manifestation of American exceptionalism—the notion that 
the United States is destined for greatness—to be the superpower that benevolently accedes 
its own sovereignty for the good of the world.”596 Or as Mark Tushnet wrote after Lawrence,
“The language of sovereignty is misleading…it overlooks the fact that a sovereign nation can 
decide that its sovereign interests are advanced overall by making agreements with other 
nations that limit what it can otherwise do.”597 
As one more example of the diverse opinions within Federalist ranks, University of 
Virginia professor Robert Turner almost agrees with this critique.598 “I’m a strong believer in 
sovereignty,” said Turner, who has debated Bolton at past Federalist events and who co-
founded Virginia’s Center for National Security Law. But for Turner there is no contradiction 
between sovereignty and multilateralism, treaties, and the obligations they entail. “One of the 
fundamental attributes of international sovereignty is the ability to make agreements,” he told 
me, making comparisons between an individual’s right to contract with a bank for a 
mortgage on a home—an arrangement resulting in present benefits at the cost of future 
obligations. “When we ratify the U.N. charter,” Turner said, “we give up our right to launch 
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an aggressive war…if we say this is not a binding obligation on us, we can’t possibly argue it 
is a binding obligation on Kim Jong Il or Saddam Hussein.” Considering the varying views 
of the Founders on international law, Turner recalled a comment made to him by former 
Secretary of State George Schultz: skepticism of “entangling alliances” among some of the 
Founding generation599 must be considered in light of the fact that continental Europe was 
dominated at that time by monarchies, not democracies as it is today. In this light, for Turner, 
Justice Kennedy’s references in the Lawrence case are not as flabbergasting as Scalia claims. 
“Looking to civilized societies around the world to see how other people have addressed 
them may be a useful thing,” he said, “so long as they’re not pretending it’s precedent.” 
Turner, who has worked on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon, is also a combat 
veteran. “I’ve been to war twice,” he told me. “Our job as lawyers, as people who care about 
ethics and character,” he said, “is to try to make sure that our behavior on the battlefield is 
honorable and within the laws of armed combat.” Hence, for Turner, his opposition in the 
national media600 to the Bush administration’s apparent flaunting of international law 
regarding the treatment of enemy detainees and the use of procedures classified as torture 
under the Geneva Conventions—matters of moral authority, as he sees it. “We have done 
horrible damage to our country,” he said to me in a decidedly somber tone.  
Turner perceives in the brashness of the New Sovereigntists both hubris and a failure 
to learn from history. In contrast to the go-it-alone stance of the Bush administration he 
points to American policy following World War II, when the country had a monopoly on 
military power that included the atomic bomb. “We could have placed all sorts of demands 
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on the world,” Turner said. Instead, there followed the Marshall Plan, the rebuilding of 
Japan, billions of dollars in foreign aid, and an invitation to the United Nations to establish 
itself on American territory in New York City. “And the world said, my God, the Americans 
are different,” Turner said wistfully.  
 
* * *
Observing these legal and geopolitical tussles we would do well to keep ourselves 
attuned to the rhetorical work being done by the term sovereign. Who (or what), precisely, is 
represented by this term? A sovereign nation as such (Tushnet); a sovereign government that 
acts internationally as one nation among equals (Turner); a sovereign people whose 
representatives constitute a government beholden directly to their will (Dobriansky, Bork)? 
From citizen to representative to government to transnational governance—thus ascends the 
level of generality and accountability. With each step, the majoritarian warns, representation 
is diluted; authority is delegated and delegated and delegated until the delegator is erased 
from the political picture.  
Addressing the Federalist Society several years ago, Bolton’s United Nations 
predecessor John Negroponte spoke to this question. He made clear that the scale on which 
this self-interest would be calculated: a global one. A conservative and a lifelong diplomat, 
Negroponte interjects a somewhat different perspective to this discussion among those on the 
right: “the United States has global interests, and where our national security truly is in 
jeopardy, we cannot and will not defer to other states.” Our interests are global, in other 
words, so our sovereign power extends globally as well. Indeed, Negroponte says as much. 
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“This is not hegemony,” he says, “it’s sovereignty, perfectly in line with the precepts of the 
U.N. Charter itself.” It is a sovereignty with the reach of the nomos—strictly speaking, 
Negroponte’s terminological objections can be conceded while still identifying the United 
States, in this assertion of its “global interests,” as a hegemonic power exercising a 
hegemonic sovereignty. 
Negroponte here implies a view of the United Nations very much in harmony with the 
Bush administration’s views on sovereignty: The organization is a forum of sovereign states, 
not a sovereign actor. “It is an analytic mistake to think of the U.N. as an independent 
entity,” Negroponte tells us, “as separate and distinct from its members.”601 This distinction 
mirrors the common mistake of those on the left who mistake the Federalist Society as a 
speaker rather than a forum. 
As a pragmatist interested in the rhetorical significance to democracy on a global as 
well as a national scale, I think this a central point—and one of the best responses to the New 
Sovereigntists. Forums matter. Debate matters. Rather than become mired in the questions 
that preoccupy some Federalists—did Thomas Jefferson recognize the validity of something 
known as jus cogens, “customary international law”? Rather, I would suggest that the U.N. 
provides a unique opportunity for debate and discussion…just like the Federalist Society. To 
dismiss its validity is to invite the end of the one universally accepted global forum. This is 
not to apologize for its flaws or defend its institutional failures, nor to undermine efforts at 
reform. It is merely to recognize the practical value the U.N. provides, and suggest—to use 
some economic language—we try to maximize that value. In a recent film about the first Iraq 
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War, the actor playing CNN’s Baghdad producer puts it this way to Saddam’s information 
minister: “When we stop talking, we start shooting.”602 
That said, Negroponte repeats the primary legal-analytic error in the Bush 
administration’s justification for the use of force in Iraq: “the President decided that the 
Security Council's numerous resolutions directed at [Saddam’s] régime it must be 
enforced.”603 Responding to the similarly-worded provision in the October 17, 2002 
congressional resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, democratic California 
congressman Bob Filner put the point succinctly: “No nation can unilaterally decide to 
enforce the U.N.’s resolutions,” he said, “Only the U.N. has that power.”604 
Not under the New Sovereigntist view. A consistent theoretical and political 
perspective has emerged from their quarters over the past five years—and it does not 
necessarily correspond with the so-called “neoconservative” plans for remaking the Middle 
East. New Sovereigntists like Bolton and Rabkin move beyond Bismarckian Realpolitik 
toward a more expansive conception of state power rooted in popular sovereignty and 
answerable to no one (and no institution) other than the nation’s people. 
 Carl Schmitt’s theory of politics illuminates the views articulated by New 
Sovereigntists conservative thinkers and policymakers and provides an analytic tool for 
understanding their discourse as well as, perhaps, their actions.605 The confrontation that 
began on September 11, 2001 has made their actions relevant to the lives of millions of 
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people in this country and around the world. The wars we now wage represent, in a way, the 
bridge from their theory of sovereignty to its actual execution as force and as war. While the 
Federalist Society has not been responsible for these developments its has served as a forum 
for the incubation and diffusion of the ideas that have, as Richard Weaver wrote, had 
consequences.  
 With the advent of the Bush administration New Sovereignty became a realized 
theory, a melding of theory and practice into policy. Though opposition to the Bush War-on-
Terror narrative is growing, the sovereigntist argument remains dominant in conservative 
circles: an assertion of global power and the right to destroy an enemy. It is also the project 
of a legal realism which treats law and sovereignty as forms of coercion and force in the 
service of a sovereign people and its leader. “If the American citadel can be breached,” 
Bolton said in 2001, “advocates of binding international law will be well on the way toward 
the ultimate elimination of the ‘nation state’.”606 
As a closing note, it is worth remembering the place of “the people”—a term of art 
and very much an ideological construction—“deep rhetoric,” as we have seen in earlier 
discussions.607 “The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of 
a union or separation, as of an association or dissociation,” Schmitt wrote.608 The language of 
nation and of nationalism is a rhetorical production, and for the New Sovereigntists the 
Schmittian distinction is front and center. The intensity of opinion in America on issues 
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relating to the war on terror is due in part to the ways in which these particular theories of 
politics and sovereignty have been debated in the public sphere—and enacted through policy.  
Driven by a conservative ideology of sovereignty and law, America today is at work 
on a Schmittian political project which stands to remake the nomos of the earth. For the 
Federalists, this is item one on the agenda, and it’s no conspiracy: Just check their website. 
 
CONCLUSION 
RHETORIC AND CHANGE 
 
For fifty years conservatives have been working to change the political landscape in 
America. Their success has been indisputable. Not only did they capture the White House in 
1980 and hold it for 20 of the ensuing 28 years but they used their positions of power to 
reshape the terms of debate on all major policy issues—from the Cold War to social welfare 
to the role of the courts. In doing this they have fundamentally attacked the “common sense” 
of mainstream political discourse and policy. In the realm of the law—which in turn impacts 
society in all its complexity, from Affirmative Action to foreign policy—the Federalist 
Society has been their intellectual avant garde. They have pushed the liberal left into a 
defensive position and legitimized their own theories of constitutional interpretation. 
How has this attack manifested itself? Conservatives have turned “liberal activist 
judges” into a household phrase and vilified courts as “elitists” who “legislate from the 
bench.” Whatever the effects might be of George W. Bush’s big-government conservatism, a 
generation of Republican nominees is now moving into place in courtrooms and law firms 
across the nation. Bush may be the undoing of the Republicans’ hold on power, but he will 
not be the undoing of the conservative movement—at least not in its Federalist Society 
incarnation. In fact, with their enormous growth and increasingly broad reach across 
political, private sector, and educational institutions, the Federalists are poised to emerge as 
the epicenter of movement conservatism in a post-Bush world. 
318
What we have seen in the Federalist Society’s growth and success is a microcosm of 
how the broader conservative movement has gone about its project, of how the process of 
change is effected in both its persuasive and policy dimensions. Federalist conservatives have 
not just reframed questions: they have shifted and expanded the entire spectrum of ideas that 
provide the raw material for reframing. They have deligitimated old ideas and legitimated 
new ones.  
Founded by a small group of young conservatives enthralled by Ronald Reagan, the 
Federalists benefited from the social and political power of an established national 
movement. This existing network, and their diligence in building their own, made it 
possible—in Weaver’s phrase—for their ideas to have consequences. The popular language 
we use to talk about the law has changed. But so has the law itself. The Federalists’ 
intellectual project grew in tandem with the broader conservative movement, through the 
Reagan revolution and into the twenty-first century. As Tomislav Sunic writes, the right 
understands “that the source of political power must be preceded by socio-cultural action. 
Cultural power is the prerequisite of political power.”1 A trickle-down effect, one might even 
say. The Federalist project is a vital part of the right’s multidimensional social and political 
enterprise, focused as it is on the intellectual and interpretive challenges of law.  
 By serving as a forum for the generation and incubation of conservative legal thought 
the Federalist Society has provided an intellectual proving ground for lawyers, scholars, and 
law students. With chapters now active at all accredited law schools in the country the 
Society is widening its reach and providing a home for aspiring conservative lawyers, 
whether they seek to go into private practice, public service, or the judiciary. This is Leonard 
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Leo’s “pipeline”: an ever-expansive network that spreads conservative ideas and individuals. 
It is the engine that drives the boldest Federalist goal: changing legal culture.  
 Cultural change is a tall order. Cultures manifest themselves in myriad ways, some 
formal and some informal; some institutionalized and some the creature of tradition; some 
elite and some commonplace; some intellectual and some decidedly not. Conservatives have 
pursued all of these angles. “The nature of culture in general, and of legal culture as well, is 
that it is that which absorbs everything else,” Federalist president Meyer told me. 
Considering the impact the Society has had over the years, he pointed particularly to the 
increased presence on law school campuses—which the Federalist faithful continue to regard 
as the core of the organization. At the same time, high-profile conservatives like Bork and 
Scalia have contributed to the broader popular discourse outside of the ivory tower.  
With the “thrill of treason” dating back to the Goldwater campaign, the right has 
vigorously launched its attack on the status quo. The left has been slow to respond and must 
now confront the challenge of a dynamic opposition. The Federalist model embodies 
democracy but is ultimately concerned with a conservative political project;  The challenge 
for the ACS and the liberal legal academy in general is to meet the Federalists head on, to 
enact democratic exchange in service of its own legal mission—and to contest the right’s 
claims to historical integrity, guardianship over tradition and national sovereignty.  
I talked in the first chapter about the importance of “pushback” in democracy. The 
Federalists allow for this in their own organizational context, and for this they deserve 
commendation; they are enacting rhetorical democratic practice in an open and intellectually 
invigorating way. But the Federalists need pushback. And, it must be said, to trivialize their 
work as conspiratorial or non-intellectual or extremist or “fringe” is to abandon the 
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democratic obligation—Madison’s thesis in Federalist 10—that faction must be met by 
faction. It is not enough for the left to be represented on Federalist Society panels. We on the 
left must have our own forums where we hash out our own differences, agree on common 
goals, and—most important—engage our opponents on the right. We must learn from the 
right in this regard. We must learn from the Federalists. 
 
As I have shown, the Federalist Society functions effectively as a forum for debate 
and networking; it serves as a kind of engine, charging and revitalizing its members as they 
go about their work in the various tiers of  legal culture. Cultural power is the prerequisite of 
political power: Arguments can be won; candidates can be nominated; elections can be won; 
majorities can be realigned; judges appointed and precedents overturned. “It’s a harmonious 
circle,” John Fund said. “The more you win elections, the more judges you get to appoint.” 
With the Federalists pushing legal issues to the front of the political table, the actions of these 
judges—favorable and unfavorable—become decisive, leading to added political leverage. 
And to more electoral victories. Jack Balkin agrees: “Political agitation and social movement 
activism followed by successful elections and judicial appointments change constitutional 
common sense.”2 Common sense is the terrain of the political, the raw material of persuasion 
in an electoral democracy. Common sense defines who we are as a people: our expectations, 
our sense of justice and fairness, our shared identity, our values. As Federalist founder 
Steven Calabresi concludes in his recent article on American exceptionalism, “He who 
controls the interpretation of the Constitution controls the meaning of the American creed.”3
2 Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided,” 702. 
3 Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill,” 1397. 
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“We had to convince people that every issue that people care about begins and ends 
in the courts,” said Kay Daly, a communications consultant who has coordinated strategy for 
every Bush judicial nomination since he was elected. “This is an interlocking, interweaving 
project…the grass roots; the intelligentsia; the communications side; the political side,” she 
told me. The Federalists are integral to this broader, cultural project, not just because of their 
highly developed network, she said, but because of their focus on theory as well as practice. 
They provide “the legal anchor that keeps the message grounded, that keeps the message 
where it should be,” she told me. “If they weren’t there it could drift very easily…they are 
the touchstone, the guiding north star that is always there.” This connection between 
intellectual theory and politics is missing on the left. As one liberal law professor told me: 
There is indeed a vast resource of knowledge—and good argument—produced by liberal 
scholars in law and other disciplines, but “Rahm Emmanuel has no use for it.” Emmanuel 
heads the Democrats’ national campaign committee, and is seen as a primary architect of the 
2006 Congressional victory. He has no direct channel to the work of liberal scholars in law to 
parallel the Federalists. He has no pipeline. 
The ACS may be building one. In the meantime, the right forges ahead, reshaping 
political and legal common sense. Daly gave me a preview. She helped develop the rhetorical 
strategy opposing the Democratic filibusters of Bush’s first-term nominees, focusing on the 
idea of “fairness” and an “up or down vote.” (Never mind that the filibuster is fair under 
Senate rules.) Having claimed fairness as their own, she tells me that the next move may be 
to take ownership of “Constitutionalism”: You may like your Liberal Activist Judges with 
their Living Constitutions, but I like my conservative ones with their…Constitutionalism.
Imagine that—sure, liberals are entitled to their view of Constitutional law. Those views just 
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aren’t—Constitutional. This is the gambit she is contemplating. “My job is to do everything I 
can to make sure Constitutionalist judges are put on the courts,” she said as if rehearsing the 
line. The phrase implies an opposite: My Constitutionalists—opposed to your non-
Constitutionalists. Sounds impossible? Just ask Howard Dean, or Al Gore, or John Kerry, or 
Michael Dukakis why liberals don’t call themselves liberals anymore. 
Will it work? Time will tell. What we do know, though, is that movement 
conservatives, and Federalists in particular, understand the way rhetoric works. They 
understand the importance of audience; they understand, with my old boss Frank Luntz, that 
“it’s not what you say, it’s what people hear.” The idea is as old as the profession of rhetoric 
itself, as old as the Greek and Roman ancients like Cicero who argued for a broad 
understanding of human perception, persuasion, and change. “That is the magic,” Kay Daly 
told me. “That is the golden door.” 
As rhetoricians we ask our audiences to follow us there, to pass through the door and 
walk with us. But Daly knows, as all persuaders (and lawyers) do, that walking through the 
door involves choice—and we can always build a second door. The golden door is not owned 
by the right. But the left must rise to the challenge, meeting the right’s  arguments head on. 
They must open a door of their own. 
323
REFERENCES 
Aitken, Jonathan. 1993. Richard Nixon: A Life. Washington: Regnery. 
 
American Conservative Union. 1970. The Nixon Welfare Plan: Solution or Socialism? 
Washington D.C. 
 
American Conservative Union. The American Conservative Union: A History. 
http://www.conservative.org/about/history01.asp. 
 
Amsterdam, Anthony G. and Jerome Bruner. 1990. Minding the Law: How Courts Rely on 
Storytelling, and How Their Stories Change the Ways We Understand the Law—and 
Ourselves. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Andrew III, John A. 1997. The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and 
the Rise of Conservative Politics. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Aune, James Arnt. 2001. Selling the Free Market: The Rhetoric of Economic Correctness.
New York: Guilford. 
 
Etienne, Balibar. 2004. We, The People of Europe? Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Balkin, Jack. 2005. Wrong the Day It Was Decided: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism. 
Boston University Law Review 85: 677-724. 
 
Balkin, Jack. 2005. Deconstruction’s Legal Career. Cardozo Law Review 27: 719-740. 
 
Balkin, Jack, ed., 2001. What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said: The Nation’s 
Top Legal Experts Rewrite America’s Landmark Civil Rights Decision. New York: New 
York University Press. 
 
Balkin, Jack. 1993. Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning. Connecticut Law 
Review 25: 869-891. 
 
Barenboim, Daniel and Edward M. Said. 2002. Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in 
Music and Society. New York: Pantheon. 
 
Bell, Daniel. 2001 [1964]. The Radical Right. New York: Doubleday. 
 
Bennett, William J. 2003. Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism.
Washington, D.C.: Regnery. 
 
Bennett, William J. 1993. The Conservative Virtues of Dr. Martin Luther King. Washington, 
D.C., Nov. 5. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AmericanFoundingandHistory/HL481.cfm. 
 
Bolt, Robert. 1990 [1960]. A Man for All Seasons. New York: Random House. 
324
Bolton, John. 2003. Address to the Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention. 
Washington, D.C., Nov. 13. http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070324_bolton.pdf. 
 
Bolton, John R. 2001. The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from 
America’s Perspective. Law and Contemporary Problems 64: 167-180. 
 
Bork, Robert H. 2004. Address to Rome Conference on International Law, Democratic 
Accountability, and Moral Diversity. June 13. 
 
Bork. Robert H. 2003. Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges. Washington: AEI 
Press. 
 
Bork, Robert H. 2003. Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American 
Decline. New York: Regan/HarperCollins. 
 
Bork, Robert H. 1999. Thomas More for Our Season. First Things 94 (1999): 17-21. 
 
Bork, Robert H. 1990. The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law. New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Bork, Robert H. 1971. Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems. Indiana 
Law Journal 47 (1971): 1-35. 
 
Boyle, James, ed. 1992. Critical Legal Studies. New York: NYU Press. 
 
Brennan Jr., William J. 1988. The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification. In Interpreting Law as Literature, ed. Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux, 
13-24. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Brest, Paul. 1988. The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding. In Interpreting Law 
as Literature, ed. Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux, 69-96. Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press. 
 
Breyer, Stephen. 2006. Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution. New York: 
Vintage. 
 
Brown, Rebecca. 1993. Tradition and Insight. Yale Law Journal  103: 177-222. 
 
Browne, Charles E. 2005. The Ninth Amendment and Fundamental Liberty Interests. 
Perspectives on Law and Contemporary Culture 1: 1-70 
 
Browne, Stephen H. 1994. “Like Gory Spectres”: Representing Evil in Theodore Weld’s 
American Slavery As It Is. Quarterly Journal of Speech 80: 277–292
325
Buchanan, Patrick J. 2004. Where the right Went Wrong: How Neoconservative Subverted 
the Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Buckley Jr., William F. 2000. Let Us Talk of Many Things: The Collected Speeches with New 
Commentary by the Author. New York: Prima/Lifestyles. 
 
Buckley Jr., William F. 1986 [1951]. God and Man at Yale. Washington, D.C.: Regnery. 
 
Burke, Kenneth. 1966. Language as Symbolic Action. Berkeley, Calif.: University of 
California Press. 
 
Calabresi, Steven. 2006. ‘A Shining City on a Hill’: American Exceptionalism and the 
Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law. Boston University Law Review 86:
1335-1416. 
 
Calabresi, Steven. 1998. The President, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution: A Brief 
Positive Account of the Role of Lawyers in the Development of Constitutional law. Law and 
Contemporary Problems 61: 61-82. 
 
Cannon, Lou. 2000 [1991]. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Public 
Affairs. 
 
Charland, Maurice. 1999. Rehabilitating Rhetoric: Confronting Blind Spots in Discourse and 
Social Theory. In Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader, ed. John Louis Lucaites, 
Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally Caudill, 464-473. New York: Guilford. 
 
Crane, Phillip F. 1978. Surrender in Panama: The Case Against the Treaties. New York: 
Dale Books. 
 
Cribb, T. Kenneth. 1989. Robert Bork: A Man for All Seasons. Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 12: 123-126. 
 
Davenport, David. 2005. New Diplomacy Threatens American Sovereignty. In A Country I 
Do Not Recognize, ed. Robert Bork, 113-134. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 
 
Dionne, E.J. 1992. Why Americans Hate Politics. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Dobriansky, Paula. 2003. Address to the Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention. 
Washington, D.C., Nov. 15. http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070324_dobriansky.pdf. 
 
Douglas, J. Allen. 2003. “The Most Valuable Sort of Property”: Constructing White Identity 
in American Law, 1880-1940. San Diego Law Review 40 (2003): 881-946. 
 
Droge, David. 2005. From Natural to Cultural Inferiority: The Symbolic Reconstruction of 
White Supremacy in Brown v. Board of Education. In Brown v. Board of Education at Fifty: 
A Rhetorical Perspective, ed. Clarke Rountree, 107-111. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 
326
Dyzenhaus, David, ed. 1989. Law As Politics: Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press. 
 
Easterbrook, Frank H. 1984. Legal Interpretations and the Power of the Judiciary. Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy, 7: 87-99. 
 
Easton, Nina. 2000. Gang of Five: Leaders at the Center of the Conservative Crusade. New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Edwards, Lee. 1999. The Conservative Revolution: The Movement That Remade America.
New York: Free Press. 
 
Edwards, Lee. 2004. Educating for Liberty: The First Half-Century of the Intercollegiate 
Studies Institute. Washington, D.C.: Regnery. 
 
Epstein, Richard A. 2006. How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution. Washington, D.C.: 
CATO Institute. 
 
Epstein, Richard A. 2004. The Perils of Posnerian Pragmatism. University of Chicago Law 
Review 71: 639-658. 
 
Epstein, Richard A. 2003. Skepticism and Freedom: A Modern Case for Classical 
Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Epstein, Richard A. 2002. Beyond Judicial Activism and Restraint. Georgetown Journal of 
Law & Public Policy 1: 85-91. 
 
Epstein, Richard A. 1999. “Hayekian Socialism.” Maryland Law Review 58: 271-299. 
 
Epstein, Richard A. 1985. Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Epstein, Richard A. 1984. The Pitfalls of Interpretation. Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy 7 (1984): 101-108. 
 
Evans, M. Stanton. 1994. The Theme Is Freedom. Washington: Regnery. 
 
Fish, Stanley. 1989. Doing What Comes Naturally. Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Fish, Stanley. 2005. There Is No Textualist Position. San Diego Law Review 42 (2005): 629-
650. 
 
Fiss, Owen. 1988. Objectivity and Interpretation. In Interpreting Law as Literature, ed. 
Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux, 229-249. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University 
Press. 
 
327
Fletcher, Michael. 2005. What the Federalist Society Stands For. The Washington Post, July 
29, A21. 
 
Frankfurter, Felix. 1937. The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Friedman, Milton. 2002 [1960]. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Frum, David. 2000. How We Got Here: The 70's: The Decade That Brought You Modern 
Life—For Better or Worse. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gilroy, Paul. 2000. Against Race. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard/Belknap. 
 
Grey, Thomas C. 1984. The Constitution as Scripture. Stanford Law Review 37: 1-25 
 
Griffith, Damara. 2003. NAFTA, Sovereignty, and Tradeoffs. Washington, D.C.: The 
Federalist Society. 
 
Hall, Stuart. 1988. The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the left.
London: Verso. 
 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. 2001. Empire. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Hart, Roderick P., Sharon E. Jarvis, William P. Jennings, and Deborah Smith-Howell. 2005. 
Political Keywords: Using Language That Uses Us. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hariman, Robert. 1995. Political Style: The Artistry of Power. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Harrison, John. 2003. Forms of Originalism and the Study of History. Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 26: 83-94. 
 
Harrison, John. 2003. Words, Words, Words, All the Way Down? Review A Community 
Built on Words by H. Jefferson Powell. Green Bag 7: 91-94. 
 
Harrison, John. 1988. The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the 
Constitution. Cornell Law Review 73: 371-374. 
 
Hart, Jeffrey. 2006. The Making of the American Conservative Mind: National Review and 
Its Times. Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books. 
 
Hasian, Jr., Marouf, Celeste Condit, and John Lucaites. 1996. The Rhetorical Boundaries of 
“The Law”: A Consideration of the Rhetorical Culture of Legal Practice and the Case of the 
Separate but Equal Doctrine. Quarterly Journal of Speech 82 (1996): 823-342 
328
Hasian, Marouf Jr. 1993. The Public Addresses of Meese and Brennan: Voices in the 
American Legal Wilderness. Communication Studies 44: 299-319. 
 
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1994 [1944]. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1976. Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume Two: The Mirage of Social 
Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1978. Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume Three: The Political Order 
of a Free People. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hayman Jr., Robert L. 1995. The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern 
Constitutional Traditionalism. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 30: 57-80. 
 
Hayward, Steven F. 2001. The Age of Reagan: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964-
1980. New York: Prima/Forum. 
 
Heritage Foundation. “About the Heritage Foundation.” 
http://heritage.org/About/aboutHeritage.cfm.  
 
Hicks Jr., George W. 2006. The Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the 
Harvard Law School Student Body. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 29: 623-718. 
 
Hodgson, Godfrey. 1986. The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative 
Ascendancy in America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Hoff, Joan. 1994. Nixon Reconsidered. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Horwitz, Morton J. 1994. The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of 
Legal Orthodoxy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hoy, Daniel Couzens. 1988. Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist 
Perspectives. In Interpreting Law as Literature, ed. Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux, 
319-338. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Jost, Kenneth. 1986. False Students of History. New Jersey Law Journal 120: 512-514. 
Keck, Thomas M. 2004. The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to Modern 
Judicial Conservatism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kennedy, Randall. 1989. Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott. Yale Law Journal 98 (1989): 999-1067. 
 
Kirk, Russell. 1995 [1953]. The Conservative Mind from Burke to Eliot. Washington, D.C.: 
Regnery. 
329
Kirsanow, Peter. 2002. Civil Rights and Wrongs: A New Agenda for a New Era. 
Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation. 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/HL731.cfm. 
 
Kozinski, Alex, and Harry Susman. 1997. Original Mean[ander]ings. Review of Original 
Meanings by Jack Rakove. Stanford Law Review 49: 1583-1606. 
 
Kronman, Anthony. 1990. Precedent and Tradition. Yale Law Journal 99: 1029-1086. 
 
Levin, Mark. 2005. Men In Black: How the Supreme Court is Destroying America. 
Washington, D.C.: Regnery. 
 
Levinson, Sanford. 1989. Constitutional Faith. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Levinson, Sanford. 1987. Could Meese Be Right This Time? Tulane Law Review 61 (1987): 
1071-1078. 
 
Lierman, Brooke. 2005. Who Is John Bolton? Washington, D.C.: Center for American 
Progress, March 7. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/03/b252671.html. 
 
Linde, Christopher. 2006. The U.S. Constitution and International Law: Finding the Balance. 
Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 15: 305-339. 
 
Luban, David. 1991. Legal Traditionalism. Stanford Law Review 43: 1035-1060. 
 
Lukas, J. Anthony. 1986. Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three 
American Families. New York: Random House.  
 
Luntz, Frank. 2007. Words that Work: It’s Not What You Say, It’s What People Hear. New 
York: Hyperion, 2007. 
 
McCloskey, Deirdre N. 1998. The Rhetoric of Economics. Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press. 
 
McConnell, Michael W. 1998. Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past. George 
Washington Law Review 66: 1127-1140. 
 
McConnell, Michael W. 1997. The right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition. Utah Law 
Review 1997: 665-708. 
 
McConnell, Michael W. 1996. The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education.
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 19: 457–464.
McDowell, Gary L. Scratch a Libertarian: Voila! Judicial Activist. The Wall Street Journal,
April 10, 1992, A17. 
 
330
McEvoy, Arthur F. 2005. A New Realism for Legal Studies. University of Wisconsin Law 
Review 2005: 443-454. 
 
McGee, Michael. 1975. In Search of the “People”: A Rhetorical Alternative. Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 61: 235-249. 
 
Marshall, William P. 2002. Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism,” 
University of Colorado Law Review 73: 1217-1255. 
 
Meese III, Edwin, David Forte, and Matthew Spalding, eds. 2005. The Heritage Guide to the 
Constitution. Washington D.C.: Regnery. 
 
Meese III, Edwin. 1992. With Reagan: The Inside Story. Washington: Regnery. 
 
Meese III, Edwin. 1986. The Law of the Constitution. Tulane Law Review, 61: 979-990. 
 
Meese III, Edwin. 1986. The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited 
Constitution. Texas Law Review 27: 455-466. 
 
Meese III, Edwin. 1986. Address before the Federalist Society Lawyers’ Division, July 9, 
1985. In The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution, 1-10. Washington, D.C.: 
The Federalist Society. 
 
Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge. 2004. The right Nation: Conservative Power in 
America. New York: Penguin Press. 
 
Miller, John J. 2003. How Two Foundations Reshaped America. Washington, D.C.: The 
Philanthropy Roundtable. 
 
Miller, William Lee. 2002. Lincoln’s Virtues: An Ethical Biography. New York: Knopf, 
2002. 
 
Molot, Jonathan. 2006. The Rise and Fall of Textualism. Columbia Law Review 106: 2-69. 
 
Moss, Debra Cassens. 1987. “The Policy and the Rhetoric of Ed Meese.” ABA Journal,
February 1. 
Mouffe, Chantal, ed. 1999. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt. London: Verso. 
 
Murray, Charles and Richard Herrnstein. 1994. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class 
Structure in American Life. New York: Free Press. 
 
Murray, Charles. 1994. The Ideal of Equality, the Reality of Difference. Washington D.C., 
April 11. http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.18987/pub_detail.asp. 
 
331
Nagel, Robert F. 2006. Bowing to Precedent: A Decent Respect for the Constitution Should 
Cause the Supreme Court to Reconsider Some Past Decisions. The Weekly Standard, April 
17. 
 
Negroponte, John. 2003. Address to the Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention. 
Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13. http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070324_negroponte.pdf. 
 
Nunberg, Geoffrey. 2006. Talking Right: How Conservatives Turned Liberalism into a Tax-
Raising, Latte-Drinking, Sushi-Eating, Volvo-Driving, New York Times-Reading, Body-
Piercing, Hollywood-Loving, Left-Wing Freak Show. New York: PublicAffairs. 
 
Panetta, Edward M. and Marouf Hasian Jr. 1994. Anti-Rhetoric as Rhetoric: The Law and 
Economics Movement. Communication Quarterly 42: 57-74. 
 
Parry-Giles, Shawn J. and Trevor Parry-Giles. 2000. Collective Memory, Political Nostalgia, 
and the Rhetorical Presidency: Bill Clinton's Commemoration of the March on Washington, 
August 28, 1998. Quarterly Journal of Speech 86 (2000): 417-437. 
 
Perelman, Chaim and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1969. The New Rhetoric. Chicago: University 
of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Perlstein, Rick. 2001. Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American 
Consensus. New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
Posner, Richard. 1990. Bork and Beethoven. Stanford Law Review 42 (1990): 1365-1382. 
 
Powell, H. Jefferson. 2002. A Community Built on Words: The Constitution in History and 
Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Rabkin, Jeremy. 2004. The Case for Sovereignty: Why the World Should Welcome American 
Independence. Washington, AEI Press. 
 
Rabkin, Jeremy. 2004. War, International Law, and Sovereignty. Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute, June 24. 
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.843/transcript.asp. 
 
Rakove, Jack. 1986. Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison.” The New Republic, December. 
 
Raskin, Jamin B. 2003. Overruling Democracy: The Supreme Court vs. The American 
People. New York: Routledge. 
 
Rector, Robert, Kirk A. Johnson, and Patrick F. Fagan. 2001. Understanding Differences in 
Black and White Child Poverty Rates: A Report of the Heritage Center for Data Analysis. 
Washington: Heritage Foundation. 
 
Rorty, Richard. 1999. Philosophy and Social Hope. New York: Penguin. 
332
Rorty, Richard. 1982. The Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
Rosen, Jeffrey. The Unregulated Offensive. New York Times Magazine, April 17, 2005. 
 
Rossum, Ralph A. 2006. Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence: Text and Tradition. Lawrence, 
Kansas: University of Kansas Press. 
 
Rusher, William A. 1993. The Rise of the right. New York: National Review Books. 
 
Sarat, Austin, and Thomas R. Kearns, eds. 2002. History, Memory, and the Law. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
Savage, David. 1993. Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court. New 
York: John Wiley. 
 
Scalia, Antonin. 1998. A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Scalia, Antonin. 1989. Originalism: The Lesser Evil. University of Cincinnati Law Review 
57: 849-865. 
 
Schmitt, Carl. 2003 [1955]. The New Nomos of the Earth. In Nomos of the Earth in the 
International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum, 351-355. New York: Telos Press. 
 
Schmitt, Carl. 1996 [1932]. The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University Of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Schneider, Gregory L. 1999. Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom and 
the Rise of the Contemporary Right. New York: New York University Press. 
 
Schneider, Gregory L., ed. 2003. Conservatism in America Since 1930. New York: New 
York University Press. 
 
Schoenwald, Jonathan M. 2001. A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modern American 
Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Schotten, Peter. 1988. Is the Constitution Still Meaningful? Public Reflections Upon the 
Fundamental Law of the Land. South Dakota Law Review 33 (1988): 32-65. 
 
Schweikart, Larry and Micahel Allen. 2004. A Patriot’s History of the United States. New 
York: Sentinel/Penguin. 
 
Shawn, Eric. 2006. The U.N. Exposed: How the United Nations Sabotages America’s 
Security. New York: Sentinel/Penguin. 
 
333
Siegel, Reva B. 2004. Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles. Harvard Law Review 117: 1470-1547. 
 
Simons, Anna, Don Redd, Joe McGraw, and Duane Lauchengco. 2007. The Sovereignty 
Solution. The American Interest 2: 33-42. 
 
Smith, Mark W. 2006. Disrobed: The New Battle Plan to Break the left’s Stranglehold on the 
Courts. New York: Crown/Random House. 
 
Smith, Mark W. 2004. The Official Handbook of the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy.
Washington, D.C.: Regnery. 
 
Snyder, Brad. 2000. How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education.
Rutgers Law Review 52: 383-494. 
 
Solan, Lawrence. 2005. The New Textualists New Text. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
38: 2027-2062. 
 
Spitko, Edward Gary. 1990. A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Approach to Fundamental 
Rights the Adjudication. Duke Law Journal 1990: 1337-1360. 
 
Staab, James B. 2006. The Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian on the 
Supreme Court. Lanham, Maryland: Roman and Littlefield. 
 
Stevens, John Paul. 1986. Remarks before the Federal Bar Association in Chicago, Feb. 23, 
1985. In The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution, 27-30. Washington, D.C.: 
The Federalist Society. 
 
Stick, John. 1987. He Doth Protest Too Much: Moderating Meese’s Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation. Tulane Law Review, 61: 1079-1091. 
 
Sunic, Tomislav. 2004 [1990]. Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right.
Newport Beach, Calif.: Noontide Press. 
 
Sunstein, Cass. 2005. Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for 
America. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Tanner, Michael D. 2006. Leviathan on the right: How Big-Government Conservatism 
Brought Down the Reagan Revolution. Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute.  
 
Taylor Jr., Stuart. 1986. Meese Says Rulings by U.S. High Court Don’t Establish Law.” The 
New York Times, October 22, A1. 
 
Thomas, Clarence. 1989. The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 12: 63-68. 
 
334
Tribe, Laurence H. and Michael Dorf. 1991. On Reading the Constitution. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Tribe Laurence H. and Michael Dorf. 1990. Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights. 
University of Chicago Law Review 57: 1057-1108. 
 
Turner, Ronald. 2003. Were Separate-But-Equal and Antimiscegenation Laws 
Constitutional? Applying Scalian Traditionalism to Brown and Loving. San Diego Law 
Review 40: 285-339. 
 
Turner, Ronald. 1995. Was ‘Separate but Equal’ Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism and 
Brown. Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review 4 (1995): 229-262. 
 
Tushnet, Mark. 2006. “Outsourcing Authority,” Albany Law Review 69: 809-815. 
 
Tushnet, Mark. 2003. “Transnational/Domestic Constitutional law.” Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review 37: 239-269. 
 
Tushnet, Mark. 1988. Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles. In Interpreting Law as Literature, ed. Sanford Levinson and Steven 
Mailloux, 193-214. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Tushnet, Mark. 1987. The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land, and Attorney 
General Meese: A Comment. Tulane Law Review 61: 1017-1025. 
 
Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. 1986. The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Viguerie, Richard. 2006. Conservatives Betrayed: How George W. Bush and Other Big 
Government Republicans Hijacked the Conservative Cause. Los Angeles: Bonus Books. 
 
Wallsten, Peter. 2004. Abortion Foes Call Bush's Dred Scott Reference Perfectly Clear. The 
Los Angeles Times, October 13. 
 
Weaver, Richard M. 1984 [1948]. Ideas Have Consequences. Chicago: University Of hicago 
Press. 
 
Wetlaufer, Gerald B. 1990. Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse. Virginia Law Review 
76: 1545-1597. 
 
White, F. Clifton. 1992 [1967]. Suite 3505: The Story of the Draft Goldwater Movement.
Ashland, Ohio: John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, 1992. 
 
White, Dana. 2003. Who Says I’m Inferior? Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation. 
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed062703d.cfm. 
 
335
White, James Boyd. 1990. Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism.
Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
 
Whitman, Christine Todd. 2005. It's My Party, Too: The Battle for the Heart of the GOP and 
the Future of America. New York: Penguin.  
 
Whittington, Keith. 1999. Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, 
and Judicial Review. Wichita: University Press of Kansas. 
 
Wimsatt, Jr., W.K. and Monroe C. Beardsley. 1954. The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning 
of Poetry. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 
 
Wolters, Raymond. 1996. Right Turn: William Bradford Reynolds, The Reagan 
Administration, and Black Civil Rights. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction. 
 
Young, Ernest A. 2002. Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics. University of Colorado 
Law Review 73: 1139-1216. 
 
Young, L. Benjamin. 1992. Justice Scalia’s History and Tradition: The Chief Nightmare in 
Professor Tribe’s Anxiety Closet. Virginia Law Review 78: 581-622. 
 
Young, R.V. 1999. At War with the Word: Literary Theory and Liberal Education.
Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books. 
 
Zinn, Howard. 2005. A People’s History of the United States, 1492-Present. New York: 
HarperCollins. 
 
Ziotnick, David M. 1999. Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity 
to his Constitutional Methodology. Emory Law Journal 48:1377-1429. 
336
TABLE OF CASES 
 
Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. 385 (1798) 
Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 
 
McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819) 
 
Ogden v. Saunders 25 U.S. 213 (1827) 
 
Dred Scott v. Sandford  60 U.S. 393 (1856) 
 
The Slaughter House Cases 83 U.S. 36 (1873) 
 
Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
 
Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251 (1918) 
 
Snyder v. Massachusetts 291 U.S. 97 105 (1934) 
 
Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
 
Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Association 347 U.S. 971 (1954) 
 
Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26 (1954) 
 
Briggs v. Elliott 132 F.Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C.) (1955) 
 
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson 350 U.S. 877 (1955) 
 
Holmes v. City of Atlanta 350 U.S. 879 (1955) 
 
Browder v. Gayle 142 F.Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.) (1956) 
 
Gayle v. Browder 352 U.S. 903 (1956) 
 
New Orleans City Park Improvement Association v. Detiege 358 U.S. 54 (1958) 
 
State Athletic Commission v. Dorsey 359 U.S. 533 (1959) 
 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) 
 
Turner v. City of Memphis 369 U.S. 350 (1962) 
 
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education 372 F.2d 836 (5th Circuit 1967) 
 
337
Schiro v. Bynum 375 U.S. 395 (1964) 
 
Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
 
Green v. School Board of New Kent County 391 U.S. 430 (1968) 
 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 401 U.S. 402 (1971) 
 
Griggs v. Duke Power 401 U.S. 424 (1971) 
 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
 
Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
 
Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976) 
 
University Of California Board of Regents v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
 
Mobile v. Bolden 446 U.S. 55 (1980) 
 
United States v.Cortez 449 U.S. 411 (1981) 
 
Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 
 
McKleskey v. Kemp 481 U.S. 278 (1987) 
 
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation 484 U.S. 49 (1987) 
 
City of Richmond v. Croson 488 U.S. 469 (1989) 
 
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) 
 
Employment Division v. Smith 494 US 872 (1990) 
 
Missouri v. Jenkins 495 U.S. 33 (1990) 
 
Rutan v. Republican Party 497 U.S. 62 (1990) 
 
Georgia v. Randolph 547 U.S. __ (2006) (slip opinion) 
 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 (1992) 
 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
 
Smith v. United States 508 U.S. 223 (1993) 
 
338
United States v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
 
Adarand v. Peña 515 U.S. 200 (1995) 
 
44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island 517 U.S. 484 (1996) 
 
United States v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 
 
Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702 (1997) 
 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis 523 U.S. 833 (1998) 
 
Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
 
Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
 
Kelo v. City of New London 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
339
INTERVIEWS 
 
Jan Berlage, private lawyer 
May 3, 2006, telephone 
 
Rep. Howard Berman, Democrat of California 
May 25, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Robert H. Bork, The Hudson Institute 
Former Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
April 13, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Sen. Sam Brownback, Republican of Kansas 
May 25, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Prof. Steven Calabresi, Northwestern University Law School 
Founder, The Federalist Society 
April 10, 2006, telephone; April 23, 2006, telephone 
 
Jennifer Carter, Editor, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 
April 15, 2006, email 
 
Rep. Steve Chabot, Republican of Ohio 
June 9, 2006, telephone 
 
Jeffrey Clark, private lawyer 
April 14, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Sen. Hillary Clinton, Democrat of New York 
May 23, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
T. Kenneth Cribb, Intercollegiate Studies Institute 
Former Counselor to Attorney General Edwin Meese 
April 20, 2006, telephone 
 
R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, State of Texas 
April 3, 2006, telephone 
 
Kay Daly, President, Coalition for a Fair Judiciary 
June 12, 2006, telephone 
 
Prof. Michael Dimino, Widener University School of Law 
April 5, 2006, telephone 
 
Sen. Richard Durbin, Democrat of Illinois 
May 24, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
340
Prof. Richard Epstein, University of Chicago School of Law 
March 22, 2006, Chicago 
 
Sen. Diane Feinstein, Democrat of California 
May 26, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Brian Fish, Assistant State’s Attorney, Maryland 
April 18, 2006, email 
 
Rep. Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts 
May 22, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Prof. Charles Fried, Harvard University School of Law 
Former Solicitor General of the United States 
April 7, 2006, telephone 
 
John Fund, The Wall Street Journal 
March 31, 2006, telephone 
 
Prof. Nicole Garnett, Notre Dame University School of Law 
April 10, 2006, telephone 
 
Erik Jaffe, private lawyer 
April 14, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Brian Kelsey, private lawyer 
May 6, 2006, email 
 
Judge Alex Kozinsky, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
March 29, 2006, telephone 
 
Leonard A. Leo, Executive Vice President, The Federalist Society 
March 13, 2006, Washington, D.C.; Nov. 27, 2006, telephone 
 
Margaret (Peggy) Little, private lawyer 
March 31, 2006, email 
 
Sen. Trent Lott, Republican of Mississippi 
May 24, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Rep. Dan Lungren, Republican of California 
May 24, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Sen. Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky 
May 30, 2006, telephone 
 
341
David M. McIntosh, Founder, The Federalist Society  
Former Republican Member of Congress, Indiana 
March 27, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Edwin Meese III, The Heritage Foundation 
Former Attorney General of the United States 
September 22, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Ken Mehlman, Chairman, Republican National Committee 
June 7, 2006, telephone 
 
Eugene B. Meyer, President, The Federalist Society 
April 10, 2007, telephone 
 
Theodore B. Olson, private lawyer 
Former Solicitor General of the United States 
April 11, 2006, telephone 
 
Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
March 27, 2006, telephone 
 
Lee Liberman Otis, Founder, The Federalist Society  
March 10, 2006, Falls Church, Va. 
 
Roger Pilon, Ph.D., The CATO Institute 
Jan. 31, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Judge William H. Pryor, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
April 3, 2006, telephone 
 
Judge Randall R. Rader, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
April 12, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Judge A. Raymond Randolph, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
April 13, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Peter Redpath, Director, Student Division, The Federalist Society 
March 13, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Dean Reuter, Director of Practice Groups, The Federalist Society 
March 22, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
William Bradford Reynolds, private lawyer 
Former Assistant Attorney General of the United States 
March 14, 2006 
 
342
Prof. Rodney Smolla, Dean, University of Richmond School of Law 
March 16, 2006, telephone 
 
Justice Antonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court 
May 23, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Rep. Bobby Scott, Democrat of Virginia 
May 25, 2006, Washington, D.C.  
 
Sen. Jeff Sessions, Republican of Alabama 
May 22, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Hon. Hans von Spakovsky, United States Federal Election Commission 
March 10, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
Prof. Robert F. Turner, S.J.D., University of Virginia 
March 30, 2007, telephone 
 
Judge Timothy M. Tymkovich, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
May 12, 2006, telephone 
 
